

PRAXIS

PHILOSOPHISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT


ποαξις

ANARCHIE, ZUKUNFT, REVOLUTION

— T. Inđić, D. Guérin, E. Paci, I. Kuvačić, R. Jungk, H-D. Bahr, R. Quarello, V.
L. Allen, I. Maksimović, H. Fleischer, Ž.
Denić, O. Chetan, V. Mađarević, N. Bellu,
R. Kragalott, Sh. Shibata, S. Mallet, M.
Jilek GEDANKE UND WIRKLICHKEIT — K. Axelos, P. Vranicki DISKUSSION — I. Kuvačić

ANARCHIE, ZUKUNFT, REVOLUTION

3-4-1972



PRAXIS

PHILOSOPHISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT INTERNATIONALE AUSGABE

Redaktionskomitee

Branko Bošnjak, Danko Grlić, Milan Kangrga, Veljko Korać, Andrija Krešić, Ivan Kuvačić, Mihailo Marković, Gajo Petrović, Svetozar Stojanović, Rudi Supek, Ljubomir Tadić, Predrag Vranicki, Miladin Životić

Chefredakteure

VELJKO KORAĆ und GAJO PETROVIĆ

Redaktionssekretäre

Branko Despot und Nebojša Popov

Redaktionsrat

Kostas Axelos (Paris), Alfred J. Ayer (Oxford), Zygmnud Baumann (Tel-Aviv), Norman Birnbaum (Amherst), Ernst Bloch (Tübingen), Thomas Bottomore (Brighton), Umberto Cerroni (Roma), Mladen Caldarović (Zagreb), Robert S. Cohen (Boston), Veljko Cvjetičanin (Zagreb), Božidar Debenjak (Ljubljana), Mihailo Durić (Beograd), Marvin Farber (Buffalo), Vladimir Filipović (Zagreb), Eugen Fink (Freiburg), Ivan Focht (Sarajevo), Erich Fromm (Mexico City), † Lucien Goldman (Paris), André Gorz (Paris), Jürgen Habermas (Frankfurt), Erich Heintel (Wien), Agnes Heller (Budapest), Besim Ibrahimpašić (Sarajevo), Mitko Ilievski (Skopje), Leszek Kolakowski (Warszawa), Karel Kosik (Praha), Henri Lefebvre (Paris), † Georg Lukács (Budapest), Serge Mallet (Paris), Herbert Marcuse (San Diego), Enzo Paci (Milano), Howard L. Parsons (Bridgeport), Zagorka Pešić-Golubović (Beograd), David Riesman (Cambridge, Mass.), Veljko Rus (Ljubljana), Julius Strinka (Bratislava), Abdulah Šarčević (Sarajevo), Ivan Varga (Budapest), Kurt H. Wolff (Newton, Mass.), Aldo Zanardo (Bologna).

Herausgeber

Hrvatsko filozofsko društvo Jugoslavensko udruženje za filozofiju

Druck der internationalen Ausgabe: IBG — Tiskara »Zagreb« — Zagreb (IBG — Druckerei »Zagreb« — Zagreb) Preradovićeva 21

PRAXIS

PHILOSOPHICAL JOURNAL

INTERNATIONAL EDITION

Editorial Committeecc

Branko Bošnjak , Danko Grlic , Milan Kangrga , Veljko Korać , Andrija Krešić , I van Kuvačić , Mihailo Marković , Gajo P e tro v ić , Svetozar Stoj ANO v ić , Rudi S u pe k , Ljubo mir T a d ić , P predrag Vran ic k i, Miladin Živ otić

editors-in-chief

V eljko Korać u n d Gajo Petrović

Editorial secretary

B ranko D espot u n d P opov

Editorial board

Costas A xelos (Paris), A lfred J A yer (Oxford), Zygmnud Baumann (Tel Aviv), Norman Birnbaum (Amherst), Ernst Bloch (Tubingen), Thomas Bottomore (Brighton), Umberto Cerroni (Rome), Mladen Čaldarović (Zagreb), Robert S. C ohen (Boston), Veljko Cvjetičan in (Zagreb), B ožidar Debenjak (Ljubljana), Mihailo Đu rić (Belgium), Marvin Farber (Buffalo), Vladimir Filippović (Zagreb), Eugen Fink (Freiburg), Ivan Focht (Sarajevo), Erich Fromm (Mexico). City), f Lucien Goldman (Paris), Andrew Gorz (Paris), J urgen H abermas (Frankfurt), Erich H eintel (Vienna), Agnes H eller (Budapest), Besim I brahim pašić (Sarajevo).), M itko I lievsky (Skopje), L eszek K olakowski (Warsaw), Karel Kosik (Prague), Henry Lefebvre (Paris), George LukAcs (Budapest), Serge Mallet (Paris), Herbert Marcuse (San Diego), Enzo Paci (Milan), Howard L. Parsons (Bridgeport), Zagorka Pešić-G Olu Bović (Belgrade), David Riesman (Cambridge, Mass.), V eljko R us (Ljubljana), Julius Strinka (Bratislava), A bdulah Šarčević (Sarajevo), I van V arga (Budapest), Kurt H. W olff (Newton, Mass.), Aldo Zanardo (Bologna).

editor

Croatian Philosophical Society

Yugoslav Association for Philosophy

Druck der internationalen Ausgabe: IBG — Press "Zagreb" — Zagreb (IBG — Druckerei "Zagreb" — Zagreb) Preradovićeva 21

PRAXIS REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE EDITION INTERNATIONALE ZAGREB, 3° ET 4° TRIMESTRE 1972 8° ANNEE, No. 3—4

ANARCHIE, AVENIR, REVOLUTION

Trivo Inđić / Anarcho-Communism — the Movement and	
its Morals	175
Daniel Guérin / Spontanéité, organisation et anarchisme .	185
Enzo Paci / Spontaneità, ragione e modalità della praxis	195
Ivan Kuvačić / Spontanéité et organisation	203
Robert Jungk / Zukunftswerkstätten	209
Hans-Dieter Bahr / Die Zukunft des Fortschritts	215
Ricardo Quarello / Pour la construction d'une alternative po-	
litique — aussi bien que sociale — à l'industrialisme .	229
V. L. Allen / Contemporary Capitalism and Revolutionary	
Change	237
Ivan Maksimović / Teleological and Genetic Bases of the	
Economic Problems of Contemporary Socialism	251
Helmuth Fleischer / Normativistisches und materialistisches	
Verständnis der sozialistischen Transformation	269
Živojin Denić / Sociologie de l'apparition, de l'existence et	
de la fonction de l'économie marchande	279
Octavian Chetan / Culture et démocratie	305
Vlado Mađarević / Literatur und revolutionärer Mythos als	
Kategorie der Utopie	313
Niculae Bellu / Thèses sur la signification éthique du fait	
de l'art dans la constitution de la culture	321
Robert Kragalott / Mahatma Gandhi's Concept of Trusteeship	
Socialism: A Hindu Search for Utopia	325
Shingo Shibata / Die Vietnamesische Revolution und die	
marxistische Philosophie	339
Serge Mallet / Mouvements sociaux et lutte politique de	
l'après-mai 1968 en France	351
l'après-mai 1968 en France	359
PENSEE ET REAL	
Kostas Axelos / Le jeu de l'ensemble des ensembles	367
Predrag Vranicki / Theoretische Begründung der Idee der	
Selbstverwaltung	373
ŭ	
DISCUSS	ION
Ivan Kuvačić / The Basis and Prospects of the Radical Right	395
APPENI	
Index des auterus Praxis Edition internationale 1972	409

......237

Ivan Maksimović / Teleological and Genetic Bases of the Economic Problem s of Contemporary Socialism

• •

. 251

Helm uth Fleischer / Normativistic and materialistic
Understanding of the socialist transform ation

. .

. 269

Zivojin Denić / Sociology of the appearance, existence and
of the function of the m a r c h a n d economy 279
Octavian Chetan / Culture et d e m o c r a tie
Vlado Mađarević / L iteratu r und revolutionarer Mythos als
K ategorie der U t o p i e
Niculae Bellu / Theses on the ethical significance of the fact
of art in the constitution of c u l t u r e
Robert K ragalott / M ahatm a G andhi's Concept of Trusteeship
Socialism: A Hindu Search for U t o p i a
Shingo Shibata / The Vietnamese Revolution and the
m arxistische P h i l o s o p h i e339
Serge Mallet / Social movements and the political struggle of
after May 1968 in F r a n c e351
Miroslav Jilek / The Crisis of A d v e n t u r e

DISCUSSION

THOUGHT AND REALITY

Ivan Kuvačić / The Basis and Prospects of the Radical Right 395

APPENDIX

Index of the uterus, Praxis, International Edition 1972. . 409

Prema Mišljenju Republičkog sekretarijata za prosvjetu, kulturu i fizičku kulturu broj 4849/1-1972 od 10. 11. 1972., časopis »Praxis« je oslobođen plaćanja poreza na promet proizvoda.

ANARCHIE, AVENIR, RÉVOLUTION

ANARCHO-COMMUNISM — THE MOVEMENT AND ITS MORALS

Trivo Inđić Beograd

The fundamental question of anarcho-or libertarian communism, both in theory and practice, is contained in the dilemma how to attain liberty through liberty itself. Only liberty and the struggle for liberty — Malatesta always pointed out can be the school for liberty. The primary criterion for our analysis, too, is, in fact, to follow that continuous dialogue between order and liberty, efficiency and liberty, revolution and liberty, end and means, intelligence and reason, individual and society; to follow that rich and inspiring heritage of anarcho-communism as the only persistent modern a-cratic movement, as one the possible ways to a concrete Utopia.

Anarcho-communism as a project of total humanism is, in the first place, a reaction to the imperilment of the idea of humanity, the imperilment of liberty and the degradation of human dignity that constitute the essential trait of modern civilization since its very beginning. Anarcho-communism is a promethean call to revolt against violence as a constitutive element wielded by contemporary society and culture against the coercive institution that we had almost come to consider as the only possible salutary form of social integration and liberty preservation. Anarcho-communism showed us, long before Marcuse, that under the rule of a repressive structure liberty can become a powerful instrument of domination, and thereby it prophetically anticipated our present situation: the rational character of the irrational as the most burdensome aspect of developed industrial civilization.

Bearing witness to the present urgent need for a re-evaluation of utopia in the Blochian sense, (i. e. a tested will for the existence of an ALL: the active effort to transcend the existing) we take the liberty of reminding that even Gustav Landauer (De Homine 1907) refused to place on the same level the concepts of utopia and topia, that he contrasted the concept of utopia with a concept of topia, that is, he demonstrated that within each system, within

AN ARCHIE, AVEN IR, REVOLUTION

ANARCHO-COMMUNISM — THE MOVEMENT

AND ITS MORALS

Trivo Indjić

White City

The fundam ental question of anarcho-or libertarian communism, both in theory and practice, is contained in the dilemma how to attain liberty through liberty itself. Only liberty and the struggle for liberty — M alatesta always pointed out can be the school for liberty. The prim ary criterion for our analysis, too, is, in fact, to follow that t continuous dialogue between order and liberty, efficiency and liberty, revolution and liberty, end and means, intelligence and reason, individual and society; to follow that rich and inspiring heritage of anarcho-communism as the only persistent modern a-cratic movement, as one the possible ways to a concrete Utopia.

Anarcho-communism as a project of total hum anism is, in the first place, a reaction to the im perilm ent of the idea of hum anity, the im perilm ent of liberty and the degradation of hum an dignity th at constitute the essential tra it of m odern civilization since its very beginning. Anarcho-communism is a prom ethean call to revolt against violence as a constitutive elem ent wielded by contemporary society and culture against the coercive institution th at we had almost come to consider as the only possible salutary form of social integration and liberty preservation. Anarcho-communism showed us, long before Marcuse, th at under the rule of a repressive structure liberty can become a powerful instrum ent of domination, and thereby it prophetically anticipated our present situation: the rational character of the irrational as the most burdensome aspect of developed industrial civilization.

Bearing witness to the present urgent need for a re-evaluation of utopia in the Blochian sense, (i. e. a tested will for the existence of an ALL: the active effort to transcend the existing) we take the liberty of rem inding that even Gustav Landauer (De Homine 1907) refused to place on the same level the concepts of utopia and topia, that he contrasted the concept of utopia with a concept of topia, that is, he demonstrated that within each system, within 175

each topia there is a germ of utopia developing a dialectic between utopia and the established system. Utopia, then, is that which is fettered by the powers of the established society — an attitude which, we see, does not differ in the slightest from that of Marcuse (in An Essay on Liberation). Landauer, the thinker of anarchy instructs us that anarchy is concrete utopia, where projections are mediated through the existing tendencies and potentials of reality itself, with reference to the coming bearers of the society. Anarcho-communism is that dimension of the future that is deemed as adequate, i. e. which is able to activate the methodical plus ultra. That is why anarchism and socialism are not sciences, Malatesta insisted, but in fact projects of society which must be attained through practical efforts bearing in mind the given circumstances. That is why the marasmus is greater when »scientific socialism« becomes a body of given circumstances ending as a most superficial apology of opportunism, and vulgar determinism becomes the complement of integral despotism. To that extent anarcho-communism too is, as is any utopia ,an expression of authentic voluntarism which has nothing in common with the scientific blockade of the liberating function of negation.

This demand — that liberty at the same time be the prius of human action and its posterius — is in constant opposition to the vulgar scientific socialism of the Second and Third Internationals, an opposition culminating with particular vigour German social--democracy. In the doctrines of social change and its agents, socialism of this hind inevitably results in an integration with the status quo, in the equalization of society and state, in the fetichization of statism, in the so-called Volkstaat-socialism. The intensive voluntarism that appears within the anarcho-communism movement can therefore also be explained as a protest against the developed and intensively institutionalized forms of socialism and socialist, particulary Marxist, ideology. There is the origin of the libertarian theory and practice of insurrectionism, of the doctrine about the nuclei of conscious militant minorities that will lead the masses (which today are known as foco guerillero in the Third World, or as minority-detonators in more developed environments), of the initiative will of the minorities, of direct action, of propaganda through example and social experiment, etc. Malatesta insisted with particular ardor on these voluntaristic elements, which are anthropologically supported in their conception of man as a creative, freedom-loving and self-determined being. Anarchy is primarily conceived of as an aspiration of the human will arising from the moral revolt against social injustice.

As distinguished from closed scientific theories or philosophical systems, anarchy, according to Malatesta is a practical aim, a social project achieved by human will. It is a »way of individual and social life to be achieved for the highest well-being of all« through the exertion of will, the dispelling of fatalistic beliefs and through mechanical theories of social action. Liberty, responsibility, will, conscious choice, solidarity, etc. are media among which Kropot-

each topia there is a germ of utopia developing a dialectic betw een utopia and the established system. Utopia, then, is that which is fettered by the powers of the established society — an attitude which,

we see, does not differ in the slightest from that of Marcuse (in An Essay on Liberation). Landauer, the thinker of anarchy instructs us that anarchy is concrete utopia, where projections are mediated through the existing tendencies and potentials of reality itself, with reference to the coming bearers of the society.

Anarcho-communism is that t dimension of the future that is deemed as adequate, i. e. which is able to activate the methodical plus ultra. That is why anarchism and socialism are not sciences, Malatesta insisted, but in fact projects of society which must be attained through practical efforts bearing in mind the given circumstances. That is why the marasm us is greater when »scientific socialism« becomes a body of given circumstances ending as a most superficial apology of opportunism, and vulgar determinism becomes the complement of integral despotism. To that extent anarchocommunism too is, as is any utopia, an expression of authentic voluntarism which has nothing in common with the scientific blockade of the liberating function of negation.

This demand — th at liberty at the same time be the prius of hum an action and its posterius — is in constant opposition to the vulgar scientific socialism of the Second and Third Internationals, an opposition culminating with particular vigour Germ an social-

-democracy. In the doctrines of social change and its agents, socialism of this hind inevitably results in an integration with the status quo, in the equalization of society and state, in the fetichi-zation of statism, in the so-called Volkstaat-socialism. The intensive voluntarism th at appears w ithin the anarcho-com munism movement can therefore also be explained as a protest against the developed and intensively institutionalized forms of socialism and socialist, particulary Marxist, ideology. There is the origin of the libertarian theory and practice of insurrectionism, of the doctrine about the nuclei of conscious m ilitant m inorities that will lead the masses (which today are known as foco guerillero in the Third World, or as m inority-detonators in more developed environments), of the initiative will of the minorities, of direct action, of propaganda through example and social experim ent, etc. Malatesta insisted w ith particular ardor on these voluntaristic elements, which are anthropologically supported in their conception of man as a creative, freedom-loving and self-determ ined being.

Anarchy is prim arily conceived of as an aspiration of the hum an will arising from the moral revolt against social injustice.

As distinguished from closed scientific theories or philosophical

systems, anarchy, according to M alatesta is a practical aim, a social project achieved by hum an will. It is a »way of individual and social life to be achieved for the highest well-being of all« through the exertion of will, the dispelling of fatalistic beliefs and through mechanical theories of social action. Liberty, responsibility, will, conscious choice, solidarity, etc. are media among which Kropot

176

kin's too-deterministic conception of anarchy as an order resulting from the automatically presumed natural laws of scientific evolution is out of place. Anarchy for Kropotkin is a scientific philosophy, and in science he finds proof that anarchy is a natural order in which all things should be in harmony - even human societies. Malatesta considers anarchy as a consciously accepted social program that represents the norm for behavior in the present, not in some distant and indefinite future. The criticism of the contemporary heliastic conception of communism offered by Stalinism, has roots even in this controversy. Anarchy does not follow the revolution immediately. It is, Malatesta insisted, a long and painful process gradually increasing in intensity and scope, in which today only a negligible minority is participating, a minority unable to carry out the revolution alone, and not called upon to do it alone. Its methods are persuasion, social experiment, voluntary cooperation and propaganda by example and dialogue. It avoids authoritarian methods that would coerce other people to do what the anarchists do. Violence, here, is used only in defense against violence.

Just as he discarded Kropotkin's rigid determinism, Malatesta was also sceptical of Bakunin's controversial glorification of the natural tendency of the people towards anarchism, that primitive optimism of Nineteenth Century anarchists. Revolution need not necessarily be anarchy: revolution will be what it can be, but it is essential that the conditions be created for a rapid evolution towards anarchy. Anarchy is achievable -- Malatesta added -only when the people know how to live without coercion and authority. So Malatesta discarded the formula »the revolution will be anarchistic or there will be no revolution« (in the turbulent years of Italy, in 1919-21 he was always for a »united front« of all forces of the left). Revolution, then, should not be revolution at all costs, it should not be blind destruction but a positive program of continuous change stemming, as the optimal expression, from the fertile tension between the actual and the possible. And there has always existed that fatal distinction between violence in the service of liberation and the violence of repression; there has always been resistance to the so-called revolutionary terror« in the service of the official avant-garde or the revolutionary center which is the surest way to kill or extinguish the revolution. Malatesta pointed out that the apologists of the French Revolution misrepresented the role of terror and that some spokesmen for the Bolsheviks followed their example. Those who believe in the revolutionary and liberating efficiency of repression and cruelty have the same underdeveloped moral code, as jurists who believe that crime can be avoided and the world can be moralized by means of severe, cruel punishments - wrote Malatesta (IL Terrore rivoluzionario, Pensiero e Volonta, October, 1924, Rome).

Terror is only the introduction to the perpetual legalization of tyranny. Here we would add that it is important to study Malatesta's polemics with Bolshevik communists (from 1919 on), where

kin's too-deterministic conception of anarchy as an order resulting from the autom atically presumed natural laws of scientific evolution is out of place. Anarchy for Kropotkin is a scientific philosophy, and in science he finds proof th at anarchy is a natural order in which all things should be in harm ony — even human societies. M alatesta considers anarchy as a consciously accepted social program th a t represents the norm for behavior in the present, not in some distant and indefinite future. The criticism of the contem porary heliastic conception of communism offered by Stalinism, has roots even in this controversy. Anarchy does not follow the revolution immediately. It is, M alatesta insisted, a long and painful process gradually increasing in intensity and scope, in which today only a negligible m inority is participating, a minority unable to carry out the revolution alone, and not called upon to do it alone. Its m ethods are persuasion, social experim ent, volu n tary cooperation and propaganda by exam ple and dialogue. It avoids authoritarian methods that twould coerce other people to do w hat the anarchists do. Violence, here, is used only in defense against violence.

Ju st as he discarded Kropotkin's rigid determinism, M alatesta was also sceptical of B akunin's controversial glorification of the natu ral tendency of the people tow ards anarchism, th at prim itive optimism of N ineteenth C entury anarchists. Revolution need not necessarily be anarchy: revolution w ill be w hat it can be, but it is essential th a t the conditions be created for a rapid evolution tow ards anarchy. Anarchy is achievable — M alatesta added —

only when the people know how to live w ithout coercion and authority. So M alatesta discarded the form ula »the revolution will be anarchistic or the ere will be no revolution« (in the turbulent years of Italy, in 1919^—21 he was always for a »united front« of all forces of the left). Revolution, then, should not be revolution at all costs, it should not be blind destruction but a positive program of continuous change stemming, as the optimal expression, from the fertile tension between the actual and the possible. And there has always existed the at fatal distinction between violence in the service of liberation and the violence of repression; there has always been resistance to the so-called revolutionary terror«

in the service of the official avant-garde or the revolutionary center which is the surest way to kill or extinguish the revolution.

M alatesta pointed out that the apologists of the French Revolution m isrepresented the role of terror and that the some spokesmen for the Bolsheviks followed their example. Those who believe in the revolutionary and liberating efficiency of repression and cruelty have the same underdeveloped moral code, as jurists who believe that the crime can be avoided and the world can be moralized by means of

severe, cruel punishm ents — w rote M alatesta (IL

Revolutionary Terror, Thought and Will, October, 1924, Rome).

Terror is only the introduction to the perpetual legalization of tyranny. H ere we would add that it is important to study Malatesta's polemics with Bolshevik communists (from 1919 on), where 177

he, along with Fabri, Kropotkin, Pestaña, Rosa Luxemburg and others, anticipated the emergence of a new class of leaders and the deformation of revolutionaries into conservatives preserving their domination through sheer force, as occurred under Stalinism.

But this imperative of anarcho-communism to socialize power and authority until it has been completely obliviated and replaced by new, direct forms of the collective and individual life — an imperative that is under the alert control of the plus ultra of liberty — cannot exist without a radical break with the degraded, manipulated, socially and intellectually impoverished and distorted individual of our time who has accepted the escape of freedom and voluntarily enslaved himself within the established oppressive structures. The idea of social federalism, of associations of free individuals and collectivities, of self-management and the re-evaluation of the individual (man as beginning and end) through integral social participation - all of which constitute the foundations of libertarian comunism — must have as a prerequisite what Marcuse and Malatesta call »the instinctual basis for freedom« that has long been blocked by the history of class-or authority--based society. In order to be an anarchist it is not sufficient to wish the emancipation of the individual but the emancipation of all, it is not sufficient to revolt against oppression but to refuse to be an oppressor. That is the foundation of the Malatestian formula: the greatest possible amount of communism comes from achieving the maximal possible individualism, i. e. maximal solidarity for a maximum of freedom. So when Malatesta speaks of the »fear of liberty (like Fromm), he mentions it not only in reference to the experiences under bourgeois society but also as witness to the temptations of modern authoritarian socialism.

It is exactly in the confrontation with authoritarian socialism, with a socialism that started and ended with political revolution, that the libertarian movement raised a series of themes that will long be on the agenda of every authentic revolutionary contestation. Malatesta prophetically pointed out the risk of the authoritarian deviation from Marxism, the threat of the transformation of the proletarian dictatorship into a dictatorship over the proletariat — a transformation based on the omnipotence of the state declared by a minority pretending to have a monopoly on truth and on revolutionary action (here we recognize the »Politzei socialism« of Landauer, or Rocker's »commissarocraty« that Stalinism expressed most completely). All previous experiences with socialism have demonstrated that Rocker was right in exclaiming. »Socialism will be free or it will not be at all «! — adding that it is in fact from this understanding that modern anarchism was born and from this it obtains its moral force. For only freedom can inspire men to accomplish great things and to carry out intellectual and social transformation. The myth about the autodestruction of the state under conditions of an authoritarian socialist systems remains only a myth, as the analysis and forebodings of Malatesta, Kropotkin, S. Faure, Merlino, Landauer and other have

he, along with Fabri, Kropotkin, Pestaha, Rosa Luxem burg and others, anticipated the emergence of a new class of leaders and the deformation of revolutionaries into conservatives preserving their

domination through sheer force, as occurred under Stalinism.

But this imperative of anarcho-communism to socialize power and authority until it has been completely obliviated and replaced by new, direct forms of the collective and individual life — an imperative that is under the alert control of the plus ultra of liberty — cannot exist w ithout a radical break w ith the degraded, manipulated, socially and intellectually impoverished and distorted individual of our time who has accepted the escape of freedom and voluntarily enslaved himself w ithin the established oppressive structures. The idea of social federalism, of associations of free individuals and collectivities, of self-management and the re-evaluation of the individual (man as beginning and end) through integral social participation — all of which constitute the foundations of libertarian comunism — must have as a prerequisite w hat Marcuse and Malatesta call »the instinctual basis for freedom«

that has long been blocked by the history of class-or authority-

-based society. In order to be an anarchist it is not sufficient to wish the emancipation of the individual but the emancipation of all, it is not sufficient to revolt against oppression but to refuse to be an oppressor. That is the foundation of the M alatestian formula: the greatest possible amount of communism comes from achieving the maximal possible individualism, i. e. maxim al solidarity for a maximum of freedom. So when M alatesta speaks of the »fear of liberty (like Fromm), he mentions it not only in reference to the experiences under bourgeois society but also as w itness to the temptations of modern authoritarian socialism.

It is exactly in the confrontation with authoritarian socialism, with a socialism that started and ended w ith political revolution, that the libertarian movement raised a series of themes th at will long be on the agenda of every authentic revolutionary contestation. Malatesta prophetically pointed out the risk of the authoritarian deviation from Marxism, the threat of the transform ation of the proletarian dictatorship into a dictatorship over the proletariat — a transformation based on the omnipotence of the state declared by a minority pretending to have a monopoly on tru th and on revolutionary action (here we recognize the »Politzei socialism« of Landauer, or Rocker's »commissarocraty« th at Stalinism expressed most completely). All previous experiences w ith socialism have demonstrated that Rocker was right in exclaiming. »Socialism will be free or it will not be at all«! — adding th at it is in fact from this understanding th at modern anarchism was born and from this it

obtains its moral force. For only freedom can inspire men to accomplish great things and to carry out intellectual and social transformation. The m yth about the autodestruction of the state under conditions of an authoritarian socialist systems remains only a myth, as the analysis and forebodings of Malatesta, Kropotkin, S. Faure, Merlino, Landauer and other have 178

shown. If the proletarian party is an instrument in the establishment of a monopoly on behalf of the working class, that is, if there is no direct relationship between class and history, biography and revolution, it is very dubious that the revolution will become the destructor or negater of its own monopoly-state in order to bring about the total emancipation of society and the abolishment of all classes, privileges and censorships — a humanism not only of a social-historical but also of a cosmological nature.

The Cronstadt events of 1921 and the movement of Nestor Mahhno in the Ukraine in 1919-1921 were powerful indicators of the further development of authoritarian tendencies within socialism. Cronstadt was an alarm pointing to the deformation of the October Revolution. Among its rebels were anarchists, though not many of them; but it is thanks to the anarcho-communists that the event was prophetically analysed and all its consequences were profited by. Angel Pestaña brought the news to Spain about Cronstadt and also about the persecution of anarchists in Russia, thereby raising a debate on the Russian revolution in the CNT (Confederacion Nacional De Trabajo). The CNT had joined the Third International, but on the basis of the events mentioned, decided in 1922 to withdraw from it, having heard Pestaña's report. The signs marking the deformation of socialism — which had forgotten that for every mediation, especially those of a political nature, the sword has two sharp edges, and that revolution and authority are irreconcilable (Kropotkin) — included the persecution of the anarchists who had actively supported the October Revolution (the Nabat movement, which began to condemn Soviet centralization at the congress of 1919), and the supression of the Workers' Opposition which had taken up the spontaneous movement of the workers to seize the factories and form workers' boards and soviets under workers control immediately after the February Revolution.

The workers' council movement in Italy, the Soviet Bavarian Republic, the Canton Commune in 1927, Spain 1936—1939, France in May 1968, etc. are all situations in which libertarian socialism not only experienced conflicts between efficiency and liberty, authority and liberty, but also sustained clashes with the dominant type of socialist movement of our time: with authoritarian socialism and hypercentralized, hierarchical and state-control communism. Gustav Landauer and Erich Müsham, men who stood at the forefront of the Bavarian Revolution, were advocates of the creation of workers' councils, and only later did they receive support from the communists — and that from the dissident K. A. P. D. - in adopting the so-called communism of councils, and from the anarcho-syndicalist Freie Arbeiter Union, which only fascism could later destroy. We wish to point out that whenever we mention self-management, socialism by council, participative democracy, direct or industrial democracy, we are in fact talking about the libertarian herigate without which a true aggiornamento of contemporary socialism cannot be conceived. If the oppressive

shown. If the proletarian party is an instrum ent in the establishm ent of a monopoly on behalf of the working class, that is, if there is no direct relationship between class and history, biography and revolution, it is very dubious that the revolution will become the destructor or negater of its own monopoly-state in order to bring about the total emancipation of society and the abolishment of all classes, privileges and censorships — a humanism not only of a social-historical but also of a cosmological nature.

The C ronstadt events of 1921 and the movement of Nestor Mahhno in the U kraine in 1919—1921 were powerful indicators of the fu rth er development of authoritarian tendencies w ithin socialism. Cronstadt was an alarm pointing to the deformation of the October Revolution. Among its rebels were anarchists, though not m any of them; b ut it is thanks to the anarcho-com munists that the event was prophetically analysed and all its consequences were profited by. Angel Pestana brought the news to Spain about C ronstadt and also about the persecution of anarchists in Russia, thereby raising a debate on the Russian revolution in the CNT

(Confederacion Nacional De Trabajo). The CNT had joined the Third International, but on the basis of the events mentioned, decided in 1922 to withdraw from it, having heard Pestana's report.

The signs m arking the deform ation of socialism — which had forgotten th at for every mediation, especially those of a political nature, the sword has two sharp edges, and th a t revolution and authority are irreconcilable (Kropotkin) — included the persecution of the anarchists who had actively supported the October Revolution (the Nabat movement, which began to condemn Soviet centralization a t the congress of 1919), and the supression of the W orkers' Opposition which had taken up the spontaneous movem ent of the w orkers to seize the factories and form w orkers'

boards and soviets under w orkers control im m ediately after the February Revolution.

The w orkers' council m ovem ent in Italy, the Soviet Bavarian Republic, the Canton Commune in 1927, Spain 1936—1939, France in May 1968, etc. are all situations in which libertarian socialism not only experienced conflicts betw een efficiency and liberty, authority and liberty, but also sustained clashes w ith the dominant type of socialist movem ent of our time: w ith authoritarian socialism and hypercentralized, hierarchical and state-control communism. Gustav Landauer and Erich Miisham, men who stood at the forefront of the B avarian Revolution, were advocates of the creation of w orkers' councils, and only later did they receive support from the communists — and th a t from the dissident K. A. P. D.

— in adopting the so-called com munism of councils, and from the anarcho-syndicalist. Freie A rbeiter Union, which only fascism could later destroy. We wish to point out that twhenever we mention self-management, socialism by council, participative democracy, direct or industrial democracy, we are in fact talking about the libertarian herigate without which a true aggiornamento of contemporary socialism cannot be conceived. If the oppressive 179

socialism of our time were to wish to retract all its visible convergences with bourgeois world and emerge from the crisis and degeneration into which it has fallen, it would first have to express and confess the Cain complex it has towards its otherwise fated brother — libertarian communism, i. e. anarcho-communism.

One of the answers to the growing integration of the workers' and socialist movement in bourgeois society is modern anarcho--syndicalism, which continues in the tradition of revolutionary or libertarian syndicalism. In many cases anarchosyndicalism and the anarchist movements are one and the same, i. e. the same organization (Forismo in Latin America, the CNT in Spain, the IWW — »Wobblies« in the United States, the labor unions in Holland, Sweden etc.). Rudolf Rocker correctly pointed out that modern anarcho-syndicalism is the direct reaction to the methods and concepts of political socialism (Anarchosyndicalism, Secker and Warburg, 1938, London, p. 85). Gino Cerrito also viewed anarcho-syndicalism as the answer to the doctrinary socialist movement at the close of the 19th Century and in the first decade of the 20th Century. It is the return to revolutionary action, a renewed reliance on the working class, an alternative to the parliamentary reformism of the legal socialists, and, likewise, a reaction to the degeneration of the traditional trade unions and the centralistic, unitarian tendency of the modern corporate state.1

Malatesta (who had a great influence on Pelloutier, Pouget and other revolutionary syndicalists) always pointed out that syndicalism is only one of the channels for the workers' struggle, and he criticized syndicalism which would be automatic, without the conscious and voluntary association of the workers, in striving to emancipate them from capitalistic servitude and build a new society. He was also in favor of the general strike, but he felt that the general strike could not replace complex rebellion and social revolution, and that was the point of view that he always defended in his polemics with James Guillaume, Armand Borghi, Livio Ciardi, Bistelli, and others.

Spanish anarcho-syndicalism is of particular relevance since the CNT was the pragmatic materialization of the political, economic and philosophical concepts of the anarchist movement. Even at its founding congress the CNT adopted the tactics of direct action. Syndicalism was not proclaimed as an end in itself, but

¹ The question of the role of the trade unions in the revolutionary struggle has no simple answer. We think that G. D. H. Cole correctly pointed out the differences in opinion about them existing within the anarcho-communist movement. Jean Grave and Kropotkin maintained that trade unions would not play such a role in the structure of the future society that will make it possible for them to evolve into workers' cooperatives controlling industry, although this does mean that they would not be instrumental in the revolutionary struggle. There, then, lies the borderline between the anarcho-communists in the narrow sense of the word and the anarcho-syndicalists who created revolutionary syndicalism. The followers of Grave and Kropotkin shunned the possibility that the principles of economic and political freedom should be surrendered into the hands of the authoritarian trade unions.

and confess the Cain complex it has towards its otherwise fated brother — libertarian communism, i. e. anarcho-communism.

One of the answers to the growing integration of the w orkers'

and socialist movement in bourgeois society is m odem anarcho-

-syndicalism, which continues in the tradition of revolutionary or libertarian syndicalism. In many cases anarchosyndicalism and the anarchist movements are one and the same, i. e. the same organization (Forismo in Latin America, the CNT in Spain, the IWW —

»Wobblies« in the United States, the labor unions in Holland, Sweden etc.). Rudolf Rocker correctly pointed out th at modern anarchosyndicalism is the direct reaction to the methods and concepts of political socialism (Anarchosyndicalism, Seeker and Warburg, 1938, London, p. 85). Gino Cerrito also viewed anarcho-syndicalism as the answer to the doctrinary socialist movement at the close of the 19th Century and in the first decade of the 20th Century. It is the return to revolutionary action, a renew ed reliance on the working class, an alternative to the parliam entary reformism of the legal socialists, and, likewise, a reaction to the degeneration of the traditional trade unions and the c en tra lists, U n i

tarian tendency of the modern corporate state.1

M alatesta (who had a great influence on Pelloutier, Pouget and other revolutionary syndicalists) always pointed out that t syndicalism is only one of the channels for the workers' struggle, and he criticized syndicalism which would be automatic, without the conscious and voluntary association of the workers, in striving to emancipate them from capitalistic servitude and build a new society. He was also in favor of the general strike, but he felt that the general strike could not replace complex rebellion and social revolution, and that was the point of view that he always defended in his polemics with James Guillaume, Arm and Borghi, Livio Ciardi, Bistelli, and others.

Spanish anarcho-syndicalism is of particular relevance since the CNT was the pragmatic materialization of the political, economic and philosophical concepts of the anarchist movement. Even at its founding congress the CNT adopted the tactics of direct action. Syndicalism was not proclaimed as an end in itself, but 1 The question of the role of the trade unions in the revolutionary struggle has no simple answer. We think that G. D. H. Cole correctly pointed out the differences in opinion about them existing w ithin the anarcho-

-communist movement. Jean Grave and Kropotkin m aintained th a t trad e unions would not play such a role in the structure of the fu tu re society th at will m ake it possible for them to evolve into w orkers' cooperatives controlling industry, although this does m ean th at they would not be in stru m ental in the revolutionary struggle. There, then, lies the borderline between the anarcho-comm unists in the narrow sense of the word and the anarcho-syndicalists who created revolutionary syndicalism. The followers of Grave and Kropotkin shunned the possibility th at the principles of economic and political freedom should be surrendered into the hands of the authoritarian trade unions.

180

as a means of class struggle and resistance, while the so-called lerrouxismo was rejected as a political resort of coming to power through the trade unions. The aim of the CNT, then, was the integral emancipation of the working class by expropriating the propertied classes and taking over production in their own hands.2 Direct action in this case meant the direct projection of impulses and organized will of the very social bases, renouncing the authoritarian and elitist principle of organization, leaders and those being led. Within the movement existed only so-called la accion co-responsable del militante based on the complete equality among individuals. In this way the CNT attempted within its own structure to effectuate a future society, to lay down the guidelines for planning an acratic society. It was a practical illustration, arising out of the most difficult conditions of civil war and the battle against international fascism, that libertarian or self-management socialism (socialismo de autogestion) is possible whether in industry, agriculture, education or any other branch of society.

There are two essential lessons to be learned from Spanish anarcho-communism. These are answers to the questions: how is it possible to obtain cooperation among anarchist and other socialist movements in carrying out a social revolution (especially practical relations between anarcho- and Marxist-communists), and what in fact should be the role of the anarcho-communist in the situation — irrespective of the extent to which situation is revolutionary — when it is not possible to be an integral anarcho-communist.

The Spanish experience teaches us that the so-called problem of correlating the forces of the left on the road to socialism is one of the key questions in the attainment of a concrete utopia, because it reveals the depth of the chasm between the authoritarian Marxist conception and the libertarian conception of how socialism should be attained. The struggle between these parties is leading to their mutual annihilation; it has even gone so far that their common class enemy is being forgotten. The civil war in Spain aided the CNT to discover the existence of other revolutionary forces, but cooperation between them, due to the well-known maneuvers by the remaining parties of the left in the National Front, above all by the Communist Party, was never able to materialize. The Communist Party behaved in a sectarian manner as an extended arm of the Kremlin and sabotaged all other participants in the coalition. It had no difficulty in doing so due to the weak leadership of the CNT-FAI. Under the slogan of battle against fascism, the Revolutionary Government, from which the

² Thus as early as 1888 the Congress of the French Féderation National de Syndicats adopted the resolution on complete independence from political parties, reacting in this way to the attempts of rival socialist groups and parties to place the trade unions under political control and to use them as instrument in their everyday political maneuverings. This was that positive request of anarcho-syndicalism to always strive for action sur le terrain de classe, upon which the contemporary attempts to revive syndicalism are based.

em ancipation of the working class by expropriating the propertied classes and taking over production in their own hands.2

Direct action in this case m eant the direct projection of impulses and organized will of the very social bases, renouncing the authoritarian and elitist principle of organization, leaders and those being led. W ithin the movement existed only so-called la accion co-responsable del m ilitante based on the complete equality among individuals. In this way the CNT attem pted w ithin its own structu re to effectuate a future society, to lay down the guidelines for planning an acratic society. It was a practical illustration, arising out of the most difficult conditions of civil w ar and the battle against international fascism, th at libertarian or self-management socialism (socialismo de autogestion) is possible w hether in industry, agriculture, education or any other branch of society.

There are two essential lessons to be learned from Spanish anarcho-communism. These are answers to the questions: how is it possible to obtain cooperation among anarchist and other socialist movements in carrying out a social revolution (especially practical relations betw een anarcho- and Marxist-communists), and w hat in fact should be the role of the anarcho-com m unist in the situation — irrespective of the extent to which situation is revolutionary — when it is not possible to be an integral anarcho-communist.

The Spanish experience teaches us that the so-called problem of correlating the forces of the left on the road to socialism is one of the key questions in the attainm ent of a concrete utopia, because it reveals the depth of the chasm betw een the authoritarian M arxist conception and the libertarian conception of how socialism should be attained. The struggle betw een these parties is leading to th eir m utual annihilation; it has even gone so far th at their common class enem y is being forgotten. The civil w ar in Spain aided the CNT to discover the existence of other revolution ary forces, b ut cooperation betw een them, due to the well-known m aneuvers by the rem aining parties of the left in the National Front, above all by the Communist Party, was never able to m aterialize. The Communist P a rty behaved in a sectarian m anner as an extended arm of the K rem lin and sabotaged all other participants in the coalition. It had no difficulty in doing so due to the w eak leadership of the CNT—FAI. U nder the slogan of battle against fascism, the R evolutionary Government, from which the

* Thus as early as 1888 the Congress of the French Federation National de Syndicats adopted the resolution on complete independence from political parties, reacting in th is w ay to the attem p ts of riv al socialist groups and p arties to place th e tra d e unions u n d e r political control and to use them as instru m en t in th eir everyday political m aneuverings. This was th a t positive request of anarcho-syndicalism to alw ays strive for action sur le terrain de classe, upon w hich th e contem porary attem p ts to revive syndicalism are based.

181

anarchists had withdrawn, declared war on the social revolution. The initiative was taken from the workers and the masses in the name of the slogan: primero ganar la guerra y después la revolucion (first win the war, and then the revolution). The incidents in Barcelona in May 1937 (Las jornadas de Mayo), when the Revolutionary Government brought to a blood-soaked ending the people's rebellion which had demanded more than was provided in the minimalistic platform of the government, were the same as those that occurred in Cronstadt in 1921 with the Russian revolution. So the communist movement once again resurrected the old ecclesiastical conflict and the question of the peregrines (who are, otherwise, the only living members of the Heavenly City, but nobody knows who they are until the last judgement day).

Anarcho-communist convinctions are incompatible in principle with participation in authority and the work of authoritarian structures such as government, parliament, the army. the police, land registry, etc. Spain teaches us what to expect from cooperation of the libertarian with a revolutionary government, that is, how difficult it is to remain consistently anarcho-communist in a revolutionary situation which tends towards social revolution but which, at the same time, blocks all practical efforts to bring about anarchy. It is difficult to contest the sincerity of the admonishments of Sebastian Faure against anarchist participation in the Republican Government. In its position of authority the CNT, although exacted by situation, had a destructive influence on the movement, on the mentality of its militants and on the organizational structure. The erosion of the collaboration and the spirit of ministerialism crumbled the fundamental principles of the anarcho-communist movement. The CNT was partial to central authority in the belief that it could moralize the authority and oversee its wielding. But all this placed the libertarian in an extremely inferior position in regard to the sphere of power, and even brought about the open divergence of the same authority against the CNT and anarchism (May 3rd in Barcelona; the attacks on the collectives in Aragon; the arrest and execution of CNT activists, etc.). The CNT-FAI never took any initiative which might have jeopardized the common cause of the Republic. Nevertheless, in the end, the political influence of the CNT (with two million members and one-third of the combatants in the Republican army, and with the economic power of its selfmanaged factories and agrarian collectives in the heart of the country) was reduced to a minimum, accompanied by the militarization of industry and the CNT-UGT pact in which it was difficult to identify anything whatsoever of the confederal spirit which preceded the Civil war. The state became the absolute ruler over all: the army, industry, municipalities, the economy and all nationalized land. Authority - not the revolution - was the main concern. As early as November 1936 Juan Peiro (following Orobon Fernandez, who had primacy in these matters) pleaded for a federal and socialist Spain where various forms of socialism could flourish in mutual co--existence within a frame work of regional and local autonomy)

of the slogan: primero ganar la guerra y despues la revolucion (first win the war, and then the revolution). The incidents in Barcelona in May 1937 (Las jom adas de Mayo), when the Revolutionary Government brought to a blood-soaked ending the people's rebellion which had demanded more than was provided in the minimalistic platform of the government, we ere the same as those that occurred in Cronstadt in 1921 with the Russian revolution.

So the communist movement once again resurrected the old ecclesiastical conflict and the question of the peregrines (who are, otherwise, the only living members of the Heavenly City, but nobody knows who they are until the last judgem ent day).

Anarcho-communist convinctions are incompatible in principle w ith participation in authority and the w ork of authoritarian structures such as government, parliam ent, the army, the police, land registry, etc. Spain teaches us w hat to expect from cooperation of the libertarian w ith a revolutionary government, that is, how difficult it is to rem ain consistently anarcho-com m unist in a revolutionary situation which tends towards social revolution but which, at the same time, blocks all practical efforts to bring about anarchy. It is difficult to contest the sincerity of the admonishments of Sebastian Faure against anarchist participation in the Republican Government. In its position of authority the CNT, although exacted by situation, had a destructive influence on the movement, on the m entality of its m ilitants and on the organizational structure. The erosion of the collaboration and the spirit of ministerialism crumbled the fundam ental principles of the anarcho-communist movement. The CNT was p artial to central authority in the belief th at it could moralize the authoritiy and oversee its wielding. But all this placed the libertarian in an extremely inferior position in regard to the sphere of power, and even brought about the open divergence of the same authority against the CNT and anarchism (May 3rd in Barcelona; the attacks on the collectives in Aragon; the arrest and execution of CNT activists, etc.). The CNT—FAI never took any initiative which m ight have jeopardized the common cause of the Republic. Nevertheless, in the end, the political influence of the CNT (with two million members and one-third of the combatants in the Republican army, and with the economic power of its selfmanaged factories and agrarian collectives in the heart of the country) was reduced to a minimum, accompanied by the m ilitarization of industry and the CNT-UGT pact in which it was difficult to identify anything whatsoever of the confederal spirit which preceded the Civil war.

The state became the absolute ru ler over all: the army, industry,

municipalities, the economy and all nationalized land. A uthority

— not the revolution — was the main concern. As early as November 1936 Juan Peiro (following Orobon Fernandez, who had primacy in these matters) pleaded for a federal and socialist Spain where various forms of socialism could flourish in m utual co-

-existence within a frame work of regional and local autonomy) 182

a structure which is nowadays called pluralism in a socialist society). In the end the FAI resisted, but too late, when it, and not only the CNT, had taken on many of the features of the psychology and organization of ruling bureaucratic party. It came to the point where a distinction had to be made between anarchism and its official representation in Spain, the so-called Federacion Anarquista Iberica (FAI).

Still another cause for this state of affairs, which rendered integral anarcho-communism impossible, was the leadership complex within the CNT itself and the corruption of certain CNT and FAI personalities who participated in the government of Largo Caballero. This »political boss« phenomenon enabled government and the politicians to usurp the power of the workers. Anarchism thus found itself up against two adversaries: Franco, and the Republican government which was controlled by the Marxist-communists. It then found a third adversary within the ranks of the CNT: the leaders of the CNT and the FAI. Their emergence enabled the FAI to establish a paternal relationship (faismo) toward the CNT: that is an enlightened minority was formed which was charged with preserving the purity of the movement. The old mistake was repeated — Bakunin paternalism — from the times when Bakunin founded the Alliance of Socialist Democracy (Alianza de la Democracia Socialista) as an organization of select militants who were to watch over of the International. Anselmo Lorenzo stood up in opposition to Bakunin and criticized his methods (el aliancismo) as authoritarian, saying that neither Marx nor Bakunin took seriously the assertion that the liberation of the working class is the task of the workers themselves. For Lorenzo the end did not justify all the means, and he could not accept the methods of Bakunin behind which stood the conviction that the people were not ripe for liberty. For us, Lorenzo thereby answered the question of how Spanish anarchy should have been protected from the leadership complex in its own ranks.

Thus we approach the close of our, certainly never-ending thematic cycle in which the heart of the matter is liberty — that indentity of the will with itself (Hegel). Anarchism, for us is the fertile unreified methodological doubt with its unconstrained won der that is the stimulus for the spring up of new questions from those that have already been posed — to paraphrase Bloch. It is practical humanism which considers, as the essential problem of revolution, the liberation of man and not the problem of power or economics. Quite distinct from Marx, anarcho-communism is not concerned with reconciling state and society; it is against the emphasis on coercion as a selfsupporting essence. And, as has already been stressed, anarchy is a rejection of those links of man's lofty principles which give man the sense of being subjected, imperiled and oppressed, i. e. anarchy esteems those principles which contain a human belief in a concrete emancipation.

It seems to us that the libertarian movement is sufficiently authentic to be able to speak for itself. Nevertheless, anarchism is all

a structure which is nowadays called pluralism in a socialist society). In the end the FAI resisted, but too late, when it, and not only the CNT, had taken on m any of the features of the psychology and

organization of ruling bureaucratic party. It came to the point w here a distinction had to be made between anarchism and its official representation in Spain, the so-called Federacion Anar-quista Iberica (FAI).

Still another cause for this state of affairs, which rendered integral anarcho-com munism impossible, was the leadership complex w ithin the CNT itself and the corruption of certain CNT and FAI personalities who participated in the governm ent of Largo Caballero. This »political boss« phenomenon enabled government and the politicians to usurp the power of the workers. Anarchism thus found itself up against two adversaries: Franco, and the Republican government which was controlled by the M arxist-communists. It then found a third adversary w ithin the ranks of the CNT: the leaders of the CNT and the FAI. Their emergence enabled the FAI to establish a paternal relationship (faismo) toward the CNT: th at is an enlightened m inority was formed which was charged with preserving the purity of the movement. The old mistake was repeated — Bakunin paternalism — from the times when Bakunin founded the Alliance of Socialist Democracy (Ali-anza de la Democracia Socialista) as an organization of select militants who were to w atch over of the International. Anselmo Lorenzo stood up in opposition to Bakunin and criticized his methods (el aliancismo) as authoritarian, saying that neither Marx nor Bakunin took seriously the assertion that the liberation of the working class is the task of the workers themselves. For Lorenzo the end did not justify all the means, and he could not accept the methods of Bakunin behind which stood the conviction that the people were not ripe for liberty. For us, Lorenzo thereby answered the question of how Spanish anarchy should have been protected from the leadership complex in its own ranks.

Thus we approach the close of our, certainly never-ending thematic cycle in which the h eart of the m atter is liberty — th at indentity of the will w ith itself (Hegel). Anarchism, for us is the fertile unreified methodological doubt w ith its unconstrained won der th at is the stim ulus for the spring up of new questions from those th at have already been posed — to paraphrase Bloch. It is practical hum anism which considers, as the essential problem of revolution, the liberation of man and not the problem of power or economics. Quite distinct from Marx, anarcho-com munism is not concerned w ith reconciling state and society; it is against the emphasis on coercion as a selfsupporting essence. And, as has already been stressed, anarchy is a rejection of those links of m an's lofty principles which give m an the sense of being subjected, im periled and oppressed, i. e. anarchy esteems those principles which contain a hum an belief in a concrete emancipation.

It seems to us that the libertarian movement is sufficiently authentic to be able to speak for itself. Nevertheless, anarchism is all 183

too frequently proclaimed as bygone ideology — proclamation that orthodox Marxists have been repeating for the past 130 years. In spite of this we have recently witnessed a revival of libertarian socialism: the youth movement of contestation, once again ,in May 1968, unfurled the black flag calling to account the authoritarian movement; once again the Communes' Changer la vie of Rimbaud was heard; the call for fundamental regeneration through fundamental revolt; the dilemma of socialism or barbarity.

Objectivity requires that mention also be made of those who believed that a reconciliation with Marx and Bakunin is possible and necessary: Victor Serge, Abraham Gillen, Daniel Guerin and others. But we also must be attentive to the spokesmen of anarchy who are also communists. Because they warn us that where the means are authoritarian, and where efficiency is placed before liberty, then the ends — that future real or dreamed society — will likewise be authoritarian and will never give birth to a free society. Violence as a means gives rise to violence as a system; a cult of individual personalities as a means is the source of dictatorship — small and large — and servile masses, while government — even when it is in cooperation with socialists and anarchists — produces still greater authority, as we have been cautioned by Vernon Richards.

Shall we persevere in the conviction, even though we are labeled as Don Quijotes, that liberty as an end can only be attained by liberty as a means? Those who consider that this attitude leads to sterility and the paralysis of revolutionary will, those who think that this concept is ridiculous in modern, cosmopolitan, violent and technological society as a system of domination, must be told that their realism and opportunism inevitably lead to catastrophy, the perpetuation of violence and the postponement of any serious solution. For in the world today there is already too much evil, coercion, violence and deceit and if we make concessions to it, we cannot preserve our freedom and human dignity, self-respect and respect for others. If we at all care for what is human and humanum as the true utopia of the present.

too frequently proclaimed as bygone ideology — proclam ation that orthodox M arxists have been repeating for the past 130 years. In spite of this we have recently witnessed a revival of libertarian socialism: the youth m ovement of contestation, once again, in May 1968, unfurled the black flag calling to account the authoritarian movement; once again the Communes' Changer lavie of Rimbaud was heard; the call for fundamental regeneration through fundamental revolt; the dilemma of socialism or barbarity.

Objectivity requires th at m ention also be made of those who believed th a t a reconciliation w ith M arx and Bakunin is possible and necessary: Victor Serge, A braham Gillen, Daniel G uerin and others. But we also m ust be attentive to the spokesmen of anarchy who are also communists. Because they w arn us th a t where the m eans are authoritarian, and w here efficiency is placed before liberty, then the ends — th a t fu tu re real or dream ed society —

will likewise be authoritarian and will never give b irth to a free society. Violence as a means gives rise to violence as a system; a cult of individual personalities as a means is the source of dictatorship — small and large — and servile masses, while government — even when it is in cooperation with socialists and an archists — produces still greater authority, as we have been cautioned by Vernon Richards.

Shall we persevere in the conviction, even though we are labeled as Don Quijotes, that I liberty as an end can only be attained by liberty as a means? Those who consider that this attitude leads to sterility and the paralysis of revolutionary will, those who think that this concept is ridiculous in modem, cosmopolitan, violent and technological society as a system of domination, must be told that their realism and opportunism inevitably lead to catastrophy, the perpetuation of violence and the postponem ent of any serious solution. For in the world today there is already too much evil, coercion, violence and deceit and if we make concessions to it, we cannot preserve our freedom and hum an dignity, self-respect and respect for others. If we at all care for what is hum an and hum anum as the true utopia of the present.

SPONTANEITÉ, ORGANISATION ET ANARCHISME

Daniel Guérin

Paris

La spontanéité est aujourd'hui à l'ordre du jour. Le Mai 68 français, ouragan que personne n'avait sciemment déchaîné, a contesté, dans chaque entreprise et chaque établissement scolaire de France, le pouvoir capitaliste et l'idéologie bourgeoise. En même temps, il a été à deux doigts de balayer un régime en apparence fort et prestigieux: En mai tout m'échappait«, confiera le général de Gaulle à André Malraux. Mai 68 a grisé une jeunesse ardente et les effets magique de la spontanéité l'ont éblouie. Pour ces jeunes, l'ennemi No 1 c'était le péril bureaucratique et ils se défiaient de toute forme d'organisation pouvant y conduire. Mais les mêmes sortilèges qui leur avaient fait bousculer toutes les institutions, ébranler toutes les valeurs étabilies, y compris celles devenues rituelles et sclérosées, du vieux Parti Communiste et de sa filiale syndicale, ont, à la longue, frappé d'impuissance ces jeunes magiciens. Et, de ce fait même, a été remis en question le recours exclusif à l'arme de la spontanéité, tandis que revenait au premier plan le problème des rapports entre la spontanéité d'une part, l'organisation et la conscience, d'autre part.

Ces rapports ont été approfondis par une théoricienne révolutionnaire: Rosa Luxemburg. Il était donc normal que Mai 68 décuplât l'intérêt porté à ses écrits. Il est donc logique que le présent rapport soit centré autour de Rosa Luxemburg: il n'est pas dans ma nature de théoriser dans l'abstrait. Je me sens plus à l'aise lorsque je traite un sujet à travers l'analyse critique d'une praxis.

Voyons d'abord comment les précurseurs, aussi bien marxistes qu'anarchistes, car les deux courants ont été, en ces temps lointains, d'assez proches parents, ont défini la spontanéité dans ses rapports avec la conscience.

Marx et Engels n'emploient pas encore les mots spontan, Spontaneität qui, semble-t-il, n'étaient guère utilisés dans la langue allemande qu'en physiologie. Ils appliquent au mouvement prolétarien les adjectifs selbständig ou eigentümlich qui ont tous deux le même sens, plus restrictif, plus statique, moins dynamique, que

Spontaneity is the order of the day today. May 68

French, a hurricane that no one had knowingly unleashed, challenged capitalist power and bourgeois ideology in every company and every school in France. At the same time, he was on the verge of sweeping away an apparently strong and prestigious regime: In my case, everything escaped me", General de Gaulle confided to A ndre M alraux. May 68 intoxicated an ardent youth and the magical effects of spontaneity dazzled it. For these young people, enemy No. 1 was bureaucratic peril and they mistrusted any form of organization that could lead to it. But the same spells which had caused them to shake up all the institutions, shake up all the established values, including those that had become ritual and sclerotic, of the old Communist Party and its union subsidiary, have, in the long run, struck these people with impotence. young magicians. And, by this very fact, the exclusive recourse to the army of spontaneity has been called into question, while the problem of the relationship between spontaneity on the one hand, organization and consciousness has come back to the fore., on the other hand.

These reports have been deepened by a revolutionary theoretician: Rosa Luxem burg. It was therefore normal that May 68 decu-flat interest in his writings. It is therefore logical that this report should focus on Rosa Luxem burg: it is not in my nature to theorize in the abstract. I feel more at ease when I deal with a subject through the critical analysis of a praxis.

Let us first see how the precursors, both Marxists and anarchists, for the two currents were, in those distant times, fairly close relatives, defined spontaneity in its relationship with consciousness.

M arx and Engels do not yet employ the words spontan, Spon-taneitdt which, it seems, were scarcely used in the German language except in physiology. They apply to the proletarian movement the adjectives selbstandig or eigentiimlich which both have the same meaning, more restrictive, more static, less dynamic, than 185

spontan, à savoir que ce mouvement existe par lui-même, qu'il a son existence propre. Ils usent également d'une autre expression: ils parlent de la geschichtliche Selbsttätigkeit du prolétariat, c'est-à-dire littéralement de son »autoactivité historique« que l'on a traduit, en français, en forçant quelque peu les termes, par »spontanéité historique«.

Enfin, Marx, lorsqu'il fait allusion aux premières tentatives de créer une organisation communiste internationale, écrit qu'elle »surgit naturwuchsig (tout naturellement) du sol de la société moderne«. Ici encore l'on a pris une certaine liberté en traduisant par »spontanément«.¹

Pourquoi Marx et Engels évitent-ils d'employer des termes qui marqueraient une explosion, un jaillissement de la force élémentaire des masses et pourquoi les traducteurs français doivent-ils trahir leur vocabulaire pour leur faire parler de spontanéité? Sans doute parce que les deux théoriciens ont le souci de ne pas trop s'écarter de leur déterminisme historique et aussi parce qu'ils ne sont pas entièrement affranchis d'une conception de la Révolution d'origine jacobine, d'une relative défiance vis-à-vis de la révolution par en bas.

»Auto-activité« du mouvement des masses vis-à-vis de qui? Tout d'abord, bien entendu, vis-à-vis des formations politiques bourgeoises. C'est ainsi qu'Engels a discerné lors de chaque grand mouvement révolutionnaire bourgeois l'apparition de mouvements selbständig de la classe qui était plus ou moins la devancière du prolétariat moderne.

Mais le mouvement des masses ne possède-t-il pas également une existence propre vis-à-vis des formations politiques socialistes ou communistes? Certes pour Marx et Engels »les communistes (...) n'ont pas d'intérêts séparés de ceux du prolétariat tout entier. Ils n'etablissent pas de principes particuliers sur lesquels ils voudraient modeler le mouvement prolétarien (...) Ils représentent constamment l'intérêt du mouvement total.« Pour quelles raisons cette identité? Parce que leurs conceptions théoriques »ne reposent nullement sur des idées, sur des principes inventés ou découverts par tel ou tel réformateur du monde. Elles ne sont que l'expression générale (...) d'un mouvement historique qui s'opère sous nos yeux.«

Cependant il semble que, pour les rédacteurs du Manifeste Communiste, mouvement prolétarien et communisme ne se confondent pas tout à fait, puisque les communistes, disent-ils, »ont sur le reste de la masse prolétarienne l'avantage de comprendre les conditions, la marche et les résultats généraux du mouvement prolétarien«. Les communistes sont donc des initiés, des privilégiés de l'intelligence. De là à suggérer que leur incombe un rôle »dirigeant«, il n'y a qu'un pas . . . Le mouvement de la masse pro-

¹ Karl Marx et Friedrich Engels, Manifest der Kommunisten, 1848; — Engels, Anti-Dühring, 1878, Introduction; — Marx, lettre à Freiligrath, 29 février 1860.

of its »historical self-activity« which has been translated, into French, by forging somewhat the terms, by

»historical spontaneity«.

Finally, Marx, when alluding to the first attempts to create an international communist organization, writes that it

»arises naturwuchsig (quite naturally) from the soil of modern society«. Here again we have taken a certain liberty in translating by

"spontanem ent".1

Why do Marx and Engels avoid using terms that would mark an explosion, an outpouring of the elemental force of the masses and why must French translators betray their vocabulary to make them speak of spontaneity? Doubtless because the two theoreticians were careful not to stray too far from their historical determinism and also because they were not entirely freed from a conception of the Revolution of Jacobin origin, from a relative distrust of the revolution from below.

»Self-activity« of the mass movement vis-a-vis whom?

First of all, of course, vis-a-vis the bourgeois political formations. This is how Engels discerned in each great bourgeois revolutionary movement the appearance of selbstdndig movements of the class which was more or less the predecessor of the modern proletariat.

But does not the mass movement also have an existence of its own visa-vis socialist or communist political formations? Certainly for M arx and Engels "the communists (. . .) have no interests separate from those of the proletariat as a whole.

They do not establish particular principles on which they would like to model the proletarian movement (. . .) They constantly represent the interest of the total movement. "For what reasons this identity? Because their theoretical conceptions are in no way based on ideas, on principles invented or discovered by this or that reformer of the world. Elies are only the general expression (. .. .) of a historical movement that is taking place before our eyes.

However, it seems that, for the editors of the Communist Manifesto, the proletarian movement and communism are not completely confused, since the communists, they say, "have the advantage over the rest of the proletarian mass of understanding the conditions, the march and the general results of the proletarian movement.

Communists are therefore initiates, privileged in intelligence. From there to suggesting that they have a role

»leader«, there is only one step. . . The pro-1 K arl M arx and Friedrich Engels, M anifest der Kom m unisten, 1848; —

Engels, Anti-Diihring, 1878, Introduction; — Marx, lettre š Freiligrath, 29

février 1860.

letarienne aurait ainsi une »existence propre«, une »auto-activité« élémentaire également par rapport à son interprétation politique consciente.²

Cette différenciation, certes, était encore embryonnaire, peu perceptible en 1847. Mais elle se dessinera plus nettement à une phase ultérieure et c'est ainsi, par exemple, que Trotsky, dans son Historie de la Révolution russe, fera constamment la distinction entre »le processus moléculaire des masses«, »la roue géante des masses« et l'action menée par les formations politiques révolutionnaires, en premier lieu le parti bolchevique.

Ce sont les anarchistes de langue française qui ont mis en circulation le mot »spontanéité«. Peut-être parce que plus voluntaristes que les fondateurs du marxisme et violemment hostiles à toute forme d'autorité de source jacobine. Proudhon écrit: »Ce qu'il importe de relever dans les mouvements populaires, c'est leur parfaite spontanéité«. Et encore: »Une révolution sociale (...) est une transformation qui s'accomplit spontanément (...) Elle n'arrive pas au commandement d'un maître ayant une théorie toute faite (...) Une Révolution (...) n'est vraiment l'oeuvre de personne.«

Après lui, Bakounine répète que les révolutions »se font comme d'elles-mêmes, produites par la force des choses, par le mouvement des événements et des faits. Elles se préparent longtemps dans la profondeur de la conscience instinctive des masses populaires, puis elles éclatent.« Dans la Révolution sociale »l'action des individus « est »presque nulle et l'action spontanée des masses doit »être tout«.

Cependant les deux penseurs libertaires, contrairement à ce qu'imaginent leurs adversaires marxistes, s'ils mettent l'accent sur la spontanéité, ne font nullement fi du rôle des élites conscientes. Proudhon observe que »des idées qui à toutes les époques ont agité les masses étaient écloses antérieurement dans le cerveau de quelque penseur (...) La priorité ne fut jamais aux multitudes«.

Quant à Bakounine, il prescrit aux révolutionnaires conscients l'impérieux devoir »d'aider la naissance d'une révolution en répandant dans les masses des idées« correspondant à leur instinct, »de servir d'intermédiaires entre l'idée révolutionnaire et les instincts populaires«, »de contribuer à l'organisation révolutionnaire de la puissance naturelle des masses.«³

Il convient de préciser ici que les anarchistes, si »spontanéistes« qu'ils puissent paraître, ne rejettent pas pour autant *l'organisation*. A leurs yeux, comme l'a souligné avec force l'Italien Malatesta, les deux concepts sont inséparables et complémentaires.

Mais la notion marxiste d'auto-activité et la notion anarchiste de spontanéité ont été dépréciées par des marxistes tels que Kautsky d'abord, Lénine ensuite.

Pour Kautsky, il serait »entièrement faux« que la conscience socialiste soit le résultat nécessaire, direct du mouvement de la

² Manifest der Kommunisten, 1848.

³ Cf. D. G., Ni Dieu ni Maître, Anthologie de l'anarchisme, rééd. 1970, I, pp. 137-138, 222; II, pp. 25-26.

This differentiation, to be sure, was still embryonic, hardly perceptible in 1847. But it will take shape more clearly in a later phase and it is thus, for example, that Trotsky, in his History of the Russian distinction between "the molecular process of the masses", "the giant wheel of the masses" and the action carried out by the revolutionary political formations, in the first place the Bolshevik party.

It was the French-speaking anarchists who put the word »spontaneity« into circulation. Perhaps because they were more voluntarist than the founders of Marxism and violently hostile to any form of Jacobin authority. Proudhon writes: »What is important to note in popular movements is their perfect spontaneity«. And again: "A social revolution (...) is a transformation which takes place spontaneously (...) It does not happen at the command of a master with a readymade theory (. . .) A Revolution (...) is really nobody's work.«

After him, Bakunin repeats that revolutions "take place as of themselves, produced by the force of things, by the movement of events and facts. Elijah prepares for a long time in the depth of the instinctive consciousness of the popular masses, then they break out. "In the Social Revolution" the action of individuals "

is »almost nil and the spontaneous action of the masses« must »be everything«.

However, the two libertarian thinkers, contrary to what their Marxist adversaries imagine, while they emphasize spontaneity, in no way ignore the role of conscious elites.

Proudhon observes that "ideas which at all times have agitated the masses had previously hatched in the brain of some thinker (...) Priority was never given to the multitudes".

As for Bakunin, he prescribes to conscious revolutionaries the imperious duty "to help the birth of a revolution by spreading among the masses ideas" corresponding to their instinct,

»to serve as intermediaries between the revolutionary idea and the popular instincts«, »to contribute to the revolutionary organization of the natural power of the masses.«3

It should be specified here that the anarchists, so »spontaneistic«

though they may appear, do not reject the organization.

In their eyes, as the Italian Malatesta forcefully underlined, the two

concepts are inseparable and complementary.

But the Marxist notion of self-activity and the anarchist notion of spontaneity have been depreciated by Marxists such as K autsky first, then Lenin.

For K autsky, it would be »entirely wrong« for socialist consciousness to be the necessary, direct result of the movement of socialism.

* M anifest der K o m m unisten, 1848.

3 Cf. D. G., Neither God nor Master, Anthology of anarchism, reed. 1970, I, pp. 137—138, 222; II, pp. 25—26.

masse prolétarienne. Le socialisme et la lutte de classe seraient issus de prémisses différentes. La conscience socialiste surgirait de la science. Or les porteurs de la science, ce sont, jusqu'à nouvel ordre, les intellectuels issus de la bourgeoisie. C' est par eux que le socialisme scientifique aurait été »communiqué« aux ouvriers. »La conscience socialiste, prétend Kautsky, est un élément importé du dehors dans la lutte de classes du prolétariat, et non quelque chose qui en surgit spontanément«.4

Lénine, s'il ne conteste pas l'existence de la spontanéité, ne cache pas qu'il s'en méfie. Îl le fait d'ailleurs en termes quelque peu contradictoires. Tantôt il admet qu'elle »n'est au fond que la forme embryonnaire du conscient«. Tantôt il use de mots plus péjoratifs: spontanéité est pour lui synonyme d'»inconscience« (sic). 5 Il estime que les ouvriers dispersés, opprimés, plongés dans l'abêtissement (sic) sous le capitalisme ne peuvent pas encore, dans leur large majorité, possèder une conscience de classe socialiste et que celle-ci ne peut leur être apportée que de l'extérieur.

Mais Lénine va encore plus loin: l'avant-garde révolutionnaire doit se garder de »toute soumission servile à la spontanéité du mouvement ouvrier«. S'incliner devant cette spontanéité ce serait ramener l'avant-garde à n'être qu'une »simple servante« du mouvement prolétarien, ce serait »l'écrasement complet de l'avant-garde par la spontanéité«. »Notre tâche, écrit-il, est de combattre (sic) la spontanéité«. »La lutte spontanée du prolétariat ne deviendra une véritable lutte de classes que lorsqu'elle sera dirigée par une forte organisation révolutionnaire«.7

Rosa Luxemburg réagit contre la déviation autoritaire de Kautsky et de Lénine pour revivifier la notion d'auto-activité, dont elle use parfois et qu'elle emprunte à Marx, ou de spontanéité vocable dont elle se sert le plus souvent et qu'elle doit bien qu'elle s'en défende — aux anarchistes.

Pour elle, spontanéité et conscience ne sont pas des processus séparés. C'est au cours même de la lutte que l'armée du prolétariat prend toujours davantage conscience des devoirs de cette lutte. L'avant-garde prolétarienne consciente est en état de permanent »devenir«.8

Plus le prolétariat augmente en nombre et en conscience moins l'»avant-garde« instruite est fondée à se substituer à lui. Au fur et à mesure que la cécité de la masse recule devant son éducation, la base sociale sur laquelle reposaient les »chefs« est détruite. C'est la masse qui devient la dirigeante et ses »chefs« ne sont plus que »les exécutants, les instruments de son action consciente«. L'»inconscience« de la classe ouvrière appartient à un passé révolu. Le seul sujet auquel incombe aujourd'hui le rôle de dirigeant

⁴ Karl Kautsky, Die Neue Zeit, 1901—1902, XX, I, pp. 79—80, cit. par Lénine, Que faire?, 1902.

⁵ Lénine, Ibidem, 450.

⁶ Du même, Un pas en avant, deux pas en arrière, mai 1904.

⁷ Lénine, Que faire?

⁸ R. L., Organisationsfragen der Russischen Sozialdemokratie, ds Die Neue Zeit, XXII, t. 2, 1904.

from the bourgeoisie. It is through them that scientific socialism would have been "communicated" to the workers.

"Socialist consciousness, argues Kautsky, is an important element in the class struggle of the proletariat from without, and not something that arises spontaneously from it."4

Lenin, if he does not dispute the existence of spontaneity, does not hide that he mistrusts it. He does so in somewhat contradictory terms. Sometimes he admits that it "is basically only the embryonic form of the conscious". Sometimes he uses more pejorative words: spontaneity is for him synonymous with "unconsciousness".

(sic).5 He believes that the dispersed, oppressed workers, immersed in abetment (sic) under capitalism6 cannot yet, in their large majority, possess a socialist class consciousness and that this cannot be theirs. brought only from the outside.

But Lenin goes even further: the revolutionary vanguard must guard against "any slavish submission to the spontaneity of the workers' movement". To bow before this spontaneity would be to reduce the vanguard to being only a "simple servant" of the proletarian movement, it would be "the complete crushing of the vanguard".

-guard by spontaneity«. »Our task, he writes, is to fight (sic) spontaneity«. "The spontaneous struggle of the proletariat will only become a real class struggle when it is led by a strong revolutionary organization."7

Rosa Luxem burg reacts against the authoritarian deviation of K autsky and Lenin to revive the notion of auto-activity, which she sometimes uses and which she borrows from Marx, or of spontaneity which she most often uses and which she must defend herself against it — to the anarchists.

For her, spontaneity and consciousness are not separate processes. It is during the very course of the struggle that the army of the proletariat becomes ever more aware of the duties of this struggle.

The conscious proletarian vanguard is in a permanent state

»become«.8

The more the proletariat increases in number and in consciousness, the less the educated "vanguard" is founded to replace it. As the blindness of the masses recedes before their education, the social base on which the "leaders" rested is destroyed.

It is the mass that becomes the leader and its »leaders« are only »the performers, the instruments of its conscious action«.

The "unconsciousness" of the working class is a thing of the past. The only subject to whom the role of leader falls today 4 K arl Kautsky, Die N eue Zeit, 1901—1902, XX, I, pp. 79—80, cit. by Lćnine, What to do?, 1902.

- 5 Lenin, Ibid., 450.
- 8 From the same, One step forward, two steps back, May 1904.
- 7 Lenin, What to do?
- 8 R. L., Organizational Questions of Russian Social-Democracy, ds Die Neue Zeit, XXII, t. 2, 1904.

est le Moi collectif (das Massen-Ich) de la classe ouvrière. Ce processus, certes, n'est pas instantané et il ne suit pas une ligne droite. Aussi »la transformation de la masse en dirigeante sûre, consciente, lucide n'est-elle et ne peut-elle être qu'un processus dialectique.«

Rosa passe maintenant de considérations théoriques à la *praxis* de son temps.

Dès 1904, donc avant la Révolution russe de 1905, elle affirme: »Les revirements de tactique les plus importants et les plus féconds des dix dernières années n'ont pas été l'invention de quelques dirigeants (...), mais ils ont été chaque fois le produit spontané du mouvement même se déchaînant.« La Révolution de 1905 va lui donner raison.

Elle écrit, alors, enthousiaste: »Dans les principales usines de tous les centres industriels importants se constituent spontanément des conseils ouvriers« (...) Des syndicats neufs, jeunes, vigoureux et joyeux s'élèvent comme Vénus de l'écume marine (...). Tantôt la vague du mouvement déferle sur tout l'Empire, tantôt elle se subdivise en un réseau gigantesque de minces torrents; tantôt elle jaillit des profondeurs comme une source vive, tantôt elle s'écoule tout entière dans le sol.« Toutes les formes de lutte »coulent pêle-mêle, parallèlement, s'entrecroisent, s'inondent l'une l'autre: c'est une mer de phénomènes éternellement en mouvement et fluctuante, (...) la pulsation vivante de la Révolution et en même temps sa plus puissante roue motrice, (...)«9

Le ton lyrique de Rosa peut surprendre. Mais l'intuition qu'elle a du mouvement élémentaire des masses, la façon dont elle le compare aux phénomènes de la nature, est un des traits les plus originaux de sa personnalité, un de ceux qui lui assignent une place à part dans le marxisme. Dans une lettre, elle recourt encore à des images marines pour accéder aux secrets de la puissance, et aussi de la versatilité, du mouvement des masses: »L'âme des masses recèle toujours en elle, comme la Thalatta, la mer éternelle, toutes les possibilités latentes: calmes plats mortels et tempête déchaîne, lâcheté la plus basse et héroisme le plus exacerbé. Drôle de capitaine, en vérité, celui qui piloterait son navire en fonction, de l'aspect momentané de la surface des flots et qui ne saurait pas, sur des signes en provenance du ciel et des profondeurs, prévoir l'arrivé des tempêtes.«10

C'est que Rosa n'a qu'une confiance relative dans les organisations politiques conscientes. Elle relève nombre de leurs carences par rapport à l'initiative créatrice de la classe ouvrière. Elle soutient qu'en de multiples occasions révolutionnaires l'avant-garde, loin de précéder et, comme elle en a la prétention, de »diriger«, est, en réalité, à la remoque du mouvement des masses.

Elle avait déjà tiré cette observation de l'expérience des luttes sociales qui s'étaient déroulées en Russie avant 1904: »L'initiative et la direction consciente des organisations socialistes n'y ont (...)

[•] Massenstreik, Partei und Gewerkschaften, 1906.

¹⁰ Lettre à Mathilde Wurm, ds Briefe an Freunde, Hamburg, 1950, p. 47.

Also "the transformation of the masses into a sure, conscious, lucid leader is not and can only be a dialectical process."

Rosa now moves from theoretical considerations to the praxis of her time.

From 1904, therefore before the Russian Revolution of 1905, she affirmed:

"The most important and fruitful reversals in tactics of the last ten years have not been the invention of a few leaders (. . .), but each time they have been the spontaneous product of the very movement unleashed ."The Revolution of 1905

will prove him right.

She then writes enthusiastically: "In the main factories of all the important industrial centers workers' councils are spontaneously formed" (...) New, young, vigorous and joyful unions are rising like Venus from the sea foam (...).

Sometimes the wave of the movement breaks over the whole Empire, sometimes it is subdivided into a gigantic network of thin torrents; sometimes it springs from the depths like a living spring, sometimes it flows entirely into the ground.

"flow pell-mell, parallel, intertwine, inundate one another: it is a sea of phenomena eternally in motion and fluctuating, (...) the living pulsation of the Revolution and at the same time its most powerful driving wheel, (...).«9

Rosa's lyrical tone may surprise. But the intuition she has of the elementary movement of the masses, the way in which she compares it to the phenomena of nature, is one of the most original traits of her personality, one of those which assign her a special place. in Marxism. In a letter, she again resorts to marine images to access the secrets of power, and also of the versatility, of the movement of the masses:

»The soul of

masses always conceals within it, like the Thalatta, the eternal sea, all the latent possibilities: deadly flat calms and temporary

wild pete, the lowest cowardice and the most exacerbated heroism.

Funny captain, in truth, the one who would pilot his ship according to

the momentary aspect of the surface of the waves and who could not, on signs coming from the sky and the depths, predict the arrival of the storms. farts. $\ll 10$

This is because Rosa has only relative confidence in conscious political organizations. It reveals many of their shortcomings in relation to the creative initiative of the working class. It maintains that on many revolutionary occasions the avant-garde, far from preceding and, as it claims, from "leading", is, in reality, in the wake of the movement of the masses.

She had already drawn this observation from the experience of the social struggles which had taken place in Russia before 1904: "The initiative and the conscious direction of the socialist organizations have not (...)

• Mass strike, party and unions, 1906.

10 Lettre & M athilde W urm, ds letters to friends, Hamburg, 1950, p. 47

joué qu'un rôle insignifiant.« Elle souligne »le contraste entre l'assaut impétueux de la masse et la position hésitante du socialisme.« Elle va jusqu'à dire: le parti joue un rôle naturellement conservateur.11

Cette estimation se trouva renforcée par le déchaînement de la Révolution de 1905. Le parti socialiste russe participa, certes, à la révolution, mais il n'en fut pas l'auteur. Il ne put qu'en apprendre les lois au fur et à mesure des événements, car »les révolutions ne s'apprennent pas à l'école.« Quand toutes les bases de la société craquent et s'effondrent, quand des masses populaires énormes entrent en scène, toute tentative pour régler d'avance le mouvement »apparaît comme une entreprise désespérée. Une révolution de cette ampleur et de cette profondeur ne se règle pas »crayon en main, au cours d'une paisible conférence secrète tenue par les instances supérieures du mouvement ouvrier.« Et ici, une fois de plus, Rosa recourt aux métaphores marines et aquatiques: les initiatives du parti socialiste »sont, dans l'immense bilan de la révolution, comme une goutte d'eau dans la mer«; toutes les prévisions »sont aussi vaines que la prétention de vider l'Océan avec un verre d'eau.«

Cependant, malgré toutes ses réserves quant aux capacités du parti, Rosa n'est point, comme on l'a accuse à tort, »spontanéiste«. Elle croit au rôle d'une avant-garde politique consciente. Elle proclame indispensable la direction des luttes par un parti révolutionnaire. C'est qu'elle n'ignore pas les dangers d'une spontanéité désordonnée, exaspérée qui ferait se précipiter les masses dans la lutte, aveuglément, et n'aboutirait -dit-elle-qu'à une »confusion chaotique«. Les masses ne doivent pas être laissées la bride sur le cou, elles doivent entrer sur le champ de bataille, dit-elle, »comme une armée éduquée politiquement«.12

Dans so écrit sur la Révolution russe de 1905 alternent les passages où elle souligne les relatives carences du parti socialiste et ceux où elle salue l'utilité de ses interventions. L'explosion, certes, dit--elle, fut spontanée. »Mais dans la manière dont le mouvement fut mis en branle se sont manifestés les fruits de la propagande menée pendant plusieurs années par le socialisme: les propagandistes socialistes sont restés à la tête du mouvement, l'ont dirigé.« Ce cont les organisations socialistes qui ont appelé à grève: empêtrée dans ces contradictions, elle écrit tantôt qu'elles l'ont fait »partout«, tantôt qu'elles l'ont fait »plus d'une fois«.18

Et, s'adressant à la social-démocratie allemande, Rosa répète: »L'initiative ainsi que la direction des opérations (...) incombent tout naturellement à la partie la plus éclairée et la mieux organisée du prolétariat, à la social-démocratie.« Ainsi la social-démocratie ne joue plus un rôle conservateur; elle est proclamée maintenant »l'avant-garde du prolétariat.«14

¹¹ R. L., Organisationsfragen..., cit.

¹² Wahlrechtskampf und Massenstreik, discours au congrès de Magdeburg, 1910, Gesammelte Werke, IV, 1928.

13 R. L., Massenstreik..., cit.

¹⁴ Ibidem

conservative role.11

This estimate was reinforced by the unleashing of the Revolution of 1905. The Russian Socialist Party took part in the revolution, of course, but it was not its author. He could only learn its laws as events unfolded, for "revolutions cannot be learned at school." on entering the stage, any attempt to regulate the movement in advance appears like a desperate enterprise. A revolution of this breadth and depth cannot be regulated

»pencil in hand, during a peaceful secret conference held by the higher authorities of the workers' movement. are, in the immense balance sheet of the revolution, like a drop of water in the sea; all predictions "are as vain as the pretense of emptying the ocean with a glass of water."

However, despite all her reservations about the abilities of the party, Rosa is not, as she has been wrongly accused, "spontaneist".

She believes in the role of a conscious political vanguard. It proclaims indispensable the direction of struggles by a revolutionary party. It is because she is not unaware of the dangers of a disorderly, exasperated spontaneity which would cause the masses to rush into struggle, blindly, and would only end - she says - in "chaotic confusion". The masses must not be let loose, they must enter the battlefield, she says, "like a politically educated army." 12

In her writing on the Russian Revolution of 1905, alternate passages in which she underlines the relative shortcomings of the socialist party and those in which she salutes the usefulness of its interventions. The explosion, of course, she says, was spontaneous. But in the way in which the movement was set in motion, the fruits of the propaganda carried out for several years by socialism appeared: the socialist propagandists remained at the head of the movement, directed it.

This cont the socialist organizations which called for a strike: embroiled in these contradictions, she writes sometimes that they did it

»everywhere«, as long as they did it »more than once« 13

And, addressing German social democracy, Rosa repeats:

"The initiative as well as the direction of operations (...) fall quite naturally to the most enlightened and best organized part of the proletariat, to social democracy." conservative; it is proclaimed now

»Vanguard of the proletariat.«u

11 R. L., Organisationsfragen. . . , cit.

13 Suffrage struggle and mass strike, discours au congrès de Magdeburg, 1910, Collected Wertce, IV, 1928.

13 R. L., M assenstreik . . . , cit.

14 Ibidem

On aurait cru comprendre, tout à l'heure, que spontanéité des masses est le moteur de l'action révolutionnaire. Maintenant le moteur, c'est le parti. L'énergie révolutionnaire ne provient plus des masses. Elle est engendrée par le parti.

Pourtant les disciples les plus autorisés de Rosa, tels le regretté Paul Frölich et Lelio Basso que nous entendrons bientôt ici, semblent ne pas s'apercevoir de cette contradiction. s'essaient à démontrer que, chez Rosa, l'auto-activité des masses et la direction politique se marieraient dans une harmonieuse et cohérente syntthèse. 15

J'en suis, pour ma part, moins convaincu. Certes Rosa a eu raison, cent fois raison de vouloir compléter et dépasser la spontanéité par la conscience. Mais, nous allons le voir, les formations politiques qu'elle investit du rôle de détenteurs de la conscience ne me paraissent pas avoir été dignes de remplir la fonction qu'elle leur attribuait.

Où donc Rosa Luxemburg l'avait-elle vu, ce parti révolutionnaire idéal, susceptible de diriger le prolétariat?

Elle prêta à la social-démocratie allemande des mérites dont elle savait et dont elle n'a jamais dissimulé que son parti en était démuni. Elle a consacré la quasi totalité de sa carrière politique à combattre le révisionnisme et le »crétinisme parlementaire«; quand éclata la Première Guerre mondiale, elle a pourfendu le social-patriotisme. Quelques-unes de ses lettres privées trahissent, plus encore que ses écrits publics, son découragement, son scepticisme quant à un possible redressement d'un parti enlisé de plus en plus dans le »marécage« de l'opportunisme.¹6

Le parti idéal? Elle ne croyait pas non plus que le type d'organisation léniniste fût l'oiseau rare, à même de consilier avec efficacité spontanéité et conscience. Dès 1904, elle avait lancé une mise en garde: elle ne concevait pas »de plus grand danger pour la social-démocratie russe« que la conception léniniste de l'organisation car »rien ne livre plus aisément et plus sûrement un mouvement ouvrier encore jeune à la soif de pouvoir des intellectuels que cette cuirasse bureaucratique où on l'enserre«.¹⁷

Alors quel parti? Quelle avant-garde?

La banqueroute de la social-démocratie et du socialisme international emènera enfin Rosa, après de longues hésitations, bala-yées par la révolution allemande, à admettre une scission devant laquelle elle avait si longtemps reculé. Mais ce ne sera qu'à la veille de sa mort qu'elle croira avoir enfin trouvé dans la Ligue Spartakus la formule d'un parti révolutionnaire de type nouveau, ni social-démocrate ni léniniste: »La Ligue Spartakus, était-il dit dans le Programme, n'est pas un parti qui voudrait arriver par

¹⁵ Paul Frölich, »Zum Streit über die Spontaneität«, revue Aufklärungen, 1953; — Lelio Basso, préface aux Scritti Politici de R. L., Rome, 1967; — en allemand: Rose Luxemburg's Dialektik der Revolution, Frankfurt, 1969.

¹⁶ R. L., Lettres des 27 octobre et 17 décembre 1904, ds Henrieite Roland-Holst, Rosa Luxemburg: ihr Leben und Wirken, Zurich, 1937, pp. 210—216.

¹⁷ R. L., Organisationsfragen ..., cit.

engendered by the party.

However, the most authoritative disciples of Rosa, such as P aul Frolich and Lelio Basso, whom we will soon hear here, do not seem to notice this contradiction, try to show that, in Rosa, the self-activity of the masses and political leadership would marry in a harmonious and coherent synthesis.15

I, for one, am less convinced. Certainly Rosa was right, a hundred times right in wanting to complete and go beyond spontaneity through consciousness. But, as we will see, the political formations that it invests with the role of bearers of consciousness do not seem to me to have been worthy of fulfilling the function that it attributed to them.

Where did Rosa Luxemburg l'avait-elle vu, ce parti revolutionary ideal, capable of leading the proletariat?

She attributed to German Social Democracy merits of which she knew and which she never concealed that her party lacked. She devoted almost all of her political career to fighting revisionism and "parliamentary cretinism"; when the First World War broke out, she defended social patriotism. Some of his private letters betray, even more than his public writings, his discouragement, his skepticism as to a possible recovery of a party that is increasingly bogged down in the "swamp" of opportunism.16

The ideal party? Nor did she believe that the Leninist type of organization was the rare bird capable of advising spontaneity and conscience with efficiency. As early as 1904, she had issued a warning: she did not conceive of "a greater danger for Russian social democracy" than the Leninist conception of the organization because "nothing delivers more easily and more surely a movement still young worker has the thirst for power of the intellectuals that this bureaucratic breastplate in which he is encased.

So which party? What vanguard?

The bankruptcy of social democracy and international socialism will finally lead Rosa, after long hesitations, swept away by the German revolution, to admit a split before which she had recoiled for so long. But it was only on the eve of her death that she believed that she had finally found in the Spartakus League the formula for a revolutionary party of a new type, neither social-democratic nor Leninist: "The Spartakus League was he says in the Program m e, is not a party which would like to arrive by 15 P aul Frolich, »Zum S tre it iiber die

Spontaneitat«, magazine A ujkldrungen, 1953; — Lelio Basso, preface to S critti Politici by R. L., Rome, 1967; — in German: Rose L u xem b u rg 's D ialektik der Revolution, Frank fu rt, 1969.

Ifl R. L., L ettres des 27 octobre e t 17 decembre 1904, ds Henrieite Roland-Holst, Rosa Luxemburg: ihr Leben und W irken, Zurich, 1937, pp.

210-216.

17 R. L., The question of organization. . . , cit.

dessus les masses ouvrières à établir sa domination; la Ligue Spartakus veut seulement être en toute occasion la partie du prolétariat la plus consciente du but commun.«

L'objectif socialiste à atteindre, c'était »que la grande masse travailleuse cesse d'être une masse dirigée, mais au contraire se mette à vivre par elle-même toute la vie politique et économique, à la diriger par son auto-détermination toujours plus consciente et plus libre.«

Dans son Discours sur le Programme, Rosa commenta: »Le socialisme ne sera pas fait et ne peut être réalisé par décrets, et pas davantage par un gouvernement socialiste, si parfait qu'il soit. Le socialisme doit être fait par les masses, par chaque prolétaire (...) Il ne suffit pas de renverser le pouvoir officiel central et de le remplacer par une paire ou par quelques douzaines d'hommes nouveaux. Il nous faut conquérir le pouvoir politique non par en haut, mais par en bas.« »La masse doit, en exerçant le pouvoir, apprendre à l'exercer. Il n'est pas d'autre moyen de le lui inculquer.«

En somme, Spartakus s'efforçait de reproduire en Allemagne le modèle russe de la fin de 1917 et de la première moitié de 1918, où les bolcheviks avaient, pour une courte période, concédé »tout le pouvoir aux soviets.«

Certes Rosa s'était abstenue, sur le conseil de ses amis politiques, d'exprimer publiquement son opinion sur le bolchevisme, afin de ne pas démoraliser les travailleurs allemands. Mais fort bien informée du fond de sa prison, elle savait pertinemment à quel point la réalité soviétique s'écartait de la socialisation proposée par la Ligue Spartakus. Elle l'avait avoué confidentiellement dans une brochure qui ne devait être imprimée que beaucoup plus tard, en 1922.18 Elle n'ignorait donc pas, au moment de fonder Spartakus, que la démocratie des soviets n'avait duré que quelques mois en Russie et qu'elle avait deja fait place à un régime étatique dictatorial. Elle savait que la paralyse gagnait la vie dans les soviets et que la bureaucratie demeurait le seul élément actif. Le pouvoir réel ne se trouvait plus entre les mains des ouvriers et de leurs conseils, mais d'une douzaine de chefs de parti. Quant à la classe ouvrière, elle était »invitée de temps en temps à assister à des réunions pour applaudir aux discours des dirigeants et voter à l'unanimité les résolutions propesées. « Ce n'était » pas la dictature du prolétariat mais la dictature d'une poignée de politiciens, c'est--à-dire dans le sens bourgeois, dans le sens de l'hégémonie jacobine.« Une dictature, oui, admettait Rosa, mais cette dictature aurait dû »être l' oeuvre de la classe, et non pas d'une petite minorité qui dirige au nom de la classe.«19

Ainsi donc la synthèse entre spontanéité et »direction« qu'avait cru trouver Spartakus était fragile. Elle s'inspirait d'un modèle extérieur dont les carences étaient déjà visibles à l'oeil nu. En outre, Spartakus, pour son malheur, ne dura que l'espace d'un

19 Ibidem.

¹⁸ R. L., Die Russische Revolution, publié par Paul Levi.

The socialist objective to be achieved was that the great working masses cease to be a ruled mass, but on the contrary begin to live all political and economic life by themselves, to direct it by their own - ever more conscious and freer determination.«

In his Discourse on the Programme, Rosa commented: "Socialism will not be and cannot be achieved by decrees, nor by a socialist government, however perfect it may be.

Socialism must be made by the masses, by each proletarian (...) It is not enough to overthrow the central official power and replace it with a pair or a few dozen new men. We must conquer political power not from above, but from below." "The masses must, by exercising power, learn to exercise it. There is no other way of inculcating it in him.«

In short, Spartakus was trying to reproduce in Germany the Russian model of late 1917 and the first half of 1918, when the Bolsheviks had, for a short time, ceded "all power to the soviets."

Certainly Rosa had abstained, on the advice of her political friends, from publicly expressing her opinion on Bolshevism, so as not to demoralize the German workers. But very well informed about the depths of her prison, she was well aware of the extent to which Soviet reality deviated from the socialization proposed by the Spartakus League. She had confessed this confidentially in a pamphlet which was not to be printed until much later, in 1922. few months in Russia and that it had already given way to a dictatorial state regime. She knew that paralysis prevailed in the Soviets and that bureaucracy remained the only active element.

Real power was no longer in the hands of the workers and their councils, but of a dozen party leaders. As for the working class, it was "invited from time to time to attend meetings to applaud the speeches of the leaders and to vote unanimously on the proposed resolutions. "It was not" the dictatorship of the proletariat but the dictatorship of a handful of politicians, is it

that is to say in the bourgeois sense, in the sense of Jacobin hegemony. a small minority that rules in the name of the class."19

Thus, the synthase between spontaneity and "direction" that Spartakus thought he had found was fragile. It was inspired by an external model whose deficiencies were already visible to the naked eye. Furthermore, Spartakus, to its misfortune, only lasted the space of an 18 R. L., Die Russische Revolution, published by Pau l Levi.

matin: il n'eut donc pas le temps de structurer son organisation et ses méthodes d'action, ni de mettre au point ses rapports avec le nouveau pouvoir, en l'espèce le Conseil central des conseils d'ouvriers et de soldats.

La recherche de Rosa Luxemburg est donc demeurée inachevée aussi bien sur le plan de la théorie que sur celui de la pratique. Elle n'a pas réussi à découvrir une exacte synthèse entre spontanéité et organisation consciente. Dans deux articles, écrits à la veille de sa mort, elle n'a pu se borner qu'à une indication brève, mais insuffisante. La voici: ce qu'il eût fallu au soulevement spartakiste, ce qui lui avait manqué, c'était »une direction qui émane des masses et que les masses choisissent.« Il eût fallu »que les ouvriers révolutionnaires mettent sur pied des organismes dirigeants en mesure de guider et d'utiliser l'énergie combattive des masses«. Quelle »direction«? Quels organismes? Pas, en tout cas, ceux du jeune Parti communiste issu de Spartakus, puisque, selon Rosa elle-même, il y avait eu de sa part »absence de direction²0«!

Le problème que Rosa a soulevé n'a pu aujourd'hui encore trouver pleinement sa solution. Il est le problème des problèmes. Il est pour le mouvement révolutionnaire le problème No 1 de notre temps. Seuls, peut-être, les anarchistes dans la tradition de Bakounine et leurs héritiers espagnols ont-ils, et encore bien imparfaitement, approché le secret des relations entre masses et avantgarde: »fraternités« bakounistes au sein de la Première Internationale, Fédération Anarchiste Ibérique (F. A. I) fécondant, de l'intérieur, la Confédération Nationale du Travail (C. N. T). Mais l'anarchisme lui non plus n'a pas apporté à la question posée une réponse entièrement satisfaisante.

Ici je voudrais faire remarquer que le thème qui m'a été prescrit comme sujet de rapport était: »Spontanéité, organisation et anarchie«. Je me suis permis de remplacer dans le titre anarchie par anarchisme. En effet, le mot anarchie est un mot vieux comme le monde. Il signifie absence d'autorité ou de gouvernement. Mais le préjugé ayant régné pendant des millénaires, selon lequel les hommes ne sauraient se passer de l'un ou de l'autre, anarchie a été entendu, dans un sens péjoratif: un synonyme de désordre, de chaos, de désorganisation.

Or, par anarchie, Proudhon, plus constructeur, malgré les apparences, que destructeur, entendait tout le contraire de désordre. A ses yeux, c'etait le gouvernement qui était fauteur de désordre. Seule une société sans gouvernement pouvait rétablir l'ordre naturel, restaurer l'harmonie sociale. Pour désigner cette utopie, arguant que la langue ne lui fournissait point d'autre vocable, il choisit de restituer au vieux mot anarchie son strict sens étymologique.

L'ennui est que ce diable de mot risque de ne suggérer, pour un non-initié, qu'une idée négative. Telle est la raison pour laquelle

²⁰ »L,ordre règne à Berlin«, *Die Rote Fahne*, № 14, 14 janvier 1919, et article du 11 janvier 1919 dans le même journal.

morning: he therefore had no time to structure his organization and his methods of action, nor to develop his relations with the new power, in this case the Central Council of Workers' and Soldiers' Councils. .

Rosa Luxem burg's research has therefore remained incomplete both in theory and in practice.

It has not succeeded in discovering an exact synthase between spontaneity and conscious organization. In two articles, Merits on the eve of her death, she could only get a brief but insufficient indication. Here it is: what the Spartakist uprising needed, what it lacked, was a leadership that emanates from the masses and that the masses choose. the feet of the ruling bodies capable of guiding and utilizing the combative energy of the masses. Which way"? Which organizations? Not, in any case, those of the young Communist Party born out of Spartakus, since, according to Rosa herself, there had been a »lack of leadership20« on her part!

The problem that Rosa raised has still not been able to find its full solution today. He is the problem of problems. It is for the revolutionary movement the No. 1 problem of our time. Only, perhaps, the anarchists in the tradition of Bakunin and their Spanish heirs have approached, and still very imperfectly, the secret of the relations between the masses and the vanguard: Bakunist »fraternities« within the First International, Iberian A narchist Federation (F.A.I) fertilizing, from within, the National Confederation of Labor (C.N.T). But anarchism too has not provided an entirely satisfactory answer to the question posed.

Here I would like to point out that the theme that was presented to me as a subject of report was: »Spontaneity, organization and anarchy«. I took the liberty of replacing anarchy in the title with anarchism. Indeed, the word anarchy is a word as old as the world. It means absence of authority or government. But the prejudice having reigned for millennia, according to which men could not do without one or the other, anarchy was understood, in a pejorative sense: a synonym of disorder, chaos, disorganization.

Now, by anarchy, Proudhon, more builder, despite appearances, than destroyer, understood the opposite of disorder.

In his eyes, it was the government that was causing disorder.

Only a society without a government could restore the natural order,

restore social harmony. To designate this utopia, arguing that language provided it with no other term, he chose to restore the old word anarchy to its strict etymological meaning.

The trouble is that this devil of a word risks suggesting, for the uninitiated, only a negative idea. This is the reason why 80 »Order reigns in Berlin«, Die Rote Fahne, Ns 14, January 14, 1919, and article of January 11, 1919 in the same newspaper.

j'ai préféré employer le mot anarchisme qui exprime une doctrine constructive et moderne.

Mais assez nombreux sont aujourd'hui en France les militants de filiation anarchiste qui ne se satisfont pas non plus du mot anarchisme et qui préfèrent se dénommer soit »communistes libertaires«, soit »marxistes libertaires«. Ils s'efforcent, en effet, de trouver une synthèse entre les idées les plus valables et demurées les plus vivantes de l'héritage anarchiste et les idées, également toujours actuelles, du marxisme d'origine, c'est-à-dire du communisme scientifique et dialectique.

Les communistes libertaires français ne sont ni »spontanéistes«, ni hostiles à l'organisation: Ils pensent que la spontanéité créatrice doit se dépasser et se consolider en organisation consciente. Ils se refusent à privilégier la spontanéité aux dépens de la conscience révolutionnaire. Mais, en revanche, ils n'acceptent pas que cette organisation et cette conscience soient captées par un état-major de spécialistes qui prétende diriger le prolétariat. La tâche de ce que nous appelons, nous, »organisation des révolutionnaires«, et non parti, n'est pas celle d'une avant-garde. Pour nous l'avant-garde ne se dégage, dans la lutte, qu'au sein du prolétariat. Nous nous bornons à appuyer celle-ci; nous voudrions l'aider à s'autoorganiser; nous essayons de jouer auprès d'elle un rôle de catalyseur, de révélateur, d'antidote de toute déviation bureaucratique.

Il apparaît en effet, que, dans la France de 1971, la classe ouvrière, et plus particulièrement son aile avancée juvénile, est à la recherche, par elle-même, de nouveaux moyens de lutte, qu'elle possède l' éducation et la maturité nécessaires pour les découvrir et les expérimenter. Si la nécessité de l'organisation, si le besoin de développer la conscience, se font de plus sentir, la spontanéité créatrice n'est pas à rejeter pour autant. Car, en dépit des apparences, la Révolution que nous avons commencée en Mai 68 est loin d'être morte. Elle chemine tantôt souterrainement, tantôt à ciel ouvert. Quand elle crachera, de nouveau sa lave, il lui faudra, pour triompher, aussi bien un renouveau d'imagination créatrice des masses qu'un optimum d'organisation et de conscience.

But there are quite a number of militants of anarchist descent in France today who are not satisfied with the word anarchism either and who prefer to call themselves either "libertarian communists" or "libertarian Marxists". They strive, in fact, to find a synthesis between the most valid and still living ideas of the anarchist heritage and the ideas, also still current, of the original Marxism, that is to say say of scientific and dialectical communism.

The French libertarian communists are neither »spontaneist« nor hostile to organization: They think that creative spontaneity must go beyond and consolidate itself into conscious organization. They refuse to privilege spontaneity at the expense of revolutionary consciousness. But, on the other hand, they do not accept that this organization and this consciousness be captured by a staff of specialists who claim to lead the proletariat. The task of what we call, we, "organization of revolutionaries", and not a party, is not that of a vanguard. For us, the vanguard emerges in the struggle only within the proletariat. We confine ourselves to supporting this one; we would like to help him organize himself; we try to play the role of catalyst, revealer, antidote to any bureaucratic deviation.

It appears, in fact, that in the France of 1971, the working class, and more particularly its advanced juvenile wing, was seeking, on its own, new means of struggle, that it had the education and the maturity necessary to discover and experience them. If the need for organization, if the need to develop consciousness, are increasingly felt, creative spontaneity is not to be rejected for all that. Because, despite appearances, the Revolution that we started in May 68 is far from dead. It travels sometimes underground, sometimes under the open sky. When it spits its lava again, it will need, in order to triumph, both a renewal of the creative imagination of the masses and an optim um of organization and consciousness.

SPONTANEITÀ, RAGIONE E MODALITÀ DELLA PRAXIS

Enzo Paci

Milano

Il termina »spontaneità« è un termine che può avere molteplici significati, tanto da far pensare come possibile una vera e propria fenomenologia della praxis. Si tende, in genere, a distinguere la spontaneità del conoscere da quella dell'azione. Questa distinzione è possibile, ma porta con sé una grave serie di problemi. Accenneremo piuttosto al carattere pratico della spontaneità. Un movimento spontaneo, individuale e sociale, può essere la risposta ad una reazione, e quindi può essere mediato da una certa struttura di fatti, anche se sembra immediato e, appunto, spontaneo. La spontaneità non è quindi isolabile da un certo contesto storico--dialettico: ciò che conta è che essa sia non un atto passivo, e imposto dall'esterno, ma un atto attivo e proprio. Con il termine proprio intendiamo la propria soggettività di ogni uomo e, per certi aspetti, quello che intende Husserl quando parla di monade e di corpo proprio, che non è una somma, poniamo, di sostanza estesa e di sostanza pensante, ma è unità attiva e costruttiva. Qui si vede chiaramente come il soggetto, per Husserl, è spontaneo in quanto, pur dipendendo da una serie di azioni e reazioni, egli è cosciente di rappresentare se stesso e di ricondurre tutto a se stesso in prima persona. Bisogna notare che il problema della spontaneità propria di ogni soggetto è strettamente legato con la intercostitutività dei soggetti, uno di fronte all'altro e cioè con il problema della intersoggettività. Lo spontaneo, quindi, più che immediato è centro di operazioni consapevoli appartenenti ai soggetti propri. Ognuno dei soggetti riconosce, e non potrebbe fare diversamente, di essere al centro di una situazione e di essere il punto di partenza di un' azione o di una serie di azioni. Si deve sottolineare che la spontaneità come centralità di azioni non coincide con l'azione come un atto libero. Lo stesso soggetto corporeo e pratico non può essere creato da se medesimo ed è per questo che Husserl, pur rivendicando l'attività dei soggetti, ci fa comprendere che ogni soggetto è un factum. Noi ci troviamo come siamo e, nell'intersoggettività storica, siamo dati a noi stessi e agli altri così come siamo dati. The term »spontaneity« is a term that can have multiple meanings, so much so as to suggest that a real phenomenology of praxis is possible. In general, there is a tendency to distinguish the spontaneity of knowing from that of action. This distinction is possible, but it brings with it a serious set of problems. We will rather mention the practical nature of spontaneity. A spontaneous movement, individual and social, can be the response to a reaction, and therefore can be mediated by a certain structure of facts, even if it seems immediate and, indeed, spontaneous. Spontaneity is therefore not isolable from a certain historical context-

-dialectical: what counts is that it is not a passive act, and imposed from the outside, but an active and proper act. By the proper term we mean the own subjectivity of every man and, in certain respects, what Husserl means when he speaks of monad and proper body, which is not a sum, let's say, of extended substance and thinking substance, but is united active and constructive. Here we clearly see how the subject, for Husserl, is spontaneous in that, while depending on a series of actions and reactions, he is conscious of representing himself and of bringing everything back to himself in the first person. It should be noted that the problem of spontaneity proper to each subject is closely linked with the interconstitutivity of subjects, facing each other, that is, with the problem of intersubjectivity. The spontaneous, therefore, more than immediate, is the center of conscious operations belonging to one's own subjects. Each of the subjects acknowledges, and could not do otherwise, that they are at the center of a situation and that they are the starting point of a

action or series of actions. It must be emphasized that spontaneity as the centrality of actions does not coincide with action as a free act. The same bodily and practical subject cannot be created by himself and it is for this reason that Husserl, while claiming the activity of subjects, makes us understand that every subject is a factum. We find ourselves as we are and, in historical intersubjectivity, we are given to ourselves and to others as we are given.

Fino al momento nel quale comincia la mia attività autocosciente io porto con me tutto il mio passato e tutto il mio ambiente. La possilibità di agire realmente, nonostante che il passato — e passato è tutta la realtà fino ad un istante prima a quello in cui si inizia la mia azione consapevole — sia ormai intrasformabile-è, appunto, la possibilità di agire nonostante tutti i condizionamenti e proprio perché esistono tali condizionamenti. Se noi consideriamo struttura l'essere in quanto condizionato non dobbiamo però comprendere nell'essere condizionato l'attività soggettiva e in tal senso spontanea: questa ha la possibilità e, in certi casi, realizza tale possibilità, di agire liberamente, nei limiti in cui si trova, e di trasformare i dati di tali limiti. In questo modo la spontaneità è chiarita come fondamento della praxis sempre in relazione alle modalità accennate e anche in relazione ad una più vasta ed analitica fenomenologia della praxis.

Si deve notare che la fenomenologia della praxis prende in esame ambienti e i dati storici nonché i rapporti particolari tra soggetti, i gruppi di soggetti, le istituzioni, le correnti di vario tipo organizzativo e burocratico, i partiti, e così via. Lo spontaneo non è mai solo, è sempre in un rapporto di gruppo, in un »consiglio« di soggetti, in un'organizzazione autonoma e, nello stesso tempo, organizzata. Qui interviene il problema del rapporto tra spontaneità e disciplina. La fenomenologia della spontaneità si traforma in fenomenologia dei »consigli«, dei gruppi, per esempio dei »soviet«. In questo caso si deve osservare che non esiste una pura azione autonoma e spontanea, ma che ogni azione è, anche se non se ne rende conto, o se non ce ne rendiamo conto, potenzialmente organizzata. Importante è di trarre tutte le potenzialità organizzative implicite, o talvolta nascoste, nello spontaneo. La disciplina nasce come una necessità organizzativa e dialettica di mantenere saldi i rapporti intersoggettivi o di gruppo. Ma la disciplina stessa esige continuamente il rinnovamento dei modi con i quali i gruppi agiscono. In altre parole non esiste una regola di disciplina dogmatica e intrasformabile, ma le regole o le modalità della disciplina sono una necessità dell'azione che vuol conservare e non distruggere la spontaneità. La disciplina deve permettere e garantire lo sviluppo e la trasformazione dei centri di spontaneità, e quindi deve realizzare le esigenze della società civile composta da soggetti e da gruppi. Come sempre il richiamo alla spontaneità è il richiamo alla società civile e non allo Stato che si contrappone al vivente movimento della società civile. Un partito o uno Stato che si considerino padroni della verità e della scienza cadono nella feticizzazione, proprio nel senso con il quale Husserl considerava la caduta più grave, quella dell'idolatria, e cioè la trasformazione di alcuni elementi particolari in momenti assoluti o in un assoluto. La critica della idolatria intesa in questo senso, che va collegata al senso marxiano della feticizzazione delle merci, è anche collegata a più di dieci anni di studio sul problema del rapporto tra marxismo e fenomenologia (si veda in proposito Aut Aut n. 123-124, 1971).

I problemi a cui abbiamo accennato sono inerenti anche al tema della direzione di un partito. Un partito diretto solo dall'alto è un

Until the moment my self-conscious activity begins, I carry with me all my past and all my environment. The possibility of actually acting, despite the fact that the past - is the past and all of reality up to an

instant before the one in which my conscious action begins - is now untransformable - and, precisely, the possibility of acting despite all conditionings and precisely because such conditionings exist. If we consider being as conditioned a structure, however, we must not understand in being conditioned the subjective and in this sense spontaneous activity: this has the possibility and, in certain cases, realizes this possibility, of acting freely, within the limits in which it is found, and to transform the data of these limits. In this way spontaneity is clarified as the foundation of praxis, always in relation to the modalities mentioned and also in relation to a broader and more analytical phenomenology of praxis.

It should be noted that the phenomenology of praxis examines environments and historical data as well as the particular relationships between subjects, groups of subjects, institutions, currents of various organizational and bureaucratic types, parties, and so on. The spontaneous is never alone, and always in a group relationship, in a »council«

of subjects, in an autonomous and, at the same time, organized

organization. Here comes the problem of the relationship between spontaneity and discipline. The phenomenology of spontaneity is transformed into the phenomenology of »councils«, of groups, for example of »soviets«. In this case it must be observed that there is no pure autonomous and spontaneous action, but that every action is potentially organized, even if we do not realize it, or if we do not realize it. It is important to draw out all the implicit, or sometimes hidden, organizational potential in the spontaneous. Discipline was born as an organizational and dialectical necessity to keep intersubjective or group relationships strong! But the discipline itself continually demands the renewal of the ways in which groups act. In other words, there is no dogmatic and non-transformable rule of discipline, but the rules or modalities of the discipline are a necessity of the action that wants to preserve and not destroy spontaneity. The discipline must allow and guarantee the development and transformation of the centers of spontaneity, and therefore must fulfill the needs of civil society made up of individuals and groups. As always, the call to spontaneity is the call to civil society and not to the State which opposes the living movement of civil society. A party or state that considers itself the masters of truth and science falls into fetishization, precisely in the sense in which Husserl considered the most serious fall, that of idolatry, that is, the transformation of some particular elements into moments absolute or in an absolute. The critique of idolatry understood in this sense, which must be connected to the Marxian sense of the fetishization of goods, and also connected

to more than ten years of study on the problem of the relationship between Marxism and phenomenology (see in this regard A u t A u t n 123—124, 1971).

The problems we have mentioned are also inherent in the theme of party leadership. A party directed only from above and a 196

partito che non permette la spontaneità intesa come continuo rinnovarsi dei rapporti intersoggettivi nel partito stesso e dei rapporti intersoggettivi tra partito e società nella quale il partito vive. La regola del partito deve essere la stessa regola della società socialista considerata come telos del processo. In una società o in un gruppo ogni soggetto deve comportarsi con l'atro considerandolo soggetto e mai oggetto. Possiamo chiamare »oggettivi« i dati storici e i dati di fatto. Tuttavia bisogna fare attenzione nell'usare il termine »oggettivo« tenendo presente che rendere oggetto qualcuno, o una serie di operazioni umane, significa porsi sulla via dell' oggettivazione intesa come alienazione. Per questo Husserl considera oggettivita nel senso di alienata, la scienza in quanto essa perde il suo telos sociale che riguarda ogni uomo, o tutta l'umanità storica, e, forse il cosmos stesso.

I cenni che abbiamo dedicato al problema della spontaneità ci fanno comprendere che il rapporto tra spontaneità e non spontaneità non è univoco. Esso presenta molte vie e molte modalità, a seconda del modo di presentarsi di tali vie. Un organo centrale non è quindi l'imposizione di determinate leggi o regole dall'alto. Un partito continuamente si sviluppa in diverse linee nel dinamismo dei condizionamenti e delle attività. Questo dinamismo dialettico deve essere interpretato in modo da far vedere come la spontaneità dia luogo a diversi modelli di azione e quindi a diverse modalità della praxis. In questo modo la spontaneità è collegata alla ragione. La ragione non fissa in schemi intellettualistici provenienti dall'alto, e cioè senza rapporto con l'esperienza e con la spontaneità vissuta, ma continuamente scopre figure dialettiche. Ritroviamo qui lo schematismo di Kant la critica di Hegel all'intelletto, ma la ritroviamo sul piano pratico. La ragione a contatto con il rinnovarsi continuo dei condizionamenti e delle azioni elabora tipicità che sono quelle da seguire nella situazione storia in atto e che sono quindi tipicità modali dell'azione. Possiamo qui aggiungere che questo discorso va collegato alla particolare importanza che ha oggi, anche per il neopositivismo, logica della modalità. Non solo ma è attraverso la rivalutazione della modalità che il formalismo logico (il quale completa e svuoto spesso se medesimo nei paradossi a cui dà luogo la sua mancanza di contenuto storico e di contenuto reale ed umano) si trova di fronte, anche se ancora non lo vuole riconoscere, a dei tipi di paradossi che conducono la logica sul piano della dialettica. Come abbiamo spesso detto la crisi del neopositivismo e dello strutturalismo è un grande contributo in quanto, di fatto, tele crisi ripropone, in un modo rinnovato che deve essere esaminato, particolarmente tutti i temi della dialettica e cioè delle modalità teorico-pratiche nelle quali l'opposizione ingenua tra prassi e teoria, opposizione che ha dato tanto da fare sia agli organizzatori pratici che ai professori di formule intellettuali, si è perduta, sostituendo una dialettica fittizia alla dialettica della modalità della praxis. Tra l'altro esiste anche una dialettica tra l'apparenza e la realtà nella quale esse vengono scambiate: abbiamo in altre occasioni osservato come

a party that does not allow spontaneity understood as the continuous renewal of intersubjective relationships in the party itself and of the intersubjective relationships between the party and the society in which the party lives.

The rule of the party must be the same rule of the socialist society considered as the telos of the process. In a society or in a group, each subject must behave towards the other considering him a subject and never an object. We can call historical data and factual data »objective«. However, one must be careful in using the term »objective« bearing in mind that making someone an object, or a series of human operations, means setting oneself on the path of objectivation understood as alienation. This is why Husserl considers objectivity in the sense of alienated, science insofar as it loses its social telos which concerns every man, or all historical humanity, and perhaps the cosmos itself.

The hints that we have dedicated to the problem of spontaneity make us understand that the relationship between spontaneity and non-spontaneity is not univocal. It has many ways and many ways, depending on how these ways present themselves. A central body is therefore not the imposition of certain laws or rules from above.

A party continuously develops in different lines in the dynamism of conditionings and activities. This dialectical dynamism must be interpreted in such a way as to show how spontaneity gives rise to different models of action and therefore to different modalities of praxis. In this way spontaneity is linked to reason. Reason does not fix in intellectual schemes coming from above, i.e. unrelated to experience and lived spontaneity, but continually discovers dialectical figures.

We find here the schematism of Kant and Hegel's critique of the intellect, but we find it on a practical level. Reason, in contact with the continuous renewal of conditioning and actions, elaborates typicalities which are those to be followed in the current historical situation and which are therefore modal typicalities of the action. We can add here that this discourse must be connected to the particular importance that the logic of modality has today, even for neo-positivism. Not only that, but through the re-evaluation of the modality that logical formalism (which often completes and empties itself in the paradoxes to which its lack of historical content and real and human content gives rise) is faced, even if not yet he wants to recognize it, to the types of paradoxes that lead logic to the level of dialectics. As we have often said, the crisis of neopositivism and structuralism is a great contribution in that, in fact, telecrisis reproposes, in a renewed way that must be examined, particularly all the themes of the dialectic and that is of the theoretical-practical modalities in such as the naive

opposition between praxis and theory, an opposition that has given so much to do both to practical organizers and to professors of intellectual formulas, has been lost, substituting a fictitious dialectic for the dialectic of the modality of praxis. Among other things, there is also a dialectic between appearance and reality in which they are exchanged: we have observed on other occasions how 197

questa dialettica sia uno dei temi fondamentali del Capitale di Marx (rimando al mio libro Funzione delle scieze e significato dell'uomo).

La fenomenologia della praxis è una fenomenologia dei vari modi possibili della praxis. Come abbiamo già osservato si tratta quindi di una fenomenologia della modalità. In quanto diciamo modalità pensiamo anche ai rapporti di quantità, di qualità e di relazione (cioè ai tre tipi di categorie che Kant fa precedere alla modalità). La modalità più che una categoria è una caratteristica che riguarda tutte le categorie. Così nell'azione noi possiamo parlare di quantità dell'azione, sia perché compiuta da gruppi più o meno grandi, sia perché deve essere determinabile e distinguibile un ordine quantitativo dell'azione stessa. E' abbastanza intuitivo che l'azzione ha dei modi qualitativi. Essa può essere direttamente attiva, oppure può essere un'opposizione o una limitazione. Questi modi dell'operare danno luogo ad una dialettica che in parte è la dialettica che ci è stata presentata da Hegel e in parte quella ricostruita, propriamente nel senso pratico, da Marx. La caratteristica fondamentale di quest'ultima è che essa ha una base pratica di carattere economico, o una struttura. Il problema della struttura dà luogo allo studio dei bisogni e del lavoro e dei dati di fatto economici dell'ambiente o dei vari ambienti. Poiché la struttura è un bisogno essenziale che deve essere necessariamente soddisfatto, essa ha una necessità negativa e determinante e in tal senso dipendono da essa quelle altre strutture che il marxismo chiama sovrastrutture. Si può, come si sa, parlare anche di infrastrutture e così di seguito. Per noi il problema ci riconduce alla realtà di base dà luogo ad una fenomenologia del bisogno e dell'economia e ad una fenomenologia della psiche o fenomenologia dell'attività psicologica. E' un problema mal posto chiedersi se le due fenomenologie dipendano univocamente l'una dall'altra. Esse in realtà aprono vasti campi di studio che interessano tutta la economia, nelle sue varie parti, e tutta la psicologia contemporanea. Non si deve dimenticare che ciò che accenniamo in questo stesso nostro discorso ha senso se è riferito ad una situazione concreta e storica che si pone come centro di ogni determinazione e di ogni tipicità. Le modalità della praxis sono sempre in funzione della situazione storica presente e dei soggetti che operano in tale relazione storica. Non si tratta mai di una descrizione astratta. Perciò vengono indicati dei tipi o dei modi fenomenologici i quali possono essere corretti o posti in relazioni diverse nel momento attuale e centrale dell'azione. In ultima analisi le tipicità e i modi, a cui qui appena accenniamo, sono le specificazioni della dialettica tra gruppi, società e classi, nonché tra collettività ed ambienti e tra vasti centri collettivi che si pongono, oggi, come le grandi divisioni sociali, internazionali e nazionali del pianeta, a cui la dialettica che l'azione vuol mouvere in direzione del socialismo non può non essere collegata. Non si tratta dunque del semplice richiamo alle contraddizioni e al superamento della contraddizioni. Di fatto la fenomenologia dell'azione che si muove nelle situazioni storiche continuamente assume le contraddizioni e le soluzioni come mezzi

this dialectic is one of the fundamental themes of Marx's Capital (reference to my book The Function of Science and the Meaning of Man).

The phenomenology of praxis is a phenomenology of the various possible modes of praxis. As we have already observed, we are therefore dealing with a phenomenology of modality. In so far as we say modality we also think of the relationships of quantity, quality and relation (that is, of the three types of categories that Kant makes precede the modality). The m ode is more than a category and a characteristic that affects all categories. Thus in action we can speak of the quantity of the action, both because it is performed by more or less large groups, and because a quantitative order of the action itself must be determinable and distinguishable. It is quite intuitive that action has qualitative modes. It can be directly active, or it can be an opposition or a limitation. These ways of operating give rise to a dialectic which is in part the dialectic that was presented to us by Hegel and in part the one reconstructed, properly in the practical sense, by Marx. The fundamental characteristic of the latter is that it has a practical basis of an economic nature, or a structure. The problem of the structure gives rise to the study of the needs and of the work and of the economic facts of the environment or of the various environments. Since the structure is an essential need that must necessarily be satisfied, it has a negative and determinant need and in this sense those other structures that Marxism calls superstructures depend on it. As we know, we can also talk about infrastructures and so on. For us, the problem leads us back to basic reality and gives rise to a phenomenology of need and of the economy and to a phenomenology of the psyche or phenomenology of psychological activity. Instead, it is a problem to ask whether the two phenomenologies depend univocally on each other. They actually open up vast fields of study that affect the whole economy, in its various parts, and all of contemporary psychology. It must not be forgotten that what we mention in this same discourse of ours makes sense if it is referred to a concrete and historical situation which is the center of every determination and of every typicality.

The modalities of praxis are always a function of the present historical situation and of the subjects who operate in this historical relationship.

It is never an abstract description. Therefore, phenomenological types or modes are indicated which can be corrected or placed in different relationships in the current and central moment of the action. In the final analysis, the typicalities and ways, which we are just hinting at here, are the specifications of the dialectic between groups, societies and classes, as well as between collectivities and environments and between vast collective centers which present themselves, today, as the great social divisions, international and national organizations of

the planet, to which the dialectic that action wants to move in the direction of socialism cannot fail to be connected. It is therefore not a question of the simple reference to contradictions and the overcoming of contradictions. In fact, the phenomenology of action that moves continuously in historical situations assumes contradictions and solutions as means 198

che conducono situazioni nuove. Questo cenno ci può far capire come la modalità della praxis abbia il suo centro nel presente e cioè nella situazione storica attuale. Ciò avviene perché, considerando la storia come un processo di eventi in relazione e in controrelazione dialettica, noi vediamo nel processo storico vari momenti temporali come il presente e le sue modalità già studiate da Husserl. Bisogna sempre rifarsi al soggetto, alle relazioni tra i soggetti e alle relazioni di fondo economico psicologico e storico in atto nella società vivente intesa come società civile. Qui, a parte le grandi distinzioni della dialettica, appare il modo con cui un soggetto, unito all'ambiente, o una psiche incarnata in un corpo, si costituisce (è quello che la filosofia classica chiamava sostanza); appare il modo con il quale un soggetto, un gruppo di soggetti, un insieme di eventi (o varie sostanze), sono tra loro in un rapporto analogo a quelo di causa e di effetto (la filosofia classica parlava senz'altro di una causa meccanica: noi ci riferiamo ad una causa probabilistica); appare infine il modo, nelle sue varie caratteristiche, con il quale una causa reagisce su un effetto e un effetto reagisce su una causa (quella che la filosofia classica chiamava azione reciproca).

Si potrà ritrovare nella filosofia di Kant ciò che abbiamo precedetemente detto se si pensa alle categorie della relazione e cioè alla sostanza alla causa e alla azionereciproca. Oviamente queste categorie devono passare attraverso Hegel, Marx e attraverso il rapporto tra fenomenologia e marxismo, per arrivare a quella che noi consideriamo una filosofia della relazione specifica e generale. Questa filosofia nella qualle ogni soggetto è in relazione con tutti gli altri e nella quale la natura e l'ambiente assumono un carattere monadico può essere anche considerata come una filosofia nella quale le relazioni di qualsiasi tipo, diventano, in quanto principi di azione, soggetti, e i soggetti diventano sempre relazioni concrete, relazioni che sono opposizioni, accettazioni, contraddizioni e soluzioni, antitesi e sintesi, ma che sono, d'altra parte, comprensione tra soggetti umani e società storiche, esperienza che un soggetto ha di un altro, una collettivita di un'altra collettività, una civiltà di un'altra civiltà. Se nella società socialista ogni soggetto deve dare secondo le sue capacità e avere secondo i suoi bisogni, in una società socialista mondiale ogni gruppo, ogni collettività, ogni popolo deve offrire e dare agli altri le sue caratteristiche di gruppo o nazionali, mentre deve ricevere e aprirsi a tutte le esigenze e caratteristiche altrui. Ogni nazionalismo è valido nell'internazionalismo e ogni internazionalismo e valido in quanto è vissuto da ogni nazionalismo. Questa meta finale che è, per la storia del pianeta terra quella di una società in cui ogni soggetto sia soggetto e non oggetto (in cui sia abolito ogni sfruttamento) è quello che, in senso fenomenologico, ma anche in senso marxistico noi, riferendoci a Husserl, e precisamente alla Crisi delle scienze europee, chiamiamo telos dell'umanità. Il problema della constituzione dell'internazionalismo è parallelo al problema della concituzione da parte dell'uomo dell altro uomo: è la forma

leading to new situations. This hint can help us understand how the modality of praxis has its center in the present, that is, in the current historical situation. This is because, considering history as a process of

events in dialectical relation and counter-relation, we see in the historical process various temporal moments such as the present and its grid modalities studied by Husserl. We must always refer to the subject, to the relationships between subjects and to the underlying economic, psychological and historical relationships in place in living society understood as civil society. Here, apart from the great distinctions of dialectics, the way in which a subject, united with the environment, or a psyche embodied in a body, is constituted (and what classical philosophy called substance) appears; appears the way in which a subject, a group of subjects, a set of events (or various substances), are in a relationship analogous to that of cause and effect (classical philosophy undoubtedly spoke of a mechanical cause: we refer to a probabilistic cause); finally appears the way, in its various characteristics, with which a cause reacts on an effect and an effect reacts on a cause (what classical philosophy called reciprocal action).

What we have previously said can be found in Kant's philosophy if one thinks of the categories of the relationship, i.e. the substance, the cause and the reciprocal action. Obviously these categories must pass through Hegel, Marx and through the relationship between phenomenology and Marxism, to arrive at what we consider a specific and general philosophy of relationship.

This philosophy in which every subject is related to all others and in which nature and the environment assume a monadic character can also be considered as a philosophy in which relations of any kind become, as principles of action, subjects, and subjects always become concrete relations, relations which are oppositions, acceptances, contradictions and solutions, antitheses and synthesis, but which are, on the other hand, understanding between human subjects and historical societies, an experience which a subject has of another, a community of another community, a civilization of another civilization. If in a socialist society every individual must give according to his abilities and receive according to his needs, in a world socialist society every group, every collectivity, every people must offer and give to others his group or national characteristics, while he must receive and open up to all the needs and characteristics of others. Every nationalism is valid in internationalism and every internationalism is valid insofar as it is experienced by every nationalism. This final goal which is, for the history of planet earth, that of a society in which every subject is a subject and not an object (in which all exploitation is abolished) is what, in a phenomenological sense, but also in a moral sense Arxistically, referring to Husserl, and precisely to the Crisis of European sciences, we call the telos of humanity. The problem of the constitution of internationalism is

parallel to the problem of the constitution by man of the other man: and the form 199

più alta della costituzione intersoggetiva. Per questa ragione noi indichiamo questa posizione non solo come socialismo ma come intersocialismo.

I problemi di una fenomenologia delle modalità della praxis sono molto vasti e molto numerosi: essi designano vari campi di studio che tuttavia non esauriscono mai, per principio, il tema. Ogni attività rientra in un mondo della praxis, ma questi modi hanno vari gradi e varie qualità. Anche l'analisi storica e l'analisi empirica sono forme di praxis che rimandano però ad una praxis sempre meno astratta e sempre modificantesi, in quanto deve essere prassi del momento presento o del momento attuale. Ogni prassi è presente ma la presenza non è mai pura attività in quanto è accompagnata da tutto il passato che in essa si fa presente e dal futuro che in essa è potenziale.

Tra i vari campi della fenomenologia della prassi accenneremo solo a due: il primo è il problema della dialettica come contraddizione e come relazione; il secondo è il problema del rapporto tra mezzi e fini.

La dialettica in atto è sempre negativa ma essa è, nello stesso tempo, superamento del negativo che conserva, come dice Hegel, i caratteri positivi della tesi e dell'antitesi. Sono stati fatti e si possono, su questo tema ,impostare molti discorsi e molte ricerche. Tuttavia a noi preme sottolineare che nell'interno della relazione negativa, dei vari tipi di antitesi e di contraddizioni, nel momento stesso nel quale agisce la praxis, questa deve cogliere un momento sintetico positivo o, più semplicemente, il momento di relazione e non solo quello di negazione. Ciò che si deve sottolineare è che la relazione non deve ripetere relazioni già costituite e storicamente già esaurite: queste conducono, appunto, alla contraddizone. L'importanza del carattere positivio implicito nella dialettica è data dal fatto che ogni trasformazione, ogni riforma, ogni rivoluzione, non deve ricadere nelle contraddizioni della società che viene combattuta. L'azione continuamente sensibile a questa posizione, anche nel momento più acceso di un'azione distruttiva, deve cogliere e coglie gli elementi positivi di una costruzione. In conclusione la dialettica non è soltanto negativa ma è, e talvolta proprio nel seno stesso del movimento negativo, positiva e costruttrice. Qui noi abbiamo dato solo un cenno, ma il problema è estremamente vasto: in filosofia raccoglie tutti i vari modi con i quali la dialettica si è presentata: dai Sofisti ad Aristotele; dalle discussioni medievali fino a Cusano, della retorica all'arte dell'argomentazione, fino alla attuale rinascito di questo problema (per esempio in Perelman); dalla cosiddetta dialettica della natura al problema del rapporto tra logica e struttura fisica, tra formalismo e strutturalismo. Tutte queste indicazioni, ed altre che si potrebbero dare, rientrano nelle modalità della praxis come in questa rientrano tutti i comportamenti dell'uomo e degli esseri viventi, in una fenomenologia generale del comportamento come quella tentata da Mereau-Ponty.

L'altro tema a cui abbiamo accennato riguarda il rapporto tra mezzi e fini. Anche senza risalire a Machiavelli la fenomenologia higher than the intersubjective constitution. For this reason we refer to this position not only as socialism but as inter-socialism.

The problems of a phenomenology of the modalities of praxis are very vast and very numerous: they designate various fields of study which, however, never, in principle, exhaust the theme.

Every activity falls within a world of praxis, but these modes have various degrees and various qualities. Historical analysis and empirical analysis are also forms of praxis which, however, refer to an ever less abstract and ever changing praxis, inasmuch as it must be the praxis of the present moment or of the present moment. Every praxis is present but presence is never pure activity as it is accompanied by all the past that becomes present in it and by the future that is potential in it.

Among the various fields of the phenomenology of praxis we will mention only two: the first is the problem of dialectics as contradiction and as relation; the second is the problem of the relationship between means and ends.

The ongoing dialectic is always negative but it and, at the same time, overcoming the negative which preserves, as Hegel says, the positive characteristics of the thesis and of the antithesis. Many discourses and much research have been done and can be based on this theme.

However, we would like to underline that within the negative relationship, of the various types of antithesis and contradictions, at the very moment in which praxis acts, it must grasp a synthetic positive moment or, more simply, the m om relationship and not only that of negation. What must be emphasized is that the relationship should not repeat relationships already. constituted and historically already exhausted: these lead precisely to contradiction. The importance of the positivio character implicit in the dialectic is given by the fact that every transformation, every reform, every revolution, must not fall back into the contradictions of the society that is being fought against. The action that is continuously sensitive to this position, even in the most heated moment of a destructive action, must grasp and grasp the positive elements of a construction. In conclusion, dialectics is not only negative but positive and constructive, and sometimes precisely within the very heart of the movement. Here we have given only a hint, but the problem is extremely vast: in philosophy it brings together all the various ways in which dialectics has presented itself: from the Sophists to Aristotle; from medieval discussions up to Cusano, from rhetoric to the art of

argumentation, up to the current renaissance of this problem (for example in Perelman); from the so-called dialectic of nature to the problem of the relationship between logic and physical structure, between formalism and structuralism. All these indications, and others that could be given, fall within the modalities of praxis as all the behaviors of man and living beings fall within this, in a general phenomenology of behavior such as that attempted by M ereau-Ponty.

The other theme we have mentioned concerns the relationship between means and ends. Even without tracing the phenomenology back to Machiavelli 200 si presenta come studio dei mezzi proprio e perché è, per principio, una filosofia del telos. Si possono qui indicare due momenti. Se ogni mezzo è direttamente necessario a questo o a quel fine particolare è tuttavia necessario che l'uso del mezzo sia tale da non identificare immediatamente il fine con il mezzo stesso. E' questa la dogmatizzazione dei mezzi che, alla fine, impedisce lo sviluppo della praxis e che si presenta sempre nel campo dell'azione e deve perciò essere continuamente affrontato da una praxis positiva. Il momento che indichiamo è quindi la negazione dell'identificazione con i mezzi che vengono usati. I mezzi sono sempre relativi e mai assoluti. Qualora per un fine fosse assunto un particolare problema, un particolare conflitto, o magari la sua soluzione, come fine unico, il mezzo non sarebbe più mezzo, ma entrerebbe in contraddizione con se stesso e annullandosi annullerebbe anche il fine.

Il secondo momento è rappresentato dall'uso di attività o operazioni che in sé sono positive, ma che diventano negative se male usate. Un esempio molto chiaro è l'uso della scienza e della tecnica, in sé positive, come mezzi di distruzione dell'umanità. In quest'ultimo caso si deve però ricordare che anche quanto riguarda i suoi fondamenti scientifici una scienza che si pone contro l'umanità non è scientificamente fondata.

Vogliamo infine accennare ad un punto che è fondamentale per la nostra posizione. Tutto quello che abbiamo detto in queste pagine e tutto quello che abbiamo scritto in questi ultimi anni è rivolto allo studio e all'aplicazione del problema della modalità. Le categorie della modalità, e cioè il possibile e l'impossibile, il reale e il non reale, il necessario e il contingente, danno luogo ad una particolare logica che, come si è detto, viene studiata anche nel campo della logica formale. Non neghiamo questo studio, diciamo soltanto che è un aspetto del problema. L'altro aspetto è il ritorno nella modalità dei problemi della dialettica e la trasformazione della logica modale in dialettica scientifica e storica. Sono qui in gioco grandi problemi della previsione e della probabilità. In ultima analisi è la probabilità, e cioè un modo che permette di trasformare la possibilità in realtà, quello che ci interessa, perché questo modo è, appunto, il campo stesso della modalità della praxis.

201

it presents itself as a study of proper means and because it is, in principle, a philosophy of telos. Two moments can be indicated here. If each means is directly necessary for this or that particular end, it is nevertheless necessary that the use of the means is such as not to immediately identify the end with the means itself. It is this dogmatization of means which, in the end, prevents the development of praxis and which always occurs in the field of action and must therefore be continuously faced by a positive praxis. The moment we indicate is therefore the denial of identification with the means that are used. Means are always relative and never absolute. If for an end a particular problem, a particular conflict, or perhaps its solution, were taken as the sole end, the means would no longer be a means, but would enter into contradiction with itself and canceling itself would also cancel the end.

The second moment is represented by the use of activities or operations which are positive in themselves, but which become negative if misused. A very clear example is the use of science and technology, positive in themselves, as means of destroying humanity. In the latter case, however, it must be remembered that even as regards its scientific foundations, a science that sets itself against humanity is not scientifically founded.

Finally, we want to mention a point which is fundamental to our position. Everything we have said in these pages and everything we have written in recent years is directed towards the study and application of the modality problem.

The categories of modality, i.e. the possible and the impossible, the real and the non-real, the necessary and the contingent, give rise to a particular logic which, as has been said, is also studied in the field of formal logic. We are not denying this study, we are just saying that it is one aspect of the problem. The other aspect is the return to modality of the problems of dialectics and the transformation of modal logic into scientific and historical dialectics. Great problems of prediction and probability are at stake here.

Ultimately analysis is the probability, and that is a way that allows to transform the possibility into reality, what interests us, because this way is, precisely, the very field of the praxis modality.

201

SPONTANEITE ET ORGANISATION

Ivan Kuvačić Zagreb

Il n'est pas exagéré de dire que le sentiment du tragique compte parmi les qualités essentielles de la culture humaine. Ce sentiment, comme catégorie historique, apparaît précisément dans cet écart qui sépare la nature de la culture, et qui est caractérisé par les efforts faits par l'homme pour s'arracher, se libérer de l'emprise de l'inné, du quotidien, de l'ordinaire, et pour se tourner vers le neuf, l'inconnu, l'incertain. C'est à cela que l'on pense quand on dit que l'homme est créé à l'image de Dieu. En lui couve l'étincelle divine de la création, mais en même temps il est faible, limité, transitoire, d'où le tragique de sa position. Les plus grands élans de l'homme sont placés sous le signe d'une tragique contradiction entre la faiblesse et la vulnérabilité d'une part, et d'autre part ses aspirations à l'éternité et à la permanence. C'est là thème essentiel des suprêmes réalisations de l'art antique, exemple impérissable dont s'inspirèrent Dante, Michel-ange, Cervantes, Shakespeare, Beethoven, Goethe et tant d'autres grands de notre temps. Leurs oeuvres restent en permanence des sources d'attraction et d'inspiration, car elles contiennent, sous une forme artistique, cet écart qui sépare humain et le fatal, et dont le tragique s'ouvre sur les dimensions les plus profondes et les plus belles de l'existence humaine.

Il faut indiquer que notre époque manifeste très peu d'intérêt pour la poésie et pour l'art en général, les questions essentielles se déplaçant de plus en plus dans le sens de la philosophie et des sciences. Elles perdent ainsi beaucoup de leur tragique d'avant. A mesure que la science refoule la philosophie, on est enclin à diminuer l'importance de ces questions. On tend de plus en plus à confondre progrès et expansion pure, expansion qui n'est pas comprise comme un moyen, mais comme un but; la société s'apparente de plus en plus à un type d'appareil mécanique dont l'objectif s'épuise en une incessante production et dépense d'énergie. Tout est orienté pour la préparation de bonds technologiques qui ne s'accompagnent pas de progrès social et humain. C'est parce

Zagreb

It is no exaggeration to say that the sentiment of tragedy is one of the essential qualities of human culture. This feeling, as a historical category, appears precisely in this gap which separates nature from culture, and which is characterized by the efforts made by man to tear himself away, to free himself from the grip of innate, everyday, ordinary, and to turn to the new, the unknown, the uncertain. This is what we mean when we say that man is created in the image of God. In it broods the divine spark of creation, but at the same time it is weak, limited, transitory, hence the tragedy of its position. The greatest impulses of man are placed under the sign of a tragic contradiction between weakness and vulnerability on the one hand, and on the other hand his aspirations to eternity and permanence. This is the essential theme of the supreme achievements of ancient art, an imperishable example which inspired Dante, Michelangelo, Cervantes, Shakespeare, Beethoven, Goethe and so many other greats of our time.

Their works remain permanent sources of attraction and inspiration, because they contain, in an artistic form, this gap which separates the human and the fatal, and whose tragedy opens on the deepest dimensions and the finest of human existence.

It should be pointed out that our time manifests very little interest in poetry and in art in general, the essential questions shifting more and more in the direction of philosophy and the sciences. They thus lose much of their earlier tragedy.

As science suppresses philosophy, we are inclined to diminish the importance of these questions. We tend more and more to confuse progress with pure expansion, expansion which is not understood as a means, but as an end; society is becoming more and more like a type of mechanical apparatus whose objective is exhausted in an incessant production and expenditure of energy.

Everything is oriented towards the preparation of technological leaps that are not accompanied by social and human progress. it's because 203

que le progrès technique impose un incessant perfection nement de l'organisation de la vie, et que cette organisation a beau être et désirée et inévitable, il n'en reste pas moins qu'elle a toujours tendance à s'infléchir vers le mécanique, c'est-à-dire vers l'inhumain. C'est la raison pour laquelle elle s'opposera toujours à ce désir du spontané, de l'inimittable et du libre qui est depuis les origines une qualité indomptable de l'âme humaine. Les principes de fonctionnalité optimale qui caractérisent toute vaste organisation menacent inévitablement la spontanéité de l'individu. C'est là l'une de ces vérités que l'homme moyen est d'autant moins susceptible de combattre que ses conditions de vie sont techniquement plus parfaites.

On comprendra parfaitement que ce désir dont nous parlions trouve son expression dans la revendication d'une participation à la gestion. Les revendications de cette sorte sont de plus en plus fréquentes, notamment dans les pays qui ont atteint un haut degré de développement technique. Elles sont dirigées contre les centres de direction et de programmation qui procèdent avec les hommes comme avec de purs objets, leur enlevant initiative et activité personnelle. Les revendications pour la decentralisation des décisions prises sont une condition indispensable de la réalisation de la liberté humaine. Cette revendication, on la trouve chez presque tous les grands penseurs de notre temps qui s'inquiétent du sort de l'homme dans la société industrielle. Souvent formulée sous forme d'alternative, elle soutient que la société moderne a à choisir la décentralisation comme mise en pratique humaine de la science, ou à laisser se créer un certain nombre de super--puissances militaristes qui, par le développement du totalitarisme et de l'armement atomique, conduiront l'homme au bord de sa perte.

Dans les pays capitalistes développés, tout un mouvement s'est créé spontanement pour s'opposer à cette seconde tendance. C'est un mouvement de jeunes, en majorité des étudiants, qui croient en l'association humaine, au développement de la commune, à la résurrection et à la reconstruction des agglomérations rurales, à la décentralisation générale du pouvoir. Ils partent du principe que des hommes qui s'occupent en permanence des affaires les plus diverses sont le mieux placés pour les gérer, et en outre, ils estiment que ces hommes sont plus inventifs et plus efficaces que la bureaucratie centralisée. Ils vont jusqu'à penser qu'une suppression pure et simple du pouvoir, loin d'instaurer le chaos sur terre, susciterait une auto-régulation, car les hommes libres se comprennent facilement, choisissent les leaders qui leur plaisent et écoutent volontiers les conseils des spécialistes quand le besoin s'en fait sentir. Dans la lutte contre le complexe armée-industrie, auquel sont subordonnées toutes les institutions, y compris l'université, et qui introduit partout le principe du profit et de l'organisation rationnelle, ce mouvement développe un style de vie où domine l'immédiateté émotive, le désir d'une spontanéité et d'une créativité authentiques. Ses adeptes sont contre tout programme

that technical progress imposes an incessant perfection of the organization of life, and that this organization may well be both desired and inevitable, the fact remains that it always tends to bend towards the mechanical , that is to say towards the inhuman. This is the reason why it will always oppose this desire for the spontaneous, the inimitable and the free which has been an indomitable quality of the human soul since the beginning. The principles of optimal functionality that characterize any large organization inevitably threaten the spontaneity of the individual. This is one of those truths which the average man is less likely to contend with as his conditions of life are technically more perfect.

We understand perfectly that this desire of which we spoke finds its expression in the demand for participation in management. Claims of this kind are increasingly frequent, especially in countries which have achieved a high degree of technical development. They are directed against the centers of direction and programming which precede with men as with pure objects, depriving them of initiative and personal activity. Demands for the decentralization of decision-making are an indispensable condition for the realization of human freedom. This claim is found in almost all the great thinkers of our time who worry about the fate of man in industrial society. Often formulated in the form of an alternative, it argues that modern society has to choose decentralization as the human practice of science, or to let a certain number of super-

- m ilitarist powers which, through the development of totalitarianism and atomic armament, will lead man to the brink of his ruin.

In the developed capitalist countries, a whole movement has arisen spontaneously to oppose this second tendency. It is a movement of young people, mostly students, who believe in human association, in the development of the commune, in the resurrection and reconstruction of rural agglomerations, in the general decentralization of power. They start from the principle that men who constantly deal with the most diverse affairs are best placed to manage them, and furthermore, they believe that these men are more inventive and more efficient than the centralized bureaucracy. . They go so far as to think that a pure and simple suppression of power, far from establishing chaos on earth, would give rise to self-regulation, because free men easily understand each other, choose leaders who please them and listen. willingly the advice of specialists when the need arises. In the fight against the army-industry complex, to which all institutions are subordinated, including the university, and which introduces everywhere the principle of profit and rational organization, this movement develops a style of life dominated by emotional immediacy, the desire for authentic spontaneity and creativity. Its followers are against any program m e 204

fixe, car cette sorte de programme exige une hiérarchie rationnelle des fonctions. A la différences des organisations qui établissent des programmes rationnellement et imposent à une énorme
majorité la position de purs et simples exécutants, là, on met
l'accent que sur l'action, non comme moyen, mais comme un but
qui suffit à combler et à ennoblir. Ce désir de réhabiliter la spontanéité humaine a pour conséquence soit le mépris de l'industrie
moderne et du niveau de vie, s'accompagnant d'un retour à la vie
idyllique du village, soit, comme le montre l'exemple de Provos,
la vision d'une nouvelle Babel où tout le monde chantera, s'aimera
et fera ce qu'il lui plaît, tandis que tous les travaux dits nécessaires accomplis par des machines automatiques.

La revendication de participation à la gestion des entreprises et des institutions représente la véritable voie de la lutte pour la réhabilitation de la spontanéité humaine et pour la réalisation des tentatives et des visions dont nous parlions plus haut. Ses adeptes ne se détournent pas plus de l'industrie moderne qu'ils n'acceptent la vision d'un homme absolument exclu du processus de production. Mais sur un plan à long terme leur conception contient des elements utopiques, car elle prévoit la disparition progressive des fonctionnaires, qui agissent au nom de l'organisation, et leur remplacement par des autogesteurs, qui prennent des décisions conformes aux besoins sociaux et supportent les responsabilités. A la base de ces prévisions, on trouve la croyance en la possibilité de substituer à l'organisation bureaucratique une association de producteurs libres.

Il est bien certain que l'idée de ce que l'on appelle la »participation démocratique«, notion si répandue de nos jours, peut avoir des motifs et des sources de toutes sortes et peut aussi être utilisée de différentes manières. C'est la raison pour laquelle, en dépit de ses éléments utopiques, l'idée et sa réalisation doivent toujours être replacées dans leur situation concrète. L'exemple yougoslave est intéressant, et attire l'attention parce qu'il n'est pas né de la base, mais sur l'initiative de la gestion d'état, puis répandu comme organisation sociale dans le pays tout entier. Dans les premières étapes de son développement, il n'a pas retenu l'attention par sa seule nouveauté, mais par ses succès, alors que ces derniers temps on parle surtout de faiblesses et même de crise sérieuse. Sans entrer dans un examen exbaustif de la question, nous en examinerons quelques moments qui se rattachent au thème qui nous intéresse ici.

Le premier point est apparemment de nature terminologique. Mais derrière la terminologie se dissimule ici une question d'une importance essentielle. C'est ce dont parlait Marcuse dans la dernière partie de son rapport à Korčula en 1968 (Praxis 1/2 1969 p. 24). Pour lui, l'auto-détermination (self-determination) est la qualité distinctive de la société socialiste. Ce terme est mal traduit par le mot »autogestion« (»selbesverwaltung«). Dans l'interprétation de Marcuse, le mot »autogestion« ne désigne qu'une forme différente de gestion; il n'exprime pas clairement le contenu

fixed, because this kind of program requires a rational hierarchy of functions. Unlike organizations which establish programs rationally and impose on an enormous majority the position of pure and simple executants, there, the emphasis is only on action, not as a means, but as an end which suffices. to fill and ennoble. This desire to rehabilitate human spontaneity results either in contempt for modern industry and the standard of living, accompanied by a return to idyllic village life, or, as the example of Provos shows, , the vision of a new Babel where everyone will sing, love each other and do what they please, while all the so-called necessary work is done by automatic machines.

The demand for participation in the management of companies and institutions represents the true way of the struggle for the rehabilitation of human spontaneity and for the realization of the attempts and visions of which we spoke above. Its followers no more turn away from modern industry than they accept the vision of a man absolutely excluded from the production process. But on a long-term level their conception contains utopian elements, for it foresees the gradual disappearance of civil servants, who act in the name of the organization, and their replacement by self-managers, who make decisions in accordance with social needs. and bear the responsibilities. At the base of these forecasts, we find the belief in the possibility of replacing the bureaucratic organization with an association of free producers.

It is quite certain that the idea of what is called "democratic participation", a concept so widespread today, can have motives and sources of all kinds and can also be used in different ways. This is the reason why, despite its utopian elements, the idea and its realization must always be replaced in their concrete situation. The Yugoslav example is interesting, and attracts attention because it was not born from the grassroots, but on the initiative of state management, then spread as a social organization throughout the country. In the first stages of its development, it attracted attention not only by its novelty, but by its successes, whereas lately there is talk mainly of weaknesses and even of serious crisis. Without going into an exhaustive examination of the question, we will examine a few moments of it which relate to the theme which interests us here.

The first point is apparently of a terminological nature.

But behind the terminology lies a question of essential importance. This is what Marcuse was talking about in the last part of his report to Korčula in 1968 (Praxis 1/2 1969

p. 24). For him, self-determination is the distinctive quality of socialist society. This term is m ay translated by the word »self-management« (»selbesverwaltung«). In Marcuse's I n t e r pretation, the word "self-

management" designates only a different form of management; it does not clearly express the content 205

et les buts de la gestion, et un simple changement dans la forme de la gestion n'introduit pas encore de différence qualitative. Même si ce changement dans la gestion introduit la substitution d'une classe à une autre, ou plutôt de certains groupes d'une autre classe, la substitution n'est pas qualitative tant que la nouvelle classe perpétue les aspirations et les valeurs de la société existante, tant que le progrès capitaliste reste plus ou moins un modèle latent de progrès«. (souligné par moi). Dans la discussion qui suivit le rapport (Praxis 3/4 1969, p. 600) Marxuse a exprimé la conviction que l'autogestion peut être un stade, un pas en avant dans le processus révolutionnaire original, dans la seule mesure où la nouvelle forme de gestion est le fait d'hommes décidés et capables d'orienter le processus capitaliste de production vers un mode de vie radicalement différent. Un mode de vie où les hommes ne se contentent plus des désirs et des besoins agressifs et répressifs de la société de classe, où ils ne produisent plus la même chose dans le même but. Il n'y a donc pas autogestion tant qu'il ne s'est pas produit de changement libérateur dans tous les groupes qui participent à la gestion. S'il en était autrement, le changement ne briserait pas la continuité de la production répressive, la continuité de la production marchande. Il se contenterait d'»étendre la forme et la production marchandes à un autre niveau de gestion et de rapports«.

Autrement dit, l'autogestion, pour être autre chose qu'un simple changement dans la forme de la gestion, doit se développer à l'intérieur d'une classe ouvrière politique qui a déjà brisé les chaînes de la société de classe, car — comme dit Marcuse — nous ne pouvons pas espérer de miracle et ce changement ne se produira pas dans le processus de l'autogestion après son introduction. Bien plus, si la condition préalable n'est pas remplie, autrement dit si le développement du socialisme est ajourné au nom du progrès technique ou en tout autre nom, on voit se développer un processus inverse qui finira par l'étouffer. Le passage du principe de travail au principe de besoins est donc déterminé dans une première phase non seulement par la création d'une base matérielle et technologique, mais aussi, et de façon décisive, par le mode d'édification de cette base. Le contrôle du processus de production par les producteur directs met en branle un développement qui distingue l'histoire de l'homme libre de sa préhistoire. (Onedimensional man Boston 1964, p. 41).

Il est plus qu'évident aujord'hui que le système social existant chez nous ne représente pas une base réelle pour un mode de vie qualitativement nouveau, qu'il n'y aura pas de miracle et que l'état actuel des choses ne laisse rien espérer de ce genre. Etant donné que pour beaucoup, ce système représente une expérience socialiste qui, contrairement à ce qui se passe dans la théorie et dans la pratique technocratiques des organisations de plus en plus parfaites, met l'accent sur l'activisme volontaire et spontané des hommes, il est nécessaire, à la lumière des remarques ci-dessus, d'indiquer brièvement du moins quelques aspects de la stagnation et de la crise dont il souffre.

and goals of management, and a mere change in the form of management does not yet introduce a qualitative difference. Even if this change in management introduces the substitution of one class for another, or rather of certain groups of another class, the substitution is not qualitative as long as the new class perpetuates the aspirations and the values of existing society, so long as capitalist progress remains more or less a latent model of progress" (emphasis mine). In the discussion which followed the report (Praxis 3/4 1969, p. 600) M arxuse expressed the conviction that self-management can be a stage, a step forward in the original revolutionary process, in the only measure where the new form of management is the act of men who are determined and capable of directing the capitalist process of production towards a radically different way of life. A way of life where men are no longer content with the aggressive and repressive wants and needs of class society, where they no longer produce the same thing for the same purpose. There is therefore no selfmanagement until there has been a liberating change in all the groups that participate in management. If it were otherwise, the change would not break the continuity of repressive production, the continuity of commodity production. It would content itself with "extending the market form and production to another level of management and relations".

In other words, self-management, to be more than a mere change in the form of management, must develop within a political working class which has already broken the chains of class society, because — as Marcuse says — we cannot hope for a miracle and this change will not occur in the process of self-management after its introduction. Moreover, if the preliminary condition is not fulfilled, in other words if the development of socialism is postponed in the name of technical progress or in any other name, we see the development of an inverse process which will end up by to choke. The passage from the principle of work to the principle of needs is therefore determined in a first phase not only by the creation of a material and technological base, but also, and in a decisive way, by the mode of building this base. The control of the production process by the direct producers sets in motion a development that distinguishes the history of the free man from his prehistory. (Onedimensional man Boston 1964, p. 41).

It is more than obvious today that the social system existing in our country does not represent a real basis for a qualitatively new way of life, that there will be no miracles and that the current state of things leaves no hope of this kind. Since for many this system represents a socialist experiment which, contrary to what happens in the technocratic theory and practice of increasingly perfect organizations,

places an emphasis on voluntary activism. and spontaneous nature of men, it is necessary, in the light of the above remarks, to indicate briefly at least some aspects of the stagnation and the crisis from which it suffers.

206

Le fait le plus important pour la compréhension de la situation est peut-être l'opposition entre les forces sociales qui contrôlent et instaurent le système, et les ouvriers, porteurs naturels de l'autogestion. C'est une opposition d'intérêts, d'où naissent les principaux conflits et déformations. Les premières recherches ont aussitôt mis en évidence un véritable décalage entre le projet idéologique et l'état de choses réel. Dans les entreprises, on a vu se former rapidement des groupes et des cliques vagues mais puissants, extension de l'appareil bureaucratique, qui prennent les décisions importantes, mais n'en supportent pas la responsabilité, car ils se cachent derrière la légalité du conseil ouvrier. Preuve incontestable de leur existence, les nombreuses grèves ouvrières, qui naissent parallèlement à la structure autogestive. Il faut signaler que ces tensions ont été partiellement adoucies par l'affaiblissement de l'appareil de la police secrète. Cependant, tensions et conflits se sont développés, en même temps que la stagnation économique, le chômage et le départ des ouvriers à l'étranger, ce qui menace le système à la base. On peut en conclure que la raison principale de la déviation du mouvement par rapport à cette voie qui distingue l'histoire de l'homme libre de la préhistoire est à chercher dans le fait qu'il n'était pas placé sous le contrôle direct de forces sociales à la position et aux intérêts adéquats.

Cela prouve à coup sûr que l'on n'en est pas encore à une réorientation du développement dans le but de supprimer les rapports salariés, mais que l'activation générale du mécanisme de marché élargit l'espace propice à une activité plus libre. Le résultat a été la création accélérée de couches moyennes qui exercent une pression considérable et prennent des initiatives, et finissent logiquement par se détourner du marxisme en faveur du nationalisme.

Le marxisme devient un frein pour le mouvement, car il est impossible de redresser une situation qui encourage les forts et les rusés en faisant appel à l'idéologie des pauvres et des oppressés. Le marxisme recule devant le nationalisme, qui articule et défend l'intérêt privé. Mouvement qui ne manque pas de fondements, et ceci dans un pays qui compte tant de contradictions économiques culturelles, ethniques et religieuses, qu'on aboutit à une totale confusion idéologique, une confusion sans précédent dans l'histoire moderne. On se perd en discussions infinies et pénibles sur les rapports de classe et nationaux, discussions qui ne sont pas seulement significatives en ce sens qu'elles indiquent une baisse terrible du niveau de la pensée théorique, mais aussi parce qu'elle pourraient fournir assez de matériaux pour l'étude de ce qu'on appelle la régression sociale. En ce qui concerne l'idée même d'autogestion, qui, au sens original, contient nécessairement des éléments utopiques, elle s'en tient tout simplement au mot d'ordre - sois toi-même!, et ceci au sens national de l'expression. Et, ce qui est significatif, c'est l'une des manipulations les plus réussies, car le passage est très facile de l'autogestion à l'autonomie, puis à l'égoîsme, en vertu de quoi le désir de spontanéité et de liberté

Perhaps the most important fact for understanding the situation is the opposition between the social forces which control and establish the system, and the workers, the natural carriers of self-management. It is

an opposition of interests, from which arise the main conflicts and distortions. The first researches immediately brought to light a real discrepancy between the ideological project and the real state of things. In companies, we have seen the rapid formation of vague but powerful groups and cliques, an extension of the bureaucratic apparatus, which take important decisions, but do not bear the responsibility for them, because they hide behind legality. of the workers' council. Indisputable proof of their existence, the many workers' strikes, which are born parallel to the autogestive structure. It should be noted that these tensions have been partially eased by the weakening of the secret police apparatus. However, tensions and conflicts have developed, along with economic stagnation, unemployment and the departure of workers abroad, which threatens the system at the base. We can conclude that the main reason for the movement's deviation from this path which distinguishes the history of the free man from prehistory is to be found in the fact that it was not placed under the direct control of social forces in the right position and interests.

This definitely proves that we are not yet at the stage of a reorientation of development with the aim of suppressing wage relationships, but that the general activation of the market mechanism widens the space conducive to more activity. free. The result has been the accelerated creation of middle strata which exert considerable pressure and initiative, and logically end up turning away from Marxism in favor of nationalism.

M arxism becomes a brake on the movement, because it is impossible to redress a situation which encourages the strong and the cunning by appealing to the ideology of the poor and the oppressed. Marxism recoils before nationalism, which articulates and defends private interest. A movement which does not lack foundations, and this in a country which has so many economic, cultural, ethnic and religious contradictions, that we end up in total ideological confusion, a confusion without precedent in modern history. One gets lost in endless and painful discussions on class and national relations, discussions which are not only significant in the sense that they indicate a terrible drop in the level of theoretical thought, but also because they could provide enough material for the study of what is called social regression. As regards the very idea of self-management, which, in the original sense, necessarily contains utopian elements, it simply sticks to the watchword

— be yourself!, and this in the national sense of the expression. And, what is significant, it is one of the most successful manipulations,

because the passage is very easy from self-management to autonomy, then to egoism, by virtue of which the desire for spontaneity and freedom 207

doit faire place au besoin d'institutions et d'organisations, qui protègent ce que nous avons acquis, ou usurpé.

Pour finir, un mot sur les illusions romantiques de ces individus et de ces groupes qui, par leur honnêteté, leur ouverture, leur abnégation, sont des exemples à suivre, mais qui, dans leur désir de spontané et d'authentique, nient purement et simplement toute idée et toute nécessité d'organisation. Ces points de vue sont le signe d'une conscience du dépassement de l'existant, qui ne sait pas encore ce qu'il conviendrait de mettre à la place. C'est pourquoi tout reste dans la sphère d'une destruction anarchiste, qui n'est pas négative, comme on le croit souvent, mais indispensable comme condition préalable au développement. La lutte contre ce qui est maintenant et là et pour quelque chose d'autre a la forme d'une pure spontanéité. Mais tant que la lutte se cantonne dans cette phase, elle n'est pas décisivement orientée dans le sens de la victoire. En même temps qu'elle, on voit apparaître la nécessité de l'organisation comme instrument du pouvoir, sans lequel la victoire est impossible. C'est pourquoi le pouvoir a un comportement complexe envers les apôtres révolutionnaires de la spontanéité absolue: il les contrôle, les poursuit, les tyrannise, mais souvent il leur permet de survivre dans des réserves, comme les peaux-rouges, phénomène qui devient typique des rapports de l'organisation et de la spontanéité dans les systèmes autoritaires de notre temps.

must give way to the need for institutions and organizations, which protect what we have acquired, or usurp.

Finally, a word on the ancient Roman illusions of these individuals and these groups who, by their honesty, their openness, their abnegation, are examples to follow, but who, in their desire for spontaneity and authenticity, deny purely and simply any idea and any need for organization. These points of view are the sign of an awareness of the overcoming of the existing, which does not yet know what should be put in its place. This is why everything remains within the sphere of anarchist destruction, which is not negative, as is often believed, but indispensable as a prerequisite for development. The struggle against what is now and there and for something else takes the form of pure spontaneity. But as long as the struggle is confined to this phase, it is not decisively oriented in the direction of victory. At the same time, we see the emergence of the need for organization as an instrument of power, without which victory is impossible. This is why power has a complex behavior towards the revolutionary apostles of absolute spontaneity: it controls them, pursues them, tyrannizes them, but often it allows them to survive in reserves, like the redskins, a phenomenon that is becoming typical of the relationship between organization and spontaneity in the authoritarian systems of our time.

208

ZUKUNFTSWERKSTÄTTEN ÜBER DIE NOTWENDIGE DEMOKRATISIERUNG DES UTOPISCHEN DENKENS

Robert Jungk

Berlin - Salzburg

Die Utopie, wie wir sie aus der Geschichte kennen, war bisher stets die Leistung Einzelner, mit der sie die Wünsche und Hoffnungen Vieler zum Ausdruck bringen oder anregen wollten.

Darin unterscheidet sie sich in keiner Weise von der übergroßen Mehrheit intellektueller Hervorbringungen der Vergangenheit.

Es ist nun die Frage zu stellen, ob diese Entstehungsbedingungen einer Erfindertätigkeit, die sich vorallem auf gesellschaftliche Möglichkeiten und Zustände richtet, nicht widersprüchlich sind und vielleicht wesentlich dazu beigetragen haben, von Anfang an eine tiefe Kluft zwischen individuellem Entwurf und sozialer Wirklichkeit aufzureißen, die zu einer bis heute andauernden diskriminierenden Aufspaltung Kreatoren und »Kreaturen« geführt hat. Von der autoritären zur demokratischen Utopieformulierung. Diese angeborene Besonderheit des utopischen Denkens verführt dazu, autoritäre Modelle zu formulieren. Der Utopist oder eine von ihm inspirierte Elite springt mit der Wirklichkeit und den sie erfüllenden Menschen um wie ein Künstler mit seinen erdachten Figuren. Jedes Eigenleben der zu Beglückenden wird als störend empfunden.

Dieser antidemokratische Zug des utopischen Denkens erweist sich als besonders bedenklich, wenn wir es mit den Bemühungen zu tun haben, gesellschaftliche Phantasie nicht nur heuristisch sondern programmatisch einzusetzen. Selbst in Gesellschaften, die meinen demokratisch zu handeln, werden die Bürger (oder ihre Vertreter) erst in einem fortgeschrittenen Zeitpunkt des gesellschaftlichen Innovationsprozesses zur Mitarbeit zugelassen. Berlaubt ihnen Kritik zu äußern, etwas anzunehmen oder abzulehnen das andere- geht man auf die Quelle zurück ist es sogar meist nur ein Einzelner — sich vorher ausgedacht, konzipiert und formuliert haben. Hier beginnt schon an der Quelle unerkannt oder

OF UTOPIC THINKING

Robert Jungk

B erlin — Salzburg

Utopia, as we know it from history, has always been the achievement of individuals, with which they wanted to express or stimulate the wishes and hopes of many.

In this it differs in no way from the vast majority of intellectual productions of the past.

The question must now be asked whether these conditions for the emergence of an inventive activity, which is primarily aimed at social possibilities and conditions, are not contradictory and perhaps have contributed significantly to the widening gap between individual development right from the start ur and social reality, which has led to a discriminating split between creators and »creatures« that has continued to this day. From the authoritarian to the ocratic utopia formulation. This innate peculiarity of utopian thinking leads to the formulation of authoritarian models. The utopian or an elite inspired by him deals with reality and the people who fulfill it like an artist with his imaginary characters. Every life of their own of those who are to be happy is perceived as disturbing.

This anti-democratic feature of utopian thinking proves to be particularly questionable when we are dealing with efforts to use social imagination not only heuristically but programmatically. Even in societies that tend to act ocratically, citizens (or their representatives) are only allowed to participate at an advanced stage in the social innovation process. They are allowed to express criticism, to accept or reject something, the other - if you go back to the source, it is usually just an individual - having thought up, conceived and formulated it beforehand. Here starts at the source un recognized or 209

nicht anerkannt jene Zweiteilung zwischen Planern und Verplanten, Subjekten und Objekten des Wandlungsprozesses, schöpferisch Tätigen und »Betroffenen«, die dann nachher durch kein Maß späterer demokratischer Mitbeteiligung wirklich aufgehoben werden kann.

Es sei deshalb gestattet an dieser Stelle eine Utopie von der Utopie zu skizzieren, die sich durch zwei charakteristische Züge von der Utopie herkömmlicher Art unterscheiden soll:

- sie wird durch die Partizipation interessierter Bürger vom frühestenAugenblick ihrer Entstehung an demokratisiert d. h. zum Gegenstand gemeinsamen Erfindens, Entwickelns und Entwerfens offener Institutionen gemacht
- sie wird niemals als abgeschlossen angesehen, sondern als ein offener jederzeit veränderbarer Entwurf

WER IST FÜR UTOPISCHES DENKEN QUALIFIZIERT?

Solche mit dem Erfinden von Zukünften beschäftigten Gruppen könnten sich zu »Zukunfts- Werkstätten« zusammenfinden zu denen prinzipiell jeder zugelassen werden sollte, der sich beteiligen möchte.

Das wirft die Frage auf, ob eine Teilnahme an solchen Frühstadien des gesellschaftlichen Erneuerungsprozesses nicht nur denjenigen vorbehalten werden sollte, die über genügend Wissen und Fähigkeiten verfügen.

Schon der Zweifel, der hier geäußert wird, zeigt wie sehr heute Teilnahme an gesellschaftlichen Enscheidungsvorgängen von bestimmten Qualifikationskriterien abhängig gemacht wird. Unter diesen besitzt die sogenannte »Sachkenntnis« einen besonders hohen Stellenwert und führt von Anfang an zu einer Disqualifizierung der überwiegenden Mehrheit aller Bürger.

Tatsächlich ist ein hoher Grad von spezieller Informiertheit heute eine wichtige Voraussetzung für verantwortliche Entscheidung, aber es muß die Praxis angezweifelt werden, welche diesem Kriterium meist einen fast ausschließlichen Rang einräumt.

Gerade wenn es sich um schöpferische Tätigkeit handelt ist Wissen aber oft eher hinderlich als hilfreich. Die Arbeiten der Kreativitätsforschung haben deutlich gezeigt, daß der phantasievolle, geistig flexible, kombinationsfähige und zum Teil naive Laie dem Fachmann in der Erfindung origineller Konzepte meist überlegen ist. Sein Unwissen oder Teilwissen ermutigt ihn dort Wege zu suchen wo der Experte keine gangbaren Möglichkeiten sieht.

Nun ist aber in der arbeitsteiligen, hochspezialisierten Gesellschaft des zuendegehenden zweiten Jahrtausends eigentlich jeder auf den meisten Gebieten, die außerhalb seiner eigenen Berufsund Interessensphäre liegen, uninformiert oder halbinformiert. Wir alle sind gegenüber den anderen Spezialisten »naiv«. Dies kann als Mangel gesehen werden und zu einer verstärkten Be-

not recognized that dichotomy between planners and those who are planned, subjects and objects of the process of change, creatively active and "affected", which can then really be abolished afterwards by no measure of later ocratic participation.

It may therefore be permitted at this point to outline a utopia of the utopia, which should differ from the utopia of the conventional kind by two characteristic features: 1. it is ocratized by the participation of interested citizens from the earliest moment of its emergence i.e. H.

made the object of joint invention, development and design of open institutions

2. it is never seen as complete, but as an open design that can be changed at any time

WHO QUALIFIES FOR UTOPIAN THINKING?

Such groups busy with inventing futures could come together in "future workshops" to which, in principle, anyone who wanted to participate should be admitted.

This raises the question of whether participation in such early stages of the social renewal process should not only be reserved for those who have sufficient knowledge and skills.

Even the doubt expressed here shows how much today participation in social decision-making processes depends on certain qualification criteria. Among these, the so-called "expertise" has a particularly high value and leads to a disqualification of the overwhelming majority of all citizens from the outset.

In fact, a high degree of special information is today an important prerequisite for responsible decision-making, but the practice must be questioned, which usually concedes this criterion almost exclusively.

Especially when it comes to creative activity, knowledge is often more of a hindrance than helpful. The work of creativity research has clearly shown that the imaginative, mentally flexible, combinable and partly naive layman is usually superior to the expert in the invention of original concepts. His ignorance or partial knowledge encourages him to look for ways where the expert sees no viable options.

But in the work-sharing, highly specialized society of the end of the second millennium, everyone is uninformed or half-informed in most areas that lie outside their own professional and sphere of interest.

We are all "naive" about the other specialists. This can be seen as a defect and a strengthened Be-210

mühung um weitere und intensivere Informierung möglichst Vieler führen, aber es bleibt selbst dann zweifelhaft, ob jeher Zugang aller zu allem Wissen (der eine der Grundlagen der Demokratie bildet) im Zeitalter der Informationsexplosion nicht eine unverwirklichbare Idealvorstellung bleiben muß.

Es läßt sich aber jene Notlage auch als positiver Faktor verstehen. Unwissen oder Halbwissen könnte als Voraussetzung einer Qualifikation zu schöpferischem Denken angesehen werden.

Die Herausforderung der Expertokratie

Ein solcher Gedanke muß in einer Epoche, die auf Gewußtem aufbaut und in ihm einen ihrer Leitwerte sieht, schockierend klingen. Dennoch sollte er im Zusammenhang mit der hier vorgeschlagenen Demokratisierung der gesellschaftlich orientierten Phantasietätigkeit einmal weiterverfolgt werden.

Es ließe sich nämlich von hier aus die faktisch verlorene Legitimierung des »souveränen Bürgers« wieder herstellen, der zur Teilnahme am gesellschaftlichen Denkprozeß nicht fremdes Wissen, sondern neben eigener Erfahrung, eigene Träume, eigene Wünsche, eigene Instuition, beizusteuern hätte, also gestige Fähigkeiten, die ihm zur Verfügung stehen.

Aber ist es nicht gefährlich die »Nicht-Experten« in einer so komplexen Weltsituation, die oft ausgesprochen »counterintuitive decisions« (Forrester) verlangt, mitreden zu lassen? Und ist nicht die kreative Kapazität der meisten Menschen entweder unterentwickelt oder sogar verkrüppelt?

Wenden wir uns zuerst den Gefahren zu, die durch das Einbrechen von »Sanslunettes« in die geheiligten Räume der Expertokratie heraufbeschworen werden könnten. Zweifelos würden sie viele Anregungen geben und Wünsche äußern, die unerfüllbar wären (zumindest unter den herrschenden Bedingungen), aber würde durch eine solche Mobilisierung der sozialen Phantasie auf breitester Basis nicht eine auf Veränderung drängende Kraft geweckt, die der Gesellschaft schon zu lange verlorenging? Es ließe sich denken, daß gerade in der Frühphase der Entwürfe — die ja noch nicht Entscheidungen darstellen- eine solche Öffnung zu den Massen der vom geistigen Schöpfungsprozess Verdrängten und dadurch auch in Bezug auf die gesellschaftliche Entwicklung gleichgültig Gewordenen nicht nur ungefährlich sondern sogar für die spätere Verwirklichung innovativer Konzepte notwendig wäre.

Denn nur durch die erst dann möglich werdende Konfrontation zwischen Wunsch und Möglichkeit, zwischen Traum und Expertise in den endlich ernstgenommenen und beteiligten Nichtexperten ein Gefühl der Mitverantwortung entstehen. Andererseits würden die Wissenden gezwungen die Grenzen ihrer Kenntnisse zu sehen und vielleicht unter diesem Druck zu revidieren oder zu erweitern. Die Kreativitätsforschung spricht in diesem Zusammenhang von zwei verschiedenen Phasen des Erfindungsprozesses, der des ungehinderten freien Phantasierens, das zunächst durch keinerlei

not remain an unrealizable ideal in the age of the information explosion.

However, this emergency situation can also be understood as a positive factor. Ignorance or half-knowledge could be seen as a prerequisite for a qualification for creative thinking.

The challenge of the expertocracy

Such a thought must sound shocking in an epoch that builds on the known and sees in it one of its guiding values. Nevertheless, it should be pursued further in connection with the democratization of socially oriented fantasy activity proposed here.

From here it would be possible to restore the legitimation of the »sovereign citizen«, which had actually been lost, and who, in order to participate in the social thought process, did not have to contribute the knowledge of others, but rather, in addition to their own experience, their own dreams, their own wishes, their own institution, so yesterday's skills that are available to him.

But isn't it dangerous to let the "non-experts" have a say in such a complex world situation, which often demands "counterintuitive decisions" (Forrester)? And isn't the creative capacity of most people either under t-wrapped or even crippled?

Let us first turn to the dangers that could be posed by the incursion of "sanslunettes" into the sacred spaces of the expertocracy. No doubt they would make many suggestions and wishes that would be unfulfillable (at least under the prevailing conditions), but such a mobilization of the social imagination on the broadest possible basis would not awaken a force for change that would been lost to society for too long? One could imagine that especially in the early phase of the drafts - which do not yet represent decisions - such an opening to the masses of those who have been pushed aside by the intellectual creative process and have thus also become irrelevant in relation to social development is not only safe but even for the later realization of innovative concepts would be necessary.

Because it is only through the confrontation between desire and possibility, between dream and expertise, which only then becomes possible, that a feeling of co-responsibility arise in the non-experts who are finally taken seriously and are involved. On the other hand, those who know would be forced to see the limits of their knowledge and perhaps revise or expand under this pressure. In this context,

creativity research speaks of two different phases of the invention process, that of unhindered, free fantasizing, which is initially not influenced by any 211

Kritik gehindert wird und der folgenden Stufe der Beurteilung dessen, was dabei an Brauchbarem und Durchsetzbarem zutage gefördert wurde.

Allerdings hat sich die systematische Bemühung um die Freilegung der in jedem Menschen vermuteten schöpferischen Fähigkeiten bisher vorwiegend auf Einzelmenschen und seine berufliche Tätigkeit konzentriert. Die Frage wie die über das frühe Kindesalter hinaus weiterlebende Phantasie der Menschen auf die Gesellschaft wirken und wie sie sich ihrer bedienen konnte, ist bisher kaum behandelt worden.

Es läßt sich nun gerade unter Berücksichtigung jener Ereignisse, die als »Jugendrevolte« bezeichnet worden sind, zeigen, daß eine Befreiung der Kreativität im Kindesalter ohne Veränderung jener Strukturen, die der Betätigung des Schöpferischen im weiteren Leben im Wege stehen, zu Frustrationn, Unruhe und schlißlich zu zynischer Resignation führt.

Wer für die Entwicklung der meist schon in frühster Jugend durch eine auf Anpassung gerichtete Erziehung verkrüppelten kreativen Kräfte eintritt, muß sich klar darüber sein, daß er Revolutionäre heranzieht, die eine kreative Gesellschaft verlangen, deren Mitglieder nicht mehr gewillt sind im Zustande des Empfangens und Gehorchens zu verweilen.

Erfahrungen mit Zukunftswerkstätten

Wie könnten Zukunftswerkstätten in den heutigen Gesellschaftsstrukturren funktionieren? Der Verfasser möchte hier einige Erfahrungen zusammenfassen, die bei Experimenten mit Gruppen von Studenten, jungen Arbeitern und Angestellten sowie Managern zwischen 30 und 45 Jahren in Wien (1967), Turku — Finnland (1968), West— Berlin (1969—70) und Elsinore — Däne mark (1970) gemacht wurden. Als Themen wurden u. a. behandelt: neue demokratische Institutionen, neue Formen der Arbeit, neue Erziehung, Möglichkeiten einer Gesellschaft ohne Leistungszwang neue Formen für Kongresse.

1. Zielsetzung:

Es wurde stets davon ausgegangen, daß die im Gespräch gewonnenen Konzepte nicht programmatischen Charakter haben sollten, sondern als heuristische Instrumente zu verstehen seien. Die auf diese Weise gewonnen Einsichten sind als Entwürfe zu verstehen, die das Nachdenken über gesellschaftliche Alternativen spielerisch erweitern und erfinderisch konkretisieren sollen. Durch diese Übung können dem politischen Entscheidungsprozess neue Elemente zugeführt werden, die Analyse und Prognose nicht liefern können.

Themenwahl:

Sie sollte möglichst (wenn auch nicht ausschließlich) durch eine die Teilnehmer bedrängende oder sie frustrierende Situation bestimmt werden.

Criticism is prevented and the following stage of the assessment of what was demanded of what was useful and enforceable.

However, the systematic effort to uncover the supposed creative abilities in every human being has so far focused primarily on individuals and their professional activities. The question of how people's imagination, which lives on beyond early childhood, affects society and how it could be used has hardly been dealt with up to now.

Taking into account those events that have been described as "youth revolts," it can now be shown that

a liberation of creativity in childhood without changing those structures that stand in the way of creative activity in later life leads to frustration, unrest and finally to cynical resignation.

Anyone who advocates the development of creative powers, most of which have been crippled from an early age by an adjustment-oriented upbringing, must be aware that they are bringing up revolutionaries who are demanding a creative society whose members are no longer willing of receiving and obeying.

Experiences with future workshops

How could future workshops function in today's social structures? The author would like to summarize here some experiences made in experiments with groups of students, young workers and employees, and managers between 30 and 45 years old in Vienna (1967), Turku

Finland (1968), West—B erlin (1969—70) and Elsinore—Dane m ark (1970). Topics w e u. a. treated: new democratic institutions, new forms of work, new education, possibilities of a society without pressure to perform, new forms of congresses.

1 goal:

It was always assumed that the concepts gained in the conversation should not have a programmatic character, but should be understood as heuristic instruments.

The insights gained in this way are to be understood as drafts that are intended to playfully expand and inventively concretize the reflection on social alternatives. Through this exercise, new elements can be introduced into the political decision-making process that analysis and

prognosis cannot provide.

2. Choice of topic:

If possible (though not exclusively) it should be determined by a situation that distresses or frustrates the participants.

3. Vorgehen:

Die erste Phase bestand jeweils darin eine möglichst große Zahl von Kritiken an dem zur Debatte stehenden Zustand zu sammeln und auf diese Weise einen »Negativkatolog« zu entwickeln. Bei diesem Vorgehen werden meist bereits Abhängigkeiten und größere Zusammenhänge klar. Es schälen sich dabei auch die Prioritäten heraus.

In der zweiten Phase wird versucht den zehn wichtigsten Kritiken des gegenwärtigen Zustandes (»Ist« zustand) eine weit grössere Zahl von gewünschten Zuständen (»Soll« zustände) gegenüberzustellen. Dabei haben sich die Methoden des »Brainstorming« bewährt. Also freies Spiel der Phantasie unter vorläufiger Zurückstellung der Einwände. Selbst die »verrücktesten Ideen« sollen vorgebracht und vom Protokollführer auf einer allen sichtbaren Tafel registriert werden. Besonders die Weiterentwicklung solcher Spontanbeiträge durch die Teilnehmer hat sich als erfolgreich erwiesen. Hier wird der Gesprächsteilnehmer nicht wie in der Debatte als Gegenspieler sondern als Verstärker empfunden. Auf diese Weise entstanden die originellsten Vorschläge.

In der dritten Phase wird die Verwirklichung der gemachten Vorschläge diskutiert. Dabei sollten die entstandenen Ideen und Konzepte nicht zerlöchert sondern durch Gegen- und Erweiterungsvorschläge möglichst verbessert werden.

Die vierte Phase besteht in der Bildung von Untergruppen, die sich jeweils der genaueren Entwicklung einzelner bisher nur schlagwortartig skizzierter Vorschläge widmen.

Die fünfte Phase dient dem Austausch der Ergebnisse. Jeweils zwei Untergruppen diskutieren miteinander ihre Projekte. Dadurch werden jeweils »Außenstehende« mit den Resultaten einer anderen Gruppe konfrontiert.

Es kann danach noch eine Sitzung des »Plenums« stattfinden, in der alle Resultate verlesen und diskutiert werden.

4. Zahl und Auswahl der Teilnehmer:

Es wurde mit Gesamtgruppen von höchstens fünfundzwanzig Teilnehmern experimentiert. Die Untergruppen bestanden meist nur aus vier bis fünf Teilnehmern. Experten sollten besonders in den der Kritik und Verwirklichungsmöglichkeit gewidmeten Phasen (drei, vier fünf) als Berater herangezogen werden. In der entscheidenden Phase zwei (Erfindung) sind sie eher eine Belastung.

5. Ergebnisse:

Es motiviert die Teilnehmer stärker, wenn die Ergebnisse ihrer Arbeit schriftlich fixiert und dadurch auch Außenstehenden zugänglich gemacht werden. Daher sollte ein verantwortlicher Redakteur, der später die Publikation betreut, schon bei Beginn der Arbeit gefunden werden. Die Namen der Ideengeber sollten niemals einzeln genannt werden, sondern nur im kollektiven Zusammenhang. Es wäre wünschenswert, daß verschiedene Zukunftswerkstätten ihre Protokolle untereinander austauschen.

213

3. Procedure:

the situation under discussion and in this way developing a »negative catalogue«. With this approach, dependencies and larger connections usually become clear. The priorities also emerge.

In the second phase, an attempt is made to contrast the ten most important criticisms of the current state (»1st« state) with a far larger number of desired states ("Soli" state). The methods of "brainstorming" have

preserved. So free play of the imagination with provisional deferral of objections. Even the "craziest ideas" should be put forward and recorded by the clerk on an all-visible board. In particular, the further development of such spontaneous contributions by the participants has proven to be successful. Here, the participant in the conversation is not perceived as an opponent, as in the debate, but as a reinforcer. This is how the most original proposals came about.

In the third phase, the implementation of the proposals made is discussed. In doing so, the ideas and concepts that emerged should not be torn apart, but should be improved as much as possible through counter-proposals and suggestions for expansion.

The fourth phase consists of the formation of sub-groups, each of which is dedicated to the more precise development of individual proposals that have only been outlined in keywords up to now.

The fifth phase serves to exchange the results. Two sub-groups each discuss their projects with each other. As a result, »outsiders« are confronted with the results of another group.

A plenary session can then take place, in which all the results are read out and discussed.

4. Number and selection of participants:

It was experimented with total groups of no more than twenty-five participants. The sub-groups usually consisted of only four to five participants. Experts should be called in as advisors, especially in the phases devoted to criticism and feasibility (three, four, five). In the crucial phase two (invention) they are more of a burden.

5. Results:

It motivates the participants more if the results of their work are set down in writing and are thus also made accessible to outsiders. Therefore, a responsible editor, who will later take care of the publication, should be found at the beginning of the work. The names of the idea contributors should never be mentioned individually, but only in the collective context. It would be desirable for different future workshops to exchange their protocols with each other.

DIE ZUKUNFT DES FORTSCHRITTS

Hans-Dieter Bahr
Berlin

Fortschritt heißt: aus dem Bann heraustreten, auch aus dem des Fortschritts

Th. W. Adorno

Die Frage danach, ob der »Fortschritt« der gesellschaftlichen Entwicklung Zukunft habe, meint vorallem: ob das »Bündnis, das der Fortschritt mit der Barbarei geschlossen hat«¹, eine innere Gesetzmäßigkeit der gesellschaftlichen Entwicklungen ausdrücke. Die Bestimmungen und Begründungen, die die Entscheidung jener Frage liefert, scheinen die Vernunft blindlings in eben diejenige Dialektik zu treiben, die sie bewußt zu entfalten unternahm: ihr eigener Erfolg tritt ihr in der Geschichte der Produktionsverhältnisse als fremdes Gesetz von Not und Notwendigkeit gegenüber und dokumentiert gerade so die innere Gesetzmäßigkeit dieses Bündnisses; oder — wie Nietzsche diesen Zusammenhang von Logik und Ökonomie formulierte: »Enthält jeder Erfolg in sich eine vernünftige Notwendigkeit, ist jedes Ereignis der Sieg des Logischen oder der »Idee« — dann nur hurtig nieder auf die Knie und nun die ganze Stufenleiter der »Erfolge« abgekniet«²

Der Zirkel, dem die theoretische Argumentation unterliegt, drückt die bestimmte Weise der bürgerlichen Gegenwart als unveränderliches Maß aller veränderlichen Dinge aus, wodurch die Geschichte als Vergangenheit und Zukunft einen absoluten Bezugspunkt auf den bürgerlichen Klassenwillen erhält. Was sich diesem in der Tauschwertproduktion dinglich hervortretenden Klassenwillen entzieht, erscheint entweder als »unbewältigte« Vergangenheit oder als »unbeherrschte« Zukunft. Daß dagegen die Gegenwart dieses Klassenwillens eine geschichtlich qualitative

¹ S. Freud, Der Mann Moses, Frankfurt 1964, S. 71

² F. Nietzsche, Vom Nutzen und Nachteil der Historie für das Leben, Frankfurt 1968, S. 233

B erlin

Progress means: stepping out of the spell, including that of progress

Th. W. Adorno

The question as to whether the "progress" of social development has a future means above all: whether the "alliance that progress has made with barbarism" 1 expresses an inner law of social development.

The determinations and justifications that the decision of that question provides seem to drive reason blindly into the very dialectic that it consciously undertook to unfold: its own success appears to it in the history of the relations of production as alien to the law of Necessity and necessities and in this way documents the inner lawfulness of this alliance; or - as Nietzsche formulated this connection between logic and economy: »If every success contains a reasonable necessity, every event is the victory of the logical or the "idea" - then just get down on your knees and now the whole thing Step ladder of "successes" kneeled down"2

The circle to which theoretical argumentation underlies expresses the particular mode of the bourgeois present as the unchanging measure of all changing things, giving history as past and future an absolute point of reference to the bourgeois class will. What eludes this class will, which materially emerges in the production of exchange value, appears either as "unmastered"

past or as an "uncontrolled" future. On the other hand, the presence of this class will is a qualitative historical one

* F. Nietzsche, From the Use and Disadvantage of History for Life, Frankfurt 1968, p. 233

Veränderliche ist, erfährt dieser Wille stets nur feindlich, als Unterworfenheit unter ein Gesetz, das er selbst etabliert: das Gesetz seines Daseins als Kontrahent gegen sich.

Wird von diesem Willen aus »Fortschritt« in der Geschichte festgestellt, so ist nicht mehr als eine bestimmte Relation der Vergangenheit zur Gegenwart,, die er selbst darstellt, ausgesagt; — eine Relation, von deren objektiven Egozentrie Kant sagte: »Befremdend bleibt es immer hiebei, daß die älteren Generationen nur scheinen um der späteren willen ihr mühseliges Geschäft zu treiben... ohne doch selbst an dem Glück, das sie vorbereiteten, Anteil nehmen zu können.«³ — Wird dieser Gedanke von Fortschritt in die Zukunft projiziert, so erweist sich das Glück der »späteren Generationen« stets wieder als »mühseliges Geschäft« für noch spätere Generationen; stets deklariert in diesem Fortschritt die gerade bestehende Generation die vorhergegangene zum Menschenaffen ihrer selbst.

Zugleich ist eine Zukunft, als dasjenige, was auf uns zukommt, bloß Verarbeitungsgegenstand des gegenwärtigen Klassenwillens: das Subjekt stellt sich gegen die Zukunft als »Zeit tilgendes Absolutes« (Hegel), oder als eines im Wartesaal, oder als Gläubiger, der die Frist abwartet, die er dem Schuldner beließ. — In solcher Zukunft wird immer nur die schäbige Struktur der Gegenwart begriffen. Zukunft wird auch als die »vor uns liegende Zeit« begriffen, aber von denen, die sie als Bedrohung erfahren: nämlich als die Immergleichheit der abstrakten gesellschaftlichen Arbeitszeit, die jede künftige Zeit nivellierend verschlingt.

Läßt sich, wie Walter Benjamin es tat, in der Fatalität dieser Dialektik ein paradiesischer Sturm benennen, der den »Engel der Geschichte unaufhaltsam in die Zukunft treibt, der er den Rücken kehrt, während der Trümmerhaufen vor ihm zum Himmel wächst«⁴?

In beiden Verhältnissen des Subjekts zur Zukunft — als Gläubiger oder als Arbeitskraft — bleibt das Bild von der Zukunft unterm Bann der gewordenen, statt im befreienden Licht der werdenden Gegenwart. Nur die dürre Logik einer Naturteleologie ist in diesem Verhältnis zu finden, in dem entweder die Zukunft, zuversichtlich oder bang erwartet, zum Subjekt gemacht wird, das sich seine unheiligen Mittel aus der Gegenwart holen wird: oder es wird die Gegenwart, als beherrschte oder unterdrückende, zum Subjekt gemacht, das sich die Zukunft nur als Mittel seiner bornierten Zwecke aneignen kann. — Insgesamt also ist das Verhältnis von Gegenwart und Zukunft, — ob von seiten der Unterdrücker oder den Unterdrückten gesehen, ist hierbei einerlei, — nach dem Modell der abstrakten Arbeit in der Form der Austauschbarkeit ihrer Produkte gedacht, eine Arbeit, in der nur die Form einer Zweckmäßigkeit ohne Zweck anwesend, ist, die man also entwe-

³ I. Kant, Idee zu einer Allgm. Geschichte in weltbürgl. Absicht, in: kleine phil. Schriften, Leipzig (o. Z.), S. 222

^{* »}Das, was wir den Fortschritt nennen, ist dieser Sturm. « W. Benjamin, Geschichtsphil. Thesen in: Zur Kritik der Gewalt, Frankfurt 1965, S. 85

If "progress" in history is determined by this will, then no more than a specific relation of the past to the present, which he himself represents, is stated;

— a relation whose objective egocentricity Kant said:

"It always remains strange here that the older generations only seem to do their arduous business for the sake of the later ones. . . without being able to share in the happiness that they prepared. «3 — If this idea of progress is projected into the future, then the happiness of the

"later generations" again and again as a "troublesome business"

for still later generations; always in this progression the current generation declares the preceding one to be the ape of itself.

At the same time, a future, as that which is coming towards us, is merely an object of processing of the present class will: the subject opposes the future as a "time-wiping absolute" (Hegel), or as one in the waiting room, or as a believer who waits for the period that he left for the debtor. — In such a future only the shabby structure of the present is ever understood. The future is also referred to as "the time ahead"

understood, but by those who experience it as a threat: namely as the eternal equality of abstract social working time, which devours every future time in a leveling manner.

Can one name, as Walter Benjam did in es, in the fatality of this dialectic a paradisiacal storm that unstoppably drives the "angel of history into the future, to which he turns his back, while the debris heaps before him to heaven grows«4?

In both of the subject's relationships to the future—as a believer or as a worker—the image of the future remains under the spell of the present that has become, rather than in the liberating light of the present that is becoming. Only the dry logic of a natural teleology can be found in this relationship, in which either the future, confidently or fearfully awaited, is made into a subject that will fetch its unholy means from the present: or it the present, as controlled or oppressive, is made into a subject that can appropriate the future only as a means of its narrow-minded ends. — Overall, then, the relationship between the present and the future — whether viewed from the side of the oppressor or the oppressed is the same here — conceived according to the model of abstract work in the form of the interchangeability of its products, a work in which only the form of expediency without

purpose is present, which one can therefore either 3 I. Kant, Idea for a general. history in global intention in: small phil. Writings, Leipzig (untitled), p. 222

4 "What we call progress is this storm." W. Benjamin, history phil. Theses, in: On the criticism of violence, Frankfurt 1965, p. 85

der selbst aber ohne eigenen Zweck leistet, oder die man durch andere aber in eigenen Diensten leisten läßt. Es ist zugleich eine Form des Arbeitsverhältnisses, die Marx als Wesen der bürgerlichen Produktionsweise kennzeichnete: als Ökonomie der Mittel, der Stoffe und der Wechselseitigkeit ist dieses Produktionsverhältnis die reale Abstraktion von der luxurierenden Mannigfaltigkeit der Natur und der Gesellschaft, sowie die Logik ihre ideale Abstraktion darstellt; nur erfährt diese Logik das Bewegungsgesetz ihrer Formen nicht, wie Hegel konzipierte, aus sich selbst wie es für die Geschichte der Produktionsverhältnisse gilt. Vielmehr sind die logisch-grammatikalischen Formen, in denen der gesellschaftliche Prozeß gedacht wird — etwa die Formen von Vergangenheit, Gegenwart und Zukunft - bereits durch die wechselseitigen Verhältnisse der Gesellschaft gesetzte Maßstäbe, in denen — wenn sie ihrerseits auf die Verhältnisse angelegt werden - von jenem, das Maß setzenden Subjekt, also vom herrschenden Klassenwillen, abstrahiert wird; die Anwesenheit des messenden Willens wird im Akt des Messens selbst vergessen und verdrängt, und erst so kann der Maßstab den Schein seiner interesselosen Faktizität um sich verbreiten.

Und eben die Verdrängung des gesellschaftlichen Subjekts im Zukunft bemessenden Denken ist die Verdrängung der kritischen Dialektik, die fähig wäre, wirkliche Maßstäbe der Zukunft zu erzeugen, indem es die falsche Gegenwart sprengt. Zurückbleibt das karge Gerüst einer kausalistisch verbrämten Moral terroristischer Eindeutigkeit: Zukunft ist immer das Bessere gegen das Schlechtere, bzw. umgekehrt: man werde doch nie selbst ernten, was man säate. Zukunft und ihr Maßstab bleiben in dieser Konzeption erreichbarer oder unerreichbarer Erfolg, der als Gewinn am Maßstab der Preise zählbar ist.

Auch das Verhältnis des Geschehenen auf das zu Geschehende oder erst noch Geschehende unterschlägt das Subjekt als Punkt der Kon-zentration von Erinnnerung und Vorwegnahme, als Produkt vergangener Erfahrungen, dem die vergangene Erfahrung selbst als erfahrene Vergangenheit zum Gesetz des Werdens von Zukunft gerinnt. Stets hat sich das Subjekt als Maß aller Werte gesetzt, als Geld, und es mißversteht sich selbst, so wie Ricardo das Maß der Werte, als unveränderlich; gerade als Maß bestimmendes Subjekt bleibt der bürgerliche Klassenwille blind und bewußtlos. Marx hatte dieses Subjekt als Resultat seiner kontrahierenden Partialwillen und - interessen begriffen, ein Resultat, das als Synthese dieser widersprechenden Partialwillen erst von denselben als geldliches Maß aller Werte ausgeschlossen werden mußte, damit der Partialwille erfahren mußte, daß er sich selbst von der Setzung des Maßes ausgeschlossen hat, so wie das Geld die anderen Waren degradierte zur einfachen, zufälligen relativen Wertform. Gerade die Äquivalenz der Gesellschaft wurde so als ihr dingliches Produkt von ihr selbst verbannt, die bürgerliche Geschichte ist die Geschichte der Krisen und Revolutionen, die die Planbarkeit der eigenen Zukunft verunmöglichen. - Im

who does it himself without his own purpose, or which one lets others do in their own service. At the same time, it is a form of the labor relationship that Marx characterized as the essence of the bourgeois mode of production: as an economy of means, materials and reciprocity, this production relationship is the real abstraction of the luxuriant diversity of nature and society, so how logic represents its ideal abstraction; only this logic does not experience the law of motion of its forms, as Hegel conceived, from itself, as it applies to the history of production conditions. Rather, the logical-grammatical forms in which the social process is conceived — such as the forms of past, present, and future — are already standards set by the mutual relationships of society, in which — if they, for their part, the conditions are created—abstracted from that subject who sets the standard, i.e. from the ruling class will; the presence of the measuring will is forgotten and repressed in the very act of measuring, and only in this way can the scale spread the appearance of its disinterested factuality around itself.

And precisely the repression of the social subject in thinking that measures the future is the repression of critical dialectics, which would be able to generate real standards for the future by exploding the false present. What remains is the sparse framework of a causalistically camouflaged morality of terrorist unequivocalness: the future is always the better against the worse, or vice versa: you will never reap what you sow. In this conception, the future and its benchmark remain achievable or unattainable success, which is payable as a profit based on the prizes.

The subject also suppresses the relation of what happened to what is to happen or is yet to happen as a point of concentration of memory and anticipation, as a product of past experiences, to which past experience itself as the experienced past becomes the law of becoming future coagulates. The subject has always posited itself as the measure of all values, as money, and it misunderstands itself, like Ricardo the measure of values, as immutable; precisely as a measure-determining subject, the bourgeois class will remains blind and unconscious. M arx would have understood this subject as the result of his contracting partial wills and interests, a result which, as a synthesis of these contradictory partial wills, first had to be excluded by them as a monetary measure of all values, so that the P artial will had to learn that he had excluded himself from the positing of the mafia, just as money degraded the other commodities to a simple, random relative form of value. Precisely the equivalence of society was banned from itself as its material product; bourgeois history is the history of crises and revolutions that make it impossible to plan one's own future. — In the 217th

Kapital schließlich ist das Wesen des dinglichen bürgerlichen Klassenwillens zum agierenden und dennoch subjektlosen Unwesen, bzw. zur Wesenlosigkeit der Geschichte der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft verdichtet. Nur listig wendet sich der Wille zur Unveränderlichkeit der bestehenden Verhältnisse auch gegen die herrschenden Subjekte selbst; das unveränderte Grinsen in den Zügen der Masken offenbart die Unheimlichkeit der Zukunft, indem es das Wesen der Gegenwart verbirgt.⁵

Unter der Herrschaft dieses dinglichen Klassenwillens als Maß der Werte, durch den ermöglicht ist, die jeweils erzeugte Rationalität, d. h. die erzeugte Synthese von Ökonomie und Logik in der Geschichte wieder zu verwerten — ('Wert' bezeichnet ja nichts anderes als die 'Geltung' bestimmter, zu dinglich-ökonomischen Formen erstarrter Verhältnisse einer Gesellschaftsformation, die auf der naturhaften Basis dividierter Aneignung ihre Wechselseitigkeit konstituierte) — unter dieser Herrschaft besteht angesichts der Zukunft stets das eherne Gesetz, daß die künftige Gegenwart oder gar Vergangenheit immer eingeschränkter sein wird als die gegenwärtige Zukunft; anders ausgedrückt: die Zerrissenheit der Gesellschaft, getrieben von der Realabstraktion der Mehrwertproduktion, erzeugt die Utopie, die eine Chance auf Realisierung hätte, immer nur als Idealität, als 'reine' Form rational-rationeller Schlußfolgerung, in der nur quantifizierend und messend die Gegenwart überschritten wird; diese Idealität wird dann zum integrierten Moment realisierter 'Zukunft', die sich eben nur quantitativ von der vergangenen Gegenwart unterscheidet; als Moment der neuen Wirklichkeit etabliert dieses Denken die Faktizität der herrschenden Verhältnisse als Faktizität der logischen Gesetze.

Die Chance aber liegt gerade darin, daß — da die Verengung von Zukunft durch ihre Realisierung als Gesetz nur aus der bisher erfahrenen Vergangenheit abgeleitet ist — dieses Gesetz zwar alles über die Vergangenheit und Gegenwart der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft aussagt, nichts oder wenig über echte Zukunft und nichts über den Fortschritt und dessen Chancen, die Echtheit der Zukunft als freier auszumachen. Die vergangen-gegenwärtige Wirklichkeit ist dann stets enger als das Mögliche, wenn die Gewalt der Verhältnisse der Grund ihres Bestehens sind; unter dem Gesichtspunkt einer 'Herrschaft der toten, vergangenen, vergegen-

⁵ »Die Waren sind Dinge und daher widerstandslos gegen den Menschen. ... Um diese Dinge als Waren aufeinander zu beziehen, müssen die Warenhüter sich zueinander als Personen verhalten, deren Willen in jenen Dingen haust, so daß der eine nur mit dem Willen des andern, also jeder nur vermittels eines, beiden gemeinsamen Willensaktes sich die fremde Ware aneignet, indem er die eigene veräußert.« (K. Marx, MEW-23, S. 99) und: »Aber nur die gesellschaftliche Tat kann eine bestimmte Ware zum allgemeinen Aquivalent machen. Die gesellschaftliche Aktion aller andern Waren schließt daher eine bestimmte Ware aus, worin sie allseitig ihre Waren darstellen.« (ebd., S. 101) Und: »Der Körper der Ware, die zum Aquivalent dent, gilt stets als Verkörperung abstrakt menschlicher Arbeit.« (ebd. S. 72) — Typisches Zeichen der Renalssance der vulgärmarxistischen Ökonemisiererei in der etablierten Studentenlinken ist die Verdrängung der Frage nach dem Subjekt und Willen der gesellschaftlichen Verhältnisse.

cunningly does the will to the immutability of the existing conditions turn against the ruling subjects themselves; the unchanged grin in the masks' features reveals the uncanniness of the future by hiding the essence of the present.3

Under the dominance of this material class will as measure

of the values, through which is possible, the respective generated rationale lis t, i.e. H. to re-use the generated synthesis of economy and logic in history — ('value' designates nothing other than the 'validity' of certain conditions of a social formation that have ossified into material-economic forms, which on the natural basis of divided appropriation constituted their reciprocity) — under this domination, in view of the future, there is always the iron law that the future present or even the past will always be more limited than the present future; In other words: the inner turmoil in society, driven by the real abstraction of value-added production, creates the utopia that had a chance of being realized, always only as an ideality, as a 'pure' form of rational-rational conclusions, in the nu r quantifying and measuring the present is exceeded; this ideality then becomes an integrated moment of realized 'future', which differs only quantitatively from the past present; as a moment of the new reality, this thinking establishes the factuality of the prevailing conditions as a factuality of the logical laws.

But the opportunity lies precisely in the fact that — since the narrowing of the future through its realization as a law is only derived from the past experienced up to now — this law says everything about the past and present of bourgeois society, but little or nothing about real Z future and nothing about progress and its chances of identifying the authenticity of the future as freer. The past-present reality is always narrower than what is possible when the force of the circumstances is the reason for its existence; from the point of view of a 'rule of the dead, past, con-5' »Commodities are things and therefore unresistable to man.

. . . In order to relate these things to one another as commodities, the keepers of commodities must relate to one another as persons whose will resides in those things, so that the one only with the will of the other, i.e. each one only by means of one, both common acts of will appropriate the foreign goods by dulling their own.« (K. Marx, MEW-23, p. 99) and: »But only the social act can have a certain value make are the general equivalent. The social action of all other commodities therefore excludes a specific commodity in which they present their commodities on all sides."

(ibid., p. 101) And: "The body of the commodity, which serves as an equivalent, is always regarded as the embodiment of abstract human labour." (ibid., p. 72) - Typical sign of the Renaissance of the vulgar Marxist okonem ization in the established student left is the suppression of the question of the subject and will of social conditions.

ständlichten Arbeit über die lebendige' (Marxens erste Bestimmung des 'Kapital') läßt sich das Mögliche der Zukunft nur idealisch als spezifische Wirklichkeit begreifen; die verhinderte Möglichkeit gibt sich zu erkennen als die Immergleichheit des bürgerlichen Behauptungswillens, der sich zur Äquivalenz aller Kontrahenten verdinglicht und Zukunft ins Armenhaus einer ewig verlängerten Gegenwart sperrt. — Diese falsche Totalität des 'Wertes', — dem der Partialwillen zur Zufälligkeit der einzelnen Existenzen wird statt zum Moment der Konkretion von Totalität,- birgt das Geheimnis der Mechanik als traditionelle Logik der Schlußfolgerungen aus gegebenen Urteilen, in welchen die Zukunft denkend vor der falschen Totalität der Gegenwart in die Knie gezwungen wird. Dieser Zwang ist im bürgerlichen Begriff des Fortschritts nur voluntativ übersteigert.

Die Prämisse im Denken von Fortschritt wird auch von anderer Seite her einsichtig: die Abschaffung von Sklaverei und Frondearbeit ist ein Fortschritt gegen die Verwertung des Werts der Arbeitskraft, die selbst nicht mehr sein soll als ihre Reproduktionskosten, also stets dasselbe; die Abschaffung von Seuchen ist der Fortschritt gegen die Möglichkeit bakteriologischer Kriege, die Abschaffung der Hungersnot ein Fortschritt gegen das Aushungern unterentwickelt gehaltener Länder. Die Abschaffung von Naturkatastrophen und Krisen setzt die Bedingung fürs Überleben der Gattung, die sich als in Klassen geteilte Gesellschaftsformationen aus diesen Bedingugen selbst die Mittel nehmen, sich zu unterdrücken und auszubeuten. Das Überleben ist so immer schon die Prämisse der Futurologie, die doch ihr zufolge erst das Ergebnis einer in der Zukunft bewältigten gasellschaftlichen Tat sein soll. Doch wer nicht oder in Bedrohung nur überlebt, wessen Existenz durch keine kritische Erinnerung den physichen Tod überlebt, der eben hat weder Zukunft noch gar fortschrittliche.

Ist der Zirkel von Fortschritt und Auf-der-Stelle-treten nur theoretisch zu durchbrechen? Oder ist er umgekehrt nur durch das Eintreten in ihn zu sprengen? — Kant hatte ironisch den Hellsehern der Zukunft zugerufen: »Wie aber eine Geschichte apriori möglich? — Antwort: wenn der Wahrsager die Begebenheiten selber macht und veranstaltet, die er zum voraus verkündet. «6 Der Satz ist doppelsinnig wie bürgerlicher Fortschritt selbst; er hat den richtigen Geschmack eines unwirschen Appells ans eigene kritische Selbstbewußtsein, das sich am Gegenstand zur praktischen Kritik zu konkretisieren habe; der Satz hat aber auch den falschen Geruch bloßer Geschäftstüchtigkeit, worin Selbstbewußtsein nur rabiater Unternehmergeist ist.

Friedrich Engels hatte, angesichts der Münzerschen Bewegung in den Bauernkriegen, die Hartnäckigkeit begriffen, mit der die Schaffung einer befreiten Zukunft durch eine bloß abstrakte Negation der Gegenwart behindert wird, wenn die revolutionäre Subjektivität hinausgeht 'nicht nur über die Gegenwart, sondern

⁶ I. Kant, Der Streit der Fakultäten, in: Kleine phil. Schriften, Leipzig (1961), S. 242

sameness of the bourgeois assertiveness, which reifies itself into the equivalence of all opponents and locks the future into the poorhouse of an eternally prolonged present. — This false totality of

'Value' - where the partial will becomes the contingency of the individual existences instead of the moment of the concretion of totality - holds the secret of mechanics as the traditional logic of the conclusions from given judgments, in which the future thinking before the wrong one totality of the present is brought to its knees. In the bourgeois concept of progress, this compulsion is only voluntarily exaggerated.

The premise in thinking about progress is also understandable from another side: the abolition of slavery and forced labor is progress against the exploitation of the value of labor power, which itself should be no more than its reproduction -costs, always the same; the abolition of plagues is progress against the possibility of bacteriological wars, the abolition of famine is progress against the starvation of countries kept underdeveloped. The abolition of natural catastrophes and crises sets the condition for the survival of the species, which as social formations divided into classes take from these conditions the means to oppress and exploit themselves. Survival is thus always the premise of futurology, which according to it should only be the result of a social act accomplished in the future. But those who do not survive or only survive under threat, whose existence does not survive physical death through any critical memory, then they have neither a future nor even a progressive one.

Can the circle of progress and standing still only be broken theoretically? Or, conversely, can it only be blown up by entering it? - K ant would have called out ironically to the clairvoyants of the future: "But how is a history possible a priori? — Answer: if the fortune-teller himself creates and organizes the events that he announces in advance.«6 The sentence has a double meaning, like bourgeois progress itself; he has the right taste for a surly appeal to his own critical self-confidence, which has to be concretised on the object of practical criticism; but the sentence also has the wrong smell of mere business acumen, in which self-confidence is only found in rabid entrepreneurial spirit.

Friedrich Engels had, in the face of M iinzer's movement in the Bauem wars, understood the obstinacy with which the creation of a liberated future is hampered by a mere abstract negation of the present when revolutionary subjectivity goes 'not just beyond the present, but

• I. K ant, The controversy of the faculties, in: Small phil. Writings, Leipzig (1961), p. 242

selbst über die Zukunft').7 Andrerseits läßt sich gerade da, wo gegen bloß revoltierende Schwärmerei angegangen wird, ein resignativer Unterton in der Vorsicht der Argumente nicht vermeiden. etwa da, wo Marx von der Arbeiterschaft der Pariser Commune schreibt: »Sie hat keine Ideale zu verwirklichen; sie hat nur die Elemente der neuen Gesellschaft in Freiheit zu setzen, die sich bereits im Schoß der zusammenbrechenden Bourgeoisiegesellschaft entwickelt haben.«8 Jedoch schließt sich der Zirkel gerade dort, wo gegen Marxens Nüchternheit die Spontaneität gehißt wird, die eher an abstrakte Ungeduld denn an diejenige Unmittelbarkeit erinnert, in die sich die anstrengende Arbeit an der Gegenwart hineinvermittelt hat; so teilweise in Ulrich Sonnemanns wichtiger Kritik der marx'schen Anthropologie, wenn er schreibt: »Nicht anders wird der Zukunft von den Revolutionen auf die Sprünge geholfen als durch eine Unbekümmertheit ums Ankommen.«9

Die Frage, so klingt es an, woraus diese Mechanik zwanghaften Fortgangs besteht, beantwortet sich nur in der kritisch denkenden und handelnden Entscheidung, was diese Mechanik nicht ohne den Willen frei werden wollender Menschen soll.

Die Mechanik -schon als nur physikalische - ist die praktische Antwort auf die tödliche Unsicherheit, die dem Menschen durch seinesgleichen und durch die Natur droht, ebenso wie diese Mechanik als Kriegs- und Produktionsverhältnis selbst der Grund der Bedrohung geworden ist und als schlechthin Anti-Humanes erfahren wird. Als Himmelsmechanik, von Newton auf den Begriff der gleichförmigen Bewegung gebracht, spiegelte sie zunächst nur ideell wider, was ihre Realität schließlich wurde: nämlich die Gestalt der Wiederholung und Wiederholbarkeit, die zum verborgenen Betrug aller Prognosen auf die Zukunft wurde; die Astrologie, als frühzeitiges Spiegelbild erst antizipierter Verhältnisse, leitete nur ironisch die Dialektik der kapitalistischen Verwertung ein: vorhersagen ließ sich nur, was sich als Schicksal vollzog, was also mit unerbittlicher Glechförmigkeit in berechenbaren, abgerundeten Zyklen wiederkehrte. Die Unterbrechung dieses Zirkels wurde dagegen zum Inbegriff des Unvorhergesehenen, das selbst nur Gesetz der drohenden zyklischen Krise ist, also nichts Neues als die alte Barbarei bringt. Gegen sie wird stets von neuem nur die Lückenlosigkeit der Bewegungsmechanismen von Maschinerie und Verwaltung beschworen, als einzige im Bürgertum vorhandenen Mittel, das Überleben zu garantieren. Die Zukunft war also nur zu beherrschen, indem die in Erfahrung gebrachten Gesetze der Vergangenheit verlängert wurden, d. h. ihre Lücken geschlossen und ihre Wirkungssphäre ausgedehnt wurden.

Prognose — selbst solche, die großzügig die Überholtheit des Privateigentums der Anderen proklamiert — gewinnt also ihre sichere Anwartschaft auf die Zukunft nur durch eben dieses We-

⁷ F. Engels, MEW-7, S. 346

⁸ K. Marx, Der Bürgerkrieg in Frankreich, MEW-17, S. 343
⁹ Vgl. U. Sonnemann, Negative Anthropologie, Reinbek 1969, S. 99

Workers of the P ariser Commune write: »It has no ideals to realize; it only has to liberate those elements of the new society that have already developed in the womb of the collapsing bourgeois society. which is more reminiscent of abstract impatience than of that immediacy in which the strenuous work on the present has mediated itself; This is partly the case in U lrich Sonnemann's important critique of Marxian anthropology, when he writes: »The only way the future will be helped by revolutions is by a lack of concern about its arrival.«9

The question, it sounds, of what this mechanism of compulsive progress consists of, can only be answered in the critical thinking and acting decision as to what this mechanism should not do without the will of people wanting to become free.

Mechanics—already as a mere physical one—is the practical answer to the deadly insecurity that threatens man through his kind and through nature, just as this mechanic as a war and production relationship itself has become the reason for the threat and as par excellence antihuman anes is experienced. As celestial mechanics, brought to the concept of uniform movement by Newton, it initially reflected only ideally what its reality ultimately became: namely the form of repetition and repeatability, which led to the hidden fraud of all forecasts of the future became; astrology, as an early reflection of conditions only anticipated, only ironically introduced the dialectics of capitalist exploitation: it was only possible to predict what happened as fate, i.e. what returned with inexorable sameness in calculable, rounded cycles. The breaking of this circle, on the other hand, became the epitome of the unforeseen, which itself is only the law of the threatening cyclical crisis, so it brings nothing new but the old barbarism. Against them, only the completeness of the movement mechanisms of machinery and administration is invoked again and again as the only means available in the bourgeoisie to guarantee survival. The future could only be controlled by prolonging the laws of the past, i. H. their gaps were closed and their sphere of influence expanded.

Prognosis - even one that generously proclaims the obsolescence of the private property of others - thus gains its secure expectancy for the future only through this very way

- 8 K. Marx, The Civil War in France, MEW-17, p. 343
- Cf. U. Sonnemann, Negative Anthropologie, Reinbek 1969, p. 99

sen des Privateigentums an der Macht des dinglichen gesellschaftlichen Klassenwillens im Geld und im Kapital. Einzig auf Kosten der Wiederholung — d. h. der ewigen Wiederherstellung des Werts der Arbeitskraft durch den Wert der sie erhaltenden Lebensmittel — war ein 'sicherer' Fortgang als Bestehenbleiben der Gesellschaft möglich. Die Himmelsmechanik wurde in diesem Prozeß zum Maßstab der irdischen: als Uhr steht sie seither der abstrakten gesellschaftlichen Arbeitszeit ebenso gegenüber wie das Geld als unveränderlicher Maßstab der Preise der übrigen Warenwelt.

Wie fatal bereits in ihrer Begriffswahl die Futurologie dem Fetischismus der Uhrzeit — als Maßstab abstrakter Arbeitszeit, der zu dem von Geschichtszeit überhaupt hypostasiert wird - verfallen ist, zeigt ihre unreflektierte Affinität zum Physikalisch--mechanischen in den Naturwissenschaften. In der Verkümmerung der Präzision von Dialektik zur Statik der mathematischen Abstraktion wird zumeist noch den Kritikern die von ihnen aufgedeckten Zustände angelastet.10 So schreibt Flechtheim: »Hätte Marx den Maßstab der radikalen Kritik auch an seine eigene Vision angelegt, so hätte er die Zukunft nicht als Notwendigkeit, sondern als Möglichkeit prognostiziert. Er hätte dann nicht dogmatische Thesen, sondern falsifizierbare Hypothesen aufstellen müssen.«11 Der Unterschied zwischen einer, angeblich von Marx dogmatisch behaupteten, Notwendigkeit bestimmter Geschichtsprozesse, was ihre Zukunft angeht, und der als falsifizierbar-hypothetischen Möglichkeit ist so groß wie der Unterschied zwischen der Physik Newtons und der Plancks, nämlich der Unterschied einer Mechanik der Gewißheit und einer Mechanik der Wahrscheinlichkeit; wobei in der Übertragung des Unterschieds auf die Gesellschaftswissenschaft von den Theoretikern der Wahrscheinlichkeit nur die triviale 'Notwendigkeit' einer Reihe von Irrtümern einkalkuliert wird; durch Fehlschüsse hindurch gewinnt die Flack ihre Zielsicherheit.

Die Prognose, auf der Basis einer infiniten gleichförmigen Bewegung, die durch willensmäßig fixierte Punkte den Charakter des sich wiederholenden Kreislaufs annimmt, — sie kann als physikalische Basis des Deduktionsschlusses gelten, wogegen das 'Unvorhergesehene' sich erst im induktiven Experimentieren und im Vollzug der Strategien erkennen läßt. In den Kategorien von Deduktion und Induktion verbirgt sich also auch der Antagonismus von Krise und dem Willen zu unveränderlichen Verhältnissen; sie können nicht ahnungslos auf das Begreifen des Wesens von Zukunft angewendet werden, wie es die Futurologen tun. Gerade der Dezisionismus M. Heideggers ist der Konstruktion, bzw. gedanklichen Nachbildung jener Mechanik der Wahrscheinlichkeit, unter der die Zukunft selbst anonymes Subjekt der über die Zukunft der Gesellschaft entscheidenden Situationen bleibt, nicht

¹⁰ Die »Notwendigkeit« kann auch als wendende Not, die Moglichkeit als Beschränktheit der Gegenwart begriffen werden!

¹¹ O. K. Flechtheim, Marx-futurologisch gesehen, in PRAXIS- 1-2, Zagreb 1969, S. 82

money and in capital. Solely at the expense of repetition—i.e. H. the eternal restoration of the value of labor power by the value of the means of subsistence that sustains it

— was a 'safe' continuation possible as the company continued to exist. In this process, celestial mechanics became the yardstick for terrestrial ones: since then, as a clock, it has stood in opposition to abstract social labor time, just like money, as the unchanging yardstick for the prices of the rest of the world of commodities.

Just how fatally futurology has fallen into the fetishism of the time in its choice of terms - as a measure of abstract working time, which is hypostatized to be historical time - is shown by its unreflected affinity with the physical.

-mechanical in the natural sciences. In the decline in precision from dialectics to the statics of mathematical abstraction, the critics are mostly still blamed for the states they uncovered.10 Flechtheim writes: created his own vision, he predicted the future not as a necessity but as a possibility. He would then not have had to put forward dogm atic theses, but falsifiable hypotheses.«11 The difference between the necessity of certain historical processes, allegedly dogmatically asserted by Marx, as far as their future is concerned, and the need as falsifiable-hy -pothetical possibility is as great as the difference between Newtonian and Planckian physics, namely the difference between a mechanics of certainty and a mechanics of probability; whereby in the transfer of the difference to social science only the trivial 'necessity' of a series of errors is taken into account by the theorists of probability; through missed shots, the anti-aircraft gun gains its accuracy.

The prognosis, on the basis of an infinite uniform movement, which takes on the character of the repetitive cycle through volitionally fixed points - it can be regarded as the physical basis of the deductive conclusion, whereas the

'Unforeseen' can only be recognized in inductive experimentation and in the execution of strategies. So the categories of deduction and induction also conceal the antagonism of crisis and the will to immutable conditions; they cannot be unsuspectingly applied to conceiving the nature of the future, as futurologists do. Precisely M. Heidegger's decisionism is the construction, or

mental imitation of that mechanism of probability, under which the future itself remains an anonymous subject of the situations decisive for the future of society Become understood now!

 $11\ O.\ K.\ Flechtheim,\ Marx-futurologically seen,\ in\ PR\ A\ X\ IS-\ 1-2,\ Zagreb\ 1969,\ p.\ 82$

unähnlich; so heißt es bei Heidegger: »Wenn aber Schicksal die ursprüngliche Geschichtlichkeit des Daseins konstituiert, dann hat die Geschichte ihr wesentliches Gewicht weder im Vergangenen. noch im Heute und seinem 'Zusammenhang' mit dem Vergangenen, sondern im eigentlichen Geschehen der Existenz, das aus der Zukunft des Daseins entspringt.«12 — In einer Gesellschaftsordnung, in der die Garantie aufs Überleben sorgfältig und unsorgfältig verwaltet wird, ist 'Sorge' kein Existential allein, sondern auch Ergebnis jener Bedrohung, ohne die die 'Ordnung' des Überlebens nicht im herrschenden Sinne aufrechterhalten werden kann.

Bereits in ihrer Selbstgliederung entscheidet die Futurologie konservativ über die Zukunft, indem sie die bestehenden Antagonismen zwischen Idealität und Realität, zwischen Sein und Sollen wiederholt: Zukunft ist immer das, was ganz jenseits der Gegenwart liegt. 13 Sie wird ein statistischer Wert bezüglich der Prognose, ein widerstandsloser Hohlraum bezüglich der Planung, ein abstrakter Sollen-Wert bezüglich dem, was zu tun sei. Die 'Bevölkerungsexplosionen, die Erschöpfung von Rohstoffquellen, die Umweltverschmutzung, die Überwucherungen der Zerstörungskräfte, die Verkümmerung der Persönlichkeit' - sie werden nicht als das begriffen, was sie bereits jetzt sind: erbärmliche Eigenschaften der stets gegenwärtigen bürgerlichen Produktionsverhältnisse.14 Die angebliche bedrohte Zukunft verbirgt die Gegenwart der Bedrohung noch darin, daß ja alles noch nicht so schlimm sei, daß der Schaden noch abwendbar sei. Dies mag der Grund sein, warum die Sprache der Futurologen selten leugnet, daß es um Besitzergreifung geht, daß die Unheimlichkeit der Zukunft in der Erfahrung und Ahnung liegt, daß sie schon jetzt heimlich das Privateigentum der Gegenwart ist. Selten ist die sublimierte Gier nach Gewinn und Erfolg verborgen, wenn technische und institutionelle Neuerungen ausgemalt werden. 15 Auch muß die Futurologie eine Voraussetzung machen, deren Berechtigung mitnichten ausgewiesen ist, nämlich die Voraussetzung, daß die Menschengattung überlebe; nur 'wenn die Katastrophe eines globalen Krieges vermieden wird', besitzen nach Flechtheim bestimmte futurologische Aussagen einen an Sicherheit grenzenden Grad der

¹² M. Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, Tübingen 1960, S. 386. Vgl. auch: »Das Jetzt geht nicht schwanger mit dem noch-nicht jetzt, sondern die Gegenwart entspringt der Zukunft in der ursprünglichen ekstatischen Einheit der Zeitigung der Zeitlichkeit.«, ebd., S. 427

¹⁵ G. Picht unterscheidet zwischen 'Prognose-Utopie-Planung', R. Jungk zwischen 'Voraussage-Voraussicht-Entwurf', Flechtheim zwischen 'Prognose-Planung-Philosophie der Zukunft'. Vgl. Der Griff nach der Zukunft, hrsg. v. R. Jungk u. H. J. Mundt, München 1964; O. K. Flechtheim, Futurologie-Möglichkeiten und Grenzen, in Neue Rundschau 2, 1968

Moglichkeiten und Grenzen, in Neue Rundschau 2, 1968

14 Vgl. O. K. Flechtheim, Futurologie — Herkunft und Umrisse einer neuen Wissenschaft, Hessischer Rundfunk, Mai 1968, Manuskript, S. 30

15 »Die Zukunftforschung bemüht sich, Informationen über zukünftige gewinnen. K. Steinbuch, Zukunftsplanung als politische Aufgabe, in: Die technische, wirtsclaftliche, gesellsehaftliche oder politische zu stände zu neue Gesellschaft, März-April 1968, S. 123. — Vgl. auch: O. K. Flechtheim, Von der Wissenschaft der Zukunft zur Futurologie in: Die Mitarbeit, Heft I. Von der Wissenschaft der Zukunft zur Futurologie, in: Die Mitarbeit, Heft 1, Febr. 1968

actual happenings of existence that springs from the future of existence.«12 — In a social order in which the guarantee of survival is carefully and carelessly administered, 'care' is not an existential alone, but also the result of that threat without which the 'Order' of survival cannot be maintained in the prevailing sense.

Already in its self-classification, futurology decides conservatively about the future by repeating the existing antagonisms between ideality and reality, between being and ought: the future is always that which lies entirely beyond the present.13 They w becomes a statistical value in relation to the prognosis, an unresisting void in relation to planning, an abstract target value in relation to what is to be done. The 'population explosions, the depletion of resources, the pollution, the excesses of destructive powers, the atrophy of personality'—they are not understood for what they already are: pathetic properties of the always present bourgeois production conditions.14 The allegedly threatened future still conceals the presence of the threat in the fact that everything is not yet so bad that the damage can still be averted. This may be the reason why the language of futurologists seldom denies that it is about possession, that the uncanniness of the future lies in the experience and intuition that it is already secretly the private property of the present. Rarely is the sublimated greed for profit and success hidden when technical and institutional innovations are envisioned.15 Futurology must also make a presupposition whose justification is by no means proven, namely the presupposition that the M human species survive; 12 M. Heidegger, Being and Time, Tubingen 1960, p. 386. Cf. also: »The now is not pregnant with the not yet, but the present arises from the future in the original ecstatic unity of the maturation of temporality.«, ibid., p. 427

- 13 G. Picht distinguishes between 'Prognose-Utopia-Planning', R. Jungk between 'Forecast-Forecast-Draft', Flechtheim between 'Prognose-
- -Planning philosophy of the future'. Cf. The grasp for the future, ed.
- v. R. Jungk and H. J. M undt, Munich 1964; O. K. Flechtheim, Futurology Possibilities and Limits, in Neue Rundschau 2, 1968
- 14 Cf. O. K. Flechtheim, Futurology origin and outline of a new science, Hessischer R undfunk, May 1968, manuscript, p. 30
- 15 "Future research endeavors to obtain information about future ones." K. Steinbuch, Future planning as a political task, in: The

technical, economic, social or political conditions for a new society, March-April 1968, p. 123. — See also: O. K. Flechtheim, From the Science of the Future to Futurology, in: Die Mitarbeit, Issue 1, February 1968

Wahrscheinlichkeit; ¹⁶ ebenso heißt es bei Steinbuch: »Unsere Überlegungen sollen den Fall ausschließen, daß die menschliche Kultur durch einen Großkrieg mit Atomwaffen total vernichtet oder auf eine primitive Stufe zurückgeworfen wird.«¹⁷ In diesen Voraussetzungen verbirgt sich die Tautologie, daß, wenn die Menschheit den Stand ihrer Entwicklung zu erhalten vermag, sie sich eben auf der Basis dieses Standes zu entwickeln vermag.

Die Futurologie als Staatswissenschaft¹⁸ legt ihr Gewicht auf die Notwendigkeit längerfristiger Planung gegen die Anarchie in der Konkurrenz;¹⁹ insofern nimmt die Futurologie an der Dialektik des Fortschritts²⁰ als deren Moment teil: indem sie die Seite der Vergesellschaftung aller partialen Verhältnisse der Gegenwart betreibt, konserviert sie die falsche Totalität der Gesellschaftsformation durch deren eigene Rationalität. Darin unterscheidet sich die Futurologie nur in der größeren Abstraktheit ihres Gegenstandes von den technologisch-ökonomischen Wissenschaften.

Aus dem theoretischen Modell der Politischen Ökonomie ist die Vorstellung entnommen, 'Planung' sei in irgendeiner Weise die Verfügung über die — letztlich linear und 'progressiv', d. h. formalteleologisch gedachte -Zeit.²¹ Die künftige Zeit erscheint als zu ökonomisierender Arbeitsgegenstand; sie darf ohne 'Rationalisierung', d. h. hier: ohne sparsame und durchdachte Zumessung nicht angewendet noch über sie verfügt werden. Überhaupt ist das ihr

¹⁶ Vgl. Flechtheim, Futurologie, a. a. O, S. 30

¹⁷ K. Steinbuch, a. a. O, S. 125

¹⁸ Soll heißen: nur als 'illusionäres Gesamtsubjekt' (Marx), im Staat, hat das Bürgertum ein Interesse an vorausgeplanter Zukunft, das über die konkurrierenden Partialinteressen hinausgeht.

¹⁹ »Kurzfristigere und beschränktere menschliche Voraussicht und Vorausplanung werden so zu 'aufgehobenen' Momenten längerfristiger und umfassenderer menschlicher Bewertungen und Zielsetzungen, Entwürfe und Visionen.« Flechtheim, Von der Wissenschaft —, a. a. O, S. 20

²⁶ Adornos Denken ist bestimmt von der Erfahrung, 'daß die Verwüstungen die der Fortschritt anrichtet, allenfalls mit dessen eigenen Kräften wieder gut zu machen sind, niemals durch die Wiederherstellung des älteren Zustandes, der sein Opfer ward'. Vgl. Th. W. Adorno, Fortschritt, in: Stichworte, Frankfurt 1969, S. 42. — Wenn Hentig meint: »Wenn die Planung zu einer Termitenmentalität führt, dann hebt sie ihre eigenen Bedingungen auf: Termiten können nicht planen.« So setzt doch die These ein unzerissenes gesellschaftliches Subjekt voraus, das als Ganzes betroffen wäre. Die Spaltung in Plannende und Verplante aber verbietet diesen Optimismus e negativo. — Vgl. H. v. Hentig, Planung entwickelt eine neue Mentalität, in: Der Griff nach der Zukunft, a. a. O, S. 158

²¹ Für Steinbuch besteht die Methode der Planung in einer 'Extrapolation des bisherigen Verlaufs einer Zeitfunktion' (a. a. O., S. 124); G. Anders meint: ∍Planung verwandelt die Zeit in einen uns verfügbaren 'Zeitraum' (G. A., Was ist Planung, in: Der Griff nach der Zukunf, a. a. O, S. 47) Nicht jedoch die Zeit läßt sich verwandeln, denn 'Zeit' ist nichts als ein Maßstab. der an verschiedene Veränderungsprozesse angelegt wird; diese qualitativ verschiedenen, auf einen quantitativ vergleichbaren Nenner gebrachten Prozesse verbergen, wie der Wert, das Subjekt der Vergleichung. Anders meint jedoch richtig, daß Planung, das heißt das Festlegen des Modus einer Veränderung, die erst bewirkt werden soll, bereits retroaktiv die gegenwärtigen Tätigkeiten festlegen und bestimmen.

assumptions conceal the tautology that that if mankind is able to maintain the level of its development, it can develop on the basis of this level.

Futurology as political science18 places its weight on the need for long-term planning against anarchy in competition;19 in this respect futurology takes part in the dialectic of progress20 as its moment: by pursuing the side of the socialization of all partial relationships of the present, it conserves the false totality of the social formation through its own rationality. In this respect, futurology differs from the technological-economic sciences only in the greater abstractness of its subject.

The idea that 'planning' is in some way the disposal of the - ultimately linear and 'progressive', i. H. formally teleologically conceived - time.21 The future time appears as a work object to be economized; it may be used without 'rationalization', i. H. here: neither used nor made available without economical and well thought-out measurement. Anyway, that's her

*• See Flechtheim, Futurologie, a. The. O, S. 30

17 K. Steinbuch, a. a. O, S. 125

18 Soil means: only as an 'illusionary total subject' (Marx), in the state, does the bourgeoisie have an interest in a pre-planned future that goes beyond the competing partial interests.

18 "Shorter-term and more limited human foresight and planning thus become 'suspended' moments of longer-term and more inclusive human evaluations and goals, designs and visions." Flechtheim, Von der Wissenschaft —, a. a. O, p. 20

*• Adorno's thinking is determined by the experience that 'the devastation caused by progress can at best be made good by its own strength, never by restoring the older one condition that became his victim'. Cf. Th. W. Adorno, progress, in: key words, F ra n k fu rt 1969, p. 42. — If H entig means: »If planning leads to a term mentality, then it annuls its own conditions: termites cannot plan.' So the thesis presupposes an undivided social subject that would be affected as a whole. However, the division into planning and planning prohibits this optimism us e negativo. — Cf. H. v. Hentig, Planning develops a new mentality, in: The grasp for the future, op. a. O, p. 158

For Steinbuch, the method of planning consists of an 'extrapolation of the previous course of a time function' (ibid., p. 124); G. Anders says:

"Planning turns time into a 'period of time' available to us."

(G. A., What is planning, in: Der Griff nach der Zukunf, op ird these qualitatively different processes, reduced to a quantitatively comparable denominator, hide, like the value, the subject of the comparison. Differently, however, correctly means that planning, i.e. the determination of the mode of a change that is only to be effected, already retroactively determine and determine the current activities.

Gegenstück, das Sich-Zeit-nehmen oder Sich-Zeit-lassen, bleibt ihre abstrakte Utopie ebenso wie sie die partiale Existenz dieses Gegenstücks als 'Faulheit' und 'Gammelei' haßerfüllt verfolgt.

'Planung' darf sich nur in dem bereits vorhandenen Gegensatz zwischen konkreter und abstrakt gesellschaftlicher Arbeitszeit bewegen, den sie doch zugleich auflösen soll. Der Gegensatz selbst wird unter dem einheitlichen Maßstab 'Zeit' verdeckt,22 so daß er als widerspruchsfreie Planung nur in die Zukunft 'verlängert' wird. Wird aber unterm Maßstab 'Zeit' nur die Form gegenwärtiger Verhältnisse als Planung verlängert, so ist Subjekt dieser 'Perpetuierung' eben dasjenige, das den Maßstab setzte: der Klassenwille der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft als Prinzip der Verwertung, der die eigenen Verhältnisse als 'unveränderliche' in die Zukunft, d. h. über den eigenen Einflußbereich eben dieses Willens zu bewahren trachtet. Eben damit schneidet die Bourgeosie als Subjekt der Planung eine Veränderungsmöglichkeit der bestehenden Bedürfnisse selbst ab, deren Falschheit sich in der Anpassung des Proletariats an die bürgerlichen Lebensweisen offenbart.23 Der ganze Charakter dieses geplanten Fortschritts wird blitzhaft deutlich in der Bemerkung Pierre Bertaux's: »In der neotechnischen Welt von morgen (...) wird der Zwang nicht mehr nötig sein; da fügt sich jeder gern.«24 Daß jeder Einzelne auf sich seine Bedürfnisse in Zukunft noch mehr zu verzichten habe, ist in der Erklärung des Futurologen Haseloff, warum die Zukunft sich bisher dem Griff der Planer entzogen habe, gleich als heimliches Soll mitgeliefert: »Der wohl wichtigste Grund hierfür dürfte in der Tatsache liegen, daß die überlieferten Versuche der gedanklichen Bewältigung der Zukunft sich stets von Wünschen und Gefühlsbedürfnissen haben lenken lassen.«25

224

The counterpart, taking one's time or allowing oneself time, remains her abstract utopia, just as she hates the partial existence of this counterpart as 'laziness' and 'rottenness'.

^{22 »}Die Arbeit zählt nur noch nach ihrem Zeitmaß« (K. Marx, MEW-23, S. 210). Dies ist auch das Geheimnis der Feststellung Blochs: »Die übliche Historie kennt aber nicht einmal das Problem variabler Zeitmaße.« (E. B., Tüb. Einl. in die Philosophie I, Frankfurt 1963, S. 182) Kant hat den Zusammenhang von Zeit und Zahlenverhältnis, der bei Marx nicht ausgeführt wird, expliziert: »Also ist die Zahl nichts anderes, als die Einheit der Synthesis des Mannigfaltigen einer gleichartigen Anschauung überhaupt, dadurch, daß ich die Zeit selbst in der Apprehension der Anschauung erzeuge.« (I. K., Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Leipzig 1956, S. 241) Vgl. auch: Alfred Sohn-Rethel, Geistige und körperliche Arbeit, Frankfurt 1970, wo die kantische Transzendentalität dieser Erzeugung der Abstraktion aus der Abstraktion aus der Tauschform abzuleiten versucht wird.

²³ »Die Ansprüche des Nationalstaates und der Wirtschaftsgesellschaft bringen es also mit sich, daß nicht das sozial Wünschbare, sondern das industriell und militärisch-technisch Machbare den Fortschritt der Wissenschaften in ihrer Gesamtheit entscheidend bestimmt. (Claus Koch, Staatliche Forschung und Planung, in: Der Griff nach der Zukunft, a. a. O., S. 386/7) — Die Intelligenz ist dieser Rationalität des Wertgesetzes nicht enthober.

²⁴ P. Bertaux, Denkmaschinen, Kybernetik und Planung, in: Der Griff nach der Zukunft, a. a. O., S. 75 — P. B. erklärt kurzerhand die Entscheidung darüber, ob in Zukunft der Einzelkapitalist oder der Technokrat die herrschende Minorität sein wird, zu einer Frage des Glaubens, 'also zur Privatangelegenheit' (ebd., S. In der Form, daß der Kapitalist als Kreditgeber zum Gläubiger werden kann, its B. von der Wahrheit garnicht so weit entfernt.

²⁵ O. Haseloff, Strategie und Planung ,in: Der Griff nach der Zukunft, a. a. O., S. 124

'Planning' may only move in the already existing contrast between concrete and abstract social working time, which it is supposed to resolve at the same time. The contrast itself is concealed under the uniform scale 'time',22 so that as planning free of contradictions it only 'extends' into the future

becomes. But if only the form of present conditions is extended as planning under the 'time' scale, then the subject is this

'Perpetuation' is precisely that which sets the standard: the class will of bourgeois society as a principle of valorization, which projects one's own circumstances as 'unchangeable' into the future, i. H. seeks to prove this will over its own sphere of influence. It is precisely in this way that the bourgeoisie, as the subject of planning, cuts off a possibility of changing the existing needs themselves, the falsity of which is revealed in the adaptation of the proletariat to the bourgeois way of life.23 The whole character of this planned progress becomes clear in a flash in the note P ierre B ertau x 's observation: »In the neotechnical world of tomorrow (...) coercion will no longer be necessary; everyone agrees."24 The fact that each individual will have to do without his needs even more in the future is immediately apparent in the explanation of the futurologist Haseloff as to why the future has so far eluded the planners' grasp Should also be supplied: "The most important reason for this may lie in the fact that the traditional attempts at intellectual mastery of the future have always been guided by desires and emotional needs."25

22 »Work only pays according to its time measure« (K. M arx, MEW-23, p. 210). This is also the secret of Bloch's statement: "But the usual history does not even know the problem of variable time measurements.", p. 182) K ant hat explicates the connection between time and the numerical relationship, which is not explained in Marx: "The number is therefore nothing other than the unity of the synthesis of the manifold of a homogeneous intuition in general, by the fact that I create time myself in the apprehension of the intuition.«

(I.K., criticism of pure reason, Leipzig 1956, p. 241) See also: Alfred Sohn-Rethel, Geistige und korperliche Arbeits, Frankfurt 1970, where the Kantian transcendentality of this generation of the An attempt is made to derive abstraction from abstraction from the form of exchange.

23 »The claims of the national state and the economic society mean that it is not what is socially desirable, but what is industrially and militarily-technically feasible that promotes the progress of science in

their G all decisively determined.« (Claus Koch, State Research and Planning, in: Der Griff nach der Zukunft, loc. cit., p. 386/7) —

Intelligence is not exempt from this rationality of the law of value.

24 P. B ertaux, Thinking machines, cybernetics and planning, in: The grasp for the future, op. a. O., p. 75 — P. B. explains in a nutshell the decision about whether in the future the individual capitalist or the technocrat will be the ruling minority as a question of faith, 'that is, as a private a t-matter' (ibid., p. In the form that the capitalist as lender can become a creditor, it's not so far from the truth.

26 O. Haseloff, Strategy and Planning, in: The Grip for the Future, op. a. O., p. 124

Gerade Haseloff, als Techniker des Planungsdenkens, offenbart unbewußt, daß Planung stets nur da den Erfolg verspricht, wo die Zukunft längst ausgemacht ist; die Realisierung des Geplanten hängt nur noch von einigen statistisch berechneten Momenten ab, die als fast ganz ausgemachte Möglichkeiten schon jetzt das Ganze der Zukunft ausmachen; wo sich die Zukunft dagegen den Möglichkeiten der Befreiung öffnet, ist sie unzuverläßlich, unberechenbar, abstrakt-utopisch. Gerade deshalb erscheint aber im Planmodell die Zukunft nur als Bedrohung der Gegenwart, sprich: des Privateigentums, auch wenn diese Bedrohung als 'Risiko' längst zur 'präzisierbaren und affektneutralen Variablen im Deziionsmodelli'26 geworden ist. Da dieses Risiko jedoch nur zu beherrschen ist, wenn vorher schon 'eindeutig' postuliert wird vom Futurologen, 'was sein soll und was nicht sein soll',27 so ist sebst der Terror gegen den wirklichen Fortschritt nicht auszuschließen von seiten derer, die die Mittel haben, die Zukunft wieder nur nach ihrem bornierten Willen und Interesse zu gestalten. — Das wirklich existierende 'Dezisionsmodell' ist jedoch leider keine Erfindung von futurologischen Planern; es ist ein Modell, durch das die Verfahrensweise fixiert wird, bevor das die Entscheidung auslösen sollende Ereignis selbst eintritt, indem also eine prolongierte Methode die gegenständliche Form des Inhalts und damit modifizierend diesen selbst apriori beeinflußt. Dieses Modell ist der kapitalistische Betrieb selbst, in dem die Methoden, nämlich die Konkurrenz, längst ausgemacht ist, bevor sie jeweils als das 'neue Risiko' eintrifft; ähnlich in jeder militärischen Auseinandersetzung. Dezisionsmodelle, in denen die Strategien schon vorher festgemacht werden, erscheinen in der futurologischen Theorie als die bedrückende Tatsache, daß auch in Zukunft sich die Methoden nicht ändern.

Der Futurologie ist bisher nur zu entnehmen, daß der Fortschritt keine Zukunft habe, weil die Zukunft nur die 'Mängel' im geschlossenen System der gegenwärtigen Gesellschaft beseitigt, indem zugleich die Auswege mit vermauert werden. Der Fortgang in die Zukunft, wenn er unkritisch und ohne Revolutionierung der Verhältnisse sich selbst überlassen wird, tritt auf der Stelle des öden Einerlei der herrschenden Gegenwart, deren zynische Dialektik Hegel die Wendung gab: "Es kommt hierin zum Vorschein, daß bei dem Übermaße des Reichtums die bürgeliche Gesellschaft

Mittel für künftiges Handeln bereit. Die wählbaren Entscheidungen werden in ein Aletrnativsystem gebracht. Instruktionen über Informationen und Bedingungen legen fest, ob und wann jeweils die eine oder andere Alternative mit allen ihren Konsequenzen in Kraft tritt.« Ebd, S. 148

²⁷ Der abstrakte Sein-Sollen Gegensatz, von dem die Futurologie durchtränkt ist, treibt sie zu ihrer Selbstauflösung: »In Wirklichkeit enthält aber zumindest jede Gesellschaftswissenschaft einerseits induktive Wahrscheinlichkeitsaussagen, andrerseits deduktive Aussagen über sichere Zusammenhänge. Insofern unterscheidet sich die Futurologie von der Soziologie oder Ökonomie, ja sogar auch von der Psychologie oder Biologie garnicht so Grundsätzlich« Flechtheim, Futurologie, a. a. O., S. 28; obiges Zitat S. 39

now only depends on a few statistically calculated moments, which, as almost completely established possibilities, already make up the whole of the future; on the other hand, where the future opens up to the possibilities of liberation, it is unreliable, unpredictable, abstract-utopian. Precisely for this reason, however, the future only appears in the planning model as a threat to the present, i.e. to private property, even if this threat is seen as a 'risk'.

has long since become a 'precise and affect-neutral variable in the decision model'26. However, since this risk can only be controlled if the futurologist has already 'unambiguously' postulated 'what should be and what shouldn't be',27 even terror against real progress on the part of these people cannot be ruled out who have the means to shape the future again only according to their narrow-minded will and interests. — Unfortunately, the actually existing 'decision model' is not an invention of futurological planners; it is a model by which the procedure is fixed before the event that is supposed to trigger the decision itself occurs, i.e. by a prolonged method influencing the objective form of the content and thus modifying it a priori. This model is the capitalist enterprise itself, in which the methods, i.e. the competition, have long been worked out before they are considered as that

'new risk' arrives; similarly in every military dispute. In futurological theory, decision models in which the strategies are fixed beforehand appear as the depressing fact that the methods will not change in the future either.

So far, futurology has only been able to tell that progress has no future, because the future only eliminates the 'deficiencies' in the closed system of present-day society, while at the same time the ways out are walled up. Progress into the future, if it is left to its own devices uncritically and without revolutionizing the situation, takes the place of the dreary monotony of the dominant present, whose cynical dialectic gave Hegel the phrase:

with the excess of wealth s the bourgeois society M Haseloff, p. 144 and: »Strategic dispositions provide foresighted means for future action. *The selectable decisions are brought into an a letm ative sy stem. In stru c tio n s on inform ation and conditions determine whether and when one or the other alternative with all its consequences comes into force.« Ibid, p. 148

27 The abstract contrast between what is and what should be, which permeates futurology, drives it to its self-dissolution: »In reality,

however, at least every social science contains, on the one hand, inductive probabilities statements, on the other hand deductive statements about certain connections. In this respect, futurology differs from sociology or economics, yes even from psychology or biology, not so fundamentally« Flechtheim, Futurologie, op. a. above, p. 28; above quote p. 39

nicht reich genug ist, d. h. an dem ihr eigentümlichen Vermögen nicht genug besitzt, dem Übermaße der Armut und der Erzeugung des Pöbels zu steuern.«²⁸

Wenn Flechtheim der marxistischen Theorie entgegenhält: »Die Dialektik garantiert keinen Fortschritt. «, ²⁹ so wird darin doch nur eine Wahrheit der bürgerlichen Theorie in ihrer blinden Gegnerschaft ausgesprochen: Dialektik und Garantie, zumal statische Gewißheit schließen sich ebenso aus, wie die Mechanik des bloßen Fortgangs und der durch Kritik der Verhältnisse implizierte Fortschritt. In diesem Widerspruch ist zugleich die produktive Ungewißheit angelegt, eben weil Fortschritt, wie Adorno bemerkt, 'nicht bloß den Umfang dessen beschreibt, was Dialektik hat, sondern dialektisch is tim eigenen Begriff'. ³⁰

Die Verdinglichung des bürgerlichen Klassenwillens vollzog sich in der Etablierung gesellschaftlicher Verhältnisse, aus denen die abstraktiven Formen der Verstandesfunktionen, als Formen der Quantität, des Maßes, der Relationen und Modalitäten usf., ebenso herauswuchsen wie sie ihrerseits der Entwicklung der gesellschaftlichen Verhältnisse in den Abstraktionsformen die Bedingung dafür lieferten, daß die Vergesellschaftungsprozesse eine allgemeine Gestalt erhielten; die logisch-ökonomischen Verstandesformen, deren Gestalt aus der Praxis, d. h. aus dem abstraktiven Verhältnis der Produzenten und Warenbesitzer in einer arbeitsteiligen Gesellschaft, hervortraten, haben immer schon zugleich den Fortgang eben derselben Verhältnisse der Gesellschaft zu sich selbst und zur Natur mitbestimmt. Nie hat — wie aus einigen Partien der marx'schen Theorie deduzierbar scheint - die Logik des gesellschaftlichen Verstandes überwiegend in einer bloß äußerlichen Beziehung oder auf den Kopf gestillten Beziehung zu den materiellen Grundlagen der gesellschaftlichen Verhältnisse gestanden; obwohl sie - als Wissenschaft oder reine Kopfarbeit, d. h. als bewußte Verstandestätigkeit nicht nur in den begriffenen Dingen aufgeht, sondern ein Moment der Äußerlichkeit entweder als Spekulation oder in Form der Ideologie und Kritik selbst ist. Nicht erst die Technisierung dieser Logik in der Computerindustrie³¹ sondern die gesamte Geschichte der Kopfarbeit, ob diese als Wissenschaft relativ selbständig besteht oder Moment der Produktions- und Zirkulationserfahrung blieb, existiert nur in der Verflochtenheit von Ideal- und Realabstraktion. Jene als Maße und Verhältnisse erstarrenden, dinglich werdenden gesellschaftlichen Verstandesfunktionen, sie — weil sie bewußtlos erzeugt werden,

G. W. F. Hegel, Enzyklopädie, Hamburg 1959, S. 201
 Flechtheim, Marx futurologisch gesehen, a. a. O., S. 82

³⁰ Adorno, Fortschritt, a. a. O., S. 40

³¹ P. Bertaux hat recht, was die Chance des unkritischen Denkens angeht, wenn er meint, daß durch die Denkmaschinen das Denken als intellektuelle Tätigkeit, immer weniger die Angelegenheit des einzelnen sein wird, und immer mehr die Angelegenheit organisierter Gruppen' (a. a. O., S. 57) — Selbst in solchen Feststellungen hinkt die Theorie hinter der Wirklichkeit her: die Trennung von Hand und Kopf und die Entwicklung der Wissenschaft war angesicht der Resultate nie das Denken 'enzelner'.

When Flechtheim counters the Marxist theory:

»The dialectic does not guarantee progress«,28 so it only expresses one truth of bourgeois theory in its blind opposition: dialectic and guarantee, especially static certainty, are just as mutually exclusive as the mechanics of the mere Progress and the progress implied by criticism of the circumstances. At the same time, productive uncertainty is inherent in this contradiction, precisely because progress, as Adorno remarks,

'not merely describes the scope of what has dialectics, but dialectic is in its own term'.30

The reification of the bourgeois class will took place in the establishment of social relations, from which the abstract forms of the intellectual functions, as forms of quantity, measure, relations and modalities, etc., grew out just as they in turn contributed to the development of social relations in the forms of abstraction provided the condition for the processes of socialization to acquire a general shape; the logical-economic forms of understanding, the shape of which derives from practice, i. H. from the abstract relationship of producers and owners of goods in a society based on the division of labour, have always co-determined the progress of the very same relationships of society to itself and to nature. The logic of social understanding has never - as seems to be deducible from some parts of Marx's theory - predominantly in a mere

external or inverted relationship to the material foundations of social relations; although - as a science or as pure mental work, i. H. as conscious intellectual activity, not only arises in the things understood, but is a moment of externality either as speculation or in the form of ideology and criticism itself.

Not only the mechanization of this logic in the computer industry31 but the entire history of mental work, whether it exists relatively independently as a science or remained a moment of production and circulation experience, only exists in the interweaving of ideal and real abstraction. Those social functions of the intellect that solidify as measures and relationships, becoming material, because they are generated unconsciously, 28 G. W. F. Hegel, Enzyklopadie, Hamburg 1959, p. 201

s* Flechtheim, M arx seen futurologically, a. a. O., p. 82

80 Adorno, Progress, op. a. O., p. 40

31 P. B ertaux is right as far as the chance of uncritical thinking is concerned when he thinks that thinking as an intellectual activity will be less and less the concern of the individual, and always more the matter of organized groups' (ibid., p. 57) —

Even in such statements, the theory lags behind reality: the separation of hand and head and the development of science was never 'individual' thinking in view of the results.

226

ihre Kristallisation sich 'hinter dem Rücken' der eigenen Produzenten vollzieht, — sie sind in der Ökonomie der Mittel genau diejenigen Funktionen, die allererst das Wesen aller gesellschaftlichen Abstraktion ausmachen. In eben diesen Formen liegt das Geheimnis der Mechanik, die jeden Fortschritt in der Geschichte stets nur als allenfalls quantitative Bedingung und äußere Zweckmäßigkeit eines möglichen Fortschritts in der Geschichte ankünden. Aus der Zukunft aber wird das sich befreien wollende Subjekt stets wieder in die Fesseln der Gegenwart zurückgeschleudert, solange der bürgerliche Klassenwille unerkannt in und als die Form und Methode des in die planbare Zukunft hineinragenden Denkens haust, solange der Wille des tätigen Verstandes sich selbst als Maß unveränderlicher Verhältnisse mißversteht, weil in Wirklichkeit er selbst als unveränderliches Maß der Dinge verhartt

Wenn aber die Gesellschaft in ihren Verhältnissen selbst die gegenständliche Form ihres blinden Wissens ist, das sich als Form ihrer wechselseitigen, ihrer verwaltend-normierenden und technischen Relationen und Modalitäten etabliert, so heißt das auch, daß das Proletariat im Lohnkampf gegen die Bourgeosie sich notwendig selbst zum bloßen Moment des abstrakten bürgerlichen Klassenwillens macht, nämlich zum Geldwert der eigenen Arbeitskraft, die nach der Zeit, als dem ökonomischen Maßstab der bürgerlichen Ausbeutung, gemessen wird und einzig darin ihren Wert, d. h. ihre gesellschaftliche Geltung besitzt. Der Lohnkampf für sich genommen ist nur der Kampf einer 'Ethik' der einfachen Warenproduktion W-G-W gegen die kapitalistische Warenproduktion in ihrer spezifischen Umkehrung und Verselbständigung der Akkummulation des abstrakten Reichtums. Leicht wird das dritte Gemeinsame der Klassen Bourgeosie und Proletariat in diesem Kampf selbst verdeckt: die Rationalität des dinglichen bürgerlichen Klassenwillens, der in seiner Durchsetzung als Wert nicht nur die falsche Totalität der blinden Verhaltnisse setzt, sondern auch die des blinden gesellschaftlichen Denkens.

Eine Kritik der ökonomischen Verstandesformen hätte zu erweisen, daß die Intelligenz, als Techniker, Ausbilder, Manager, Wissenschaftler usf., ebenso die repressive Abstraktion der bestehenden Arbeitsteilung betreibt, als Instrument und Bedingung der Verwertung, wie die Kritik der Politischen Ökonomie erwies, daß das Proletariat im täglichen Kampf um die bloße Erhaltung des Werts seiner Arbeitskraft der Fortschritt nur als die List des blinden Fortgans etabliert, der über die einzelnen Mitglieder der Gesellschaft hinweggeht, um das falsche Ganze der Gesellschaft, ihren Wert als das Gelten ihrer Gesetze, aufrechtzuerhalten und voranzubringen.

Ohne den Kampf der kritischen Intelligenz gegen die Mechanik sich etablierender ökonomischer Verstandesformen wird die mögliche Umwälzung der gesellschaftlichen Verhältnisse durch das Proletariat als der eine Pol der falschen Totalität ebenso blind dem abstrakten Fortschritt der Produktivkräfte verhaftet bleiben,

their crystallization takes place 'behind the backs' of their own producers - in the economy of means they are precisely those functions which first and foremost constitute the essence of all social abstraction. The secret of mechanics lies in precisely these forms, which always announce every advance in history only as a quantitative condition and external expediency of a possible advance in history. From the future, however, the subject who wants to free himself is always thrown back into the chains of the present, as long as the bourgeois class will dwells unrecognized in and as the form and method of thinking that projects into the plannable future, as long as the will of the active understanding misunderstands itself as the measure of unchangeable relations, because in reality it itself remains as the unchangeable measure of things.

If, however, society itself in its circumstances is the objective form of its blind knowledge, which establishes itself as the form of its reciprocal, its administrative-norming and technical relations and modalities, then this also means that

the proletariat in the wage struggle against the bourgeoisie necessarily makes itself a mere element of the abstract bourgeois class will, namely the monetary value of its own labor power, which is measured according to time, as the economic standard of bourgeois exploitation and only in this their value, i. H. has its social validity. The wage struggle in itself is only the struggle of an 'ethics' of simple commodity production C-M-W against capitalist commodity production in its specific reversal and autonomy of the accumulation of abstract wealth. The third thing that the classes bourgeoisie and proletariat have in common is easily concealed in this struggle itself: the rationality of the material bourgeois class will, which in its implementation as a value not only sets the false totality of blind conditions, but also the of blind social thinking.

A critique of economic forms of understanding would have to prove that the intelligentsia, as technicians, trainers, managers, scientists, etc., also pursues the repressive abstraction of the existing division of labor, as an instrument and condition of the V assessment, as the criticism of political economy proved, that

the proletariat in the daily struggle for the mere preservation of the value of its labor power only establishes progress as the cunning of the blind advance, which ignores the individual members of society for the false whole of society, theirs Worth as the enforcement of their laws, to uphold and advance.

Without the struggle of the critical intelligentsia against the mechanics of established economic forms of understanding, the possible overturning of social relations by the proletariat, as one pole of the

false totality, will remain just as blindly attached to the abstract progress of the productive forces , 227

wie ohne den Kampf des Proletariats die bestehende Arbeitsteilung und damit die bürgerliche Struktur der gesellschaftlichen Bedürfnisse stets nur reproduziert wird. — Gerade die syndikale Organisation der Arbeiterbewegung betrieb bisher nur das Geschäft der abstrakten, latent gebliebenen Vergesellschaftung: die Kaderpartei, selbst wo sie den Sturz der kapitalistischen Verhältnisse betreibt, blieb nur der politische Spiegel der syndikalen Interessen; ihr Erfolg hat nur die Beseitigung der Form G-W-G' erzielt, um die einfache Warenproduktion in einer größeren Verallgemeinerung wieder aufzunehmen; die falsche Totalität war nur auf 'höherer' Ebene reproduziert. -- Die Kaderpartei, übertragen auf fortgeschrittene kapitalistische Nationen, betreibt zudem die falsche Integration der Intelligenz in ein bestehendes Svstem proletarischer Bedürfnisse. Die darin von der Intelligenz geleugneten Eigeninteressen, die in einer Differenz zu den proletarischen nicht bloß, wie stets unterstellt wird, als bürgerliche bestehen müssen, führte in der inzwischen etablierten Intelligenzbewegung zur abstrakten Identifizierung — nicht mit den proletarischen Interessen, sondern mit den Methoden des vergangenen Kampfes der Arbeiterbewegung in der Geschichte; darin verfällt sie blind dem Widerspruch, daß eine Intelligenz, die sich als 'kleinbürgerliche Bündnispartner' dem Proletariat anbietet, nicht zugleich dessen 'Gesamttheoretiker' sein kann, zu dem sie sich dennoch aufschwingt.

Die Selbstkritik der Intelligenz könnte hier allererst zu einer Kritik der bürgerlichen Organisationsformen des Proletariats führen; denn wirklich die eigene Verbürgerlichung überwinden könnte das Proletariat nur durch die Erweiterung der praktischen Kritik der Produktionsverhältnisse durch die Kritik der bürgerlich-instrumentellen Verstandesformen, die jene sich etablieren helfen. Die wirkliche Zukunft eines befreienden Fortschritts könnte dann die Gegenwart sein.

how without the struggle of the proletariat the existing division of labor and with it the bourgeois structure of social needs is always only reproduced. - The syndical organization of the workers' movement in particular has so far only been involved in the business of abstract, latent socialization; the cadre party, even where it is promoting the overthrow of capitalist conditions, remained only the political mirror of syndical interests; its success has only the elimination of the form G-W -G'

achieved in order to resume the simple production of goods in a larger generalization; the false totality was only reproduced at a 'higher' level. - The cadre party, transferred to advanced capitalist nations, also promotes the false integration of the intelligentsia into an existing system of proletarian needs. The self-interests denied by the intelligentsia, which differ from the proletarian ones and not just as bourgeois interests, as is always assumed, led to abstract identification in the meanwhile established intelligentsia movement - not with the proletarian interests, but with the methods of the past struggle of the labor movement in history; in this it blindly falls for the contradiction that an intelligence that presents itself as

'Petty-bourgeois allies' to the proletariat, cannot at the same time be their 'overall theorist', to which it nonetheless soars.

The self-criticism of the intelligentsia could here first of all lead to a criticism of the bourgeois forms of organization of the proletariat; for the proletariat could only really overcome its own bourgeoisification by expanding the practical critique of the conditions of production through the critique of the bourgeois-instrumental forms of understanding that help them to establish themselves. The real future of liberating progress could then be the present.

228

POUR LA CONSTRUCTION D'UNE ALTERNATIVE — POLITIQUE AUSSI BIEN QUE SOCIALE — À L'INDUSTRIALISME

Riccardo Quarello Torino

I — Le paradoxe contemporain

Le monde contemporain est soumis tout à la fois à l'emprise d'une double nécèssité. Les zones industrielles sont caractérisées par l'emprise exercée sur l'individu, les groupes sociaux, et les forces institutionnelles par la nécéssité sociale de la maladie mentale, de la disgrégation sociale, du déséquilibre écologique; par contre les zones qui n'ont pas été atteintes jusqu'ici par l'industrialisation restent soumises à l'emprise de la nécéssité naturelle, qui est à la fois une nécéssité materielle, une soumission au traditionalisme et un autoritarisme phisiologique.

Cette double emprise de la nécéssité, dépourvue de tout précédent aussi bien en ce qui concerne sa dimension quantitative qu'au point de vue de son rapport avec la conscience collective, me semble caractériser la situation historique actuelle: une condition paradoxal s'établit par là qui ne manque pas de désorienter la raison. Le problème théorique et pratique contemporain intéressant l'humanité entière est justement le dépassement de ce paradoxe. En effet la refléxion reconnait la racine de cette double emprise de la nécéssité dans la logique d'assujettissement et d'aliénation. Cette logique peut rendre les individus ou la collectivité riches ou pauvres au point de vue propriétaire mais il les appauvrit tous sous l'angle de leur rapport avec leur histoire, leur humanité et leur mileu les réduisant au niveau d'objets sans monde.

La logique de l'industrialisme est une logique de guerre étant fondée sur le rapport esclavagiste éxistant entre un sujet qui vit sa liberté en tant que indétermination pure et donc absolue, et la nature la culture et la société qui en sont reduites à l'objet d'une maîtrise indiscriminée et donc absolue.

Il est bien connu que la limite du rapport éxistant entre l'esclave et son maître reside dans la liberté de tuer en tant que droit

A LTNDUSTRIALISME

Richard Quarello

Torino

I — The contemporary paradox

The contemporary world is simultaneously subject to the grip of a double necessity. Industrial areas are characterized by the grip exerted on the individual, social groups, and institutional forces by the social necessity of mental illness, social disgregation, ecological imbalance; on the other hand, the zones which have not hitherto been affected by industrialization remain subject to the grip of natural necessity, which is both a material necessity and a submission to labor.

ditionalism and a physiological authoritarianism.

This double grip of necessity, devoid of any precedent both with regard to its quantitative dimension and from the point of view of its relationship with the collective consciousness, seems to me to characterize the current historical situation: a paradoxical condition is established by which does not fail to disorient reason. The contemporary theoretical and practical problem of interest to all of humanity is precisely the overcoming of this paradox.

Indeed, reflection recognizes the root of this double grip of necessity in the logic of subjection and alienation.

This logic can make individuals or the community rich or poor from the point of view of ownership, but it impoverishes them all from the angle of their relationship with their history, their humanity and their environment, reducing them to the level of objects without a world. .

The logic of industrialism is a logic of war being founded on the slavery relationship existing between a subject who experiences his freedom as pure and therefore absolute indetermination, and the nature, culture and society that are part of it. reduced to the object of an indiscriminate and therefore absolute mastery.

It is well known that the limit of the relationship existing between the slave and his master resides in the freedom to kill as a right.

sur la vie de l'autre. C'est là l'essence de la loi de la guerre: dans l'industrialisme l'état de guerre est permanent, entre les hommes, aussi bien qu'entre l'homme et la nature et l'homme et la culture. Le recours aux armes n'est donc qu'un épiphénomène de la réalité quotidienne: par ce recours la déhumanisation se manifeste en tant que telle.

L'instrument politique homogène à cet état de guerre permanent est l'état national, en tant qu'état-église et état-administration: c'est-à-dire en tant que moyen de gérér l'anomie par la réligion de la hierarchie.

A l'heure actuelle l'agence politique de l'industrialisme est en passe de devenir mondiale; plutôt que dans l'organisation anémique des nations unies on peut la reconnaître dans l'alliance monstrueuse entre les ennemis d'hier et d'avant — hier: l'impérialisme russo-américain est complémentaire au révanchisme allemand et japonais et il est objectivement intéressé à la sauvegarde et à l'expansion, par n'imposte quelle voie, des fascismes nationaux et sociaux.

Et purtant on a l'impression qu'un agent politique aussi étendu ne soit pas encore suffisant pour défendre, sauvegarder et étendre le paradoxe contemporain.

II - La nouvelle gauche

Tous ceux qui ne sont pas aptes à la guerre sont objectivement disponibles pour un processus de mutation, pour la construction d'une civilisation caractérisée par des nouveaux rapports entre l'homme et la nature, les hommes entre eux, les hommes et la culture.

Ce nouveau rapport devant être respectueux de l'humanité dans toutes ses situations: la civilisation qui en résultera devra être par conséquent non-violente, autonormative et paritaire.

On peut expliquer ainsi le dénominateur commun des protestations des jeunes, de l'inquiétude des femmes, du malaise des personnes âgés, de la résistence des malades, dans les zones industrielles. Comme par ailleurs il y a lieu de considérer que les personnes les moins aptes à la guerre sont celles qui risquent davantage de la perdre en raison de leur faiblesse découlant d'un niveau technologique inférieur, on peut s'expliquer également la disponibilité au processus de mutation qui caractérise la population entière dans les zones qui n'ont pas étés atteintes par l'industrialisme.

Nous considérons ici la nouvelle gauche comme l'ensemble des personnes des groupes sociaux et des forces institutionnelles se posant en tant que objectif à poursuivre plutôt que mythe à contempler, l'utopie humaine éternelle d'une humanité non partagée, dans le sens d'un monde sans frontières et donc d'une civilisation planétaire, d'un monde sans discrimination de pouvoir et donc d'une civilisation olocratique, d'une societé sans classes, douée d'un civilisation paritaire.

on the life of another. This is the essence of the law of war: in industrialism the state of war is permanent, between men as well as between man and nature and man and culture.

Recourse to arms is therefore only an epiphenomenon of daily reality: through this recourse, dehumanization manifests itself as such.

The political instrument homogeneous with this permanent state of war is the national state, as a state-church and a state-administration: that is to say, as a means of managing the anomie by the religion of the hierarchy.

Today the political agency of industrialism is becoming global; rather than in the anem ic organization of the united nations, it can be recognized in the monstrous alliance between the enemies of yesterday and the day before — yesterday: Russo-American imperialism is complementary to revanchism e German and Japanese and he is objectively interested in the safeguarding and expansion, by any imposture, of national and social fascisms.

And yet one has the impression that such an extensive political agent is not yet sufficient to defend, safeguard and extend the contemporary paradox.

II — The New Left

All those who are not fit for war are objectively available for a process of change, for the construction of a civilization characterized by new relationships between man and nature, men among themselves, men and Culture.

This new relationship must be respectful of humanity in all its situations: the civilization which will result from it must consequently be non-violent, self-normative and equal.

We can thus explain the common denominator of the protests of young people, the anxiety of women, the discomfort of the elderly, the resistance of the sick, in the industrial zones. Since, moreover, there is reason to consider that the people least fit for war are those who are more likely to lose it because of their weakness resulting from a lower technological level, one can also explain the availability to the process. of change that characterizes the entire population in areas that have not been affected by industrialism.

We consider here the new left as the whole of people from social groups and institutional forces posing as an objective to be pursued rather than my thea to be contemplated, the eternal human utopia of an unshared humanity. , in the sense of a world without borders and therefore of a planetary civilization, of a world without discrimination of power and therefore of an olocratic civilization, of a society without

La nouvelle gauche n'est donc pas seulement forcéé à rechercher une nouvelle définition et une nouvelle localisation de la classe en soi et de la classe pour soi, elle doit surtout préciser toutes les conséquences théoriques et pratiques d'une éthique que nous avons défini l'éthique de la guerre. Cette éthique a inspiré le cours tout entier de la revolution moderne en tant qu'effort de reduire la raison à une technique fonctionnelle à une mauvaise foi métaphisique.

On la retrouve dans tous les corollaires politiques de la pensée moderne: le principe hierarchique-bureaucratique, en tant que modèle inspirant l'organisation de la société, de l'entreprise, et de l'état; le principe aristocratique-oligarchique en tant que modèle de direction politique économique, et administrative; le principe carismatique-individualiste en tant que modèle d'innovation au niveau individuel, social, institutionnel.

Placés devant le problème de comment dépasser ces corollaires, dont le résultat ultime est de mettre en doute la notion même de parti, — en tant qu'oligarchie-utilisant l'état-en tant que bureaucratie-avec la légitimation d'une idéologie-en tant que totalisation abstraite, — la nouvelle gauche ne se reconnait pas et se partage entre le spontanéisme, professé par ceux qui voient dans un engagement personnel généralisé la seule garantie de liberté de la praxis politique, le léninisme d'après la seule garantie de verité de la praxis politique reside dans l'élaboration interpersonnelle des groupes, et le démocratisme, caractérisant ceux qui voient dans la pratique assembléaire la seule garantie de l'existence de la praxis politique.

III — Politique socialiste et socialisation de la politique

Le spontanéisme, le léninisme, le démocratisme ne sont qu'autant dégradations du problème d'une praxis de mutation: ils rentrent tous en effet dans le cadre d'une praxis politique conçue comme une sorte de praxis séparée pour la transformation de la praxis sociale. Leur incompatibilité reciproque tire son origine de leur inclusion dans ce cadre, ainsi que leur impuissance pratique.

C'est ainsi que la praxis politique se proposant de déprivatiser et de désinstitutionnaliser la conduite collective, mais que l'on continue à penser comme une réalité en soi, refuse de s'organiser et reste par conséquent prisonnière de l'inertie des institutions ainsi qu'il arrive au spontanéisme.

D'autre part, en refusant de se socialiser elle reste prisonnière de l'intêrêt particulier de l'oligarchie, et c'est le cas du léninisme. Enfin en refusant de se soumettre à une critique elle reste prisonnière de la platitude du bon sens et c'est bien ce qui se passe quand on choisit le démocratisme.

Le léninisme considère en effet que le rapport interpersonnel évoluant grâce à une pratique permanente d'établissement de projets, et de recensement de données, est capable de résoudre le proThe new left is therefore not only forced to seek a new definition and a new localization of the class in itself and of the class for itself, it must above all specify all the theoretical and practical consequences of an ethic that we have defined. the ethics of war. This ethic has inspired the entire course of the modern revolution as an effort to reduce reason from functional technique to metaphysical bad faith.

It is found in all the political corollaries of modern thought: the hierarchical-bureaucratic principle, as a model inspiring the organization of society, business, and the state; the aristocratic-oligarchic principle as a model of political, economic, and administrative leadership; the charismatic-individualistic principle as a model of innovation at the individual, social and institutional level.

Faced with the problem of how to overcome these corollaries, the ultimate result of which is to cast doubt on the very notion of party—as oligarchy-using the state-as bureaucracy-with legitim ation of an ideology-as an abstract totalization - the new left does not recognize itself and divides itself between spontaneism, professed by those who see in a generalized personal commitment the only guarantee of freedom of political praxis, Leninism e according to the only guarantee of truth of political praxis lies in the interpersonal elaboration of groups, and democratism, characterizing those who see in assembly practice the only guarantee of the existence of political praxis.

Ill—Socialist politics and the socialization of politics Spontaneism, Leninism, democratism are only so many degradations of the problem of a praxis of change: they all come within the framework of a political praxis conceived as a sort of separate praxis for the transformation of social praxis. Their reciprocal incompatibility stems from their inclusion in this framework, as well as their practical impotence.

This is how political praxis, proposing to deprivatize and deinstitutionalize collective conduct, but which we continue to think of as a reality in itself, refuses to organize itself and consequently remains prisoner of the inertia of institutions as well as that he arrives at spontaneism.

On the other hand, by refusing to socialize it remains a prisoner of the particular interest of the oligarchy, and this is the case of Leninism.

Finally, by refusing to submit to criticism, it remains a prisoner of the platitude of common sense and this is what happens when we choose

democratism.

Leninism indeed considers that the interpersonal relationship evolving thanks to a permanent practice of establishing projects, and collecting data, is capable of resolving the problem.

blème de l'élaboration collective des décisions, étant donné qu'il peut permettre l'unification par une communauté d'objectits au lieu d'unification par un compromis.

Un parti est révolutionnaire quand il est un groupe en fuison et quand il surgit de la mobilisation permanente afférant aux choix que chacun accomplit pour les autres, et que tous accomplissent pour la totalité. Comme toutefois le parti ne s'identifie pas avec la société entière, il est repoussé dans la logique d'un sous-système social: il peut devenir ainsi reformiste sous le poid de son rapport avec l'état ou maximaliste sous la pression des tensions sociales.

Le démocratisme reconnait le caractère élitaire du léninisme et situe l'opérateur institutionnel de la révolution dans l'organisation autonome des masses, dans laquelle on rencontre la totalité des possibilités de conscience, d'éxpérience et de pouvoir.

L'état révolutionnaire est caractérisé par une structure consiliaire permettant le développement des niveaux d'autogestion de la population ainsi que l'extension de la praxis politique à la société toute entière. Et cependant dans la mesure où l'assemblée comprend son rôle comme celui d'un opérateur total, entièrement sujet à la volonté générale, c'est-à-dire comme totalisant en soi, elle exerce son pouvoir tyrannique sur les individualités qui la composent alors qu'elle devient esclave des décisions collectives qu'elle exprime.

Se berçant dans l'illusion de posséder la verité elle en finit alors pour perdre le pouvoir, du fait qu'elle méconnait le »nous« interpersonnel, seul sujet concret de la praxis qui puisse en quelque sorte faire la navette entre la vérité et le pouvoir.

Quant au spontanéisme, il découle de la critique des deux positions précédentes, en ce sens qu'il accepte la critique démocratique du léninsme, en même temps qu'il critique l'objectivité abstraite du démocratisme.

Le spontanéisme se fond essentiellement sur l'affirmation du rôle de la personne, dans la praxis révolutionnaire, non pas en tant que subjectivité abstraite, mais bien en tant que personnalité concrète. L'élément intentionnel qui permet à l'action humaine de traverser, pour ainsi dire, le cadre social et de s'objectiver sans toutefois s'épuiser en son objectivation, implique la primauté de l'engagement personnel tel qu'il se qualifie par la poursuite d'un devoir-être qui est en même temps un intérêt effectif.

On parvient ainsi à une sorte de renouvellement de la praxis, la soustrayant à une pétrification inévitable entre l'institutionalisation et la privatisation.

On en arrive par là à considérer la personne comme étant l'opérateur capable de racheter l'inertie de tout système théorique, politique ou technique. La spontanéité de l'engagement personnel est toutefois vouée à rester minoritaire vis-à-vis de la raison d'état, ainsi que d'intérêt du parti, à moins qu'elle ne sorte de son âge mineur en acceptant de se mesurer avec le problème de l'organisation et de la communication de la praxis révolutionnaire.

A party is revolutionary when it is a group in flight and when it emerges from the permanent mobilization relating to the choices that each makes for the others, and that all make for the totality. Since, however, the party does not identify itself with the entire society, it is pushed back into the logic of a sub-

- social system: it can thus become reformist under the weight of its relationship with the state or m axim alist under the pressure of social tensions.

Democratism recognizes the elitist character of Leninism and situates the institutional operator of the revolution in the autonomous organization of the masses, in which one encounters the totality of the possibilities of consciousness, experience and power.

The revolutionary state is characterized by a council structure allowing the development of levels of self-management of the population as well as the extension of political praxis to the entire society. And yet to the extent that the assembly understands its role as that of a total operator, entirely subject to the general will, that is to say as totalizing in itself, it exercises its tyrannical power over the individualities that compose it while it becomes a slave to the collective decisions that

she expresses.

Embracing herself in the illusion of possessing the truth, she then ends up losing power, because she knows the "we" to me.

interpersonal, the only concrete subject of praxis that can somehow shuttle between being truth and power.

As for spontaneism, it stems from the criticism of the two previous positions, in the sense that it accepts the democratic criticism of Leninism, at the same time as it criticizes the abstract objectivity of democratism.

Spontaneism is essentially based on the affirmation of the role of the person, in revolutionary praxis, not as an abstract subjectivity, but as a concrete personality. The intentional element which allows human action to cross, so to speak, the social framework and to objectify itself without however being exhausted in its objectification, implies the primacy of personal commitment such as it is qualified by the pursuit of a duty to be which is at the same time an effective interest.

We thus achieve a sort of renewal of praxis, removing it from the

inevitable petrification between institutionalization and privatization.

We thus come to consider the person as the operator capable of redeeming the inertia of any theoretical, political or technical system. The spontaneity of personal commitment is, however, doomed to remain in the minority vis-à-vis reasons of state, as well as the interest of the party, unless it emerges from its minor age by accepting to come to grips with the problem of the organization and communication of revolutionary praxis.

232

La recherche continue socialisée et problématique que le spontanéisme sollicite doit trouver son complément dans une organisation qui ne soit ni tyrannique, ni élitaire, ni statique et dans une communication qui ne soit ni abandonnée au hasard, ni sujette à des discriminations ou à des déformations.

IV — Une alternative politique aussi bien que sociale

Le problème d'une politique socialiste contemporaine s'identifie avec celui de la socialisation de la politique ainsi que avec celui de la politicisation de la conduite quotidienne, au sens de sa déprivatisation et de sa désinstitutionalisation.

Le problème de la révolution et du moyen révolutionnaire permettant aboutir à la création d'un homme nouveau se transforme par là en celui de la mutation sociale, réalisée par l'humanité en acte, qui est appelée à élaborer des projets sans en faire des fétiches et à construire des instruments sans croire à leur automatisme.

En d'autres termes sa vocation est d'éviter à la fois, les deux périls complémentaires de l'idéologisation et de la bureaucratisation. En effet il s'avère impossible d'échapper à la dégradation réciproque du léninisme, du démocratisme et du spontanéisme ainsi qu' à leur incompatibilité, qui a été suffisemment expérimentée, à moins d'abandonner l'hypothèse moderne d'une politique conçue en tant que monopole des forts, en s'éfforçant de racheter les faibles à moyen de l'autorité de l'état. Au point de vue de la pensée politique tout comme à celui de la pensée économique et antropologique il s'impose de reconsidérer la qualité de notre méthodologie en laissant de côté le corollaire de la mauvaise foi métaphysique.

Ceci revient à dire qu'il est indispensable de vérifier que nos moyens soient homogènes par rapport aux objectifis que nous poursuivons.

Notre objectif est celui de bâtir une civilisation humaine planétaire, paritaire, olocratique par la réalisation de notre humanité dans ses rapports avec la nature, la société et l'histoire; il en découle qu'il est impossible de la poursuivre sans y participer en tant que sujets concréts.

Cette transformation qui se manifestera sous la forme d'un »aut-aut«, c'est-à-dire rupture de continuité entre les vieux devoirs établis et les nouveaux devoirs en gestation, ne pourra avoir d'autres protagonistes que nous-mêmes.

Il n'est pas moins vrai toutefois que cette transformaiton n'aura pas lieu sans la médiation unifiante de la vie collective de chaque jour.

En d'autres termes la notion d'humanité universelle n'est pas à comprendre comme une totalité à venir, ni même comme une totalité originaire, ni encore moins comme une totalité abstraite et mistificatrice.

Cette totalité reside vraisemblablement en nous-mèmes: nous la retrouvons dans l'humanité de chacun d'entre nous, dans l'humanité tel que nous la connaissons tous et dans l'humanité entière

The continuous socialized and problematic research that spontaneism calls for must find its complement in an organization that is neither tyrannical, nor elititarian, nor static and in a communication that is

neither abandoned to chance, nor subject to discrimination. or has deformations.

IV — A political as well as a social alternative The problem of contemporary socialist politics is identified with that of the socialization of politics as well as with that of the politicization of daily conduct, in the sense of its deprivation and its deinstitutionalization.

The problem of revolution and of the revolutionary means allowing the creation of a new man is thereby transformed into that of social change, carried out by humanity in action, which is called upon to elaborate projects without turning them into fetishes and building instruments without believing in their automatism.

In other words, its vocation is to avoid at the same time the two complementary perils of ideologization and bureaucratization. In fact, it is impossible to escape the reciprocal degradation of Leninism, democratism and spontaneity as well as their incompatibility, which has been sufficiently experienced, unless we abandon the modern hypothesis of a a policy conceived as a monopoly of the strong, striving to redeem the weak through state authority. From the point of view of political thought just as from that of economic and anthropological thought, it is necessary to reconsider the quality of our methodology, leaving aside the corollary of metaphysical bad faith.

This amounts to saying that it is essential to check that our means are homogeneous with respect to the objectives that we are pursuing.

Our objective is to build a planetary, equal, olocratic human civilization through the realization of our humanity in its relationship with nature, society and history; it follows that it is impossible to pursue it without participating in it as concrete subjects.

This transformation, which will manifest itself in the form of a

»aut-aut«, that is to say, the break in continuity between the old established duties and the new duties in the making, cannot have other protagonists than ourselves.

It is no less true, however, that this transformation will not take place without the unifying mediation of everyday collective life.

In other words, the notion of universal humanity is not to be understood as a totality to come, nor even as an original totality, nor even less as an abstract and misleading totality.

This totality probably resides in ourselves: we find it in the humanity of each one of us, in humanity as we all know it and in humanity as a whole 233

que nous poursuivons ensemble. Il est donc tout à fait improbable qu'une humanité ainsi conçue puisse s'affirmer en faisant abstraction des sujets que la praxis révolutionnaire a traditionnellement négligé, à savoir, chacun d'entre nous en sa singularité inépuisable, nous tous dans la richesse inépuisable du rapport interpersonnel fondé sur la réciprocité et l'humanité entière dans la disponibilité inépuisable des projets, appelés à se transformer en oeuvres accomplies.

Ce »nous« dont il est question n'est donc autre chose que le rapport concret entre le »moi« et les »autres«; il est le biais par lequel l'individu prend sur soi-même les conditions réelles de la société où il vit, et même il cesse d'être un sujet éthique-juridique-economique abstrait en devenant une personne capable d'exprimer sa propre universalité. Il est l'intérmédiaire grâce auquel la societé prend sa propre signification par rapport à une fin collective qui la mesure en tant que telle.

C'est par ce »nous« que la societé se transforme en communauté, qu'il découvre et mesure sa propre particularité. Le »nous«, est donc le seul protagoniste possible d'une praxis véritable, qui soi collective sans cesser d'être individuelle, qui soit durable sans cesser d'être quotidienne, qui soit objective sans cesser d'être vécue.

Il y a donc lieu de considérer ce »nous« comme le catalisateur historique permanent en raison de son rôle d'entrepreneur social des fins et des moyens dans le cadre d'un processus d'autoplanification permanente en même temps que punctuelle.

Le »nous« que nous venons de définir, cette communauté concue comme un devoir-être réel, est alors tout à la fois la révolution en tant que fin, en tant qu'instrument et en tant que organisation.

Il ne représente pas une alternative politique qui ne pourrait devenir social qu'en s'institutionnalisant et en retombant par là dans la spirale bien connue, allant de la raison idéologique à la raison d'état par le tranchement de la raison de parti. Il est au contraire une alternative tout à la fois, politique-sociale-institutionnelle en raison de sa qualité humaine alternative.

Le »nous« que nous avons ainsi défini produit en effet une transformation des termes de la particularisation pratique et intellectuelle de la personnalité de chacun, se manifestant tour à tour sous la forme de motivations-atteintes et d'orientations-conduites.

Il en découle donc une transformation socio-culturelle intéressant l'organisation de la societé ausi bien que la dimension des rôles et des conditions institutionnells, c'est-à-dire la réalité socio-institutionnelle toute entière. La présence de ce »nous« implique donc l'élaboration d'un projet collectif ainsi qu'une gestion collective de la réalité sociale sous la forme d'une volonté constitutente permanente. Le rapport entre l'état et la societé de même que entre la culture et la societé ne serait par conséquent nié, et incessamment affirmé de la communauté non partagée, c'est-à-dire de la societé en acte. Comme par ailleurs ce »nous« croit en même temps que la praxis dont il est porteur, il ne serait pas inu-

that we pursue together. It is therefore quite improbable that a humanity thus conceived can assert itself by disregarding the subjects that revolutionary praxis has traditionally neglected, namely, each of us in his inexhaustible singularity, all of us in the inexhaustible richness of the interpersonal relationship based on reciprocity and entire humanity in the inexhaustible availability of projects, called to be transformed into accomplished works.

This "we" in question is therefore nothing more than the concrete relationship between the "self" and the "others"; it is the bias through which the individual takes upon himself the real conditions of the society in which he lives, and he even ceases to be an abstract ethical-legal-economic subject by becoming a person capable of expressing his own universality. It is the intermediary through which society acquires its own meaning in relation to a collective end which measures it as such.

It is through this "we" that society is transformed into a community, that it discovers and measures its own particularity. The "we" is therefore the only possible protagonist of a true praxis, which is collective without ceasing to be individual, which is durable without ceasing to be daily, which is objective without ceasing to be experienced.

There is therefore reason to consider this "we" as the permanent historical catalyst because of its role as a social entrepreneur of ends and means within the framework of a process of permanent self-planning at the same time as punctual.

The "we" that we have just defined, this community conceived as a real must-be, is then at the same time the revolution as an end, as an instrument and as an organization.

It does not represent a political alternative which could only become social by becoming institutionalized and thereby falling back into the well-known spiral, going from ideological reason to reason of state by cutting through the reason of left. On the contrary, it is an alternative at the same time, political-social-institutional because of its alternative human quality.

The "we" that we have thus defined produces in fact a transformation of the terms of the practical and intellectual particularization of each person's personality, manifesting itself alternately in the form of motivations-achievements and orientations-conducts. .

This therefore results in a socio-cultural transformation involving the organization of society as well as the dimension of institutional roles and conditions, that is to say the socio-institutional reality as a whole.

The presence of this "we" therefore implies the elaboration of a collective project as well as a collective management of social reality in the form of a constituted will.

permanent kill. The relationship between the state and society as well as between culture and society would therefore not be denied, and incessantly affirmed by the unshared community.

say of society in action. As, moreover, this "we" believes at the same time as the praxis of which it is the bearer, it would not be

234

tile d'examiner ici le rapport entre cette praxis et la conduite privée ou institutionnalisée qui se fonde sur le rapport anomie-hierarchie.

En effet s'il va de soi que l'aire de référence du nous est plus vaste dès le debut que celle soumise au rapport entre le moi et les autres, ou, pour mieux dire, qu'elle est énormément plus vaste la grande majorité des individus, il est tout aussi ressemblable que l'aire d'incidence du nous, du fait même qu'elle est encore à construir dans une large mesure, puisse démeurer pour un certain temps moins vaste que celle soumise à l'intérêt individuel-institutionnel.

A un niveau très général il est possible d'en hypotiser les conséquences sur trois paliers: le système de la personnalité, le système de la societé, le système de l'état.

Dans le système de la personnalité, l'affirmation du »nous« implique le passage graduel de l'habitude de commander et d' obéir, c'est-à-dire de l'hétérodirection telle que s'exerce dans les differents niveaux de la machine sociale, à l'habitude de projeter et élaborer, c'est-à-dire à l'autonormativité.

Dans le système juridique l'affirmation du »nous« implique l'élimination progressive de la souveraineté de l'état en tant que personne, et par conséquent du critère d'organisation hiérarchique en faveur de la souveraineté des citoyens en tant que communauté et, donc; du critère olocratique.

Dans le système sociale l'affirmation du »nous« implique enfin l'épuisement progressif des intérêts, des rôles, et des rêntes privées et institutionnelles, par la socialisation de la culture et du travail.

V - Lignes de tendence de l'industrialisme

Bien que la réalité effective puisse paraître insurmontable et l'utopie de la communauté évanescente, le paradoxe contemporain a déjà surclaisé la praxis traditionnelle de la gauche et impose la recherche d'une praxis de mutation.

En effet, l'impérialisme n'a pas été l'étape suprème du capitalisme, et au moment actuel l'industrialisme n'oppose pas les pays capitalistes entre eux, il oposse, au contraire, toujours, les pays à différents niveau technologique entre eux, et cela se produit en particulier au sein du monde socialiste.

En outre l'industrialisme représente la raison sociale de la grande alliance russo-américiane et de la disparition de la classe ouvrière en tant que classe, c'est-à-dire, groupe social doué d'xpérience intellectuelle et technique particulière même si subalterne.

L'industrialisme totalise d'une façon actuelle le principe hiérarchique et bureaucratique, aristocratique et olygarchique, charysmatique et individualiste, s'affirmant comme l'héritier non seulement de la philosophie classique allemande, mais aussi de la révolution moderne, se plaçant après l'opérateur-état et l'opérateur-parti.

It is useful here to examine the relationship between this praxis and the private or institutionalized conduct that is based on the anomiehierarchy relationship. Indeed, if it goes without saying that the area of reference of the us is larger from the start than that subject to the relationship between the self and the others, or, to put it better, that it is enormously larger the vast majority of individuals, it is just as similar that the area of incidence of the we, by the very fact that it is still to be constructed to a large extent, may remain for a certain time less vast than that subjected to the individual-institutional interest.

At a very general level, it is possible to hypothesize the consequences on three levels: the system of personality, the system of society, the system of the state.

In the personality system, the assertion of »we«

involves the gradual transition from the habit of ordering and

obeying, i.e. heterodirection as exercised at the different levels of the social machine, has the habit of planning and elaborating, i.e. to autonormativity.

In the legal system, the assertion of "we" implies the progressive elimination of the sovereignty of the state as a person, and consequently of the criterion of hierarchical organization in favor of the sovereignty of the citizens as a person. t that community and, therefore; of the olocratic criterion.

In the social system, the affirmation of the "we" finally implies the progressive exhaustion of interests, roles, and private and institutional rents, through the socialization of culture and work.

V — Tendency lines of industrialism Although actual reality may seem insurmountable and the utopia of the evanescent community, the contemporary paradox has already overshadowed the traditional praxis of the left and imposed the search for a praxis of mutation.

Indeed, imperialism was not the supreme stage of capitalism, and at the present moment industrialism does not oppose capitalist countries to each other, on the contrary, it always opposes the countries to different levels of technology between them, and this happens especially within the socialist world.

Furthermore, industrialism represents the social reason for the great Russian-American alliance and for the disappearance of the working class as a class, that is to say, a social group endowed with particular intellectual and technical experience. even if subordinate. Industrialism today totalizes the hierarchical and bureaucratic, aristocratic and olygarchic, charysmatic and individualistic principle, asserting itself as the heir not only of classical German philosophy, but also of the modern revolution, claiming after the operator-state and the operator-

-party.

235

De tout cela il s'ensuit donc que la praxis politique en tant que praxis séparée est minoritaire par rapport à praxis industrielle; et le parti léniniste qui devrait en être l'instrument est voué à succomber en face de l'entreprise en tant que institution qui, en déchirant les fondéments objectifs de l'idéologie à travers la technologie, en exclut l'espace subjectif au moyen de la publicité, tandis que l'état national, qui aurait dû être le seul théâtre de la praxis politique, ne se eduit (en face à la progression du cosmopolitisme sous le couvercle de l'impérialisme) qu'à fiction juridique ou à prétexte mental pour des consciences plus ou moins candides

L'industrialisme separe de plus en plus l'humanité de ses institions. L'humanité entière est blessée de plus en plus profondement dans son patrimoine bio-psychique, technique et naturel, socio-culturel et ses institutions détruisent de plus en plus rapidement les ressources qui passent à travers leurs mailles, par le poi de leurs hiérarchies, tout en cherchant d'équilibrer l'anomie qui pénètre la societé comsmopolitique.

Dans cette situation donc, n'a plus aucun sens l'opposition de spontanéisme à léninisme et de léninisme à démocratisme et moins encore de maximalisme à reformisme; ainsi que l'opposition entre nationalisme et impérialisme, l'opposition de la métamorphose révolutionnaire de demain à la permanence fasciste du présent, c'est-à-dire à la continuité de la privatisation dans l'institutionnalisation et le contraire. L'effort d'objectivation de la communauté, semble impliquer d'autres coordonnées théoriques-pratiques, d'autres rythmes constructifs, une différente transparence sociale.

La construction de la communauté dans la recherche de l'humanité totale réalise une alternative universale aussi bien que particulière, et universelle en tant que particulière parce que: nous avons besoin, en tant qu'êtres socials, de l'humanité des tous les hommes, nous avons besoin en tant qu'êtres historiques, de la totalité de l'histoire, nous avons besoin en tant qu'êtres naturels, d'une rélation avec la totalité du milieu.

L'alternative que nous venons de proposer semble ainsi se représenter comme humanité en mouvement, caractérisée par l'enracinement social, par le gradualisme temporel, par un aménagement harmonique de la nature. Mais elle est caractérisée aussi et immédiatement par son mondialisme, communitarisme et constructivisme.

From all this it therefore follows that political praxis as a separate praxis is a minority in relation to industrial praxis; and the Leninist party which should be its instrument is doomed to succumb to the enterprise as an institution which, by tearing apart the objective foundations of ideology through technology, excludes its subjective space by means of advertising, while the national state, which should have been the only theater of political praxis, is not reduced (in the face of the progression of cosmopolitanism under the cover of imperialism) than a legal fiction or a mental pretext for more or less candid consciences.

Industrialism increasingly separates humanity from its institutions. The whole of humanity is wounded more and more deeply in its biopsychic, technical and natural, socio-cultural patrimony and its institutions destroy more and more rapidly the resources which pass through their meshes, by the part of their hierarchies, while seeking to balance the anomie that pervades comsmopolitical society.

In this situation, therefore, the opposition of spontaneism to Leninism and of Leninism to democracy and even less of maximalism to reformism no longer makes sense; as well as the opposition between nationalism and imperialism, the opposition of the revolutionary metamorphosis of tomorrow to the fascist permanence of the present, that is to say to the continuity of privatization in institutionalization and the opposite. The effort of objectification of the community seems to imply other theoretical-practical coordinates, other constructive rhythms, a different social transparency.

Community building in the quest for total humanity realizes an alternative that is universal as well as particular, and universal as particular because: we need, as social beings, to the humanity of all men, we need, as historical beings, the totality of history, we need, as natural beings, a relationship with the totality of the environment.

The alternative that we have just proposed thus seems to represent itself as humanity in movement, characterized by social rooting, by temporal gradualism, by a harmonious arrangement of nature. But it is also and immediately characterized by its globalism, communitarianism and constructivism.

CONTEMPORARY CAPITALISM AND REVOLUTIONARY CHANGE

V. L. Allen

An examination of revolution in contemporary capitalist countries hinges in the first instance on the meaning attached to the term contemporary capitalism. Firstly the claim which is often made that capitalist countries have not experienced revolution can only be made if the capitalist system is seen as a limited one containing only what can be described as the metropolitan capitalist countries in Western Europe and the U.S. A. The capitalist system, however, is more all-embracing than that. Every metropolitan country in it has its satellites. The satellites, euphemistically called 'developing countries' are as much and as essential a part of the capitalist system as are the metropolitan centres. The satellites in Asia, Africa and Latin America possess characteristics which are non-capitalist in origin. They are culturally mixed and they possess economic forms which are feudal or tribal and subsistence in character. But their dynamism stems primarily from the effects of the contradictions in the metropolitan countries. The forces which produce revolutions then are roughly the same as those which can or should produce them in the metropolitan countries. The question should really be why have there been revolutions in some countries within the capitalist system and not in others. Why in Cuba and not in the U.S. A.?

Contemporary capitalism may also mean different things depending on how classical capitalism is defined. Often, without offering a difinition, Western social scientists acknowledge that what existed in nineteenth century Western Europe and the U. S. A. was capitalism. It was a polarised situation with sharp, apparent distinctions between the classes; it possessed obvious poverty and conspicuous consumption; it was characterized by relatively small scale production in competitive markets. This situation has obviously changed and the changes are used as criteria for concluding that capitalism has so changed its form, certainly since Marx wrote, that should strictly be called something else. This

Leeds

An exam ination of revolution in contem porary capitalist countries hinges in the first instance on the meaning attached to the term contem porary capitalism. Firstly the claim which is often made that t capitalist countries have not experienced revolution can only be made if the capitalist system is seen as a lim ited one containing only w hat can be described as the m etropolitan capitalist countries in W estern Europe and the U. S. A. The capitalist system, however, is more all-em bracing than that. Every metropolitan country in it has its satellites. The satellites, euphem istically called 'developing countries' are as m uch and as essential a p art of the capitalist system as are the m etropolitan centres. The satellites in Asia, Africa and Latin America possess characteristics which are non-capitalist in origin. They are culturally mixed and they possess economic forms which are feudal or tribal and subsistence in character. But th eir dynam ism stems prim arily from the effects of the contradictions in the m etropolitan countries. The forces which produce revolutions then are roughly the same as those which can or should produce them in the m etropolitan countries.

The question should really be w hy have there been revolutions in some countries w ithin the capitalist system and not in others. Why in Cuba and not in the U. S. A.?

Contem porary capitalism m ay also m ean different things depending on how classical capitalism is defined. Often, without offering a difinition, W estern social scientists acknowledge th at w hat existed in nineteenth century W estern Europe and the U. S.

A. was capitalism. It was a polarised situation w ith sharp, apparen t distinctions betw een the classes; it possessed obvious poverty and conspicuous consumption; it was characterized by relatively small scale production in com petitive m arkets. This situation has obviously changed and the changes are used as criteria for concluding th a t capitalism has so changed its form, certainly since M arx wrote, th a t should strictly be called something else. This 237

conclusion enables the analysts to say that factors which could produce revolutionary change were present in the capitalist societies of Marx's time but are no longer present. The class structure is complex and fluid; obvious poverty has been removed and material distinctions have been blurred; production is large-scale, highly bureaucratized, controlled by managers; governments are concerned about welfare and are equipped with devices to maximize it.

Capitalism, however, is not a collection of ad hoc characteristics, but a clearly defineable system. It is a system in which the means of production are privately owned and are utilized through the market mechanism. Arising out of these factors the main characteristic is the division between the owners of the means of production and the non-owners whose only means of subsistence is by the sale of their labour power. Where the primary factors and its derived characteristic remain unaltered then no matter what other changes occur the system stays basically the same. The countries of Western Europe and the U. S. A. are, by this criterion, still capitalist ones, dominated by the prime contradiction between the social relations to the means of production and the forces of production. This situation can only be altered by a change in the social relations to the means of production; that is by the abolition of private ownership.

Essentially, then, the situation in capitalist countries is as it was during Marx's lifetime. If qualitative changes had occured they would not be capitalist countries; revolutions would have occurred and there would have been no discussion of this kind. But, of course, because these countries are subject to perpetual pressures from contradictions, they have undergone change. The prime contradiction has produced a succession of crises which have produced in the first instance a growth in the degree of monopoly and in the second instance an increasing intervention by the state to support the system of capitalism. The inability of the market mechanism to operate through the strain of the crises has brought states to legislate in its support. In Britain the most important sign of this is the attempt to impose a concensus through the Industrial Relations Act. In all the metropolitan capitalist countries recent changes have brought them nearer no the Corporate State stages of capitalism which leads to fascism and is the prelude to the ultimate crisis.

The point to note about capitalist countries is that no expediency, whether it be imperialism, neo-colonialism or fascism, can prevent their ultimate transformation. To deny this, to imply a quality of permanence, of immutability to capitalism is to be dogmatically unscientific in the approach to social behaviour. It is a rudimentary scientific precaution to admit the possibility of qualitative transformations rezulting even from continuous addition. However, assertions about the inevitability of revolutionary change must be put into the context of empirical evidence. There have as yet been no revolutions in metropolitan capitalist coun-

conclusion enables the analysts to say that factors which could produce revolutionary change were present in the capitalist societies of Marx's time but are no longer present. The class structure is

complex and fluid; obvious poverty has been rem oved and m aterial distinctions have been blurred; production is large-scale, highly bureaucratized, controlled by m anagers; governm ents are concerned about welfare and are equipped w ith devices to m aximize it.

Capitalism, however, is not a collection of ad hoc characteristics, but a clearly defineable system. It is a system in w hich the m eans of production are privately owned and are utilized through the m arket mechanism. Arising out of these factors the m ain characteristic is the division betw een the owners of the means of production and the non-ow ners whose only means of subsistence is by the sale of the eir labour power. W here the prim ary factors and its derived characteristic rem ain u naltered then no m atter w hat other changes occur the system stays basically the same. The countries of W estern Europe and the U. S. A. are, by this criterion, still capitalist ones, dom inated by the prime contradiction between the social relations to the means of production and the forces of production. This situation can only be altered by a change in the social relations to the means of production; the at is by the abolition of private ownership.

Essentially, then, the situation in capitalist countries is as it was during M arx's lifetim e. If qualitative changes had occured they would not be capitalist countries; revolutions would have occurred and there would have been no discussion of this kind.

But, of course, because these countries are subject to perpetual pressures from contradictions, they have undergone change. The prim e contradiction has produced a succession of crises which have produced in the first instance a grow thin the degree of monopoly and in the second instance an increasing intervention by the state to support the system of capitalism. The inability of the market mechanism to operate through the strain of the crises has brought states to legislate in its support. In B ritain the most im portant sign of this is the attempt to impose a concensus through the Industrial Relations Act. In all the metropolitan capitalist countries recent changes have brought them nearer no the Corporate State stages of capitalism which leads to fascism and is the prelude to the ultim ate crisis.

The point to note about capitalist countries is that no expediency, whether it be imperialism, neo-colonialism or fascism, can prevent their ultimate transformation. To deny this, to imply a quality of permanence, of imm utability to capitalism is to be dogmatically unscientific in the approach to social behaviour. It is a rudimentary scientific precaution to admit the possibility of qualitative transform

ations rezulting even from continuous addition. However, assertions about the inevitability of revolutionary change m ust be put into the context of em pirical evidence. There have as yet been no revolutions in m etropolitan capitalist coun

238

tries. Perhaps the analysis which predicts their inevitability is in some way defective. In any event it is necessary to examine more cerefully the analytical approaches to revolutionarö change.

The dominant paradigm in metropolitan capitalist countries for the understanding of revolutionary change is systems analysis. Social scientists use various models within this paradigm but all converge, eventually in the practice of empiricism. This means that every situation is examined for its own particular, peculiar qualities. The explanations which follow are particularistic. It does not matter that different situations may show different characteristics or that new characteristics may emerge. The definition of situation is important here. Within the framework of systems analysis it is legitimate to isolate any segment of social activity for examination. What is a system is left to the investigator to decide for there are no a priori guide lines for him. This means that it is possible to look at, say, the issue of student protest as a phenomenon with its origin in particular universities. The university or even department of a university where protest takes place may be defined as the system. There is no logical necessity for an empiricist to consider the structure of higher education or the social context of higher education as possible causal factors. It follows that revolutionary changes may never be identified by empiricists for each movement for social change can be so isolated and confined in terms of its causes and implications that its general relevance is not recognized. There is no confusion amongst empiricists about what constitutes revolutionary change; about the mechanism for change; about impulses and media. Empiricism can accommodate any number of different accounts. Student protests, negro revolts and strikes can be attributed to irresponsible leadership, defective communications, bad working or living conditions, psychological disorders or any of a number of other factors. Nor is there any confusion among empiricists about the timing of revolutionary change. They cannot anticipate such a change because systems analysis is static and does not, therefore, permit the possibility of qualitative changes. Empiricists are essentially concerned with the identification classification and description of revolutions once they have occurred. Their analyses support the status quo and are heuristically unimportant.

The alternative conceptual approach is Marxism by which is meant dialectical materialism. This is based on a dynamic conception of reality and, therefore can show revolutionary change in all of its stages. By enabling the necessary and sufficient conditions to be identified, it opens up questions concerning the identity of the conditions, the relationship between them, the mechanism for change and its timing. In contrast to systems analysis, dialectical materialism stipulates both the order of priority to be given to causal factors and the manner in which they operate. This paradigm has to be applied to concrete situations and the identity of the factors can only be obtained through empirical research. There is much less scope in this case for the exercise of intuition, for

tries. Perhaps the analysis which predicts their inevitability is in some way defective. In any event it is necessary to examine more cerefully the analytical approaches to revolutionaro change.

The dom inant paradigm in m etropolitan capitalist countries for the understanding of revolutionary change is systems analysis.

Social scientists use various models w ithin this paradigm but all converge, eventually in the practice of empiricism. This means that every situation is exam ined for its own particular, peculiar qualities. The explanations which follow are particularistic. It does not m atter th at different situations may show different characteristics or that new characteristics may emerge. The definition of situation is im portant here. W ithin the fram ew ork of systems analysis it is legitim ate to isolate any segment of social activity for exam ination. W hat is a system is left to the investigator to decide for there are no a priori guide lines for him. This means that it is possible to look at, say, the issue of student protest as a phenomenon with its origin in particular universities. The university or even departm ent of a university where protest takes place m ay be defined as the system. There is no logical necessity for an em piricist to consider the structure of higher education or the social context of higher education as possible causal factors. It follows that t revolutionary changes may never be identified by empiricists for each m ovem ent for social change can be so isolated and confined in term s of its causes and implications that its general relevance is not recognized. There is no confusion amongst empiricists about w hat constitutes revolutionary change; about the mechanism for change; about impulses and media. Empiricism can accommodate any num ber of different accounts. Student protests, negro revolts and strikes can be attrib u ted to irresponsible leadership, defective communications, bad w orking or living conditions, psychological disorders or any of a num ber of other factors. Nor is there any confusion among empiricists about the timing of revolutionary change. They cannot anticipate such a change because systems analysis is static and does not, therefore, perm it the possibility of qualitative changes. Em piricists are essentially concerned with the identification classification and description of revolutions once they have occurred. Their analyses support the status quo and are heuristically unim portant.

The alternative conceptual approach is M arxism by which is m eant dialectical m aterialism. This is based on a dynamic conception of reality and, therefore can show revolutionary change in all of its stages. By enabling the necessary and sufficient conditions to be identified, it opens up questions concerning the identity of the conditions, the relationship betw een them, the mechanism for change and its timing. In contrast to systems analysis, dialectical materialism stipulates both the order of priority to be given to causal factors and the manner in which they operate. This paradigm has to be applied to

concrete situations and the identity of the factors can only be obtained through em pirical research. There is m uch less scope in this case for the exercise of intuition, for 239

arbitrary judgements and for guesswork than is the case with systems analysis. The necessary conditions for change once stipulated, are given for the social analyst. All that remains is for the sufficient conditions to be identified and even here analyst is given guidance.

Dialectical materialism enables the broad outlines of the process of revolutionary change to be identified. This was done first by Karl Marx and elaborated by Lenin. Marx identified the source of change as the contradiction between the forces of production and social relations to the means of production. The prime relationship in a capitalist society, that between the buyers and sellers of labour power, was that through which the contradiction would work itself out by worsening the conditions of the sellers of labour power, the non-owners of the means of production, and transforming them from constituting of class of itself into a class for itself. This transformation would come about from the spread of class consciousness. A class of employees fully conscious of its objective economic position would revolt and acquire the ownership of the means of production for the state and thus destroy the prime relationship which characterizes a capitalist society. The class of employees, usually described as the working class, is the medium through which change is achieved.

The application of this paradigm to concrete situations has raised questions about the timing of revolutionary change, the role of the working class and the kind of conditions which would give rise to revolutionary action. The questions stem in the first instance from an impatience for change which has distorted the historical perspective of the analysts. The qualitative transformation of pre-capitalist societies can be analyzed dispassionately, using time mainly as a dimension for comparative purposes. But the rate of change in a contemporary society cannot be viewed in quite the same way. It is difficult for the analyst of contempory capitalist society to take an historical view of change. He is continually looking for signs and is apt to identify elements which may appear relevant in the short-run but which have no long-run significance. The more committed the analyst is to changing the capitalist system then the more likely he is to allow his perspective to be distorted and to engage in theoretical improvisations.

Three factors in contemporary reality have tended to lead some analysts to modify the ortodox Marxist explanation of revolutionary change. The first is the apparent inert nature of the working class; the second is the rise of student protest movements while the third is the change in the composition of the working class. Evidence of revolutionary inertia by the working class consists of two types. There is the strictly empirical evidence that so far there has not been a successful revolution involving an established working class. Put another way, no metropolitan capitalist society has yet experienced revolutionary change while satellites with relatively small, migratory labour forces have done so. There does not appear, moreover, to be much indication of re-

arb itrary judgem ents and for guesswork than is the case with systems analysis. The necessary conditions for change, once stipulated, are given for the social analyst. All that remains is for the sufficient conditions to be identified and even here analyst is given guidance.

Dialectical m aterialism enables the broad outlines of the process of revolutionary change to be identified. This was done first by K arl M arx and elaborated by Lenin. M arx identified the source of change as the contradiction betw een the forces of production and social relations to the means of production. The prim e relationship in a capitalist society, thaa t between the buyers and sellers of labour power, was that through which the contradiction would work itself out by w orsening the conditions of the sellers of labour power, the non-owners of the means of production, and transforming them from constituting of class of itself into a class for itself. This transform ation w ould come about from the spread of class consciousness. A class of employees fully conscious of its objective economic position would revolt and acquire the ow nership of the means of production for the state and thus destroy the prim e relationship which characterizes a capitalist society. The class of employees, usually described as the w orking class, is the medium through w hich change is achieved.

The application of this paradigm to concrete situations has raised questions about the tim ing of revolutionary change, the role of the working class and the kind of conditions w hich would give rise to revolutionary action. The questions stem in the first instance from an im patience for change which has distorted the historical perspective of the analysts. The qualitative transform ation of pre-capitalist societies can be analyzed dispassionately, using tim e m ainly as a dimension for com parative purposes. But the rate of change in a contem porary society cannot be viewed in quite the same way. It is difficult for the analyst of contempory capitalist society to take an historical view of change. He is continually looking for signs and is apt to identify elem ents which may appear relevant in the sh o rt-ru n but w hich have no long-run significance. The more com m itted the analyst is to changing the capitalist system then the more likely he is to allow his perspective to be distorted and to engage in theoretical improvisations.

Three factors in contem porary reality have tended to lead some analysts to modify the ortodox M arxist explanation of revolutionary change. The first is the apparent in e rt natu re of the working class; the second is the rise of student protest movem ents w hile the th ird is the change in the composition of the working class. Evidence of revolutionary in ertia by the working class consists of two types. There

is the strictly em pirical evidence th at so far there has not been a successful revolution involving an established working class. P u t another way, no m etropolitan capitalist society has yet experienced revolutionary change w hile satellites w ith relatively small, m igratory labour forces have done so. There does not appear, moreover, to be m uch indication of re

volutionary intent among established working classes. The second type of evidence consists of an explanation of the absence of revolutionary intent but it has been accorded an independent identity by being seen not simply as a reason why established working classes have not revolted but why they cannot ever revolt. Working classes are seen to be influenced by a socialization process to accept the values of capitalism and work within its framework and, in any event, are inhibited from taking action by the process of bureaucratization. Different analysts have given priority to one or other of these processes. Herbert Marcuse, for example, sees socialization as the main obstacle to revolutionary action by the working class. His book One Dimensional Man explains in detail how this process works. »One-dimensional thought, « he stated, »is systematically promoted by the makers of politics and their purveyors of mass information. Their universe of discourse is populated by self-validating hypotheses which, incessantly and monopolistically repeated, become hypnotic definitions or dictations . . . «1 This discourse validates what exists; it serves as a justification of the status quo and treats non-operational ideas as non-behavioural and subversive. Such was the power to limit critical thought and hence action that Marcuse saw it as a brake on the resolution of contradictions. »Contradictions«, he added, »do not explode by themselves. «2 He became disillusioned with dialectical theory. He stated that »Dialectical theory is not refuted, but it cannot offer the remedy ... It defines the historical possibilities, even necessities; but their realization can only be in the practice which responds to the theory, and at present, the practice gives no such response.«3

Herbert Marcuse recognized that practice was inhibited by the bureaucratization of working class organizations as well as by socialization. So did Ernst Mandel, but he emphasized the potency of bureaucratization. He stated that "the traditional organizations of the workers movement are profoundly bureaucratized and long since co-opted into bourgeois society..." He dismisses them as possible vehicles of change. The working class can, Mandel, believes, take part in revolutionary struggles by rising spontaneously, creating its own leadership and committees but only if it erects "multiple barriers against the penetration of bourgeois ideology into the working class..." If these barriers are not erected then Mandel shares in the gloom of Marcuse about the dialectical pro-

Both Marcuse and Mandel recognized that revolutionary change had to take place through the working class but believed that this class was incapable of initiating change. In order to recover their optimism, to satisfy their commitment to revolutionary change,

¹ p. 14 ² ibid, p. 253

ibid
 *The New Vanguard«, in The New Revolutionaries, edited by Tariq
 p. 50.
 ibid

volutionary intent among established working classes. The second type of evidence consists of an explanation of the absence of revolutionary intent but it has been accorded an independent identity by being seen not simply as a reason why established working classes have not revolted but w hy they cannot ever revolt. Working classes are seen to be influenced by a socialization process to accept the values of capitalism and w ork w ithin its fram ework and, in any event, are inhibited from taking action by the process of bureaucratization. D ifferent analysts have given priority to one or other of these processes. H erbert Marcuse, for example, sees socialization as the main obstacle to revolutionary action by the working class. His book One Dimensional Man explains in detail how this process works. »One-dimensional thought, « he stated, »is system atically prom oted by the m akers of politics and their pu rveyors of mass information. Their universe of discourse is populated by selfvalidating hypotheses which, incessantly and monopolistically repeated, become hypnotic definitions or dictation s...«*

This discourse validates w hat exists; it serves as a justification of the status quo and treats non-operational ideas as non-behavioural and subversive. Such was the pow er to lim it critical thought and hence action th a t Marcuse saw it as a brake on the resolution of contradictions. »Contradictions«, he added, »do not explode by themselves.«2 He became disillusioned w ith dialectical theory. He stated th a t »Dialectical theory is not refuted, b ut it cannot offer the re m e d y . . . It defines the historical possibilities, even necessities; b ut th eir realization can only be in the practice which responds to the theory, and at present, the practice gives no such response.«3

H erb ert M arcuse recognized th a t practice was inhibited by the bureaucratization of w orking class organizations as well as by socialization. So did E rnst Mandel, b u t he emphasized the potency of bureaucratization. He stated th a t »the traditional organizations of the w orkers m ovem ent are profoundly bureaucratized and long since co-opted into bourgeois s o cie ty ... «4 He dismisses them as possible vehicles of change. The w orking class can, Mandel, believes, take p a rt in revolutionary struggles by rising spontaneously, creating its own leadership and committees b u t only if it erects

»multiple b arriers against the penetration of bourgeois ideology into the working c la ss ...«5 If these b arriers are not erected then Mandel shares in the gloom of Marcuse about the dialectical process.

Both Marcuse and Mandel recognized that t revolutionary change had to take place through the working class but believed that this class

was incapable of initiating change. In order to recover their optimism, to satisfy th eir com m itm ent to revolutionary change, 1 p. 14

2 ibid, p. 253

8 ibid

4 »The New Vanguard«, in The N ew Revolutionaries, edited by Tariq Ali, p. 50.

8 ibid

241

they had to search for catalysts or detonators outside of the working class. The student protest movements provided the answer. Ernest Mandel wrote that the student »can and... must play a powerful role as detonator. By playing this role within the working class, above all through the intermediary of the young workers, they can free in the working class itself enormous forces for challenging capitalist society and the bourgeois State.«6 This detonator-explosive theory is also accepted by Marcuse who became the great apostle of student protest.

The modifications which Marcuse and Mandel have introduced into the ortodox dialectical materialist explanation of revolutionary change are profound and amount to a virtual rejection of its dialectical basis. Looking at something dialectically means regarding it as something which is emerging, is incomplete and is in the process of change. It involves recognizing that change occurs through contradictions between related determinants of behaviour in all and every sphere of social activity and that each contradiction in the process of its resolution creates repercussion effects which produce further contradictions. Thus change is continuous and inexorable. The notion that anything can be exempt from the pressures of contradictions; that anything can exist without being an element in a contradiction and possessing its own, is inconsistent with dialectical theory. According to dialectical materialism there can be no distinction between detonator and explosive. An analysis which makes such a distinction assumes that the explosive is static until it is detonated; in other words that the explosive is insulated from all but special pressures which have detonating qualities. It gives no guidance about the identity of the detonator which is left either to speculation or empirical experience. Whether or not a protest possesses the qualities of a detonator is left for the analyst to decide. There is fairly wide support for the view that during the May/June 1968 events in France the students' protests acted as a catalyst for a wider protest movement. There is much less support for the view that students' protests in general have catalyst qualities for, even if students protest as they do in the U.S. A., Japan and Federal Germany, there is no generally accepted causal link between their action and that of the working class. It is open, therefore, for analysts to say that this or that student movement can act as a catalyst or that negro protests in the U.S. A. or any other alienated minority may do so. This modification is plain empiricism. The assumption that the working class cannot detonate itself, no matter how sociologically erudite is its explanation, is inconsistent with Marxism but is consistent with the use of systems analysis. Thus the modifications of Herbert Marcuse in particular have converted a Marxist explanation into a conventional empiricist one.

It is not enough, however, just to damn Marcuse with the taint of empiricism. The conception of the working class as an inert phenomenon or as one that is contained by socializing pressures

⁶ ibid, p. 52.

Ernest Mandel w rote th at the student »can a n d . . . m ust play a powerful role as detonator. By playing this role w ithin the w orking class, above all through the interm ediary of the young w orkers, they can free in the working class itself enormous forces for challenging capitalist society and the bourgeois State.«6 This detonator-explosive theory is also accepted by M arcuse who became the great apostle of student protest.

The modifications which M arcuse and Mandel have introduced into the ortodox dialectical m aterialist explanation of revolution ary change are profound and am ount to a virtu al rejection of its dialectical basis. Looking at something dialectically means regarding it as something which is emerging, is incomplete and is in the process of change.

It involves recognizing that t change occurs through contradictions betw een related determ inants of behaviour in all and every sphere of social activity and that each contradiction in the process of its resolution creates repercussion effects which produce fu rth er contradictions. Thus change is continuous and inexorable. The notion th at anything can be exempt from the pressures of contradictions; th a t anything can exist w ithout being an elem ent in a contradiction and possessing its own, is inconsistent with dialectical theory. According to dialectical m aterialism there can be no distinction between detonator and explosive. An analysis which makes such a distinction assumes that the explosive is static until it is detonated; in other words th a t the explosive is insulated from all but special pressures which have detonating qualities. It gives no guidance about the identity of the detonator which is left either to speculation or em pirical experience. W hether or not a protest possesses the qualities of a detonator is left for the analyst to decide. There is fairly wide support for the view th at during the M ay/June 1968 events in France the students' protests acted as a catalyst for a wider protest movement. There is much less support for the view th at students' protests in general have catalyst qualities for, even if students protest as they do in the U. S. A., Japan and Federal Germany, there is no generally accepted causal link betw een their action and that of the working class. It is open, therefore, for analysts to say that this or th at student m ovement can act as a catalyst or that negro protests in the U. S. A. or any other alienated m inority m ay do so. This modification is plain empiricism. The assum ption that the working class cannot detonate itself, no m atter how sociologically erudite is its explanation, is inconsistent with M arxism but is consistent with the use of systems analysis. Thus the modifications of H erbert Marcuse in particular have converted a M arxist explanation into a conventional

em piricist one.

It is not enough, however, ju st to dam n M arcuse w ith the taint of empiricism. The conception of the working class as an inert phenomenon or as one th a t is contained by socializing pressures 8 ibid, p. 52.

242

is plainly contrary to empirical reality. The most that might be said is that the working classes in metropolitan capitalist countries have not yet conceived of themselves as belonging to a class, as constituting a class for itself — that the final transition to class consciousness has not been made. But even this is dubious as an explanation of why the working classes in metropolitan countries have not engaged in revolutions. Working classes do not make revolutions; they form an integral part of revolutionary situations but are not the whole situation. They do not start revolutions but act in response to a complex combination of factors. If they appear to be inert it is because the contradictions, primary secondary and internal, have not so disrupted their total situation that revolutionary action of some sort is inevitable. In the face of such disruption involving divisions in the ranks of the ruling class, disaffection in the armed forces and the police, socializing pressures count for nothing for they become inconsistent with a reality which connot be ignored. It is straight Parsonian functionalising to believe that indoctrinating pressures, or the constant application of the dominant values of the capitalist system, can determine behaviour irrespective of the reality of concrete situations. In any case, it just does not happen. The crucial point here is that though a revolutionary situation may be reached, the manner of its resolution is not predetermined and will depend upon the political direction given to the working class and the manner in which consciousness is developed during the course of the revolution. The emergence of a widespread class consciousness is unlikely to be a developing phenomenon unless the crisis situation itself is of the kind which is drawn out. A working class san become conscious of the need for a basic alternation in the political system almost overnight if the severity of the crisis is great and provided there exists organized means to give political direction. It is important, therefore, to examine the dynamics of the whole system rather than to concentrate on the working class alone in order to understand the process of revolutionary change.

Nothing that has been said so far is intended to belittle or underestimate the part the working class plays in revolutionary change. It plays the major part. The prime contradiction in capitalist societies works itself out initially at the point of production. The contradiction is about economic forces but these work through people depending on their class position. The class for change is the working class, not by choice or political decision but through the nature of the prime contradiction. The working class must, by definition, be the vehicle for revolutionary change. It is pertinent, therefore, to look at the composition of the working class for evidence about its responses. This has been highlighted by some commentators, Serge Mallett and Norman Birnbaum in particular. Birnbaum, for example, believes "newer forms of class conflict" may have emerged and that the developments of a "new middle class or technical intelligentsia" may have some bearing on this.

is plainly contrary to empirical reality. The most that might be said is that the working classes in metropolitan capitalist countries have not yet conceived of themselves as belonging to a class, as constituting

⁷ »The Crisis in Marxist Sociology« by Norman Birnbaum, in Social Research, Vol. 35, 1963, pp. 356—7.

a class for itself — th at the final transition to class consciousness has not been made. But even this is dubious as an explanation of why the w orking classes in m etropolitan countries have not engaged in revolutions. W orking classes do not make revolutions; they form an integral p a rt of revolutionary situations but are not the whole situation. They do not start revolutions but act in response to a complex combination of factors. If they appear to be in ert it is because the contradictions, prim ary secondary and internal, have not so disrupted th eir total situation th at revolutionary action of some sort is inevitable. In the face of such disruption involving divisions in the ranks of the ruling class, disaffection in the arm ed forces and the police, socializing pressures count for nothing for they become inconsistent w ith a reality which connot be ignored. It is straight Parsonian functionalising to believe that indoctrinating pressures, or the constant application of the domin ant values of the capitalist system, can determ ine behaviour irre spective of the reality of concrete situations. In any case, it just does not happen. The crucial point here is that though a revolutionary situation may be reached, the m anner of its resolution is not predeterm ined and will depend upon the political direction given to the working class and the m anner in which consciousness is developed during the course of the revolution. The emergence of a w idespread class consciousness is unlikely to be a developing phenomenon unless the crisis situation itself is of the kind which is draw n out. A w orking class san become conscious of the need for a basic alternation in the political system almost overnight if the severity of the crisis is great and provided there exists organized means to give political direction. It is im portant, therefore, to exam ine the dynamics of the whole system ra th e r than to concentrate on the w orking class alone in order to understand the process of revolutionary change.

Nothing that has been said so far is intended to belittle or underestim ate the part the working class plays in revolutionary change. It plays the major part. The prime contradiction in capitalist societies works itself out initially at the point of production.

The contradiction is about economic forces but these work through people depending on their class position. The class for change is the working class, not by choice or political decision but through the nature of the prime contradiction. The working class must, by definition, be the vehicle for revolutionary change. It is pertinent, therefore, to look at the composition of the working class for evidence about its responses. This has been highlighted by some commentators, Serge M allett and Norm an Birnbaum in particular.

Bim baum , for example, believes »newer forms of class conflict«

m ay have emerged and th a t the. developments of a »new middle class or technical intelligentsia« may have some bearing on this.7

1 »The Crisis in M arxist Sociology« by N orm an Birnbaum , in Social R esearch, Vol. 35, 1963, pp. 356—7.

243

Birnbaum states that: "The growing complexity of the production process, the increasing embeddedness of the state in society, the development of large systems of administration, distribution and services, have resulted in the growth of a new labour force, characterized by educational qualifications, organization in bureaucratic hierarchies and a somewhat labile political disposition...« Serge Mallet has written in a similar vein about "the new working class«.8

The existence of a changing labour force composition cannot be denied. It can be shown statistically that the proportion of workers engaged in point of production activities is declining and that the proportion engaged in administration, services, and technical work is increasing. These changes are common to all metropolitan capitalist countries. It is undialectical, however, to treat these changes as new phenomena and to talk, in consequence, of a »new working class«.

The labour forces in capitalist countries have always changed their composition. The decline of agriculture in absolute terms and in relation to manufacture had a profound effect on the nature of industrial labour forces. It produced a labour force which was both concentrated in factories and urbanized. Was this any the less important than the rise of service industries at a later stage? The operation of the free market mechanism continually moulds labour forces to meet its own changing requirements. The forces of production alter the labour/capital ratio in favour of capital and have created an unbroken trend towards mechanization. The process is one of the dilution of old skills and the creation of new ones. Birnbaum and Mallet are concerned with the emergence of technicians, and administrators who, in Birnbaum's words, »Expropriated from control of administration . . . nonetheless possess the skills without which administration (in a large sense of the term) would be impossible . . . « But this process has been visibly going on at variable rates since about 1900. And in any case, is it more significant than the diluting of apprentice-skilled work between say 1850 and 1900? In that process the educated elite of the labour force was displaced by the relatively uneducated with low skills. The constant struggle for markets has increased the degree of monopoly. This has accentuated the growth of administratioan and the tendency to concentrate on selling rather than producing. The emergence of administrators and salesmen is not new, nor, of course, is their organization in bureaucratic hierarchies. Was not Max Weber deeply concerned about this very phenomon before the first world war?

Labour forces are perpetually changing their composition and, therefore, at any one time they are always new. The question is then, does the present composition have any more consequence for class conflict than previous compositions? In this connection the first point to remember is that the conflict we are concerned

B irnbaum states that: »The growing complexity of the production process, the increasing embeddedness of the state in society, the development of large systems of adm inistration, distribution and

 $^{^{8}}$ »The New Working Class«, International Socialist Journal No. 8, April, 1965.

services, have resulted in the grow th of a new labour force, characterized by educational qualifications, organization in bureaucratic hierarchies and a somewhat labile political disposition.. .« Serge M allet has w ritten in a sim ilar vein about »the new w orking class«.8

The existence of a changing labour force composition cannot be denied. It can be shown statistically that the proportion of workers engaged in point of production activities is declining and that the proportion engaged in administration, services, and technical work is increasing. These changes are common to all metropolitan capitalist countries. It is undialectical, however, to treat these changes as new phenomena and to talk, in consequence, of a »new working class«.

The labour forces in capitalist countries have always changed their composition. The decline of agriculture in absolute term s and in relation to m anufacture had a profound effect on the n ature of industrial labour forces. It produced a labour force which was both concentrated in factories and urbanized. Was this any the less im portant than the rise of service industries at a later stage? The operation of the free m arket mechanism continually moulds labour forces to meet its own changing requirem ents. The forces of production alter the labour/capital ratio in favour of capital and have created an unbroken trend tow ards mechanization. The process is one of the dilution of old skills and the creation of new ones.

Birnbaum and Mallet are concerned w ith the emergence of technicians, and adm inistrators who, in B irnbaum 's words, »Expropriated from control of adm inistration . . . nonetheless possess the skills w ithout which adm inistration (in a large sense of the term) would be im possible. . .« But this process has been visibly going on at variable rates since about 1900. And in any case, is it more significant than the diluting of apprentice-skilled work betw een say 1850 and 1900? In that process the educated elite of the labour force was displaced by the relatively uneducated w ith low skills.

The constant struggle for m arkets has increased the degree of monopoly. This has accentuated the grow th of adm inistratioan and the tendency to concentrate on selling rath e r than producing. The emergence of adm inistrators and salesmen is not new, nor, of course, is their organization in bureaucratic hierarchies. Was not Max W eber deeply concerned about this very phenomon before the first world war?

Labour forces are perpetually changing th eir composition and,

therefore, at any one time they are always new. The question is then, does the present composition have any more consequence for class conflict than previous compositions? In this connection the first point to rem em ber is that the conflict we are concerned 8 »The New W orking Class«, International Socialist Journal No. 8, April, 1965.

with is a structural not a superstructural phenomenon. It results from the social relations to the means of production. Superstructural phenomena may react back on it but they cannot alter the quality of conflict: they cannot permanently alter its intensity or effect the removal of conflict. We know that people in the same objective economic position will tend to produce common responses to similar pressures. All employees are in the same objective economic position and, irrespective of their social backgrounds, their educational standards, their income levels, their skills and their authority positions, they respond by forming trade unions and engaging in forms of industrial action. These responses are partial ones determined by an occupational, industrial or group consciousness. There is no useful evidence at hand to show that one labour force composition rather than another will prevent the emergence of a common class consciousness when the pressure from the objective economic position become sufficiently intense. Lastly, it has to be remembered that the absence of a revolutionary intent amongst metropolitan working classes is neither new nor peculiar to their present composition. Moreover, the tardiness in the development of class consciousness was as marked before the emergence of sophisticated methods of socialization as it is at the present.

The analysis of revolutionary change should not proceed in an ad hoc, intuitive manner. There is no doubt that the apparent inertia of working classes, the rise of protest movements apart from the working class and the changed composition of the working class are relevant factors for an understanding of working class consciousness. Other factors of relevant interest could be added, such as the relationship between industrial and political action, the role of trade unions and the significance of an unstructured shop steward's movement. Indeed many issues in capitalism as a whole could be highlighted as significant for an understanding of revolutionary change.

Dialectical materialism provides a range of logically consistent methodological tools for the analyst. It emphasizes the totality of situations so that the analysis must proceed from the whole to its parts. This means that the analysis should start from the prime contradiction, through each of the economic classes to which the social relations to the means of production under capitalism gives rise, to the point where consciousness results in political behaviour. The causes of behaviour lie in the total and not its parts, so that each factor which is examined must be seen in its environmental context. Nothing can be isolated and insulated from external causal factors.

Secondly the approach stipulates that each and every social phenomenon contains the mechanism for its own transformation. Nothing is immutable, static or inert. The working class and capitalist classes are dynamic phenomena with changing forms and relationships. They are subjected to pressures from contradictions which must inevitably transform their relationship and thus alter

w ith is a structural not a superstructural phenomenon. It results from the social relations to the means of production. Superstructural phenomena may react back on it but they cannot alter the quality of conflict: they cannot perm anently alter its intensity or effect the removal of conflict. We know that people in the same objective economic position will tend to produce common responses to sim ilar pressures. All employees are in the same objective economic position and, irrespective of their social backgrounds, their educational standards, th eir income levels, their skills and their authority positions, they respond by forming trade unions and engaging in forms of industrial action. These responses are partial ones determ ined by an occupational, industrial or group consciousness. There is no useful evidence at hand to show that one labour force composition rath er than another will prevent the emergence of a common class consciousness when the pressure from the objective economic position become sufficiently intense. Lastly, it has to be rem em bered th a t the absence of a revolutionary intent amongst m etropolitan working classes is neither new nor peculiar to their present composition. Moreover, the tardiness in the developm ent of class consciousness was as m arked before the emergence of sophisticated methods of socialization as it is at the present.

The analysis of revolutionary change should not proceed in an ad hoc, intuitive m anner. There is no doubt that the apparent inertia of w orking classes, the rise of protest movements apart from the working class and the changed composition of the working class are relevant factors for an understanding of working class consciousness. O ther factors of relevant interest could be added, such as the relationship between industrial and political action, the role of trade unions and the significance of an unstructured shop stew ard's movement. Indeed many issues in capitalism as a whole could be highlighted as significant for an understanding of revolutionary change.

Dialectical m aterialism provides a range of logically consistent methodological tools for the analyst. It emphasizes the totality of situations so that the analysis m ust proceed from the whole to its parts. This means that the analysis should start from the prime contradiction, through each of the economic classes to which the social relations to the means of production under capitalism gives rise, to the point where consciousness results in political behaviour.

The causes of behaviour lie in the total and not its parts, so that each factor which is exam ined must be seen in its environmental context. Nothing can be isolated and insulated from external causal factors.

Secondly the approach stipulates that teach and every social phenomenon contains the mechanism for its own transform ation.

Nothing is im m utable, static or inert. The working class and capitalist classes are dynamic phenomena w ith changing forms and relationships. They are subjected to pressures from contradictions which m ust inevitably transform their relationship and thus alter 245

the social relations to the means of production. The contradictions are both external and internal to them. The internal ones act contrary to the resolution of the prime one. For example the prime one is a class for itself creating factor while internal ones can be divisive and destructive of unity. Internal contradictions are derived ones and can never transcend the prime one though they may seem to be dominant. The complex of contradictions is in no sense metaphysical. Contradictions are empirically verifiable phenomena which reveal the precise relationships between significant variables.

Thirdly, the analysis is historical. This follows from use of the dialectic which is a specific historical approach. Being historical means not only examining the historical development of capitalism but also viewing the present and future as stages in that development. It also means resisting making impatient theoretical improvisations.

Lastly, while the dialectic provides the analyst with the mechanism for change materialism reveals its source and the causal priority to be given to the array of variables in any situation. There should be no confusion here about the relationship between economic and sociological factors. The first questions should always be what are the economic variables and what are their significance.

Given these analytical tools what can be said about the transformation of contemporary capitalism? Firstly, its context. Capitalism is a universal system but not the universe. It no longer dominates its environment as it did at the time of Marx. It constitutes a decreasing part of an environment which it shares with socialist countries. Capitalism, therefore, is perpetually confronted by examples of its transformation. The resolution of the prime contradiction is no longer an analytical category, a propaganda issue or a fiction. It constitutes part of social. reality. This is a factor which must be taken into account, for, insofar as men can influence events, capitalists will take it into theirs.

The significance of a socialist alternative is seen most clearly in the relations between the metropolitan and satellite capitalist countries. The main contradiction here arises out of the fact that the prosperity of the former depends upon the exploitation of the latter. The satellite countries have both economic and social problems on the one hand and material aspirations on the other which cannot be resolved or achieved so long as their positions of subordination are maintained. This is confirmed both by historical experience and analysis. There are no examples of a transition from satellite to metropolitan status within the capitalist system. There is a permanent possibility, therefore, of satellite countries, attempting to resolve their problems by the emulation of the socialist example. For the attempts to be successful they have to coincide with the resolution of the prime contradiction within the countries concerned. Mostly this coincidence does not occur. No-

the social relations to the m eans of production. The contradictions are both external and in ternal to them. The in tern all ones act contrary to the resolution of the prim e one. For exam ple the prim e one is a class for itself creating factor while in tern al ones can be divisive and destructive of unity. In tern al contradictions are derived ones and can never transcend the prim e one though they may seem to be dominant. The complex of contradictions is in no sense metaphysical. Contradictions are em pirically verifiable phenomena which reveal the precise relationships betw een significant variables .

Thirdly, the analysis is historical. This follows from use of the dialectic which is a specific historical approach. Being historical means not only exam ining the historical developm ent of capitalism but also viewing the present and fu tu re as stages in that t development. It also means resisting making impatient theoretical improvisations.

Lastly, while the dialectic provides the analyst with the mechanism for change materialism reveals its source and the causal priority to be given to the array of variables in any situation.

There should be no confusion here about the relationship between economic and sociological factors. The first questions should always be what are the economic variables and what are their significance.

Given these analytical tools w hat can be said about the tran sform ation of contem porary capitalism? Firstly, its context. Capitalism is a universal system but not the universe. It no longer dom inates its environm ent as it did at the time of M arx. It constitutes a decreasing p art of an environm ent which it shares with socialist countries. Capitalism, therefore, is perpetually confronted by exam ples of its transform ation. The resolution of the prime contradiction is no longer an analytical category, a propaganda issue or a fiction. It constitutes p art of social, reality. This is a factor which must be taken into account, for, insofar as men can influence events, capitalists will take it into theirs.

The significance of a socialist alternative is seen most clearly in the relations betw een the m etropolitan and satellite capitalist countries. The m ain contradiction here arises out of the fact that the prosperity of the form er depends upon the exploitation of the latter. The satellite countries have both economic and social problems on the one hand and m aterial aspirations on the other which cannot be resolved or achieved so long as their positions of subordination are m aintained. This is confirmed both by historical experience and analysis. There are no exam ples of a transition from satellite to m etropolitan status w ithin the capitalist system.

There is a perm anent possibility, therefore, of satellite countries,

attem pting to resolve their problems by the em ulation of the socialist example. For the attem pts to be successful they have to coincide w ith the resolution of the prim e contradiction w ithin the countries concerned. Mostly this coincidence does not occur. No

netheless all attempts are seen by metropolitan countries as threats to their power and prosperity. This has led to armed intervention to prevent the attempts being made.

The same contradiction has led satellite countries to exploit the dependence of metropolitan countries on them but strictly within the system. For example, the Middle-Eastern and African oil producing countries, led by Libya, are successfully pushing up their share of revenues from oil. This has repercussions in the metropolitan countries for the standard of living of their inhabitants and, therefore, intensifies the struggles there. The ability of capitalist satellites to look to socialist countries for support has weakened the power of the metropolitan capitalist countries to use unequivocal armed intervention as a means of control and, in consequence, has altered the character of imperialism and neo-colonialism as final stages in the development of capitalism. Imperialism and neo-colonialism are no longer the final solutions to the problem of capitalism. This, of course, was so for capitalist countries in the interwar years which did not share in the control of satellings.

Metropolitan capitalist countries have been forced to look for internal solutions for their problems of production and distribution. These are of two kinds. Firstly there is the re-emergence of corporate states involving legally imposed consensuses and devices for its legitimation in order to control class conflict. All of the metropolitan capitalist countries possess elements of corporate state apparatus and are moving towards one form or other of fascism which seems at the present to be the final stage of capitalism. Because of the dialectical nature of social phenomena, however, it is not possible to talk categorically about final stages. The second type of solution is internal to metropolitan countries and involves collusion such as in the European Economic Community. This will and does reinforce movements towards oppressive internal solutions.

An inevitable consequence of the resolution of the prime contradiction in capitalist societies is the growth in the degree of monopoly. This has become an institutionalized universal phenomenon through the development of international and multi-national firms. These firms have to be seen first in market then in power terms. They act as legitimate means of control in capitalist satellites where gun boat diplomacy has become illegitimate. Their emergence, therefore, has assisted in perpetuating the system.

Inside separate capitalist countries the movement towards qualitative structural change must be examined within the context of the wider contradictions of capitalism. These contradictions intensify class conflict and, thereby, heighten consciousness. But they also produce internal contradictions which are divisive within classes. Capitalists are divided as their interests compete — small businessmen range against monopolists, financiers against manufacturers, farmers against industrialists and so on. These divisions need to be examined empirically in order to understand the extent

netheless all attem pts are seen by m etropolitan countries as threats to their power and prosperity. This has led to arm ed intervention to prevent the attem pts being made.

The same contradiction has led satellite countries to exploit the dependence of m etropolitan countries on them but strictly within the system. For example, the M iddle-Eastern and African oil producing countries, led by Libya, are successfully pushing up their share of revenues from oil. This has repercussions in the m etropolitan countries for the standard of living of their inhabitants and, therefore, intensifies the struggles there. The ability of capitalist satellites to look to socialist countries for support has weakened the power of the m etropolitan capitalist countries to use unequivocal arm ed intervention as a means of control and, in consequence, has altered the character of im perialism and neo-colonialism as final stages in the development of capitalism. Imperialism and neo-colonialism are no longer the final solutions to the problem of capitalism. This, of course, was so for capitalist countries in the in terw ar years which did not share in the control of satellites.

M etropolitan capitalist countries have been forced to look for internal solutions for their problems of production and distribution. These are of two kinds. Firstly there is the re-em ergence of corporate states involving legally imposed consensuses and devices for its legitim ation in order to control class conflict. All of the metropolitan capitalist countries possess elements of corporate state apparatus and are moving towards one form or other of fascism which seems at the present to be the final stage of capitalism. Because of the dialectical n ature of social phenomena, however, it is not possible to talk categorically about final stages.

The second type of solution is internal to m etropolitan countries and involves collusion such as in the European Economic Community. This will and does reinforce movements towards oppressive internal solutions.

An inevitable consequence of the resolution of the prim e contradiction in capitalist societies is the grow th in the degree of monopoly. This has become an institutionalized universal phenomenon through the developm ent of international and m ultinational firms. These firm s have to be seen first in m arket then in power terms. They act as legitim ate means of control in capitalist satellites w here gun boat diplomacy has become illegitim ate. Their em ergence, therefore, has assisted in perpetuating the system.

Inside separate capitalist countries the movement towards qualitative structural change m ust be exam ined w ithin the context of the w ider contradictions of capitalism. These contradictions intensify class conflict and, thereby, heighten consciousness. B ut they also produce internal contradictions which are divisive within classes. Capitalists are divided as their interests compete — small businessmen range against monopolists, financiers against m anufacturers, farm ers against industrialists and so on. These divisions need to be exam ined em pirically in order to understand the extent 247

to which the process of transformation is proceeding. The working classes are also divided, often along the same lines as their employers. With workers, however, there are additional and more pervasive divisive factors which can be exploited by employers and utilized to assist in the maintenance of the status quo. The working classes can and are divided by colour, by ethic origins and by religion. In the U.S. A. colour is a divisive factor; in West Germany and Switzerland the division is between indigenous workers and short-term immigrants; in France, as in Great Britain, white workers are divided from coloured immigrants. Northern Ireland provides a case where religion divides the working class. In some instances the divisions have protecting, insulating qualities for the dominant power holding groups in the working class. In West Germany and Switzerland, for example, the flow of short--term immigrant workers from Italy, Yugoslavia, Spain and Greece, enables work-force requirements to be met for the economies as a whole and acts as a basis for their prosperity. The working classes there are protected from economic pressures which could result from less prosperous conditions.

Working class movements are reflections of the societies in which they operate. They are penetrated by the divisive elements present in the market mechanism. The interests of workers are opposed in manufacturing and agriculture, in manufacturing and public service, in expanding and contracting areas, in exporting and non-exporting industries, in new declining occupations. Wherever new machinery is introduced and old skills diluted or jobs displaced sharp divisive forces are present. The more intensely the prime contradiction affects the point of production making for class unity, the more, up to a point, it generates class divisive elements. This creates situations of apparent confusion. The present situation in Great Britain is at the stage of confusion where acts of class unity coincide with intense bitterness and rivalry between groups.

In an analysis of this kind the socializing factors are relatively unimportant. As behaviour is primarily environmentally determined then attitudes cannot be generated for long which are inconsistent with the reality of workers' lives. The important factors are those which make up that reality. In the same way it is not possible to go further with education and political activity in the development of consciousness than concrete situations permit. It is not possible as the French experience in 1968 illustrated, to create a revolutionary situation when the conditions for revolution are not present.

The French experience raises a vital question for the understanding of revolutionary change in contemporary capitalism. It is, what constitutes a revolutionary situation? How can it be identified? It cannot be assumed that the factors which led to revolutionary change in Czarist Russia. Kuomintang China and Batistic Cuba will also lead to change elsewhere. Firstly, whilst those societies had primary qualities in common they had sufficiently different historical backgrounds and superstructures to make ge-

to which the process of transform ation is proceeding. The working classes are also divided, often along the same lines as the ir employers. With workers, however, there are additional and more

pervasive divisive factors which can be exploited by employers and utilized to assist in the m aintenance of the status quo. The working classes can and are divided by colour, by ethic origins and by religion. In the U. S. A. colour is a divisive factor; in West G erm any and Sw itzerland the division is betw een indigenous workers and short-term im m igrants; in France, as in G reat Britain, w hite w orkers are divided from coloured im m igrants. N orthern Ireland provides a case w here religion divides the w orking class.

In some instances the divisions have protecting, insulating qualities for the dom inant pow er holding groups in the w orking class. In W est G erm any and Sw itzerland, for exam ple, the flow of short-

-term im m igrant w orkers from Italy, Yugoslavia, Spain and Greece, enables work-force requirem ents to be m et for the economies as a whole and acts as a basis for th eir prosperity. The w orking classes there are protected from economic pressures which could result from less prosperous conditions.

W orking class movem ents are reflections of the societies in which they operate. They are pen etrated by the divisive elem ents present in the m arket mechanism. The interests of w orkers are opposed in m anufacturing and agriculture, in m anufacturing and public service, in expanding and contracting areas, in exporting and non-

-exporting industries, in new declining occupations. W herever new m achinery is introduced and old skills diluted or jobs displaced sharp divisive forces are present. The m ore intensely the prim e contradiction affects the point of production m aking for class unity, the more, up to a point, it generates class divisive elements.

This creates situations of ap parent confusion. The present situation in G reat B ritain is a t the stage of confusion w here acts of class unity coincide w ith intense bitterness and riv alry betw een groups.

In an analysis of this kind the socializing factors are relatively unim portant. As behaviour is p rim arily environm entally determ ined th en attitudes cannot be generated for long which are inconsistent w ith the reality of w orkers' lives. The im portant factors are those w hich m ake up th a t reality. In the same w ay it is not possible to go fu rth er w ith education and political activity in the developm ent of consciousness th an concrete situations perm it. It is not possible as the French experience in 1968 illustrated, to create a revolutionary situation when the conditions for revolution are not present.

The French experience raises a vital question for the understanding of revolutionary change in contem porary capitalism. It is, w hat constitutes a revolutionary situation? How can it be identified? It cannot be assumed that the factors which led to revolution ary change in Czarist Russia. K uom intang China and B atista's Cuba will also lead to change elsewhere. Firstly, w hilst those societies had prim ary qualities in common they had sufficiently different historical backgrounds and superstructures to make ge

248

neralizations untenable. Secondly, as societies are moulded and altered by complexes of contradictions over time so must the factors which can alter their structures change. In other words, revolutionary situations are not static but dynamic phenomena. It is necessary to take into account the uniqueness of a society at a particular period. It might be misleading, therefore, to look for conventional signs of breakdown such as a high level of unemployment and increasing poverty. The actual signs in contemporary capitalism may be far less obtrusive. Contradictions affect the relative positions of the groups which comprise the classes. It is an empirical task to discover the impact of such changes within complex labour forces on consciousness. It is equally necessary to examine in the light of contemporary conditions the determinants of change in other aspects of the total structure of particular societies.

249

neralizations untenable. Secondly, as societies are moulded and altered by complexes of contradictions over time so m ust the factors which can alter th eir structures change. In other words, revolutionary situations are not static b u t dynamic phenomena. It is necessary to take into account the uniqueness of a society at a particular period. It m ight be misleading, therefore, to look for conventional signs of breakdown such as a high level of unem ploym ent and increasing poverty. The actual signs in contemporary capitalism may be far less obtrusive. Contradictions affect the relative positions of the groups which comprise the classes.

It is an em pirical task to discover the im pact of such changes w ithin complex labour forces on consciousness. It is equally necessary to exam ine in the light of contem porary conditions the determ inants of change in other aspects of the total structure of particular societies.

249

TELEOLOGICAL AND GENETIC BASES OF THE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS OF CONTEMPORARY SOCIALISM

Ivan Maksimović

Beograd

Ι

There is no doubt that a complex of economic problems lies among several core problems which modern socialism has faced since the moment of its practical emergence in the Soviet Union. The essence of economic problems can be reduced to this: that the economic forces modern socialism possesses and the economic methods it uses do not correspond to the real needs of socialist society. Moreover, both the economic forces and the economic methods constitute, at the present level, limiting factors upon the fuller development of socialist social relations and, in a certain sense, objectively give birth to elements which in one or another way disintegrate the socialist society, which create — or permanently reproduce — unsocialist relations.

Mention is usually made of a lot of reasons of a historical character which explain this statement although they do not justify it. Socialism has emerged — it is emphasized — as an organized and guided economic and social reality in the countries of a relatively low economic potential, and in an early phase of capitalist development, while sometimes it has even emerged upon the basis of precapitalist formations, contradicting, apparently or actually, all the objective laws of dialectical development. Such a basis it is added — has conditioned the fact that existing organized socialist societies, where the political revolution of the working classes have taken place, achieve the economic foundations material and organizational — which were attributed to the evolutional process of capitalism by the classics of scientific socialism for which private ownership was a sufficient institutional framework of development, only during the course of their development. Hence Lenin formulated the thesis of the permanence of the economic socialist revolution which follows the political one. The Soviet Union has passed in its practice through some pre-typical

PROBLEMS OF CONTEMPORARY SOCIALISM

Ivan Maksimović

White City

I

There is no doubt that a complex of economic problems lies among several core problems which modern socialism has faced since the moment of its practical emergence in the Soviet Union.

The essence of economic problem s can be reduced to this: that the economic forces m odern socialism possesses and the economic m ethods it uses do not correspond to the real needs of socialist society. Moreover, both the economic forces and the economic methods constitute, at the present level, lim iting factors upon the fuller developm ent of socialist social relations and, in a certain sense, objectively give b irth to elements which in one or another way disintegrate the socialist society, which create — or perm anently reproduce — unsocialist relations.

Mention is usually m ade of a lot of reasons of a historical character which explain this statem ent although they do not justify it. Socialism has em erged — it is emphasized — as an organized and guided economic and social reality in the countries of a relatively low economic potential, and in an early phase of capitalist development, while sometimes it has even emerged upon the basis of precapitalist formations, contradicting, apparently or actually, all the objective laws of dialectical development. Such a basis —

it is added — has conditioned the fact that t existing organized socialist societies, where the political revolution of the working classes have taken place, achieve the economic foundations —

m aterial and organizational — which w ere attributed to the evolutional process of capitalism by the classics of scientific socialism for which p rivate ownership was a sufficient institutional fram ew ork of development, only during the course of the eir development.

Hence Lenin form ulated the thesis of the permanence of the economic socialist revolution which follows the political one. The Soviet Union has passed in its practice through some pre-typical 251

early-capitalist sequences of development such as primitive socialist accummulation or even NEP. To this we would add that the five-year plans were and have remained the achievement only of the state-monopolistic-socialist phase of development.

In Yugoslav theory and practice there have also been certain views according to which the present phase of self-managing-market socialism is the one of the constitution of the entrepreneurial function of the working class by means of liberal-capitalist methods of competition from which the elements of primitive accumulation have not beeen removed. The stressing of national, state, and economic interests — and of the role of national state in the creation of the new phase in Yugoslav society — can also be understood as a substitute for a phase of economic progress which in part is to solve what previously — before the socialist phase — was solved by later phases of capitalist development which Yugoslavia however missed.

But in spite of the suggestiveness of these arguments it would be imprecise and incomplete to focus only on this dimension od the *degree* of economic development which socialism has inherited, no matter how important as the vital and lasting background of present-day problems.

For the economic problems which socialism is facing taday an equally important dimension is how this society has overcome its economic backwardness, that is, on which scientific assumptions and knowledge, and by which means it just opposed both the objective laws of capitalist economy, still lastingly present in the sphere of economic relations, and the building up of the new socialist economic relations.

We consider this theoretical-methodological-cognitive, and instrumental-organizational, side of the economic origin and reproduction of socialist relations as an important basis of the present-day economic problems of socialism as the genetic-historical one In a certain sense this latter is even more significant. For concurrently with the development of socialism the significance of the historical economic inheritance has become secondary for modern problems, has become less and less important, while the methods and means of organization of the socialist economy have become more essential and primary.

TT

We would identify the theoretical-methodological and instrumental-organizational aspects of the economic problems of socialism today with, respectively, the teleological and genetic approaches (method) and standpoint (conceptual basis) with respect to socialist economics which have exerted and still exert an indisputable impact on all the forms of organized activity of economic forces under socialism, whose imprint is borne by all the solutions relating to the functioning of economic systems.

Our hypothesis, which we shall try to explain and verify in our further exposition, is that the exclusivity and temporary domi-

early-capitalist sequences of developm ent such as prim itive socialist accum m ulation or even NEP. To this we would add that the fiveyear plans were and have remained the achievem ent only of the state-m onopolistic-socialist phase of development.

In Yugoslav theory and practice there have also been certain views according to which the present phase of self-m anaging-

-m arket socialism is the one of the constitution of the entrep reneurial function of the working class by m eans of liberal-capitalist methods of competition from which the elem ents of prim itive accum ulation have not beeen removed. The stressing of national, state, and economic interests — and of the role of national state in the creation of the new phase in Yugoslav society — can also be understood as a substitute for a phase of economic progress which in p art is to solve w hat previously — before the socialist phase — was solved by later phases of capitalist development which Yugoslavia however missed.

B ut in spite of the suggestiveness of these argum ents it would be imprecise and incom plete to focus only on this dimension od the degree of economic developm ent which socialism has inherited, no m atter how im portant as the vital and lasting background of present-day problems.

For the economic problem s which socialism is facing taday an equally im portant dimension is how this society has overcome its economic backwardness, th at is, on w hich scientific assumptions and knowledge, and by which means it ju st opposed both the objective laws of capitalist economy, still lastingly present in the sphere of economic relations, and the building up of the new socialist economic relations.

We consider this theoretical-m ethodological-cognitive, and instrum ental-organizational, side of the economic origin and reproduction of socialist relations as an im portant basis of the present-

-day economic problems of socialism as the genetic-historical one In a certain sense this latter is even more significant. For concurrently with the development of socialism the significance of the historical economic inheritance has become secondary for modern problems, has become less and less important, while the methods and means of organization of the socialist economy have become more essential and primary.

II

We would identify the theoretical-m ethodological and instrum entalorganizational aspects of the economic problems of socialism today with, respectively, the teleological and genetic approaches (method) and standpoint (conceptual basis) with respect to socialist economics which have exerted and still exert an indisputable impact on all the forms of organized activity of economic forces under socialism, whose imprint is borne by all the solutions relating to the functioning of economic systems.

O ur hypothesis, which we shall try to explain and verify in our fu rth er exposition, is that the exclusivity and temporary domi

252

nance of teleological or genetic doctrine in theory and practice of the guidance of socialist economic development constitute the causes of the majority of economic problems which socialism is facing today.

We need first of all to say what we understand by teleological, and by genetic concept or doctrine. However, this is not at all an easy task, because both concept and the doctrines which evolved with these concepts, and the practice inspired by them, are manysided and include a wide field of axiological and epistemological meanings and categories. That is why it is perhaps better to approach them in an indirect way, historically. Chronologically and historically both the teleological and genetic approaches were already being formulated as schools of thought at the time of debate relating to Soviet industrialization (1924-1928 and NEP), reaching their first climax at the time of dispute over, and constitution of the First Five Year Plan in the Soviet Union (1928 and later). Howewer, for a variety of historical reasons with which we cannot deal here the protagonists of the genetic trend were indentified in the Soviet Union with political reaction while the concept of teleological direction was built into the basis of the Soviet centralized system by the administrative methods of directed planning. [3, ch. 12; 5 p. 7; 19 ch. 9] Certain compromise solutions of the genetic and teleological principles which come into existence along with the improvement of the Soviet system of planning, and, particularly, after the official rehabilitation of the principle of a commodity economy, and with the Reforms in the postwar development of the SSSR, still did not bring with them a solution of the respective role and significance of the genetic and teleological approaches and neither accordingly, of the solutions of economic problems the Soviet Union is facing. [13, ch. 1; 14, p. 306] The situation is quite similar in other East Europen Socialist countries. (In China the problems differ qualitatively and in their dimensions from those in Europe.)

In Yugoslavia it appears to us the case is reversed. Here after we had rejected the methods of planning applied in the USSR (this means the prevalence of the teleological concept) the market economy, as an element of the building up of the self-managing economy was strengthened and, so, concurrently with it, the impact and significance of the genetic principle has increased in theory and practice. It has been reflected in the prevalence of the concept of indicative and polycentric »planning« and in practically planned activity which has, in essence, gradually led to the abolition of planning in general. [16, p. 35] Concurrently with this practice the significance of market forces has increased in Yugoslav theory, achieving among many people the status of mythological beliefs and laissez faire apologetics. After the first enthusiasm, which went as far as advocating a new historical commodity formation as the optimal future of Yugoslavia, had abated, recessions, a decrease in the rate of development and employment, concurrently with significant differentiation beween social groupings,

nance of teleological or genetic doctrine in theory and practice of the guidance of socialist economic development constitute the causes of the m ajority of economic problems which socialism is facing today.

We need first of all to say w hat we understand by teleological, and by genetic concept or doctrine. However, this is not at all an easy task, because both concept and the doctrines which evolved with these concepts, and the practice inspired by them, are many-sided and include a wide field of axiological and epistemological meanings and categories. That is why it is perhaps better to approach them in an indirect way, historically. Chronologically and historically both the teleological and genetic approaches were already being form ulated as schools of thought at the time of debate relating to Soviet industrialization (1924—1928 and NEP), reaching their first climax at the tim e of dispute over, and constitution of the First Five Y ear Plan in the Soviet Union (1928 and later). However, for a variety of historical reasons with which we cannot deal here the protagonists of the genetic trend were indentified in the Soviet Union with political reaction while the concept of teleological direction was built into the basis of the Soviet centralized system by the administrative methods of directed planning. [3, ch. 12; 5 p. 7; 19 ch. 9] C ertain compromise solutions of the genetic and teleological principles which come into existence along with the improvement of the Soviet system of planning, and, particularly, after the official rehabilitation of the principle of a commodity economy, and with the Reforms in the postw ar development of the SSSR, still did not bring with them a solution of the respective role and significance of the genetic and teleological approaches and n eith er accordingly, of the solutions of economic problems the Soviet Union is facing. [13, ch. 1; 14, p. 306] The situation is quite sim ilar in other East Europen Socialist countries. (In China the problem's differ qualitatively and in their dimensions from those in Europe.)

In Yugoslavia it appears to us the case is reversed. Here after we had rejected the m ethods of planning applied in the USSR

(this means the prevalence of the teleological concept) the m arket economy, as an elem ent of the building up of the self-managing economy was strengthened and, so, concurrently w ith it, the impact and significance of the genetic principle has increased in theory and practice. It has been reflected in the prevalence of the concept of indicative and polycentric »planning« and in practically planned activity which has, in essence, gradually led to the abolition of planning in general. [16, p. 35] Concurrently w ith this practice the significance of m arket forces has increased in Yugoslav theory, achieving among m any people the status of mythological beliefs and laissez faire apologetics. A fter the first enthusiasm, which w ent as far as advocating a new historical commodity form ation as the optim al fu tu re of Yugoslavia, had abated, recessions, a decrease in the rate of

developm ent and employment, concurrently w ith significant differentiation beween social groupings, 253

led to a changed theoretical climate but not to great changes in the practice of planning. Today serious economists speak about the need for »an organized and controlled commodity production« and about the future plan which integrates and interweaves — the instruments of forecasting, coordination, administrative control and directions. [16, p. 36; 17, p. 251/2] However, this unity and optimization of the genetic and teleological principles in planning is a matter for the future in Yugoslavia. For the moment the genetic principle prevails, which we identify with the spontaneous movement of the economy, at the back of which, in the very economic structure, we suppose the existence of the law of value and commodity production which serve for allocation and for the balancing of inputs and outputs, that is to say production factors, outgoings and incomes.

Ш

The foregoing short historical sketch of the relationship between the genetic and teleological approaches has pointed only to the formal side of the problem, to planning and the market as frameworks within which socialist reproduction develops. What, however, is the essence and content of these conceptual bases?

For an explanation and discussion of this complex question we must once more return to the beginnings of planning in the USSR. Concurrently with the debate over Soviet industrialization and with the manifestations of the effects of NEP, concurrently with the victory of the belief that the necessary socialist reconstruction of the economy could be achieved only on the basis of long-term planning, the intellectual channelling of economists was towards questions as to what and what kind of planning there ought to be, that is questions of methodology, of relationships and the place of forecasts or directives in planning, of whether it should be "open" or balanced, whether it constitutes a scientific document or simply a method or administrative device (art). [5, p. 3, 3, ch. 9]

Soon the apparently practical question of the relation between the prognostic and directive element in forward planning become a central point of departure for economist and for the formation of the departure for economist and for the formation of the genetic and teleological doctrines and schools. And not without reason. For behind this question of the measure and method of planning there polarized all the economic dilemmas of socialism, both today's and yesterday's.

It is sufficient to enumerate those of yesterday to confront the disputes and uncertainties of today, over whether the plan is a predication, potentially backed by a full knowledge of the structure of the economy and of the laws which determine the interdependence of its elements and the possibility of development, and to which all actors must strictly submit; or whether the plan under socialism is "something more", expressed in directives which represent the economic expression of the wish of the working class for a change in the economic class structure.

led to a changed theoretical clim ate b ut not to great changes in the practice of planning. Today serious economists speak about the need for »an organized and controlled commodity production«

and about the future plan which integrates and interw eaves —

the instrum ents of forecasting, coordination, adm inistrative control and directions. [16, p. 36; 17, p. 251/2] However, this unity and optimization of the genetic and teleological principles in planning is a m atter for the future in Yugoslavia. For the m oment the genetic principle prevails, w hich we identify w ith the spontaneous m ovement of the economy, at the back of which, in the very economic structure, we suppose the existence of the law of value and commodity production which serve for allocation and for the balancing of inputs and outputs, that is to say production factors, outgoings and incomes.

I 11

The foregoing short historical sketch of the relationship between the genetic and teleological approaches has pointed only to the form al side of the problem, to planning and the m arket as fram eworks w ithin which socialist reproduction develops. What, however, is the essence and content of these conceptual bases?

For an explanation and discussion of this complex question we m ust once more re tu rn to the beginnings of planning in the USSR.

C oncurrently w ith the debate over Soviet industrialization and w ith the m anifestations of the effects of NEP, concurrently w ith the victory of the belief th a t the necessary socialist reconstruction of the economy could be achieved only on the basis of long-term planning, the intellectual channelling of economists was towards questions as to w hat and w hat kind of planning there ought to be, th a t is questions of methodology, of relationships and the place of forecasts or directives in planning, of w hether it should be

»open« or balanced, w hether it constitutes a scientific document or simply a m ethod or adm inistrative device (art). [5, p. 3, 3. ch. 9]

Soon the apparently practical question of the relation between the prognostic and directive elem ent in forw ard planning become a central point of departure for economist and for the formation of the departure for economist and for the form ation of the genetic and teleological doctrines and schools. And not w ithout reason.

For behind this question of the m easure and m ethod of planning there polarized all the economic dilemmas of socialism, both today's and yesterday's.

It is sufficient to enum erate those of yesterday to confront the disputes and uncertainties of today, over w hether the plan is a predication, potentially backed by a full knowledge of the structure of the economy and of the laws which determ ine the interdependence of its elements and the possibility of development, and to which all actors must strictly submit; or w hether the plan under socialism is "something more", expressed in directives which represent the economic expression of the w ish of the working class for a change in the economic class structure.

254

The geneticists defended the principle of economic determinism the view that behind every act of conscious transformation which the proletariat undertakes there stand »objective economic conditions« »genetically ordered by their own past development« and conditioned in their future development by »hidden objective tendencies of its development«. [6, p. 362] Thus if follows that planning can be nothing other than a »prediction of development«, an extrapolation of a future process which is genetically ordered by its past development.

Consequently, geneticists have not been against the plan and planning in general. But they considered that the possibilities of influencing the plan and of controlling the courses of economic life were extremely limited. For the »force of the internal links of an economy is enormous.« That is why «measures of economic policy can certainly influence economic reality but they can be means to produce substantial changes.« »Even revolutions cannot change economic forms overnight by means of the socialization of the process of production and trade. Nationalization cannot encompass all enterprises neither can the shift to planned distribution destroy the free market, which continues to albeit exist in an illegal way.« [6, p. 361]

The limitation and subordination of planned action and planned methods through the inexorable law of values and laws of the market, has perhaps been best described by B. Bazarov in the following way: »The economy must be harmonious, an organic entity, as stable as possible a system of mobile equilibrium, not solely upon the completion of the reconstruction established in the general plan, but at any point of development. The emergence of certain time disproportions in development, which lead to crises, are inevitable in the event that the process of reconstruction is spontaneous, even though this cannot be tolerated. The demand for proportion and internal consistency of the separate elements of the process of reconstruction exclude the possibility of proceeding along a straight line, or any kind of line defined in advance, and the problem of intermediary phases of recontruction crops up as a separate planning problem. From this stems the need for outlining, along with the general plan, the plan of »prospects« in the strict sense of the word, or rather, a plan projecting the immediate phases of the general prospect in their chronological sequences and organic connection«. [7, p. 367]

The genetic concept of planning has stemmed from the above-mentioned general concepts. It could be succintly reduced to the following statements. First, planning organs cannot modify the operation of the economic laws of a comodity economy (the law of value), without provoking serious crises. Planning organs can disorganise the existence of overall proportions (for example, between industry and agriculture), but do little to influence lasting changes in these proportions. Second. these proportions, or rather the internal tendencies of the economy, must in fact be studied, and the objectives and goals of the plan deduced from them. On

The geneticists defended the principle of economic determinism the view th at behind every act of conscious transform ation which the proletariat undertakes there stand »objective economic conditions«

»genetically ordered by th eir own past development« and conditioned in their fu tu re development by »hidden objective tendencies of its development«. [6, p. 362] Thus if follows th at planning can be nothing other than a »prediction of development«, an extrapolation of a fu tu re process which is genetically ordered by its past development.

Consequently, geneticists have not been against the plan and planning in general. But they considered that the possibilities of influencing the plan and of controlling the courses of economic life were extremely limited. For the »force of the internal links of an economy is enormous.« That is why «measures of economic policy can certainly influence economic reality but they can be means to produce substantial changes.« »Even revolutions cannot change economic forms overnight by means of the socialization of the process of production and trade. Nationalization cannot encompass all enterprises neither can the shift to planned distribution destroy the free market, which continues to albeit exist in an illegal way.« [6, p. 361]

The lim itation and subordination of planned action and planned m ethods through the inexorable law of values and laws of the m arket, has perhaps been best described by B. Bazarov in the following way: »The economy m ust be harmonious, an organic entity, as stable as possible a system of mobile equilibrium, not solely upon the corlipletion of the reconstruction established in the general plan, b ut at any point of development. The emergence of certain tim e disproportions in development, which lead to crises, are inevitable in the event th a t the process of reconstruction is spontaneous, even though this cannot be tolerated. The dem and for proportion and internal consistency of the separate elements of the process of reconstruction exclude the possibility of proceeding along a straight line, or any kind of line defined in advance, and the problem of interm ediary phases of recontruction crops up as a separate planning problem. From this stems the need for outlining, along with the general plan, the plan of »prospects«

in the strict sense of the word, or rather, a plan projecting the im m ediate phases of the general prospect in their chronological sequences and organic connection«. [7, p. 367]

The genetic concept of planning has stem m ed from the above-

-m entioned general concepts. It could be succintly reduced to the following statem ents. First, planning organs cannot modify the

operation of the economic laws of a comodity economy (the law of value), w ithout provoking serious crises. Planning organs can disorganise the existence of overall proportions (for example, betw een industry ajid agriculture), b u t do little to influence lasting changes in these proportions. Second, these proportions, or rather the internal tendencies of the economy, m ust in fact be studied, and the objectives and goals of the plan deduced from them. On 255

the basis of data from previous years it is possible to establish certain definite relationships between certain variables (*statistical coefficients*, laws) as well as the regularity in the transformation of proportions related to changes in the level of economic forces (*dynamic coefficients* laws). These coefficients, upon which planning is based, should guarantee economic equilibrium, the basic law in planning. [6, p. 362/4]

Teleologists have opposed a concept different in principle to this scheme a concept which produced special repercussions in the evaluation of the methods and paths of Soviet industrialization.

It can be summed up in the words of S. Sarow, who has expressed it most succinctly in the following way:

»The teleological, military, concept of the plan is this: there is a given situation, there are given objective factors, these objective factors are approached by subjective will which seeks to alter them for subjective purposes. This subjective will take the given objective factors as the point of deparature and with respect to their solution, projects goals which suit its purpose.«

»This is how the plan originates. Until a subject appears which has its own goals, i. e. seeks to alter objective factors and has the will to alter them, there is no plan and there can be no talk of plan. From this point of view, no examination of given objective factors, even the most painstaking, no elucidation of their historical trends in the past, even the most correct, no determination of laws of their development, even the most exact, no forecast of their future deviations, even the most accurate, can constitute the plan.

Control figures, conjuctural economic prognoses, the hypothetical balances of the national economy are sometimes very useful for planning, but they are in no way plans, and to circulate them as such, even under the designation of "genetic" is to offer not the genuine product, but an imitation". [8, p. 380/2]

Upon this basis the teleological concept of planning is constituted through the following phases:

Phase I. The pre-conditions of planning: the existing situation, the subjective will seeking to alter it, the general goal parallel to this will.

Phase II. The comparison of the goals with the objective (existing) situation. The setting of goals, upon this basis, in the form of concrete tasks, accurate and clear, which relate to qualitative and quantitative results in a given branch and in the given economic territory.

Phase III. The choice between partial goals through which the general goal is concretized (and partly achieved), and between the possible methods for the realization of partial goals. The decision on them represents the basic plan factor. Success in this depends »on the art of administration which like any art rests on three pillars: scientific knowledge, talent and experience.«

Phase IV. The planning of the implementation of decisions or rather the plan of mobilization of the existing human and mateproportions related to changes in the level of economic forces (»dynamic coefficients« laws). These coefficients, upon which planning is based, should guarantee economic equilibrium, the basic law in planning. [6, p. 362/4]

Teleologists have opposed a concept different in principle to this scheme a concept which produced special repercussions in the evaluation of the methods and paths of Soviet industrialization.

It can be summed up in the words of S. Sarow, who has expressed it most succinctly in the following way:

»The teleological, m ilitary, concept of the plan is this: there is a given situation, there are given objective factors, these objective factors are approached by subjective will which seeks to alter them for subjective purposes. This subjective will take the given objective factors as the point of deparature and w ith respect to their solution, projects goals which suit its purpose.«

»This is how the plan originates. Until a subject appears which has its own goals, i. e. seeks to alter objective factors and has the will to alter them, there is no plan and there can be no talk of plan. From this point of view, no exam ination of given objective factors, even the most painstaking, no elucidation of their historical trends in the past, even the most correct, no determ ination of laws of their development, even the most exact, no forecast of their future deviations, even the most accurate, can constitute the plan.

Control figures, conjuctural economic prognoses, the hypothetical balances of the national economy are sometimes very useful for planning, but they are in no w ay plans, and to circulate them as such, even under the designation of »genetic« is to offer not the genuine product, but an imitation«. [8, p. 380/2]

Upon this basis the teleological concept of planning is constituted through the following phases: Phase I. The pre-conditions of planning: the existing situation, the subjective will seeking to alter it, the general goal parallel to this will.

Phase II. The comparison of the goals with the objective (existing) situation. The setting of goals, upon this basis, in the form of concrete tasks, accurate and clear, which relate to qualitative and quantitative results in a given branch and in the given economic territory.

Phase III. The choice betw een p artial goals through which the general goal is concretized (and p artly achieved), and betw een the

possible methods for the realization of p artial goals. The decision on them represents the basic plan factor. Success in this depends

»on the a rt of adm inistration which like any a rt rests on three pillars: scientific knowledge, talent and experience.«

Phase IV. The planning of the im plem entation of decisions or rath er the plan of mobilization of the existing hum an and m ate rial resources, the plan of additional resources and the sequence in which and the points at which to bring forces to bear in the fulfillment of a task, and the date of its completion. « [8, p. 382].

We think that two vital economic characteristics are essential for the teleological philosophy of the plan which, later, shift to various special problems: attitude towards economic determinism, the market and goods economy, methods of development and planning.

The first characteristic is the concept of goals as independent constants which determine the future planning and not the structure of the economy itself and its past and present. The content of the goal, on the other hand, is determined by the creative will of the proletariat.«

Strumlin is extremely explicit about this: while criticizing »dynamic coefficients« of genetists as methodological manifestations of ideological errors, he says:

»If we were merely to extrapolate from the past, we could at best extend that past, in a revised and enlarged version, by another five to fifteen years. But we won't build a new social order in that way.«

»We deny that extrapolation methods are in any significant degree applicable in the realm of perspective planning, and do so not only because these methods are most unreliable, but because of another factor which is far more important to us. We are entering a new phase of development, with the creative will of the proletariat irresistibly driving a wedge between our past and our future«. [9, p. 431]

The second essential characteristic of the teleological philosophy, of rather a methodological nature but deriving from the preceding one, is that the general plan is essentially a single plan.

... »because it contemplates a single general task; the general lines to be followed in accomplishing this task can be dictated only by a single goal and single will; all partial plans should constitute an elaboration of this plan. It is complex because it solves problems of separate economic branches in their interconnection and, in projecting their development, embraces them as an integrated whole, not, of course, by coordinating autonomous departemental suggestions, but through the issuance of specific plans to the departments of specific directives for their plans.« [8, p. 385].

It strikes the eye that even followers of the teleological concept were willing to admit (as they have been doing in Soviet planning practice) the importance and effect of dynamic and statistical coefficients or rather, the given structural relations and effect of the law of values and extrapolation upon the basis of studies of objective economic laws in the current and short-term planning. And yet, they have refused, to adopt any kind of more significant meaning or the acceptance of genetic principles for long term, i. e., perspective planning — [9, p. 431/2].

rial resources, the plan of additional resources and the sequence in which and the points at which to bring forces to bear in the fulfillm ent of a task, and the date of its completion.« [8, p. 382], We think th at two vital economic characteristics are essential for the teleological philosophy of the plan which, later, shift to various special problems: attitud e tow ards economic determinism, the market and goods economy, methods of development and planning.

The first characteristic is the concept of goals as independent constants which determ ine the future planning and not the structu re of the economy itself and its past and present. The content of the goal, on the other hand, is determ ined by the creative will of the proletariat.«

S tru m lin is extrem ely explicit about this: w hile criticizing »dynamic coefficients« of genetists as methodological manifestations of ideological errors, he says:

»If we were m erely to extrapolate from the past, we could at best extend th a t past, in a revised and enlarged version, by another five to fifteen years. B ut we w on't build a new social order in th a t way.«

»We deny that t extrapolation methods are in any significant degree applicable in the realm of perspective planning, and do so not only because these methods are most unreliable, but because of another factor which is far more important to us. We are entering a new phase of development, with the creative will of the proletariat irresistibly driving a wedge between our past and our future«. [9, p. 431]

The second essential characteristic of the teleological philosophy, of ra the r a methodological nature but deriving from the preceding one, is that the general plan is essentially a single plan.

... »because it contem plates a single general task; the general lines to be followed in accomplishing this task can be dictated only by a single goal and single will; all partial plans should constitute an elaboration of this plan. It is complex because it solves problem s of separate economic branches in their interconnection and, in projecting th eir development, embraces them as an integrated whole, not, of course, by coordinating autonomous departem ental suggestions, b u t through the issuance of specific plans to the departm ents of specific directives for their plans.«

It strikes the eye that the even followers of the teleological concept where willing to admit (as they have been doing in Soviet planning practice) the importance and effect of dynamic and statistical coefficients or rather, the given structural relations and effect of the law of values and extrapolation upon the basis of studies of objective economic laws in the current and short-term planning.

And yet, they have refused, to adopt any kind of more significant m eaning or the acceptance of genetic principles for long term, i. e., perspective planning — [9, p. 431/2].

257

The implementation of the teleological and genetic principle in the practice of socialist economic development has never been absolutely one-sided. This is not only because both doctrines left room for the effect of objective, (or subjective) factors, but to an even greater extent because socialist society has inherited or has created its own specific structures and peculiarities which have not made possible an absolute and exclusive implementation of one principle in business operations. Thus, for instance, bureaucratic and centralistic structures in socialist countries have been continuosly reproduced and consolidated, they have been steadily establishing the teleological principle but they have been finding their counter-balance in the democratic forces of the working class, in national, regional and professional centripetal forces, as well as in objective economic laws. Economic centralism has always had its counterbalance in decentralization while technocratism and the administrative principle had their counter-balance in their conflict with economic laws.

And yet, one may speak about prevailing and dominant elements of teleological or genetic methods of business operations in the two models of socialism so far existing which have been established upon corresponding different economic logics. One is the model of centralplanned business operations, based upon the state economy which is concurrently the essential representative of the subject of the business operations and the vehicle of the sovereignty of socialist property. This theoretical model has wirtually been realized with varied specific features in the USSR and other European socialist countries. The second model is the model of market socialism, based upon the self-management economy of decentralized economic subjects in which the state plays the economic role of subject, of coordinator of an economic, »primus inter pares«, whose role, in principle and in theory alike, is not vital for the model even though it is still very important in practice.

There exist two vital factors, it seems to us which determine the supremacy of the teleological method in the model of planned centralized business operations. The first is that the goals of economic reproduction are exogenous, resulting from the »law« of gratification of social requirements which are formulated and institutionalized by the state itself. Substantially economic needs are the expression of the economic and political relationships of forces of leading groups which achieve power on behalf of the working class and for it. The other vital factor is that these goals are realized by means of methods of planning activity whose content, methods and forms are derived by Soviet economists from »laws of planning.« [10, p. 199, 210; 11, ch. 30] A broader, comprehensive analysis of this *law a shows that Soviet theory includes in it three kinds of teleological factor: one that is built into the criteria relates to »proportionality« (in relations of production, accumulation, personal and general consumption the distribution of per-

IV.

The im plem entation of the teleological and genetic principle in the practice of socialist economic developm ent has never been absolutely one-sided. This is not only because both doctrines left room for the effect of objective, (or subjective) factors, b u t to an even greater extent because socialist society has inherited or has created its own specific structures and peculiarities which have not made possible an absolute and exclusive im plem entation of one principle in business operations. Thus, for instance, bureaucratic and centralistic structures in socialist countries have been continuosly reproduced and consolidated, they have been steadily establishing the teleological principle but they have been finding their counter-balance in the democratic forces of the w orking class, in national, regional and professional centripetal forces, as well as in objective economic laws. Economic centralism has always had its counterbalance in decentralization while technocratism and the adm inistrative principle had their counter-balance in their conflict with economic laws.

And yet, one may speak about prevailing and dom inant elements of teleological or genetic m ethods of business operations in the two models of socialism so far existing which have been established upon corresponding different economic logics. One is the model of centralplanned business operations, based upon the state economy which is concurrently the essential representative of the subject of the business operations and the vehicle of the sovereignty of socialist property. This theoretical model has w ir-tually been realized w ith varied specific features in the USSR and other European socialist countries. The second model is the model of m arket socialism, based upon the self-m anagem ent economy of decentralized economic subjects in which the state plays the economic role of subject, of coordinator of an economic, »primus inter pares«, whose role, in principle and in theory alike, is not vital for the model even though it is still very im portant in practice.

There exist two vital factors, it seems to us w hich determ ine the supremacy of the teleological m ethod in the model of planned centralized business operations. The first is that the goals of economic reproduction are exogenous, resulting from the »law« of gratification of social requirem ents which are form ulated and institutionalized by the state itself. Substantially economic needs are the expression of the economic and political relationships of forces of leading groups which achieve power on behalf of the working class

and for it. The other vital factor is that these goals are realized by means of methods of planning activity whose content, methods and forms are derived by Soviet economists from »laws of planning.« [10, p. 199, 210; 11, ch. 30] A broader, comprehensive analysis of this »law« shows that Soviet theory includes in it three kinds of teleblogical factor: one that is built into the criteria relates to »proportionality« {in relations of production, accumulation, personal and general consumption the distribution of per-258

sonnel and in allocations for the complex development of regions, division of work, specialization and cooperation.) This is chiefly a question of criteria deduced from the hierarchy of goals formulated by the single social subject. The second aspect of a teleological nature is contained in the concept of "an existing proportionality consciously maintained, i. e. (the realization of goals in the economic sphere), "The law of proportionality" requires that the development of all branches of production be subordinated to a single management on the part of society.

From this general teleological principle are derived special principles, methodical rules and institutional forms of economic activity. This is probably the vital concomitant of the teleological concept. [12, p. 52/5] It relates to the creation of the structure of planning activity itself, (to its all-encompassing, normative nature, to the character of its directives, to the binding nature, rigidity and control of the plan), likewise in the principle of so-called »key links« and democratic centralism in its implementation as well as the institutionalizing of the organizational form of planning: the state is the basic subject of planning. It defines the basic economic goals, links, proportions, it gives them the character of economic laws, linking the normative and the positive, the legal-administrative and economic. The state also organizes within itself a large number of institutions which are engaged in planning in a direct or indirect manner, and through which is linked central political will and control, with the making of operative decisions and their coordination at various levels of the horizontal and vertical scheme of the planning system. In connection with this function of the state the entire history of the organization of planning institutions in the USSR and its present structure, is extremely instructive connecting into an entity an extremely large number of institutions with varied competences and functions in the realization of planning, ranging from the Economic Council within the government of the USSR and the Inner Governmental Committee, which deal with the adoption of planning decisions at the top and with their coordination, to State Committees which have an advisory function in planning: and the Gosplan, ministries, sovnarhoses, local executive planning committees dealing with long-term and current planning, the planning of reserves and raw materials, administration and management. To them must be added the Party and Parliament (Supreme Soviet, Supreme Council for national economy, Gostroi), The Supreme Committee for development, the Republican councils of ministries, the National Control Committee, the Ministry of Finance, Central statistical administration, the Bank, as well as institutions of authority and administration which directly or indirectly share the influence, control and administration of a planned economy. [13, p. 3/48].

The third element of the teleological principle can be derived from the concept of »Planning rationality« which is most often identified, when the planned rearrangement of production factors is involved, with the following goals and tasks: the bringing closer

sonnel and in allocations for the complex development of regions, division of work, specialization and cooperation.) This is chiefly a question of criteria deduced from the hierarchy of goals formulated by th e single social subject. The second aspect of a teleological nature is contained in the concept of »an existing proportionality consciously m aintained, i. e. (the realization of goals in the economic sphere), »The law of proportionality« requires that the development of all branches of production be subordinated to a single management on the part of society.

From this general teleological principle are derived special principles, m ethodical rules and institutional forms of economic activity. This is probably the vital concomitant of the teleological concept. [12, p. 52/5] It relates to the creation of the structure of planning activity itself, (to its all-encompassing, norm ative nature, to the character of its directives, to the binding nature, rigidity and control of the plan), likewise in the principle of so-called »key links« and democratic centralism in its im plem entation as well as the institutionalizing of the organizational form of planning: the state is the basic subject of planning. It defines the basic economic goals, links, proportions, it gives them the character of economic laws, linking the norm ative and the positive, the legal-adm inistrative and economic. The state also organizes w ithin itself a large num ber of institutions which are engaged in planning in a direct or indirect m anner, and through w hich is linked central political will and control, with the making of operative decisions and their coordination at various levels of the horizontal and vertical scheme of the planning system. In connection w ith this function of the state the entire history of the organization of planning institutions in the USSR and its present structure, is extrem ely instructive connecting into an en tity an extrem elv large num ber of institutions with varied competences and functions in the realization of planning, ranging from the Economic Council w ithin the governm ent of the USSR and the Inner G overnm ental Committee, which deal w ith the adoption of planning decisions at the top and w ith the ir coordination, to S tate Committees which have an advisory function in planning: and the Gosplan, m inistries, sovnarhoses, local executive planning committees dealing with longterm and cu rren t planning, the planning of reserves and raw m aterials, adm inistration and m anagem ent. To them m ust be added the P arty and P arliam ent (Supreme Soviet, Suprem e Council for national economy, Gostroi), The Suprem e Committee for development, the Republican councils of m inistries, the National Control Committee, the M inistry of Finance, C entral statistical adm inistration, the Bank, as well as institutions of au th o rity and adm inistration which directly or indirectly share the influence, control and adm inistration of a planned economy. [13, p. 3/48].

The th ird elem ent of the teleological principle can be derived from

the concept of »Planning rationality« which is most often identified, when the planned rearrangem ent of production factors is involved, w ith the following goals and tasks: the bringing closer 259

together of centres of production activity and centres of natural sources and the extractive industry through a uniform system of communication and transport with the elimination of competition between possible substitutes; the territorial distribution of industry with the purpose of elimination the backwardness of agriculture and the elimination of disproportions in the development of industry and agriculture; the distribution of the labour force aimed at the liberation of "redundant labour force", depending upon changes in productivity; the transfer of the principle of "proportional development" from the sphere of "national economy" to the sphere of the world socialist system upon the basis of specialization, cooperation and integration (CEMA and other organizations).

It must be stressed that theoretically admitted and practically observed influence of certain other laws operates as will, which cannot be directly connected with, or derived from the teleological principle, but would rather belong to genetic criteria. Thus, for instance, we can perceive, both in Soviet theory and in the economic-systematic practice, the practical effects of the doctrine that objective laws of commodity production, the laws of a more rapid growth of the first section of social reproduction than the second one, the laws of the economy of work time, the law of distribution according to the work performed, — are acting in the socialist economy. [11, ch. 29, 30, 31]

And yet, without entering here into the extremely complex nature of these laws and the heterogeneity and controversies of the doctrine concerning their explanation and action; let us underline that even these laws are not considered to be exempt from control or independent of the effects of the teleological principle. On the contrary, some of the above —mentioned laws are integrated into the teleological model of planning as a component part of the goals of socialism (distribution according to the work performed, the law of the economy of work time, or rather, the law of increase of productivity) while certain other general laws are considered to be limited, guided and controlled by the teleological plan (the law of a more rapid development of the first than of the second period, the laws of commodity production.).

v

The principal economic problem with which the economic system organized upon the basis of the teleological principle is confronted, is approximately equal to the one with which the model of complete (perfect) monopoly is faced. Complete control and supremacy of the »centre«, whole in relation to »sections«, parts of the economy, also determines the supremacy of administrative — and political criteria in relation to economic motives and methods of organization of economic life. For this reason the economic equilibrium of the system does not stem from the effect of objective economic forces, but the very need for equilibrium becomes subjectively evaluated and subjected to arbitrary criteria. This results from the fact that all economic cells of the system are

together of centres of production activity and centres of n atu ral sources and the extractive industry through a uniform system of communication and transport w ith the elim ination of competition between possible substitutes; the territo rial distribution of industry w ith the purpose of elim ination the backwardness of agricultu re and the elim ination of disproportions in the developm ent of industry and agriculture; the distribution of the labour force aimed at the liberation of »redundant labour force«, depending upon changes in productivity; the transfer of the principle of »proportional development« from the sphere of »national economy« to the sphere of the world socialist system upon the basis of specialization, cooperation and integration (CEMA and other organizations).

It m ust be stressed th at theoretically adm itted and practically observed influence of certain other laws operates as will, which cannot be directly connected with, or derived from the teleological principle, b ut would rath er belong to genetic criteria. Thus, for instance, we can perceive, both in Soviet theory and in the economic-systematic practice, the practical effects of the doctrine th at objective laws of commodity production, the laws of a more rapid grow th of the first section of social reproduction th an the second one, the laws of the economy of work time, the law of distribution according to the w ork perform ed, — are acting in the socialist economy. [11, ch. 29, 30, 31]

And yet, w ithout entering here into the extrem ely complex nature of these laws and the heterogeneity and controversies of the doctrine concerning th eir explanation and action; le t us underline th at even these laws are not considered to be exem pt from control or independent of the effects of the teleological principle. On the contrary, some of the above —m entioned laws are integrated into the teleological model of planning as a component part of the goals of socialism (distribution according to the work performed, the law of the economy of w ork time, or rather, the law of increase of productivity) w hile certain other general laws are considered to be limited, guided and controlled by the teleological plan (the law of a more rapid developm ent of the first than of the second period, the laws of commodity production.).

V

The principal economic problem w ith which the economic system organized upon the basis of the teleological principle is confronted, is approxim ately equal to the one w ith which the model of complete (perfect) monopoly is faced. Complete control and supremacy of the

»centre«, whole in relation to »sections«, parts of the economy, also determ ines the suprem acy of adm inistrative —

and political criteria in relation to economic motives and methods of organization of economic life. For this reason the economic equilibrium of the system does not stem from the effect of objective economic forces, but the very need for equilibrium becomes subjectively evaluated and subjected to arb itrary criteria. This results from the fact that all economic cells of the system are 260

treated as technological-economic subjects. That is why the structure of expenditures, prices, normatives of reproduction, incomes profitableness, and productivity individual and collective economic motivation and concern, has a chiefly technological-political and strategic importance and content, and only partly reflects in a peripheral manner the economic preprerentials of the micro--collective. [14, p. 623/4] In the sphere of the mechanism and method of reproduction of planning this system is confronted, with numerous practical and economic difficulties: the coordination of micro and macro plans, the exactness of forecasting, inadequate exploitation of the potential economic resources of the economy, contradictions and clashes of interests of the whole of the economy and its parts, lack of interest and slowness as regards innovations and technological progress, while the personal initiative and stimulative impueses conected with material stimuli are also planned and limited by the given of profitableness irrespective of creative effects. For this reason the rate of growth in this model of business operations is below the social maximum rate while in the last decade the system has even shown signs of a drop in the rate of growth, or rather of an increase in capital coefficients. [15, p. 11/2] However, as far as the structure of the social product is concerned, in this model - in which the »consumers' sovereignty« can be conceived of only within the narrow setting of the »consumers' planned choice« and where the freedom of profession is under strong state control and guidance, both as regards professional orientation and as regards the allocation of the labour force - it could be said that the economic structure is determined by the philosophy »what is good for the society (= state) is also good for the individual.« This is where the economy touches the social and functional implications of the teleological model of business operations and directs our attention to the class structuralization of the society and the ratio of forces and authority, in order to give a reply to the question as to the realistic socialist content of this model of economic operation.

VI

When we say that the Yugoslav self-management economic system rests upon the genetic principle and doctrine we of course largely simplify matters in order to-rather as in the preceding case — perceive the substance and logic of economic operation which is prevalent. The dominant characteristic of the Yugoslav economic system at present is that the law of value, or rather the laws of commodity production resting upon the general law of value, are expressed as a determining objective force which determines the economic activity and motives of all actors in the economy. This concurrently signifies that the partial equilibriums of actors in the economy and the general equilibrium of the system are created in a spontaneous way, through the mediation of the effects of the market, in a cyclic form, whereby the form and intensity of this cycle are determined by technological and empirical

treated as technological-economic subjects. That is why the structu re of expenditures, prices, norm atives of reproduction, incomes profitableness, and productivity individual and collective economic m otivation and concern, has a chiefly technological-political and strategic im portance and content, and only partly reflects in a peripheral m anner the economic preprerentials of the micro-

-collective. {14, p. 623/4] In the sphere of the mechanism and method of reproduction of planning this system is confronted, w ith num erous practical and economic difficulties: the coordination of micro and macro plans, the exactness of forecasting, inadequate exploitation of the potential economic resources of the economy, contradictions and clashes of interests of the whole of the economy and its parts, lack of interest and slowness as regards innovations and technological progress, while the personal initiative and stim ulative impueses conected w ith m aterial stimuli are also planned and lim ited by the given of profitableness irrespective of creative effects. For this reason the rate of grow th in this model of business operations is below the social m axim um rate while in the last decade the system has even shown signs of a drop in the rate of growth, or rath e r of an increase in capital coefficients. [15, p. 11/2]

However, as far as the structure of the social product is concerned, in this model — in which the »consumers' sovereignty« can be conceived of only w ithin the narrow setting of the »consumers'

planned choice« and w here the freedom of profession is under strong state control and guidance, both as regards professional orientation and as regards the allocation of the labour force — it could be said th a t the economic structure is determ ined by the philosophy »what is good for the society (= state) is also good for the individual.« This is w here the economy touches the social and functional im plications of the teleological model of business operations and directs our attention to the class structuralization of the society and the ratio of forces and authority, in order to give a reply to the question as to the realistic socialist content of this model of economic operation.

VI

When we say that the Yugoslav self-management economic system rests upon the genetic principle and doctrine we of course largely simplify matters in order to -rather as in the preceding case — perceive the substance and logic of economic operation which is prevalent. The dominant characteristic of the Yugoslav economic systemat present is that the law of value, or rather the laws of commodity production resting upon the general law of value, are expressed as a determining objective force which determines the economic activity and motives of all actors in the economy. This concurrently signifies that the p

artial equilibrium s of actors in the economy and the general equilibrium of the system are created in a spontaneous way, through the mediation of the effects of the m arket, in a cyclic form, whereby the form and intensity of this cycle are determ ined by technological and empirical 261

laws of the Yugoslav system and the specific features of Yugoslav economic structure and development.

In contrast to the teleological principle, the goals of the activity and development of economic subjects are not derived directly from "social requirements" and are not connected with the state as the subject of social planning, but are directly derived from the logic of the law of value. The purpose of economic operations in the Yugoslav model is the maximizing of incomes which are concurrently the basic criterion of rationality and profitableness of business operations and the basis of the economic equilibrium at the level of the micro-economy (the enterprise equates total marginal expenditures and incomes). This is the essential difference in relation to the genetic principle. That is why the concept of polycentric planning is possible in the Yugoslav model, upon the basis of the genetic approach: every subject plans its marginal expenditures and incomes (short-term), or rather, total expenditures and incomes (long-term).

What about planning at the »level of society?« Current Yugoslav practice has gradually given up this level of planning, being unable to find a genuine functional expression and modus operandi for this type of planning. However, what has remained from the social planning is absolutely in the spirit of the genetic principle. It boils down to the genetic forecast of future trends of development in the internal economy and in the world market. This forecast is based upon information collected about the goals of development of economic organizations and requirements of individual regions, upon the basis of the state of production resources and factors, and of the envisaged rates of development of the macro-economy. The task of the social plan is solely to suggest measures of economic policy by means of which the laws of the commodity production would be established, i. e., by means of which would be secured the economic and institutional settings and instruments for an as flexible and continous as possible internal and external equilibrium at the micro and macro levels.

Consequently, social planning is "necessary" and "conditioned upon" two preconditions: the first is in cases when the market mechanism does not function properly and does not produce correct information for economic subjects in connection with their development plans, and, second, that the structure of development derived from the sum of partial plans of economic subjects does not secure the social optimum. [17, p. 240] The problem then boils down to the optimum structure of planned investments. [16, p. 38]

To the extent to which it has acted as a system of social planning so far, in connection with item 1., planning has been increasingly transformed from administrative and binding directives, into a method of exploatation of economic-financial instruments (credits, interest rates, rent, taxes, foreign currency regime, etc.). The philosophy and method has explicitly been of a genetic nature: where the economic process is based upon a market and commodity basis, genetic research and indirect influences of market

In contrast to the teleological principle, the goals of the activity and developm ent of economic subjects are not derived directly from "social requirem ents" and are not connected with the state as the subject of social planning, but are directly derived from the logic of the law of value. The purpose of economic operations in the Yugoslav model is the maximizing of incomes which are concurrently the basic criterion of rationality and profitableness of business operations and the basis of the economic equilibrium at the level of the microeconomy (the enterprise equates total marginal expenditures and incomes). This is the essential difference in relation to the genetic principle. That is why the concept of poly centric planning is possible in the Yugoslav model, upon the basis of the genetic approach: every subject plans its marginal expenditures and incomes (short-term), or rather, total expenditures and incomes (long-term).

W hat about planning at the »level of society?« C urrent Yugoslav practice has gradually given up this level of planning, being unable to find a genuine functional expression and modus ope-randi for this type of planning. However, w h at has rem ained from the social planning is absolutely in the spirit of the genetic principle. It boils down to the genetic forecast of fu tu re trends of developm ent in the internal economy and in the w orld m arket.

This forecast is based upon inform ation collected about the goals of developm ent of economic organizations and requirem ents of individual regions, upon the basis of the state of production resources and factors, and of the envisaged rates of development of the macroeconomy. The task of the social plan is solely to suggest measures of economic policy by means of which the laws of the commodity production w ould be established, i. e., by means of which would be secured the economic and institutional settings and instrum ents for an as flexible and continous as possible in ternal and external equilibrium a t the micro and macro levels.

Consequently, social planning is »necessary« and »conditioned upon« two preconditions: the first is in cases when the market mechanism does not function properly and does not produce correct information for economic subjects in connection with their development plans, and, second, that the structure of development derived from the sum of partial plans of economic subjects does not secure the social optimum. [17, p. 240] The problem then boils down to the optimum structure of planned investments. [16, p. 38]

To the extent to which it has acted as a system of social planning so far, in connection w ith item 1., planning has been increasingly

transform ed from adm inistrative and binding directives, into a method of exploatation of economic-financial instrum ents (credits, interest rates, rent, taxes, foreign currency regime, etc.).

The philosophy and method has explicitly been of a genetic n a ture: where the economic process is based upon a market and commodity basis, genetic research and indirect influences of market 262

instruments, play the basic role in planning. Here, empirical laws are being sought which reveal historical regularities of the effects of the law of value in the Yugoslav system. (for example: the law of incomes, the specific price of reproduction, the law of distribution according to the work performed, etc.

Where it is a question of planning at the level of the social optimum, the long-term function of the plan has been gradually losing importance and it can also be said that it has not consistently followed the genetic principle of »coordinated and balanced development« either, taking into account the inherited economic structure. And yet, in principle and in a whole range of interventions of the state (through the mediation of investment funds or by means of instruments of taxation and monetary policy, the prices and the foreign currency regimes »planned« support has been lent to branches whose minimum capacities are comparatively great in relation to the social product of the country) the building of hydro-electric power plants, the power supply system, heavy industry, etc.) or where historical circumstances have causes the profitableness of investments to be lower than the socially average profitableness (undeveloped regions). These »planned interventions« have become substantially weaker of late following the change in the last decade of the institutional and political structure of the Yugoslav social system.

In general, the implementation of the genetic principle in the Yugoslav model of economic operation has displayed, in practical sphere, a shortcoming and anomaly similar to the implementation of the teleological principle in the USSR: a drop in the rate of development, regarded from a long-term point of view. This is contrary to the logic of socialism. This drop is probably the consequence of the unsettled basic problem: the general equilibrium which is produced by the system of planning upon the basis of genetic logic is below the optimum social equilibrium that is desirable from the point of view of possibilities offered by the development of production forces and the factual requirements of the socialist society. On the other hand, the plan conceived in this way has neither the means nor the criteria for coordinating the long--term economic equilibrium with the optimum level, i. e. with the rate of growth and consumption which corresponds to the realistic and objectively attainable requirements of the socialist society.

VII

It could be concluded that, seen from the point of view of the development of production forces and factual requirements, the exclusive implementation of methods of planning of the teleological or genetic type have been equally detrimental to socialist development so far, irrespective of the reasons — historical or other — favouring the domination of one of these principles.

It is characteristic that both in the Soviet and in the Yugoslav case the initial period has been the period of a compromise between the two principles. The first Soviet five-year plan was the

instrum ents, play the basic role in planning. Here, empirical laws are being sought which reveal historical regularities of the effects of the law of value in the Yugoslav system, (for example: the law of incomes, the specific price of reproduction, the law of distribution according to the w ork performed, etc.

Where it is a question of planning at the level of the social optimum, the long-term function of the plan has been gradually losing im portance and it can also be said that it has not consistently followed the genetic principle of "coordinated and balanced development" either, taking into account the inherited economic structure. And yet, in principle and in a whole range of interventions of the state (through the m ediation of investment funds or by means of instruments of taxation and monetary policy, the prices and the foreign currency regimes "planned" support has been lent to branches whose minim um capacities are comparatively great in relation to the social product of the country) the building of hydro-electric power plants, the power supply system, heavy industry, etc.) or where historical circumstances have causes the profitableness of investments to be lower than the socially average profitableness (undeveloped regions). These

»planned interventions« have become substantially we aker of late following the change in the last decade of the institutional and political structure of the Yugoslav social system.

In general, the im plem entation of the genetic principle in the Yugoslav model of economic operation has displayed, in practical sphere, a shortcom ing and anomaly sim ilar to the im plem entation of the teleological principle in the USSR: a drop in the rate of developm ent, regarded from a long-term point of view. This is contrary to the logic of socialism. This drop is probably the consequence of the unsettled basic problem: the general equilibrium which is produced by the system of planning upon the basis of genetic logic is below the optim um social equilibrium th a t is desirable from the point of view of possibilities offered by the developm ent of production forces and the factual requirem ents of the socialist society. On the other hand, the plan conceived in this way has n either the means nor the criteria for coordinating the long-

-term economic equilibrium w ith the optimum level, i. e. with the ra te of grow th and consumption which corresponds to the realistic and objectively attainable requirem ents of the socialist society.

VII

It could be concluded that, seen from the point of view of the developm ent of production forces and factual requirem ents, the exclusive im plem entation of methods of planning of the teleological or genetic type have been equally detrim ental to socialist developm ent so far, irrespective of the reasons — historical or other — favouring the dom ination of one of these principles.

It is characteristic that t both in the Soviet and in the Yugoslav case the initial period has been the period of a compromise between the two principles. The first Soviet five-year plan was the 263 expression of compromise outlooks since, in spite of the rejection of the concept of "adynamic equilibrium" emphasis was incontestably laid on massive investments in industry. A certain share and influence has nonetheless been secured for optimum equilibrium by the fact that the production of agricultural and industrial consumer goods has not been neglected. Also, the view of "two regulators of economic operation", of the law of value and the plan, has prevailed in theory. [3, p. 68/72; 12, p. 50]

In the Yugoslav case, the abandoning of administrative, centralized planning and the shift to a market economy has been carried through in practice for a long time by means of strong state competences in the economy, and through the control of investments, while in theory the view is still advocated today that social plans must secure, in a direct manner, certain strategic proportions (basic distribution of the national income, structure of investments, and relations with foreign countries, the development of undeveloped regions). [16, p. 34/5]

For various historical and political reasons, in both cases compromise outlooks and practice have eventually been rejected. In the Soviet Union the teleological concept has prevailed because of the objective need for a strong concentration of economic and political power for the sake of reconstruction, in a given historical phase. These were later transformed from the objective necessity of the means of development into its goal. One could list numerous other reasons for this victory which are of less important nature, such as the theoretical belief concerning the cessation of the action of objective economic laws in socialism, or their indentification with the commodity economy, as well as the view that the market is by definition a method of capitalism and that it must be substituted by direct administrative control of economic trends.

In the Yugoslav case, the abandoning of social plans seems to have come just because from opposite extremes. The view is that any planning through the mediation of ex ante defined goals and with a lesser or greater degree of compulsion, is by its definition bureaucratic and antisocialist. Along with this, the state has been considered exclusively a bureaucratic instrument and this fact is to be ascribed to the slowness of the vertical development of the self-management political and economic democracy. Finally, to the fetishization of organization and administration (the state) in Soviet theory, the Yugoslav economic theory (or rather some of its representatives) has replied with an apology for the market economy, with a hypertrophism of the determinism of the law of commodity production and with a vulgarization of the interpretation of certain basically progressive consequences which the spontaneity of economic processes brings in its wake. According to what one economist has said there exists a tendency even towards a laisser-faire extreme. [16, p. 35] There is no doubt that national peculiarities and regional particularism have of the general-social, micro-economic planning in Yugoslavia and in incentive to the

expression of compromise outlooks since, in spite of the rejection of the concept of »dynamic equilibrium « emphasis was incontestably laid on massive investm ents in industry. A certain share and influence has nonetheless been secured for optim um equilibrium by the fact th at the production of agricultural and industrial consumer goods has not been neglected. Also, the view of »two regulators of economic operation«, of the law of value and the plan, has prevailed in theory. [3, p. 68/72; 12, p. 50]

In the Yugoslav case, the abandoning of adm inistrative, centralized planning and the shift to a m arket economy has been carried through in practice for a long tim e by means of strong state competences in the economy, and through the control of investm ents, w hile in theory the view is still advocated today th a t social plans m ust secure, in a direct m anner, certain strategic proportions (basic distribution of the national income, stru ctu re of investm ents, and relations w ith foreign countries, the developm ent of undeveloped regions). [16, p. 34/5]

For various historical and political reasons, in both cases compromise outlooks and practice have eventually been rejected. In the Soviet Union the teleological concept has prevailed because of the objective need for a strong concentration of economic and political power for the sake of reconstruction, in a given historical phase. These were later transform ed from the objective necessity of the means of developm ent into its goal. One could list num erous other reasons for this victory which are of less im portant nature, such as the theoretical belief concerning the cessation of the action of objective economic laws in socialism, or th eir indentification w ith the commodity economy, as well as the view th at the m arket is by definition a m ethod of capitalism and th a t it m ust be substituted by direct adm inistrative control of economic trends.

In the Yugoslav case, the abandoning of social plans seems to have come ju st because from opposite extrem es. The view is th at any planning through the mediation of ex ante defined goals and w ith a lesser or g reater degree of compulsion, is by its definition bureaucratic and antisocialist. Along w ith this, the state has been considered exclusively a bureaucratic instrum ent and this fact is to be ascribed to the slowness of the vertical development of the self-m anagem ent political and economic democracy. Finally, to the fetishization of organization and adm inistration (the state) in Soviet theory, the Yugoslav economic theory (or ra the r some of its representatives) has replied w ith an apology for the m arket economy, w ith a hypertrophism of the determ inism of the law of commodity production and w ith a vulgarization of the in terpretation of certain basically progressive consequences which the spontaneity of economic processes brings in its wake. According to w hat one

economist has said there exists a tendency even towards a laisser-faire extrem e. [16, p. 35] There is no doubt that national peculiarities and regional particularism have of the general-social, micro-economic planning in Yugoslavia and in incentive to the 264

development given strong support to the development of he genetic ideology on planning. The particular interests of individual social structures and professions (political structure, technocratic structures, nationalist structures, etc.) have consolidated the forces of desintegration against social planning.

The results are also well known. Both the teleological and genetic ideologies or rather methods of planning based upon them have produced negative consequences. A drop in the rate of development and the unsatisfactory gratification of social requirements, visible and concealed unemployment, disproportions in development and the formation of an equilibrium below the possible social optimum, bureaucratic and market differentiation of groups of inhabitants — these we may quote as the most important economic expressions.

It is certain that even beyond the economic sphere it is possible to notice negative consequences of the extremism of genetic and teleologic logic for the development of the bureaucratic alienation of society and in Yugoslavia there exists alienation founded on commodity fetishism. Both of them lead, subjectively and objectively, to the loss of both the material and ideological value perspectives of socialism.

However, it must be underlined that in neither case is a strictly determined process involved. Numerous objective and subjective forces are against this disintegration of socialist society.

We shall mention the following factors which, it seems lead to some sort of synthesis of methods and teleological-genetic principles in the contemporary development of socialist economy.

First, in the last few decades the principles and logic of the commodity economy has again been established in Soviet theory, the objective effect of the law of values is admitted, efforts are made for the definition of a type of price of reproduction and the methods of its realization, by means of which will be simultaneously optimized as far as possible the effect of planned development and of the spontaneity of the market (especially in connection with the material initiative of economic subjects). In its practical development the Soviet economy is implementing today its most important economic reform since NEP and the shift to planned development in the thirties. The substance of the reform is in numerous economic measures by means of which some sort of optimum between the effects of the central plan is sought (i. e., the state) in the postulation of the long-term development of economy of branches and of the whole system, and in the introduction of the logic of a market economy into the motives and rationality of business operation at the level of economic organizations. Profit as a criterion of success in planning and the transaction of business, direct market connection between the production and turn-over sphere, introduction of a price for social capital, (interest on fixed assets and capital goods), alimentation of the rate of development from resources of the micro-economy and loans -

development given strong support to the development of he genetic ideology on planning. The particular interests of individual social structures and professions (political structure, technocratic structures, nationalist structures, etc.) have consolidated the forces of desintegration against social planning.

The results are also well known. Both the teleological and genetic ideologies or rather methods of planning based upon them have produced negative consequences. A drop in the rate of development and the unsatisfactory gratification of social requirements, visible and concealed unem ployment, disproportions in development and the formation of an equilibrium below the possible social optimum, bureaucratic and market differentiation of groups of inhabitants—these we may quote as the most important economic expressions.

It is certain that even beyond the economic sphere it is possible to notice negative consequences of the extrem ism of genetic and teleologic logic for the development of the bureaucratic alienation of society and in Yugoslavia there exists alienation founded on commodity fetishism. Both of them lead, subjectively and objectively, to the loss of both them aterial and ideological value perspectives of socialism.

However, it m ust be underlined that in neither case is a strictly determined process involved. Numerous objective and subjective forces are against this disintegration of socialist society.

We shall m ention the following factors which, it seems lead to some sort of synthesis of m ethods and teleological-genetic principles in the contem porary developm ent of socialist economy.

First, in the last few decades the principles and logic of the commodity economy has again been established in Soviet theory, the objective effect of the law of values is adm itted, efforts are made for the definition of a type of price of reproduction and the methods of its realization, by m eans of which will be sim ultaneously optimized as fa r as possible the effect of planned developm ent and of the spontaneity of the m arket (especially in connection w ith the m aterial initiative of economic subjects). In its practical developm ent the Soviet economy is im plem enting today its most im portant economic reform since NEP and the shift to planned developm ent in the thirties. The substance of the reform is in num erous economic m easures by m eans of which some sort of optim um betw een the effects of the central plan is sought (i. e., the state) in the postulation of the long-term developm ent of economy of branches and of the whole system, and in the introduction of the logic of a m arket economy into the motives and rationality of business operation a t the level of economic organizations. Profit as a criterion of success in

planning and the transaction of business, direct m ark et connection betw een the production and turn -o v er sphere, introduction of a price for social capital, (interest on fixed assets and capital goods), alim entation of the rate of developm ent from resources of the microeconomy and loans 265

these are some of aspects of this opening of the door to the effect of the law of value, in addition to the effects of central planning. [14, p. 642-6]

This drive is also felt in Yugoslavia, although, true, it is more pronounced in theory than in practice, to reaffirm the importance of social planning within the setting of the concept of polycentric planning. It can be said that there is no economist today, prominent in this sphere, who fails to conceive of the social plan as a mutual, inter-dependent complex of genetic and teleological forces and considerations. [18. p. 350/3] The social plan is given the function of instrument, of forecasting, information and coordination of economic decisions, guidance and (when compulsory social goals are established) also of directive for federal and other social bodies. after being adopted by top-ranking political bodies. [16, p. 36] In these functions the plan must be a synthesis of spontaneous market impulses and of decisions of actors in an economy dominated by the law of value of incomes, and of long-term development prospects where the aim of social needs dominate, whose realization is connected with lesser or greater does of an administrative--coercive nature for individual actors in the economy. On the other hand, in practice this type of planning is yet to be achieved. The difficulties in which the Yugoslav economic model is involved at present will certainly render more difficult a rapid transcendence of the resistance which representatives of an uncontrolled market economy and special interest-groups offer today to planned social control and development, thereby protecting their special interest to the detriment of society's.

However, the future will prove when, and to what extent the economic theory and practice of socialist countries will find the proper methods and solutions for the control of the spontaneous laws of their development, and for the withstanding the ever threatening tendencies of differentiation and difference of interests of social classes and group which have been reproduced so far in socialist society upon the basis of the effects of the genetic and of teleological methods of planning.

This drive is also felt in Yugoslavia, although, true, it is more pronounced in theory th an in practice, to reaffirm the im portance of social planning w ithin the setting of the concept of polycentric planning. It can be said that there is no economist today, prominent in this sphere, who fails to conceive of the social plan as a m utual, inter-dependent complex of genetic and teleological forces and considerations. [18. p. 350/3] The social plan is given the function of instrum ent, of forecasting, inform ation and coordination of economic decisions, guidance and (when compulsory social goals are established) also of directive for federal and other social bodies, after being adopted by top-ranking political bodies. [16, p. 36] In these functions the plan m ust be a synthesis of spontaneous m arket impulses and of decisions of actors in an economy dom inated by the law of value of incomes, and of long-term developm ent prospects w here the aim of social needs dominate, whose realization is connected w ith lesser or g reater does of an adm inistrative-

-coercive n ature for individual actors in the economy. On the other hand, in practice this type of planning is yet to be achieved.

The difficulties in which the Yugoslav economic model is involved at present will certainly render more difficult a rapid transcendence of the resistance which representatives of an uncontrolled m arket economy and special interest-groups offer today to planned social control and development, thereby protecting their special interest to the detrim ent of society's.

However, the fu tu re will prove when, and to w hat extent the economic theory and practice of socialist countries w ill find the proper methods and solutions for the control of the spontaneous laws of the eir development, and for the w ithstanding the ever threatening tendencies of differentiation and difference of in terests of social classes and group which have been reproduced so far in socialist society upon the basis of the effects of the genetic and of teleological methods of planning.

- ¹ M. Dobb: "The discussions of the "Twenties" On Planning and Economic Growth (in Capitalism, Development and Planning", ed. Routlegde, Kegan, London, 1967)
- ² J. Klacek, J. Rybačkova: »Sovetsti ekonomove dvacatych let o mechanismu fungovani ekonomiky«, Ekonomicsky Ustav Cheskoslovenske Akademie, Ved, Praha, 1967 (Soviet Economists in Twenties About Functioning of Economic Mechanism«, ed. Chech-Slovac Academy of Sciences, Praha, 1967)
- 3 Ch. Bobrovsky: Formation du systeme sovietique de planification«, ed. Mouton, Paris, 1956
- 4 N. Spulber, ed. »Foundations of Soviet Strategy for Economic Growth«, Selected Soviet Essays, 1924/1930, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, USA, 1965
- 5 E. G. Dolan: »The Theological Period in Soviet Economic Planning«, Yale Economic Essays, vol. X, \aleph 1, 1970, pp. 2—41.
- ⁶ V. G. Groman: »O nekotorykh zakonomernostiah empiricheski obnaruzhivaemykh v nashem narodonom khozjaistve«, Planovoe khozijaistvo, 1925, str. 88—101. (»On Certain Regularities Empirically Observable in Our Economy«, trans. in Spulber, N. Foundations of Soviet Strategy for Economic Growth, pp. 361—364)
- ⁷ V. Bazarov: »O metodologii postroieniya perspektivnykh planov«, Planovoe khoziaistvo, № 7, 1926, str. 7—21 (»On the Methodology for Drafting Perspective Plans, trans. in Spulber, N. Foundations of Soviet Strategy pp. 365—377)
- ⁸ S. Sharov: "Tsel v plane i zadachi nashego khoziaistva", Planovoe khoziaistvo, 7, 1926, str. 59—70 ("The Goal of the Plan and the Task of Our Economy", trans. in Spulber, N. Foundations of Soviet Strategy, pp. 378—392)
- ⁹ S. G. Strumulin: »Perspektivnaia orientirovka na 1926—7/1930—31, Ocherki sovietskoi ekonomiki, Moskva, 1928, str. 422—39 (»Perspective Guide Lines For 1926—7/1930—31« trans. in Spulber, N. Foundations of Soviet Strategy, pp. 426—437)
- ¹⁰ J. A. Kronrod: »Zakony politicheskoi ekonomii socializma«, izd. Mysl, Moskva, 1966 (On the Laws in Political Economy of Socialism«, ed. Mysl, Moskva, 1966)
- , »Politicheskaya ekonomia«, uchebnik, Akademiya nauk SSSR, Moskva, 1955, II izd. (Political Economy, a textbook, Academy of Science of USSR, Moskva, 1955, Second ed.)
- ¹² I. Maksimovich: »Problemi političke ekonomije socijalizma«, Pravni fakultet, Beograd, 1969. (Problems of the Political Economy of Socialism«, Law Faculty ed. Beograd, 1969)
- ¹³ E. Zaleski: »Planning Reforms in the Soviet Union 1962—1966«, The University of North Carolina Press, USA, 1967
- 14 I Maksimovich: »Teorija i sistem cena u SSSR«, Ekonomska misao« № 4, 1968, str. 623—649 (Theory and Price System in USSR«, Economic Thought, № 4, 1968, Beograd, pp. 623—649)
- ¹⁵ W. Brus: »Problèmes généraux du fonctionement de l'économie socialiste«, ed. F. Maspero, Paris, 1968
- ¹⁶ B. Horvat: "Privredni sistem i ekonomska politika Jugoslavije", izd. Institut ekonomskih nauka, Beograd, 1970 (Economic System and Economic Policy of Yugoslavia, ed. Institut of Economic Sciences, Beograd, 1970)
- ¹⁷ M. Mesarich: »Planiranje privrednog razvoja«, izd. Informator, Zagreb, 1967 (Economic Development Planning, ed. Informator, Zagreb, 1967)
- ¹⁸ N. Chobeljich: *Plan i tržište u sistemu funkcionisanja socijalističke privrede«, Ekonomska Misao, № 3, 1969, Beograd, str. 335—355 (Plan and Market in System Functioning of Socialist Economy«, Economic Thought, № 3, 1969, Beograd, pp. 335—355)
- ¹⁹ A. Erlich: "The Soviet Industralisation Debate«, 1924—28, Harward University Press, Cambridge Mass., 1960.

- J. Klacek, J. Ryb a iko va: »Soviet Economists in the Twenties About the Functioning of Economic Mechanism«, Economic Constitution of the Czechoslovak Academy, Ved, Prague, 1967 (Soviet Economists in Twenties About Functioning of Economic Mechanism«, ed. Czech-Slovak Academy of Sciences, Prague, 1967)
- 3 Ch. Bobrovsky: F orm ation du system e sovietique de planification«, ed.

Sheep, Paris, 1956

- 4 N. Spulber, ed. »Foundations of Soviet Strategy for Economic Growth«, Selected Soviet Essays, 1924/1930, In diana U niversity Press, Bloomington, USA, 1965
- 5 E. G. Dolan: »The Theological Period in Soviet Economic Planning«, Yale Economic Essays, vol. X, X« 1, 1970, pp. 2—41.
- V. G. G rom an: "O nekotorykh zakonom ernostiah empiricheski obnaru-zhivaem ykh v nashem narodonom khozjaistve", Planovoe khozijaistvo, 1925, str. 88-101. ("On C ertain R egularities Empirically Observable in Our Economy", tran s, in Spulber, N. Foundations of Soviet Strategy for Economic Growth, pp. 361–364)
- 7 V. Bazarov: "O m etodologii postroieniya perspektivnykh planov", P lanovoe khoziaistvo, 7, 1926, str. 7-21 ("On the Methodology for D rafting Perspective Plans, tran s, in Spulber, N. Foundations of Soviet Strategy pp.

365-377)

- 8 S. Sharov: »Tsel v plane i zadachi nashego khoziaistva«, Planovoe khoziaistvo, 7, 1926, str. 59-70 (»The Goal of the Plan and the Task of Our Economy«, trans, in Spulber, N. Foundations of Soviet Strategy, pp. 378-392)
- S. G. Stru m u lin: »P erspektivnaia orientirovka n a 1926—7/1930 —31, Ocherki sovietskoi ekonomiki, Moskva, 1928, str. 422—39 (»Perspective Guide Lines For 1926—7/1930—31« tran s, in Spulber, N. Foundations of Soviet Strategy, pp. 426—437)
- 10 J. A. Kronrod: "Zakony politicheskoi ekonomii socializma", izd. Mysl, Moskva, 1966 (On the Laws in P olitical Economy of Socialism, ed. Mysl, Moskva, 1966)

- , "Politicheskaya ekonomia", uchebnik, Akadem iya nauk SSSR, Moskva, 1955, II izd. (Political Economy, a textbook, Academy of Science of USSR, Moscow, 1955, Second ed.)
- 12 I. Maksimovich: »Problem of the Political Economy of Socialism«, Law Faculty ed. Belgrade, 1969.
- 13 E. Zaleski: »Planning Reform s in the Soviet Union 1962—1966«, The U niversity of N orth C arolina Press, USA, 1967
- 14 I Maksimovich: »Theory and price system in the USSR«, Economic thought« $\,$
- Ns 4, 1968, str. 623—649 (Theory a n d Price System in USSR«, Economic Thought, Ns 4, 1968, Beograd, pp. 623—649)
- 15 W. Brus: "Problèm es gên êrau x du fonctionem ent de l'economie socialiste", ed. F. M aspero, Paris, 1968
- 18 B. Horvat: "Economic system and economic policy of Yugoslavia", ed.

Institute of Economic Sciences, Belgrade, 1970 (Economic System and Economic Policy of Yugoslavia, ed. Institute of Economic Sciences, Belgrade, 1970) 17 M. M. Esarich: "The Plan of Economic Development", ed. Inform ator, Zagreb, 1967 (Economic Development P lanning, ed. Inform ator, Zagreb, 1967) 18 N. Chobeljich: »Plan and market in the functioning system of socialist economy«, Ekonom ska Misao, Ns 3, 1969, Belgrade, p. 335—355 (Plan and M arket in System F unctioning of Socialist Economy«, Economic Thought, N® 3, 1969, Belgrade, pp. 335—355)

18 A. Erlich: »The Soviet Industralisatio n Debate«, 1924—28, H arw ard U niversity Press, Cam bridge Mass., 1960.

NORMATIVISTISCHES UND MATERIALISTISCHES VERSTÄNDNIS DER SOZIALISTISCHEN TRANSFORMATION

Helmut Fleischer

Berlin

Die allgemeine Prämisse der folgenden Ausführungen ist es, daß auch weiterhin Anlaß besteht, in der allgemeinen Sozialtheorie eine materialistische Betrachtungsweise zu verfechten, sie als Instanz der Kritik gegen idealistische oder besser vielleicht: ideo-logische Betrachtungsweisen anzusetzen; daß die traditionelle Gestalt des historischen Materialismus wie auch manche seiner aktuellen Ausformungen daran leiden, daß das materialistische Motiv mitunter in einer problematischen Weise geltend gemacht wird, so, daß damit auch auf der Gegenseite nur obsolete Formen des Idealismus ausgeschlossen werden, sehr aktuelle Idealismen jedoch durch die Hintertür ungeniert wieder hereinkommen; vor allem aber scheint es bisher irgendwie nicht recht zu gelingen, das aktive Moment, welches die ganze historisch-materialistische Theoriebildung durchdringt, das Interesse an »menschlicher Emanzipation«, auf eine materialistische Weise theoretisch zu integrieren.

Diese Problematik liegt bereits in den Ursprüngen der historischmaterialistischen Gesellschaftstheorie beschlossen. Genauer gesagt, darin, daß es zwei ursprüngliche Ansätze sind, die schon bei den Begründern der Theorie nicht explizit-elaboriert miteinander vermittelt sind: der eigentlichen Grundlegung der materialistischen Gesellschaftsbetrachtung ging bei Marx eine Phase voraus, in der er ganz unbefangen, theoretisch nicht sonderlich reflektiert gewisse Normen einer emanzipierten Menschlichkeit proklamierte und als Maßstab der Kritik an einer davon entfremdeten gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit in Anschlag brachte. Vermittels der Überlegung jedoch, daß die Theorie in einem Volke so weit verwirklicht wird, als sie die Verwirklichung seiner Bedürfnisse ist, es also keinen Sinn hat, der Welt mit einem Prinzip gegenüberzutreten, das nicht auch ihr eigenes ist, kam Marx zur explizit materialistischen Geschichtsauffassung, die wohl weiterhin praktisch an Emanzipation interessiert ist, gleichwohl ihre Aufgabe nicht darin sieht, die Desiderate dieser Emanzipation als »Ideale« zu Hats off to Fleischer

B erlin

The general premise of the following remarks is that there is still reason to defend a materialistic point of view in general social theory, to use it as an instance of criticism against idealistic or perhaps better: ideo-logical points of view; that the traditional form of historical materialism, as well as some of its current forms, suffer from the fact that the materialistic motive is sometimes asserted in a problematic way, so that on the other side, too, it only becomes obsolete Forms of idealism are excluded, but very topical idealisms come back unabashed through the back door; Above all, however, it does not seem to have been possible to theoretically integrate in a materialistic way the active factor that permeates the entire historical-materialistic theory formation, the interest in "human emancipation".

This problem is already settled in the origins of the historical-materialistic theory of society. More precisely, in the fact that there are two original approaches that were not explicitly and elaborately mediated by the founders of the theory: the actual foundation of the materialistic view of society was preceded by a phase for M arx in? completely unbiased, theoretically not particularly reflected, proclaimed certain norms of an e ancipated humanity and used them as a standard of criticism of a social reality alienated from them. By considering, however, that the theory is realized in a people to the extent that it is the realization of its needs, so there is no point in confronting the world with a principle that does not also apply to it r own, M arx came to the explicitly ma-terialistic conception of history, which is probably still practically interested in e ancipation, although it does not see its task in recognizing the desiderata of this e ancipation as "ideals".

verkünden, sondern eine wirkliche Bewegung theoretisch (wissenschaftlich) zu erfassen, die aus den bestehenden 'empirisch gegebenen Voraussetzungen erwächst. Die materialistische Geschichtsauffassung ist danach die Theorie der allgemeinen Voraussetzungen und Funktionsweisen menschlich-gesellschaftlicher Lebenstätigkeit, und sie geht über in die Kritik der politischen Ökonomie, also in die theoretische Analyse der gegenwärtigen bürgerlichen Gestalt des Sozialprozesses.

Die Imperative der Emanzipation — beginnend mit jenem »kategorischen« Imperativ, alle Verhältnisse umzuwerfen, in denen der Mensch ein erniedrigtes, geknechtetes und verlassenes Wesen ist — verlieren auf dem Boden der konsequent materialistischen Gesellschaftsbetrachtung ihre einstige Unmittelbarkeit.

Verfolgt man die gedankliche Entwicklung, welche die Begründer der historisch-materialistischen Theorie durchgemacht haben, so wird man feststellen, daß sich der Akzent immer mehr von der Proklamation emanzipatorischer Zielnormen weg verlagert hat, und hin zu einer betont theoretischen Analyse jener Verknüpfungen, die zwischen den Voraussetzungen und den diversen Effekten des gesellschaftlichen Lebensprozesses bestehen. Ins Praktische gewendet, werden daraus hypothetische Imperative eines praktischen Realismus; das praktische Interesse, das sich damit verbindet, its mehr eines an der realen Effektivität als eines an der humanen Dignität der einzuleitenden Maßnahmen. Auch bei den Nachfolgern hat sich die Gestalt, in welche Marx seine Theorie abschließend (mit dem Vorwort zur Kritik der politischen Ökonomie von 1859) gebracht hat vor allem als eine Denkform des praktischen Realismus in der Gesellschaftspolitik bewährt — oder wenigstens dessen, was man jeweils für Realismus hielt, — und das im Rahmen recht verschiedener Strategien (von Kautsky und Cunow bis zu Bucharin, Lukács und Korsch). Eine Schranke des Gesellscwaftsverständnisses, das sich in diesen theoretischen Koordinaten bewegt, machte sich bemerkbar, als im Ausgang des 1. Weltkriegs eine Epoche revolutionärer Möglichkeiten eintrat: es fehlen in jenem theoretischen Kanon, der im Marxschen Vorwort umrissen ist, gerade jene Kategorien, in denen sich das revolutionäre Handeln denkend vollzieht - historischer Materialismus fungierte so bei einigen seiner Verfechter geradezu als historischer Quietismus. Und in einer späteren Konstellation machte sich dieselbe Schranke erneut bemerkbar: in den Koordinaten des traditionellen historischen Materialismus fehlten auch die Kriterien, nach denen der emanzipatorische Fortschritt der verändernden Praxis (bzw. das Gegenteil davon, Zurückbleiben und Rückschritt) zu beurteilen wäre. Mit der einsetzenden Krise jener Praxisform, die sich unter der Ägide Stalins herausgebildet hatte, stellte sich unabweisbar die Frage nach dem praktischen Gehalt und insbesondere nach der emanzipatorischen Qualität. Im Zuge der humanistischen Erneuerung des Sozialismus (und der marxistischen Lehre) sollten die human-emanzipatorischen Sinngehalte in einer neuen Unmittelbarkeit zum Maß der verändernden Praxis werden.

proclaim, but to theoretically (scientifically) grasp a real movement that grows out of the existing, empirically given prerequisites. The materialistic conception of history is then the theory of the general prerequisites and modes of functioning of human-social activity, and it goes over into the critique of political economy, i.e. into the theoretical analysis of the current bourgeois form of the social process.

The imperatives of emancipation - beginning with that "categorical" imperative to overthrow all conditions in which man is a humiliated, enslaved and abandoned being - lose their former immediacy on the basis of the consistently materialistic view of society .

If you follow the intellectual development that the founders of the historical-materialistic theory went through, you will find that the accent has shifted more and more away from the proclamation of emancipatory goal norms, and towards to an emphatically theoretical analysis of those connections that exist between the prerequisites and the various effects of the social life process. Applied to the practical, this becomes hypothetical imperatives of a practical realism; the practical interest associated with this is more one of real effectiveness than one of the human dignity of the measures to be taken. Even with the successors, the form in which Marx finally brought his theory (with the foreword to the Critique of Political Economy from 1859) proved itself above all as a way of thinking of practical realism in social politics — or at least what was considered to be realism — and that within the framework of quite different strategies (from Kautsky and Cunow to Bukharin, Lukacs and Korsch). A barrier to the understanding of society that moves in these theoretical coordinates becomes noticeable when, at the end of the 1st

World War II saw an epoch of revolutionary possibilities: the theoretical canon outlined in Marx's preface lacks precisely those categories in which revolutionary action takes place in thought - historical materialism functioned in this way with some of its proponents downright as historical quietism. And in a later constellation, the same barrier became noticeable again: the coordinates of traditional historical materialism also lacked the criteria according to which the emancipatory progress of changing practice (or the opposite of it, lagging behind and stepping backwards) to be judged. With the onset of the crisis of that form of practice that had developed under Stalin's Agide, the question of practical content and in particular of emancipatory quality inevitably arose. In the course of the humanistic renewal of socialism (and of Marxist teaching), the humane-emancipatory meanings were to become the measure of changing practice in a new immediacy.

Doch dabei gerieten nur allzu oft die materialistischen Einsichten der Theorie aus dem Blickfeld; jene humanistische Erneuerung vollzog sich sozusagen ein wenig außerhalb der historisch-materialistischen Legalität.

In dieser Situation möchte ich einige Überlegungen zur aktuellen Entwicklungsperspektive der historisch-materialistischen Sozialtheorie anstellen. Das »entscheidende Kettenglied« scheint mir in der Frage zu bestehen, wie eine theoretische Integration jener beiden »Ursprünge« zu leisten ist, des aktiv-emanzipatorischen und des mehr kognitiv-rezeptiven, bedingungsanalytischen Ansatzes. Die Frage läßt sich weiter so aufschlüsseln:

Wie muß ein historischer Materialismus angelegt sein, damit er zugleich die Motivik der »menschlichen Emanzipation« in sich aufnehmen kann? — Und: Wie muß die Motivik der Emanzipation theoretisch artikuliert sein, damit sie den Einsichten materialistischer Gesellschaftsbetrachtung gemäß ist?

Das wichtigste Anwendungsgebiet, in dem sich heute eine materialistische Gesellschaftstheorie überhaupt und insbesondere eine materialistische Integration programmatisch-normativer Gehalte zu bewähren hätte, ist wohl das historische Phänomen der sozialistischen Bewegung, namentlich in der Phase nach ihrer politischen Machteroberung. Gerade dieses Anwendungsgebiet scheint mir bis heute am allerwenigsten historisch-materialistisch erschlossen zu sein. Ich werde in meinen Ausführungen jedoch nur einige der in diesem Anwendungsgebiet sich stellenden Fragen kurz berühren und in die hauptsächlich meta-theoretisch gehaltene Überlegung einbeziehen können. (Es inhaltlich weiter auszuführen ist ein wesentlicher Teil meines ferneren Arbeitsprogramms.)

Welchen spezifischen Sinn kann es heute haben, in Sachen Gesellschaft einen »materialistischen« Standpunkt entgegen einem anderen — einen idealistischen oder spiritualistischen — einzunehmen?

Die Kritik an einem Materialismus der Außenwelt-Anschauung (die ich wegen des Raummangels jetzt auslasse) ist zugleich ein Plädoyer für die Position, die ich (ebenso wie einige nähere oder fernere Weggenossen) als die des praktischen Materialismus bezeichnen möchte. Den ideengeschichtlichen Ausgangspunkt bildet die erste Marxsche Feuerbachthese mit ihrer Aufforderung, die Wirklichkeit nicht nur als Objekt der Anschauung, sondern als »sinnliche Praxis« (also auch »subjektiv«) zu fassen. Das wäre zu der allgemeinen methodologischen Direktive auszuformulieren, alle die Beziehungen, um die es der historisch-materialistischen Theorie zu tun ist — zwischen gesellschaftlichem Sein und Bewußtsein, Produktivkräften und Produktionsverhältnissen u. a. m. — als Bestrebungen eines Handlungszusammenhanges theoretisch in Handlungsbegriffen darzustellen (in pragmatologischen Kategorien), — oder jedenfalls so, daß sie jederzeit transparent auf sol-

But all too often the materialistic insights of the theory were lost sight of; that humanistic renewal took place, so to speak, a little outside of historical-materialistic legality.

In this situation, I would like to make some reflections on the current developmental perspective of historical-materialist social theory. The "decisive link" seems to me to be the question of how to achieve a theoretical integration of those two "origins", the active-emancipatory and the more cognitive-receptive, condition-analytical approach. The question can be broken down further as follows: How must historical materialism be designed so that it can also incorporate the motif of "human emancipation"? — And: How must the motive of e ancipation be articulated theoretically so that it conforms to the insights of a materialistic view of society?

The most important area of application in which a materialist theory of society in general and in particular a materialist integration of programmatic-normative content had to prove itself today is probably the historical phenomenon of the socialist movement, namely in the phase after it political seizure of power. It is precisely this area of application that seems to me to be the least historically and materialistically developed to this day. In one of my statements, however, I will only briefly touch on some of the questions that arise in this area of application and include them in the mainly metatheoretical considerations. (Expanding the content of it is an essential part of my future work program.) What specific meaning can it have today to take a "materialistic" point of view in relation to society as opposed to another - an idealistic or spiritualistic one?

The critique of a materialism in the view of the outside world (which I will now omit because of the lack of space) is at the same time a plea for the position that I (like some of my closer or more distant companions) describe as that of practical materialism would like. The starting point in terms of the history of ideas is the first Marxian thesis on Feuerbach, with its demand that reality not only be viewed as an object, but as a

"sensual practice" (hence also "subjective"). That would be to formulate one general methodological directive, all the relationships that historical-materialistic theory is concerned with — between social being and consciousness, productive forces and production conditions, etc. m.

- to present them theoretically in action concepts (in pragmatological categories) as endeavors in an action context, - or at least in such a way that they are transparent at all times on sol-271

che Begriffe bezogen bleiben und in sie übersetzbar sind. Daher der Beiname »praktisch«. In welchen Koordinaten affirmiert sich diese Betrachtungsweise nun als ein »Materialismus«?

Die Wendung zum Materialismus hatte bei Marx nicht den Sinn, auf der abstrakten Ebene einer Gegenüberstellung von Materie und Bewußtsein (Geist) verbleibend nur die Priorität umzukehren. Die Wirklichkeit ist nicht als eine Komposition aus materiellen und ideellen »Faktoren« zu begreifen. Den »Phrasen vom Bewußtsein« ist nicht eine Abstraktion von »Materie« entgegenzusetzen (und sei es auch das Materielle in seiner gesellschaftlichen Erscheinungsweise), sondern ein integraler Begriff von menschlich-gesellschaftlichem Sein als dem »wirklichen Lebensprozeß«, genauer als Lebenstätigkeit; das bildet hier die kategoriale Konstitutionsformel, sozusagen als transzendentale Einheit der Apperzeption, die eine gegenständlich-praktische Apperzeption ist.

Der praktische Materialismus bewegt sich damit — statt in der abstrakten Konfrontation von Materie und Geist — in der doppelten Korrelation von Subjekt und Objekten sowie von Subjekt und Subjekten. Als praktische Korrelationen sind sie nicht primär solche der Widerspiegelung, sondern solche des Interesses (welches rezeptive Akte als Moment in sich schließt). Materialität besteht auf beiden Seiten der Korrelation, und sie besteht in der Unabtrennbarkeit aller Verhaltens-Charaktere des Seienden von seiner Körperlichkeit bzw. Leiblichkeit. (Das bedeutet die Rückkehr von einem raffinierten zu einem schlichten Materialitätsbegriff.)

Die Konfrontation mit idealistischen Betrachtungsweisen ist eine doppelte: sie richtet sich, was das Sein der praktischen Subjekte angeht, gegen die Separation der Idee vom Interesse; und sie richtet sich, was die praktischen Subjekt-Objekt-Verhältnisse angeht, gegen die Separation der Subjekt-Tätigkeit von der Verwirklichungsbedingungen auf der Objektseite. Die Konfrontation mit dem Materialismus der Außenwelt-Anschauung läuft darauf hinaus, daß dieser einseitig die Priorität der Objekt-Seite geltend macht und das Subjektive als Funktion des Objektiven darstellt, indem er das Materielle auf die Objektseite schlägt und von dort aus auf die Subjekte »übergreifen« läßt, während es im praktischen Materialismus ebensosehr um die eigene Materialität der Subjekte und den darin beschlossenen Modus der Selbständigkeit zu tun ist.

Vor allem aber ist jetzt zu betrachten, wie sich die Orientierung des praktischen Materialismus im Felde der philosophischen Analyse menschlicher Vergesellschaftung bewährt und wie sie eine theoretische Integration des praktischen Interesses an Emanzipation zu leisten vermag.

In der praktisch-materialistischen Theorie der Gesellschaft ist das Augenmerk darauf gerichtet, das durch die jeweiligen materiell-produktiven und sozial-formativen Kräfte der Individuen und sozialen Gruppen bestimmte, im allgemeinen gruppen- und klassenspezifisch bestimmte Niveau ihrer Aktivität zu thematisieren und die auf dieser Basis sich herstellenden, von den Menschen

Marx's turn to materialism did not mean merely reversing the priority of remaining on the abstract level of a comparison of matter and consciousness (mind). Reality is not to be understood as a composition of material and ideal "factors". The "phrases of consciousness" are not opposed to an abstraction of "matter" (even if it is the material in its social manifestation), but an integral concept of human-social being as the "real life process". , more precisely than vital activity; here it forms the categorial constitutional form el, so to speak as a transcendental unity of apperception, which is an objective-practical apperception.

Practical materialism thus moves — instead of in the abstract confrontation of matter and spirit — in the double correlation of subject and objects as well as subject and subjects. As practical correlations, they are not primarily those of reflection, but those of interest (which includes receptive acts as a moment). Materiality exists on both sides of the correlation, and it consists in the inseparability of all behavioral characteristics of beings from their corporeality. (This means a return from a refined to a simple concept of materiality.) The confrontation with idealistic ways of looking at things is twofold: as far as the being of practical subjects is concerned, it is directed against the separation of the idea from interest; and as far as practical subject-object relationships are concerned, it is directed against the separation of subject activity from the conditions of realization on the object side. The confrontation with the materialism of the view of the external world amounts to the fact that it unilaterally asserts the priority of the object side and presents the subjective as a function of the objective by placing the material on the object side and from there lets it "spill over" to the subjects, while in practical materialism it is just as much a question of the subject's own materiality and the mode of autonomy that it entails.

Above all, however, we must now consider how the orientation of practical materialism proves itself in the field of philosophical analysis of human socialization and how it is able to achieve a theoretical integration of the practical interest in e ancipation.

In the practical-materialist theory of society, the focus is on what is determined by the respective material-productive and social-formative powers of individuals and social groups, generally a group- and class-specific m th level of their a ctiv ity and the on this basis produced by the people 272

hergestellten praktischen Verhältnisse, — die Subjekt-Objekt--Verhältnisse wie auch insbesondere die Subjekt-Subjekt-Verhältnisse - als Interessenverhältnisse im Koordinatensystem der jeweils historisch-praktisch ermöglichten Bedürfnisentfaltung und Bedürfnisbefriedigung zu betrachten. Die synthetische Einheit dieser Verhaltensdimensionen möchte ich kurz die Praxisform nennen, die für jede Gesellschaft eine spezifische ist. Daß die Betrachtung eine materialistische ist, impliziert nicht nur die aus dem Materiellen kommenden Determinationen — die Materialität des menschlichen Leibes, sein Angewiesensein auf materielle Lebensbedingungen und die materiell-gegenständlichen Vermittlungen der daraus erwachsenden Produktionstätigkeit angemessen zu würdigen; es bedeutet auch, empirisch von den wirklichen Menschen und ihren wirklichen Verhaltensdispositionen auszugehen. Den wirklichen Lebensprozeß der Menschen materialistisch begreifen heißt, die Handlungen der Menschen aus ihren Entstehungsbedingungen, ihren wirklichen Motivationen und Umständen begreifen, nicht sub specie irgendwelcher Sollensnormen. (Darin liegt, wie noch weiter zu besprechen sein wird, eine wichtige Abgrenzung, die gegen den sozialtheoretischen Normativismus.) Bei der näheren Bestimung dessen, was hier summarisch die »Praxisform« einer Gesellschaft heißt, wird es vor allem darum gehen, die Produktionsverhältnisse als etwas zu begreifen, was sich nicht einfach irgendwie aus den materiellen Produktivkräften »notwendig ergibt«, wie es in der Diktion der Weltanschauungs-Materialisten vorzugsweise lautet, sondern vielmehr als etwas, was die Menschen in einem eigenen Aktivitätseinsatz herstellen, also auch im Zeichen spezifischer Interessen. Das »Eingehen« von Produktionsverhältnissen bestimmt sich nicht more geometrico aus den materiellen Produktionsmitteln (wenngleich es bei Marx gelegentlich so herauskommen mag), sondern more practico aus den materiellen Produktivkräften der Individuen, worin die Produktionsmittel nur ein Moment sind, zusammen mit den produktiven Fähigkeiten der Individuen selbst. Die materiellen Produktivkräfte sind zugleich soziale Formativkräfte, die sich beim Herstellen sozialer Verhältnisse (beginnend mit den Produktionsverhältnissen) betätigen, indem die Individuen (natürlich stets in Gruppen- bzw. Klassenformationen) nach Maßgabe dieser wirklichen Kräfte ihr Verhältnis zu anderen als ein Verhältnis der Kooperation, der Konkurrenz, der Subordination (in jeweils bestimmten Komplexionen und Maßverhältnissen) etablieren, und bei einer Verschiebung dieser Kräftebilanz neu definieren. Das ist das Feld der eigentlichen praktischen Fragen, deren Dimension die Subjekt-Subjekt-Beziehungen als Interessen- und Machtbeziehungen sind, in welche die Subjekt-Objekt-Beziehungen, insbesondere die technischen, als Moment eingehen.

Die Praxisform, als die bestimmte Koordination unterschiedlich qualifizierter, autonomer und heteronomer, einander über- und untergeordneter Tätigkeiten, schließt in sich immer eine bestimmte emanzipatorische Bilanz, eben ein Maßverhältnis der gesell- to be regarded as relationships of interests in the coordinate system of the development of needs and satisfaction of needs that are historically and practically possible. The synthetic unity of these behavioral dimensions I would like to briefly call the form of practice, which is specific to each society. The fact that the consideration is a materialistic one implies not only the determinations coming from the material — the materiality of the human body, its dependence on material living conditions and the material-objective mediation of the resulting to adequately appreciate growing production activity; it also means starting empirically from real people and their real behavioral dispositions.

Understanding the real life process of people materialistically means understanding people's actions from the conditions in which they came about, their real motivations and circumstances, not sub specie of any norms that should be expected. (As will be discussed later, this is an important distinction, the one against social-theoretical normativism.) In determining more precisely what is summed up here as the "practice form" of a society, the main concern will be to comprehend the conditions of production as something that does not simply "necessarily result" from the material productive forces, as the worldview materialists prefer to say, but rather as something that Create people in their own activity, i.e. also in the context of specific interests. The »entering« of production conditions is not determined more geometrico from the material means of production (although it may occasionally come out that way with Marx), but more practico from the material productive forces of the individuals, in which the means of production only are a moment, together with the productive abilities of the individuals themselves. The material productive forces are at the same time social formative forces, which are active in the creation of social relations (starting with the production relations), in that the individuals (of course always in groups - or.

Class formations) establish their relationship to others as one of cooperation, competition, subordination (in particular complexions and proportions) in accordance with these real powers, and in the event of a shift redefine this balance of power. This is the field of the actual practical questions, the dimension of which are the subject-subject relations as interest and power relations, into which the subject-object relations, especially the technical ones, enter as a moment.

The form of practice, as the specific coordination of differently qualified, autonomous and heteronomous, mutually superior and subordinate activities, always includes a specific emancipatory schaftlichen Distribution autonomer und heteronomer Tätigkeiten. Damit dürften diese Vorerörterungen über den Sinn des historisch-praktischen Materialismus an den Punkt geführt sein, an dem ich zu dem anderen Aspekt der eingangs gestellten Doppelfrage übergehen kann: wie die Motivik der Emanzipation theoretisch zu artikulieren ist, damit sie den Einsichten materialistischer Gesellschaftsbetrachtung gemäß wird. Ich gehe darauf wieder in einer aktuell-polemischen Zuspitzung ein.

Zweitens: Das Motiv der Emanzipation — Plädoyer gegen den ideologischen Normativismus und für ein materialistisches Verständnis von Zielprojektionen

Wie schon gesagt, scheint mir die emanzipatorische Tendenz, die der proletarisch-sozialistischen Bewegung fraglos innewohnt, in der marxistischen Theorie weder bei den Begründern noch bei den Epigonen voll integriert zu sein. Verschiedene historisch-praktische Gründe mögen dafür bestimmend gewesen sein, wenn Marx und Engels alsbald davon abließen, den emanzipatorischen Sinngehalt der anstehenden Weltveränderung zu entfalten und wissenschaftstheoretisch zu reflektieren, und wenn in einer späteren Schul-Version historisch-materialistischer Theorie diese Gehalte geradezu der Verdrängung anheimfielen. Ich will zuerst nur davon sprechen, wie sich diese Problematik heute im Aussagenbestand der Theorie darstellt.

Zwei Tendenzen zeichnen sich — von Nebenlinien abgesehen — vor allem ab:

Auf der einen Seite, wo man die allgemeine Gesellschaftstheorie entschieden als historischen Materialismus anlegt; stehen die Desiderate und Kriterien der »menschlichen Emanzipation« nach wie vor nicht im Vordergrund des theoretischen Interesses. Sie scheinen vielmehr ganz und gar in das System der Vermittlungen investiert zu sein, wo es jeweils um konkret-praktische, meist ausgeprochen technisch-praktische, »nächste Aufgaben« zu tun ist. Diese Aufgaben haben innerhalb der Theorie einen ausgeprägt normativen Status, und sie konkretisieren sich zu einem System der objektiven Erfordernisse und der praktisch verbindlichen »Principien«, das sich auf der Ebene der Handelnden als ein System von Pflichten aktualisiert; sogar von moralischen Geboten. Nur sind die Normen eben nicht direkt an einer Inhaltsbestimmung menschlicher Emanzipation festgemacht. Und eine Kontrolle des Verwirklichungsprozesses sub specie der obersten Normen scheint auch gar nicht sonderlich dringend zu sein vielmehr herrscht die Überzeugung, daß alles seinen gesicherten Gang geht und man sich nur um die Durchführungsmodalitäten zu kümmern hat. Es gilt da sozusagen ein Axiom von der faktischen Kraft des Norma-

Und nun zu jener anderen Seite, auf der eine kritische Revision der praktischen Bilanz wie auch der theoretischen Rechenschaft über den Aufbau des Sozialismus aufgemacht worden ist. Die Bilanz wurde als ganz und gar nicht so positiv befunden, und die unerfüllt gebliebenen Forderungen menschlicher Emanzipation

With this, these preliminary discussions about the meaning of historical-practical materialism should have led to the point at which I can move on to the other aspect of the double question posed at the beginning: how the motif of e ancipation is to be articulated theoretically, dam if it is made in accordance with the insights of a materialistic view of society. I will go into this again in a topical polemical escalation. —

Second: The motive of emancipation - a plea against ideological normativism and for a materialistic understanding of goal projections

As already said, it seems to me that the emancipatory tendency, which is undoubtedly inherent in the proletarian-socialist movement, is not fully integrated in Marxist theory either in the founders or in the epigones. Various historical-practical reasons may have been decisive when Marx and Engels soon gave up developing the emancipatory meaning of the forthcoming world change and to reflect on it in a scientific-theoretical way, and when in a later school version historically- m aterialistic theory, these contents almost fell prey to repression. First of all, I just want to talk about how this problem presents itself today in the body of theoretical statements.

Two tendencies stand out - apart from secondary lines

— especially from:

On the one hand, where one applies the general theory of society decidedly as historical materialism; the desiderata and criteria of »human emancipation« are still not in the foreground of theoretical interest. Rather, they seem to be fully invested in the system of mediation, where concrete, practical, mostly downright technical-practical "next tasks" are to be dealt with.

Within the theory, these tasks have a pronounced normative status, and they concretize into a system of objective requirements and practically binding ones

"Principles" actualized at the level of actors as a system of duties; even of moral imperatives.

But the norms are not directly tied to a definition of the content of human emancipation. And a control of the implementation process sub specie of the highest norms does not seem to be particularly urgent, rather the conviction prevails that everything is going its own way and that one only has to worry about the implementation modalities. There is, so to speak, an axiom of the factual power of the

normative.

And now to that other side, on which a critical revision of the practical balance as well as the theoretical account of the construction of socialism has been prepared. The balance was not found to be all that positive, and the unfulfilled demands of human emancipation 274

erlangten eine drängende Aktualität, und zwar in verschiedenartigen Ausdrucksweisen: als der eigentliche Sinn der Marxschen Lehre, als unverzichtbarer Charakter des Sozialismus, und letztlich fundamental-anthropologisch als das wahre Wesen des Menschen als des Wesens der frei-schöpferischen Praxis, der dialogischen Kommunikation u. a. m. Wie schon bemerkt, kümmert man sich im Zuge dieser humanistischen Erneuerungsbewegung nicht mehr sonderlich viel um den theoretischen Kanon des historischen Materialismus. Die »wirkliche Bewegung«, so scheint es, gibt kein Maß an die Hand, der Kommunismus wird wieder zum Ideal, nach dem die Wirklichkeit sich richten soll.

Im Blickwinkel meiner augenblicklichen Überlegung, die sich auf historisch-materialische Theorie und speziell auf eine historischmaterialistische Einordnung programmatischer (emanzipatorischer) Zielstrebigkeit richtet, erscheinen nun beide Positionen — doktrinär gesprochen — als eine normativistische Verfehlung der materialistischen Linie. Und zwar haben wir es das eine Mal mit einem apologetischen, das andere Mal mit einem protestierenden, Normativismus zu tun, und meine Absicht ist es, hier wenigstens die Umrisse einer materialistischen Berichtigung aufzuzeigen.

Als normativistisch bezeichne ich hier solche Vorstellungsformen (oder Ausdrucksweisen), in denen die Zielrichtung und Maßbestimmung geschichtlicher Aktivitäten in den Termini von Prinzipien, Idealen, von programmatischen Ideen dargestellt sind—seien diese nun mehr als Inhaltsbestimmungen irgendwelcher Doktrinen gefaßt (Humanismus, Marxismus, Moral, Wissenschaft, Demokratieverständnis u. dgl.) oder als Wesensbestimmungen sozialer Systeme (etwa als Implikate dessen, was »Sozialismus« eigentlich ist). — ohne daß man sich dabei Rechenschaft gibt von den real-praktischen, sozialen Substraten derartiger normativer Gehalte, d. h. von den wirklichen Menschen, in deren wirklichen (und nicht normativ vorgeschriebenen) Handlungsdispositionen der jeweilige Normgehalt seine praktische Realität hat; ohne zu prüfen, ob und wo er eine solche Realität hat.

Der Normativismus ist eine überaus weit verbreitete Denkform. Sein »unmaterialistischer« Charakter besteht darin, daß er die »Idee« wom »Interesse« separiert, daß er geschichtliche Prozesse auf irgendwelche hypostasierte »objektive Erfordernisse« hingeordnet denkt, daß er als gültig angesetzte Doktrinen zum Maß praktischer Realisationen macht und im Falle der Nichtübereinstimmung dazu kommt, ganze Sozialformationen und Länder in ideologischen Termini etwa als »revisionistisch« zu klassifizieren, daß er soziale Gruppen, Organisationen und Individuen als Agenten von Programmen betrachtet, sei es im affirmativen oder im unerfüllt--fordernden Sinne. In diesen Rahmen fällt es auch, wenn die »Bewußtseinsbildung« als eine aparte Beschäftigung betrieben wird, wenn die Einheit von Theorie und Praxis zur Norm erhoben wird — als seien sie nicht ipso facto immer eine Einheit (fragt sich nur: welche Theorie mit welcher Praxis...)... Und manches mehr, so auch das »Kritik- Modell der »Frankfurter Schule« in der Formulierung von Adorno.

reached an urgent topicality, namely in different ways of expression: as the actual meaning of the Marxian teachings, as an indispensable character of socialism, and finally fundamentally anthropological as

the true essence of the human being as the essence of free-creative practice, of dialogic communication, e.g. m. As already noted, in the course of this humanistic renewal movement, one no longer cares much about the theoretical canon of historical materialism. The "real movement," it seems, does not provide a standard, communism is once again becoming the ideal to which reality is supposed to conform.

From the point of view of a momentary reflection, which is aimed at historical-material theory and especially at a historical-materialistic classification of programmatic (emancipatory) determination, both positions now appear -

Doctrinally speaking - as a normativist failure of the materialist line. And it is true that we are dealing in one case with an apologetic, the other with a protestant, norm ativism, and my intention here is to show at least the outlines of a materialistic correction.

I call normativistic here such forms of representation (or modes of expression) in which the direction and metric determination of historical activities are represented in terms of principles, ideals, of programmatic ideas -

whether these are understood more as content determinations of some doctrines (humanism, marxism, morality, science, understanding of democracy, etc.) or as essential determinations of social systems (e.g. as implications of what "socialism «

actually is). — without dtafi m in itself gives an account of the real-practical, social substrates of such normative contents, i.e. H. of real people, in whose actual (and not normatively prescribed) dispositions to act the respective norm content has its practical reality; without checking whether and where he has such a reality.

N orm ativism is a very widespread way of thinking.

His "unmaterialistic" character consists in the fact that he

"Idea" is separated from "interest" by the fact that he thinks historical processes in terms of some hypostatized "objective requirements";

of practical realizations, and in the event of disagreement, it comes to classifying entire social formations and countries as "revisionist" in ideological terms, such as considering social groups, organizations, and individuals as agents of Programs are considered, be it in the affirmative or in the unfulfilled—demanding sense. It also falls within this framework when "awareness-raising" is pursued as a separate

occupation, when the unity of theory and practice is raised to the norm - as if they were not ipso facto always one unit (one wonders only: which theory with which practice . . .) . . . And much more, including the »critic models of the »F rankfurt School« as formulated by Adorno.

275

Ohne jetzt im einzelnen dokumentieren zu können, wie sich die normativistische Betrachtungsweise in beiderlei Gestalt, in der »katholischen« und in der »protestantischen«, bei der theoretischen Rechenschaft vom gewordenen, vom werdenden und vom schwierigen und deformierten Sozialismus äußert, möchte ich abschließend thesenartig versuchen, einige Korrekturen anzuzeigen, die auszuführen mir als eine vorrangige Arbeitsrichtung historischmaterialistischer Theorie erscheint.

Als erstes muß - leider - noch immer eine sehr trivialle Anforderung als hoch aktuell ansehen: daß die materialistische Analyse als eine Veranstaltung wissenschaftlicher Empirie in nüchterner Weise über profane Dinge zu reden hat. Weder die feierliche Selbstaffirmation des vermeintlich schon Gelungenen noch die leidenschaftliche Denunzation von Mißratenem stellen eine From der Anteil- und Parteinahme dar, die sich historisch-materialistisch legitimieren ließe. Auf der einen Seite, wo ein apologetischer Normativismus die Theoriebildung durchsetzt, käme es auf die Einsicht an, daß der »Aufbau des Sozialismus«, weit davon entfernt, gänzlich am Leitfaden des marxistischen Programms voranzuschreiten, auf allen Stufen der Aktion (und auf der obersten Stufe, bei den Dirigenten dieses historischen Unternehmens nicht minder!) mit recht profanen Interessen kombiniert oder auch von ihnen durchkreuzt ist. Die konkrete Analyse dieser gesellschaftlichen Praxisform - eine Analyse, die bis jetzt noch lange nicht auf der theoretischen Höhe des Marxschen »Kapital« angelangt ist, also noch nicht die Plattform einer Kritik der politischen Ökonomie des werdenden Sozialismus erreicht hat-, wird schon durch ihren empirischen Gehalt eminent kritisch gegenüber den normativistischen Mystifikationen wirken. Doch nun wieder zu der anderen Seite, von der aus die »protestantische« Kritik geübt wird, wo der Marxismus aus einer apologetischen Disziplinierungs Ideologie zu einer »kritisch-revolutionären« Denkbemühung zurückfinden möchte. Die Kritik, die nicht nur einen ideologischen Schleier wegziehen, sondern das so Bloßgelegte auch praktisch überwinden will, findet ihr Richtmaß in den überfüllt gebliebenen Desideraten emanzipierter Menschlichkeit. Hier jedoch wird die Frage sehr akut, wie es theoretisch-adaquat möglich ist, beim Herangehen an diesen geschichtlichen Prozeß mit Richtmaßen menschlicher Emanzipation zu operieren, und in welcher Weise gegebenenfalls emanzipationswidrige Effekte zu kritisieren sind. Ich meine: jedenfalls nicht im Geiste eines essential-anthropologischen Normavitismus oder durch die Aktualisierung verdrängter Gehalte Marxschen Denkens. Die Desiderate der Emanzipation sind vielmehr in den Termini wirklicher Interessen (und Interessendivergenzen) identifizierbarer Subjekte der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit auszusprechen, nicht in der Art einer Konfrontation von Idee und Wirklichkeit. Die Idee kann praktisch werden nur in der organisierten Kommunikation zwischen ihren Wortführern, Intellektuellen mit einem unbefriedigten Interesse an höherer Emanzipation, und anderen, die aus verwandten Motiven zu einer kritischverändernden Aktivität bereit sind.

"Catholic" and in the "Protestant" in the theoretical account of what has become, what is becoming, and what is difficult and deformed socialism, I would like to conclude with a theses-like attempt to point out some corrections that I make as a priority A Working direction of historical-materialistic theory appears.

First of all, unfortunately, he still has to regard a very trivial requirement as highly topical: that materialistic analysis, as an event of scientific empiricism, has to talk about profane things in a me-ter way. Neither the solemn self-affirmation of what is supposedly already successful nor the passionate denunciation of mifirats represent a form of sympathy and partisanship that can be historically and materialistically legitimized. On the one hand, where an apologetic normativism prevails in the formation of theories, what matters is the insight that the "construction of socialism" is far from advancing entirely along the lines of the Marxist program at all levels of the action (and at the highest level, no less among the conductors of this historic enterprise!) is combined with quite profane interests or even thwarted by them. The concrete analysis of this form of social practice —an analysis that has by no means reached the theoretical level of Marx's Capital, i.e. has not yet reached the platform of a critique of the political economy of emerging socialism—w Due to its empiric content alone, it is eminently critical of normative mystifications. But now back to the other side from which the "Protestant" criticism is practiced, where Marxism might find its way back from an apologetic disciplining ideology to a "critical-revolutionary" thought process. Criticism, which not only wants to remove an ideological veil, but also wants to practically overcome what has been exposed in this way, finds its standard in the desiderates of em ancipated humanity that have remained overflowing. Here, however, the question becomes very acute as to how it is theoretically and adequately possible to operate with standards of human emancipation when approaching this historical process, and in what way any anti-emancipation effects can be criticized. I mean: at least not in the spirit of an essentialanthropological norma-vitism or through the actualization of repressed contents of Marxian thinking. Rather, the desiderata of e ancipation are to be expressed in terms of real interests (and divergences of interests) of identifiable subjects of social reality, not in the manner of a confrontation of idea and reality. The idea can only become practical in organized communication between its spokesmen, intellectuals with an unsatisfied interest in higher emancipation, and others who, for related motives, are ready for critically transformative activity.

Ganz zum Schluß noch eine Bemerkung, die alles das in eine selbstkritische Klammer setzt, was ich hier programmatisch und normativ über eine Perspektive historisch-materialistischer Theorie-Entwicklung gesagt habe. Eigentlich müßte ich in der Konsequenz meiner eigenen Kritik am Normativismus meine Anforderungen und Empfehlungen ebenso wie meine Kritik anders formulieren, nicht orientiert am Maß irgendwelcher verbindlichen Charaktere einer Theorie, sondern in praktischen Termini als Ausdruck eines Interesses, welches der Theorie-Form nur als einem Moment einer Praxisform gilt. Die Wirklichkeit der Theorie besteht zu allererst in der praktisch-gesellschaftlichen Position des Theoretikers, also auch in seinen praktisch-kommunikativen Beziehungen innerhalb des sozialen Feldes, dem er angehört. Sowohl die Theorien, die hier Gegenstand kritischer Bedenken sind, als auch die Theorie-Desiderate, die ich für eine angemessene Korrektur halte, sind ideelle Korrelate praktischer Positionen, und zu einer materialistischen Theorie gehört auch dies, daß sie ihre eigene praktische Subjekt-Basis mitreflektiert, das eigene Interesse des Theoretikers an einer bestimmten Form der praktisch-sozialen Kommunikation. Ordnet man in dieser Weise die Theorie in ihren praktischen Zusammenhang ein, so wird sich ferner auch zeigen, daß die Theorie als solche gar nicht so unmittelbar emanzipatorisch sein kann. Zutreffender dürfte es sein, von Theorie in emanzipatorischer Absicht zu sprechen. Wie paradox es auch klingen mag — ich finde doch, daß eine so interessierte Theorie ihrem Sinn nicht dadurch gemäß wird, daß sie die Desiderate höherer Emanzipation als Normen proklamiert oder zu utopischen Leitbildern ausformt, und dasjenige denunziert, was ihnen zuwiderläuft; daß sie analytisch nicht denunziatorisch vorgeht; dadurch, daß sie als praktisch-materialistische Analyse von Praxisformen und emanzipatorischen Bilanzen klarstellen hilft, woran man praktisch ist.

a consequence of my own criticism of normativism, I would have to formulate my requirements and recommendations as well as my criticism differently, not based on the measure of any binding characteristics of a theory, but in practical terms as an expression of an interest, which of the theory form is only valid as a moment of a practice form. The reality of the theory consists first and foremost in the practical-social position of the theorist, i.e. also in his practicalcommunicative relationships within the social field to which he belongs. Both the theories that are the subject of critical concern here and the theoretical desiderata that I consider an appropriate correction are ideal correlates of practical positions, and it is also part of a materialistic theory that it is its own practical subject basis also reflects the theoretician's own interest in a certain form of practicalsocial communication. If one arranges the theory in its practical context in this way, it will also be shown that the theory as such cannot be so immediately emancipatory. It might be more appropriate to speak of theory with an emancipatory intention. No matter how paradoxical it may sound - I still find that such an interested theory does not make sense of it by proclaiming the desiderata of higher e ancipation as norms or shaping them into utopian models, and that denounce what goes against them; that it proceeds analytically and not in a denunciatory manner; in that, as a practical-materialistic analysis of forms of practice and emancipatory balance sheets, it helps to clarify where one is practical.

SOCIOLOGIE DE L'APPARITION, DE L'EXISTENCE ET DE LA FONCTION DE L'ECONOMIE MARCHANDE

Živojin D. Denić

Priština

La propriété et la distribution sociale du travail, dans l'unité de leur moment naturel et social, constituent une partie essentielle de la structure intérieure de la communauté des hommes et des rapports qu'ils entretiennent entre eux. L'on n'ignore pas que c'est le caractere des moyens de production et les rapports de propriété y attenant qui définissent, en fin de compte, toute l'organisation sociale de la vie humaine, et, dans le cadre de cette dernière, la forme que prend l'exécution du travail et sa distribution sociale. Car, avant qu'il y ait un rapport de l'homme au travail et à ses produits, il faut qu'il y ait un rapport de l'homme aux conditions matérielles du travail et de la production, le premier représentant la vérification conséquente du second. Il s'ensuit que c'est des formes historiques de la propriété que dépend la manière de réaliser la distribution sociale du travail et tous les autres rapports qui s'inscrivent dans l'ensemble du processus de production et de reproduction sociales de la vie humaine. Jusqu'à présent, l'histoire de la société humaine a connu deux formes d'association: l'association directe et l'association indirecte.

Les formes d'union directs entre les hommes et de réalisation des associations correspondantes ont existé: 1) dans les rapports de propriété sociale et collective, et 2), dans les rapports de propriété privée, propriété privée qui s'accompagne d'un système de dépendance et de subordination de l'individu. Le premier exemple de propriété sociale et collective est la communauté primitive, parentale et communiste, dans laquelle les hommes, grâce aux rapports de parenté et à la propriété sociale,¹ sont directement associés pour la production et la reproduction de la vie, dans le cadre de laquelle le mécanisme de l'organisation sociale révèle une distribution du travail obéissant à un plan, les travaux des

¹ Karl Marx: Les époques de formation économique de la société, Belgrade, Kultura, 1960, p. 41, 42

Zivojin D. Denić

PriStina

The ownership and social distribution of labor, in the unity of their natural and social moment, constitute an essential part of the interior structure of the community of men and of the relations which they maintain among themselves. We are not unaware that it is the character of the means of production and the property relations surrounding them which ultimately define the whole social organization of human life, and, in the framework of the latter, the form taken by the execution of labor and its social distribution. For, before there is a relationship between man and work and its products, there must be a relationship between man and the material conditions of work and production, the first representative the consequent verification of the second. It follows that it is on the historical forms of property that depends the way of realizing the social distribution of labor and all the other relations which are part of the whole process of social production and reproduction of society. human life. Until now, the history of human society has known two forms of association: direct association and indirect association.

The forms of direct union between men and of realization of the corresponding associations have existed: 1) in the relations of social and collective property, and 2), in the relations of private property, private property which is accompanied by a system dependence and subordination of the individual. The first example

ple of social and collective property is the primitive, parental and communist community, in which men, thanks to kinship relations and social property,1 are directly associated for the production and reproduction of life, in the framework of which the mechanism of social organization reveals a distribution of labor according to a plan, the works of 1 K arl M arx: The times of economic formation of society, Belgrade, K u ltu ra, 1960 , p. 41, 42

individus et leur produit étant directement sociaux.² Le second exemple est l'économie de la famille paysanne patriarchale, où »... la dépense des forces de travail de l'individu, qui se mesure en durée, se manifeste dès le début comme une organisation sociale des travaux eux-mêmes, puisque les forces de travail individuelles, dès le début, n'agissent qu'en tant qu'organes des forces de travail familiales collectives «.3 Le troisième exemple est la société socialiste et communiste moderne, autrement dit la future »association d'hommes libres qui utilisent des moyens de production sociaux et dépensent consciemment leurs nombreuses forces de travail individuelles comme une seule force de travail sociale«.4 La liaison immédiate, c'est-à-dire l'association immédiate, se réalise également dans les conditions de la propriété privée complétée par le système de domination et de sujétion directes qui caractérise la structure sociale de l'esclavage et de la féodalité. Là également, les travaux des individus, esclaves ou féaux, ont sous leur forme naturelle un caractère directement social, et l'on peut dire que »les rapports sociaux des personnes, dans leurs travaux se manifestent toujours comme des rapports de personnes et ne sont pas maquillés en rapports sociaux de choses, de produit du travail«.5

Là où cessent, et dans la mesure où disparaissent, les rapports de propriété sociale et privée et le système de dépendance personnelle, en même temps qu'apparaît un rapport de propriété privée libéré de la domination et de la sujétion directes, on voit nécessairement apparaître la liaison indirecte - liaison de propriétaires et de producteurs maintenant indépendants. Ce sont, en fait, l'échange des produits, et la forme marchande qui, comme centre du système de processus social de reproduction de la vie, médiatisent — c'est-à-dire lient, assumant avant tout le rôle de moyen de »circulation«.6 Marx écrit que la catégorie d'économie d'argent (ou, ce qui revient au même, d'économie de marchandises), ... »ne met pas l'accent sur l'économie, c'est-à-dire sur le processus de production, en tant que trait spécifique, mais en tant que manière de circulation «.7 Et la base de cette manière de circulation est à chercher dans le caractère de la manière de production, et non inversement,8 même si l'influence existe aussi dans l'autre sens.

ESSENCE SOCIALE DE LA MARCHANDISE

Dans les premières pages de son analyse extensive de la marchandise, Marx constate qu'elle est »d'abord un objet extrinsèque,

² K. Marx: Capital I, Kultura, Belgrade 1947, p. 41-42, 386-387

³ Ibid. p. 42

⁴ K. Marx, Capital I, p. 42—43 ⁵ K. Marx, Capital I, p. 41

⁶ K. Marx, Introduction à la critique de l'économie politique, Supplément à la critique de l'économie politique, édition Kultura, Belgrade 1956, p. 179, 190

⁷ K. Marx, Capital II, p. 79

⁸ K. Marx, Capital II, p. 80

» .. . the expenditure of the labor forces of the individual, which is measured in duration, manifests itself from the start as a social organization of the works themselves, since the individual labor forces, from the start, do not act than as organs of collective family labor forces.3 The third example is modern socialist and communist society, in other words

"association of free men who use social means of production and consciously expend their many individual labor powers as one social labor power".4

Immediate binding, that is to say, immediate association, is also realized under the conditions of private property supplemented by the system of direct domination and subjection which characterizes the social structure of slavery and feudalism. Here too, the labors of individuals, slaves or servants, have in their natural form a directly social character, and it can be said that "the social relations of persons, in their labors, always manifest themselves as relations between persons and are not disguised as social relations of things, of the product of labor.5

Where social and private property relations and the system of personal dependence cease, and to the extent that they disappear, at the same time as a private property relation appears freed from direct domination and subjection, we necessarily sees the appearance of the indirect link—linking of owners and producers who are now independent. It is, in fact, the exchange of products, and the commodity form which, as the center of the system of social process of reproduction of life, mediates - that is to say, takes over, assuming above all the role of means of "circulation". . . "emphasizes not the economy, i.e. the process of production, as a specific trait, but as a way of circulation". 7 And the basis of this manner of circulation is to be sought in the character of the manner of production, and not vice versa, 8 even if the influence also exists in the other direction.

SOCIAL ESSENCE OF COMMODITY

In the first pages of his extensive analysis of the commodity, M arx observes that it is "first of all an extrinsic object", 2 K. M arx: Capital I, K ultura, Belgrade 1947, p. 41—42, 386—387

8 Ibid. p. 42

4 K. M arx, Capital I, p. 42—43

5 K. M arx, Capital I, p. 41

8 K. Marx, Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy, Supplement to the Critique of Political Economy, Edition K ultura, Belgrade 1956, p. 179, 190

7 K. Marx, C apital II, p. 79

8 K. Marx, Capital II, p. 80

280

une chose dont les qualités propres répondent aux besoins de toutes sortes éprouvés par les hommes«, qu'il s'agisse »de produits alimentaires, c'est-à-dire d'objets de jouissance, ou de moyen de production, par un intermédiaire reconnu«.9 Mais, outre qu'elle est un bien d'usage, la marchandise est aussi une valeur. 10 Cela revient à dire que les objets d'usage »se manifestent comme marchandises, ou bien qu'ils ont une forme de marchandises, dans la seule mesure où ils ont la double forme naturelle et de valeur«.11 La forme naturelle de la marchandise étant simple et transparente, nous n'insisterons que sur sa forme de valeur.

Tout bien d'usage, pour devenir marchandise, doit être porteur d'une valeur d'échange qui n'est rien d'autre, selon Marx, qu'»une expression nécessaire, ou la forme par laquelle se manifeste la valeur marchande«,12 ce qui revient à dire que la valeur et le rapport de valeur se cachent dans la valeur d'échange et dans le rapport d'échange de la marchandise. 13 Pour ce qui est de la valeur, sa substance »est et reste la force de travail dépensée et rien d'autre«, c'est-à-dire le travail indépendamment de son caractère d'utilité. En réalité, le fait que la production de la marchandise réclame la dépense d'une force de travail apparaît comme la matérielle propriété de la marchandise à avoir une valeur.14 Les biens d'usage n'ont de valeur que parce qu'ils réalisent la matérialisation du travail abstrait, travail qui apparaît comme une dépense des forces de travail, et par là-même, comme un travail humain homogène autorisant l'égalisation et la valorisation — autrement dit l'échange — des différents biens d'usage. Etant donné que dans la société de producteurs de marchandises, la force de travail sociale tout entière, qui se manifeste dans la valeur tout entière du monde de la marchandise, a la valeur d'une seule et même force de travail humaine, encore qu'elle se compose d'un nombre incalculable de forces de travail individuelles, ces forces de travail individuelles peuvent être identiques à tout autre dans la seule mesure où elles ont le caractère de forces de travail socialement moyennes, autrement dit dans la mesure où elles agissent en tant que telles et ne dépensent, dans la production de chaque sorte de marchandises, qu'un temps de travail moyen et socialement nécessaire. 15 C'est pourquoi la valeur de la marchandise est » déterminée par la quantité de travail socialement nécessaire, ou temps de travail socialement nécessaire à sa fábrication«.16

Cette médiation, ou cet échange, dans le cadre de quoi le travail se manifeste dans la valeur du produit, et la mesure du travail par sa durée en tant que mesure de valeur, est le produit d'une situation sociale particulière et spécifique. Pour Marx, c'est

⁹ K. Marx, Capital I, p. 3

<sup>K. Marx, Capital I, p. 26
K. Marx, Capital I, p. 14
K. Marx, Capital I, p. 6</sup>

¹³ K. Marx, Capital I, p. 14, 15

K. Marx, Capital II, p. 313
 K. Marx, Capital I, p. 7
 K. Marx, Capital I, p. 7

te".9 But, in addition to being a use good, the commodity is also a value.10 This amounts to saying that the use objects "manifest themselves as commodities, or that they have a form of commodities, only insofar as they have the double natural form and value.

The natural form of the commodity being simple and transparent, we will insist only on its form of value.

Any use good, in order to become a commodity, must bear an exchange value which is nothing other, according to Marx, than a necessary expression, or the form by which the m value manifests itself. commodity",12 which amounts to saying that value and the relation of value are hidden in the exchange value and in the exchange relation of the commodity.13 As regards value, its substance "is and remains labor power expended and nothing else", that is to say labor independently of its character of utility. In reality, the fact that the production of the commodity requires the expenditure of labor power appears as the material property of the commodity to have value.14 Use goods have value only because they realize the materialization of abstract labor, labor which appears as an expenditure of labor forces, and by that — various consumer goods. Given that in the society of commodity producers, the entire social labor power, which manifests itself in the entire value of the commodity world, has the value of one and the same human labor power, although it is composed of an incalculable number of individual labour-powers, these individual labor-powers can be identical to any other insofar as they have the character of socially average labour-powers, otherwise it insofar as they act as such and expend, in the production of each kind of commodity, only an average and socially necessary labor time.15 This is why the value of the commodity is "determined by the quantity of socially necessary labour, or time of socially necessary labour, in its manufacture".16

This mediation, or this exchange, in which labor manifests itself in the value of the product, and the measure of labor by its duration as a measure of value, is the product of a situation. particular and specific social. For Marx, it is 9 K. M arx, C apital I, p. 3

10 K. M arx, C apital I, p. 26

11 K. M arx, Capital I, p. 14

11 K. M arx, C apital I, p. 6

18 K. M arx, Capital I, p. 14, 15

14 K. M arx, C apital II, p. 313

15 K. M arx, Capital I, p. 7

18 K. M arx, C apital I, p. 7

281

un état où, premièrement, le travail social dans son ensemble se présente comme un complexe de travaux privés, qui s'accomplissent indépendamment les uns des autres, donc de travaux privés entendus comme membres du travail social tout entier, et où deuxièmement, et par voie de conséquence, les producteurs entrent en contact social par l'échange du produit de leur travail, ce qui fait que les marques distinctives sociales de leurs travaux privés ne se manifestent que dans le cadre de l'échange.17 Dans cette situation, marchandise et valeur deviennent une forme matérielle à travers laquelle les producteurs établissent des rapports réciproques entre leurs travaux privés, en faisant un même travail humain.18 Le caractère spécifiquement social des travaux privés réciproquement indépendants, c'est-à-dire formant un même travail humain, débouche sur le caractère de valeur du produit du travail,19 c'est-à-dire que »l'égalité du travail humain prend la forme concrète d'une égale objectivation de la valeur du produit du travail«.20 En réalisant leurs produits en tant valeurs, les hommes, en fait, identifient leurs différents travaux, les liant entreeux et les représentant comme des parties d'un tout social déterminé. Ce qui revient à dire que le degré de valeur de la marchandise exprime »le nécessaire rapport de la marchandise au temps de travail social«, »rapport qui relève du processus-même de sa création«.21 Donc, les valeurs des marchandises sont »des caractères matériels que reçoivent les déterminations sociales du travail, sur la base d'une certaine forme de production«,22 c'est-à-dire des caractères sociaux déterminés qui leur viennent des rapports sociaux. En bref, par l'intermédiaire de la forme marchande et du rapport de valeur du produit du travail, on voit-se réaliser le rapport social des producteurs à la totalité du travail,23 qui consiste à lier entre eux des travaux privés qualitativement différents, autonomes et indépendants, pour en faire un même tout homogène, un travail social, un processus, une forme sociale qui se suffit plus ou moins à elle-même et dont les différentes parties apparaissent comme les différentes fonctions. L'énigme de la marchandise, énigme de la forme indirecte de la réalisation de la distribution sociale du travail, vient de ce que les rapports sociaux des travaux privés ne se »présentent pas tels qu'ils sont«, ne se »présentent pas comme les rapports sociaux directs des personnes dans leur travail, mais au contraire comme des rapports réels entre les personnes et des rapports sociaux entre des choses«.24

On pourrait conclure que la valeur, c'est-à-dire le rapport de valeur des marchandises, quelle que soit la forme empruntée, par essence n'est pas une chose, mais un rapport social des hommes

A state where, first of all, social labor as a whole presents itself as a complex of private labours, which are accomplished independently of each other, therefore of private labours, understood as members of

¹⁷ K. Marx, Capital I, p. 37, 38

K. Marx, Capital I, p. 43
 K. Marx, Capital I, p. 39

²⁰ Ibid. p. 36, 37

²¹ Ibid. p. 62

²² Ibid. p. 53

²³ Ibid. p. 37

²⁴ Ibid. p. 37, 38

social labor as a whole, and where secondly, and as a consequence, producers come into social contact through the exchange of the product of their labor, so that the social distinctive marks of their private labors manifest themselves only within the framework of exchange.17 In this situation, commodity and value become a material form through which producers establish reciprocal relations between their private labors, doing the same human labor.18 The specifically social character of reciprocal private labors independent, i.e. forming the same human labor, leads to the character of value of the product of labor,19 that is to say that "the equality of human labor takes the concrete form of an equal objectification of the value of the product of labor. social determined. Which amounts to saving that the degree of value of the commodity expresses "the necessary relation of the commodity to the time of social labor", "a relation which depends on the very process of its creation". Commodities are "material characteristics which the social determinations of labor receive, on the basis of a certain form of production", 22 that is to say, determinate social characteristics which come to them from social relations. In short, through the intermediary of the commodity form and the relation of value of the product of labor, we see the realization of the social relation of producers to the totality of labor,23 which consists in linking together private labor qualitatively. different, autonomous and independent, to make of it a single homogeneous whole, a social work, a process, a social form which is more or less self-sufficient and whose different parts appear as different functions. The enigma of the commodity, the enigma of the indirect form of the realization of the social distribution of labor, comes from the fact that the social relations of private labor do not "present themselves as they are", do not "present themselves not as the direct social relationships of people in their work, but on the contrary as real relationships between people and social relationships between things".2*

One could conclude that value, that is to say the relation of value of commodities, whatever the form taken, in essence is not a thing, but a social relation of men 17 K. Marx, Capital I, p. 37, 38

18 K. Marx, Capital I, p. 43

19 K. Marx, Capital I, p. 39

40 Ibid. p. 36, 37

41 Ibid. p. 62

"Ibid. p. 53

23 Ibid. p. 37

24 Ibid. p. 37, 38

par le travail, qui, d'une forme »prosaîquement« naturelle, fait une marchandise — une forme sociale de produit du travail. Il est évident que la forme marchande réalise l'unité du rapport naturel et du rapport social, unité qui se manifeste comme unité de la valeur d'usage et de la valeur. Cette unité, comme tout ce qui est donné dans une forme sociale quelle qu'elle soit, c'est l'unité réalisée entre certaines différences, et par conséquent, un rapport entre deux parties opposées dont chacune se pose différemment face à sa moitié. En ce qui la concerne, la valeur d'usage, dans sa grossière réalisation, se manifeste comme »une base matérielle sur laquelle se présente un rapport économique déterminé — la valeur d'échange «25 La valeur, de son côté, dont l'essence est le rapport entre les hommes par le travail (rapport social), est la condition qui rend possible la réalisation de la valeur d'usage. Car »pouvoir se réaliser comme valeur d'usage, les marchandises doivent au préalable se réaliser comme valeurs«, et inversement, »doivent se confirmer comme valeurs d'usage avant de pouvoir se réaliser comme valeurs «.26

LA FORME MARCHANDE ET SON DEVELOPPEMENT

L'essence sociale de la marchandise veut que cette dernière, en tant que forme, ne peut être réalisée autrement que dans le rapport social d'une marchandise à une autre, c'est-à-dire que sa forme phénoménale doit nécessairement être sociale, de même que son essence, dont elle est inséparable.

De l'analyse de Marx ,il ressort que l'essence de la marchandise trouve sa source: premièrement, directement dans le processus du travail lui-même, c'est-à-dire de la production, et deuxièmement, indirectement dans le rapport d'échange, c'est-à-dire, plus exactement, dans l'unité de la production et de l'échange. Cependant, en ce qui concerne la marchandise en tant que forme phénoménale, elle n'est tout à fait présente que dans l'échange, ce qui signifie qu'en dehors de l'echange, les produits du travail sont ou seulement des biens d'usage, ou des valeurs d'usage, ou marchandises possibles. Pour Marx, la marchandise devient vraiment marchandise, est marchandise, au moment seulement où »sa valeur se présente sous une forme différente de sa forme naturelle«, donc, »dès qu'est atteinte la forme de valeur d'échange«. Et »cette forme, elle ne l'atteint jamais quand elle s'estime isolée, mais toujours dans un rapport de valeur ou d'échange contre une marchandise d'une autre espèce«.27

Dans ce rapport, l'une se trouve toujours sous la forme relative de la valeur, et l'autre dans la fonction, c'est-à-dire sous forme d'équivalent. Ce sont deux formes différentes, »les moitiés d'une même expression de la valeur«, des »moments qui vont l'un avec

²⁵ K. Marx, supplément à la critique de l'économie politique, Kultura

^{1956,} p. 16

** K. Marx, Capital I, p. 48

** K. Marx, Capital I, p. 26

social relationship, a unity which manifests itself as the unity of use-value and value. This unity, like everything that is given in a social form whatever it may be, is the unity achieved between certain differences, and consequently, a relationship between two opposed parts, each of which poses itself differently in the face of its half. As far as it is concerned, use-value, in its gross realization, manifests itself as "a material basis on which a determinate economic relation is presented—exchange value."25 Value, for its part, whose essence is the relationship between men through work (social relationship), is the condition that makes possible the realization of use-value. Because

»be able to be realized as use value, commodities must first be realized as values«, and conversely,

»must be confirmed as use values before they can be realized as values«.20

THE MARKET FORM AND ITS DEVELOPMENT

The social essence of the commodity requires that the latter, as a form, cannot be realized otherwise than in the social relation of one commodity to another, that is to say that its form phenomenon must necessarily be social, as well as its essence, from which it is inseparable.

From M arx 's analysis, it emerges that the essence of the commodity finds its source: first, directly in the process of labor itself, that is to say, of production. , and secondly, indirectly in the relation of exchange, that is to say, more exactly, in the unity of production and exchange. However, with regard to the commodity as a phenomenal form, it is fully present only in exchange, which means that apart from exchange, the products of labor are or only in t use-goods, or use-values, or possible commodities. For M arx, the commodity truly becomes a commodity, is a commodity, only at the moment when "its value is presented in a form different from its natural form", therefore, "as soon as the form of exchange value. And "it never attains this form when it considers itself isolated, but always in a relationship of value or exchange against a commodity of another species".27

In this relation, one is always found in the relative form of value, and the other in function, that is, in the form of equivalent. They are two different forms, »the halves of the same expression of value«, »moments which go one with 15 K. M arx, supplem ent to the critique of political economy, K ultura 1956, p . 16

*• K. M arx, C apital I, p. 48

" K. M arx, C apital I, p. 26

l'autre, et qui sont inséparables, mais en même temps des extrêmes opposés qui s'excluent réciproquement«.²⁸ La différence entre eux est en ceci que dans sa forme de valeur relative, la marchandise revêt une forme sociale indirecte, et que dans sa forme d'équivalent, elle revêt une forme sociale directe.

Il s'ensuit que la notion-même de forme marchande et d'économie marchande appartient en général au processus d'échange, où elle apparaît et existe, tandis que les conditions et les causes qui produisent le processus d'échange et la forme marchande, c'est-à--dire la valeur et le rapport de valeur comme dernière conséquence — se trouvent dans les rapports correspondants d'une production historiquement déterminée. C'est dans l'échange que la valeur des biens d'usage par exemple le drap exprimé sous la forme d'un autre bien d'usage, comme le manteau, donc dans quelque chose qui est différent de ses qualités naturelles de drap, en d'autres termes, la forme naturelle et somatique du manteau dans son rapport au drap transformé en valeur - c'est dans cet échange que la valeur des biens d'usage prend forme de valeur.29 C'est à ce moment, quand se réalise la distinction entre valeur d'échange et valeur d'usage, autrement dit dans la scission du produit du travail en chose d'usage et chose de valeur, qu'apparaît la forme marchande, phénomène spécifique de la vie économique.30 Et s'il en est ainsi, il ne nous reste plus qu'à conclure, avec Marx, que »le développement de la forme marchande coîncide avec celui de la forme de valeur«,31 ou que »le développement de la forme de valeur est identique à celui de la forme marchande«. 32 (souligné par Z. D.)

En analysant le développement de la forme de valeur, ou forme marchande, Marx découvre qu'il existe trois degrés de développement, qui s'expliquent, en fin de compte, par le développement des conditions et des causes du phénomène de la marchandise comme forme sociale de produit du travail. Le premier est donné par le rapport de valeur le plus simple, rapport dans lequel une certaine marchandise se trouve »envers une seule et unique marchandise d'une autre espèce quelle qu'elle soit«,33 et qui est tout à la fois »la forme marchande simple de produit du travail«. Simple, parce que la forme marchande en tant que phénomène, dont le contenu assure la distinction entre valeur d'échange et valeur d'usage, ou la scission du produit du travail en chose d'usage et chose de valeur - se trouve placée au degré le plus bas, distinction, scission et différentiation se réalisant fortuitement et dans un rapport à une seule et unique marchandise d'une autre espèce. Le deuxième degré dans le développement de la forme

²⁸ Ibid. p. 15

²⁹ K. Marx: Forme de la valeur, supplément au premier chapitre du tome I du Capital, publication du »Mouvement ouvrier international«, № 2/1969, p. 10. 11.

³⁰ K. Marx, Capital I, p. 26, 38

³¹ K. Marx, Capital I, p. 27
32 K. Marx, Forme de la valeur, 19

³⁵ K. Marx, Capital I, p. 15

It follows that the very notion of market form and market economy belongs in general to the process of exchange, where it appears and exists, while the conditions and causes which produce the process of exchange and the market form, that is,

that is to say, value and the relation of value as a final consequence are found in the corresponding relations of a historically determined production. It is in exchange that the value of use goods, for example cloth, expressed in the form of another use good, like a coat, therefore in something which is different from its natural qualities. of cloth, in other words, the natural and somatic form of the coat in its relation to cloth transformed into value—it is in this exchange that the value of use goods takes the form of value.29 It is at this moment, when the distinction between exchange value and use value is realized, in other words in the splitting of the product of labor into a thing of use and a thing of value, that the commodity form appears, a phenomenon specificity of economic life.30 And if this is so, all that remains is for us to conclude, with Marx, that

»the development of the market form coincides with that of the form of value«,31 or that »the development of the form of value is identical to that of the market form« 32 (underlined by Z. D.)

In analyzing the development of the form of value, or market form, M arx discovers that there are three degrees of development, which are ultimately explained by the development of the conditions and causes of the phenomenon. of the commodity as a social form of the product of labor. The first is given by the simplest relation of value, a relation in which a certain commodity is found "towards a single and unique commodity of another kind, whatever it may be",33 and which is at the same time "the simple commodity form of work product".

Simple, because the commodity form as a phenomenon, whose content ensures the distinction between exchange value and use value, or the splitting of the product of labor into a thing of use and a thing of value - is found placed at the lowest level, distinction, split and differentiation occurring fortuitously and in a relationship to a single and unique commodity of another species. The second degree in the development of the form 28 Ibid. p. 15

29 K. M arx: Form of value, supplement to the first chapter of volume I of Capital, publication of »Mouvement ouvrier international«, .Ne 2/1969, p. 10, 11.

31 K. M arx, C apital I, p. 27

32 K. M arx, Form of value, 19

33 K. Marx, C apital I, p. 15

marchande est donné par une forme de valeur totale et développée. Ce degré est caractérisé par: 1) une plus grande distinction entre la valeur de certaines marchandises et leur valeur d'usage - car maintenant, un seul bien d'usage a de nombreuses et différents valeurs d'échange, et 2), un échange entre les produits du travail qui n'obéit plus aux lois de l'exception et du hasard, mais à celle de l'»habitude«. Les avantages de la forme développée de la marchandise sont en même temps les désavantages de la forme simple. Le troisième degré est la forme générale de valeur. »Maintenant les marchandises présentent leurs valeurs premièrement simplement, parce que dans une seule et même marchandise, et deuxièmement unitairement, parce que dans la même marchandise. Sa forme de valeur est simple et commune, et de plus, générale«.34 Le rapport de base et déterminant de la forme marchande en tant que phénomène général est développé ici au maximum, car »la valeur de chaque marchandise ne se distinque pas seulement de sa propre valeur d'usage, mais de toute valeur d'usage«,35 l'échange étant établi de telle sorte qu'il se développe sans interruption. A ce degré-ci, les marchandises entrent comme valeurs dans un rapport réciproque, c'est-à-dire dans un rapport où »elles se présentent mutuellement comme des valeurs«. La réalisation de la valeur marchande commence à s'exprimer »par le rapport social multilatéral de marchandises«, en raison de quoi la valeur en tant »qu'existence sociale de ces choses« doit atteindre deuxième degré, puis du deuxième au troisième, s'accompagne de changements essentiels, de sorte que les trois degrés représentent qualitativement des états différents — qui ont changé progressivement au cours du développement de la marchandise. Le passage de la forme générale à la forme monétaire, renferme aucun changement essentiel, et »le progrès est seulement en ceci que maintenant, la forme de permutabilité générale directe, ou forme d'équivalent général, par l'habitude sociale, a enfin fait sa jonction avec la forme spécifique naturelle de la marchandise — or.

CONDITIONS ET CAUSES DE L'APPARITION ET DE L'EXISTENCE DE L'ECONOMIE MARCHANDE

On sait que dans les communautés parentales fondées sur le principe d'un communisme primitif, les rapports de propriété sociale s'arrêtent aux frontières de la communauté. La communauté a une existence indépendante, et le rapport intercommunautaire est un rapport »entre étrangers«,38 un rapport caractéristique de propriété privée. De même qu'il apparaît aux frontières des communautés, le rapport de propriété privée cesse d'exister dès que ces frontières sont effacées, c'est-à-dire dès que se réalise l'inté-

<sup>K. Marx: Forme de la valeur, 15
K. Marx, Capital I, p. 30
K. Marx, Capital I, p. 31</sup>

³⁷ K. Marx, Capital I, p. 31, 32

³⁸ Ibid. p. 35

— for now, a single good of use has many and different exchange values, and 2), an exchange between the products of labor which no longer obeys the laws of exception and chance, but of the »habit«. The advantages of the expanded form of the commodity are at the same time the disadvantages of the simple form. The third degree is the general form of value.

"Now the commodities present their values firstly simply, because in one and the same commodity, and secondly unitarily, because in the same commodity. Its form of value is simple and common, and moreover, general. of each commodity is distinguished not only by its own use-value, but by all use-value, 35 exchange being established in such a way that it develops without interruption. At this stage, commodities enter as values into a reciprocal relation, that is, into a relation in which

whey mutually present themselves as values«. The realization of market value begins to express itself "through the m u ltilateral social relation of commodities", because of which the value as "the social existence of these things" must reach the second degree, then from the second to the third, is accompanied by essential changes, so that the three degrees represent qualitatively different states - which have changed progressively in the course of the development of the commodity. The passage from the general form to the monetary form contains no essential change, and "the progress is only in that now the form of direct general permutability, or form of general equivalent, by the social habit has finally made its junction with the specific natural form of the commodity — gold.

CONDITIONS AND CAUSES OF THE APPEARANCE

AND THE EXISTENCE OF THE MARKET ECONOMY

We know that in parental communities founded on the principle of primitive communism, relations of social property stop at the borders of the community. The community has an independent existence, and the intercommunity relationship is a relationship »among strangers«,38 a relationship characteristic of private property. Just as it appears at the borders of communities, the relationship of private property ceases to exist as soon as these borders are erased, that is to say as soon as the inte-84 K M arx: Form of value, 15

85 K. M arx, Capital I, p. 30

88 K. M arx, Capital I, p. 31

87 K. M arx, Capital I, p. 31, 32

88 Ibid. p. 35

gration de deux ou de plusieurs communautés. Primitivement, le rapport de propriété privée entre communautés s'instaure directement, pour céder le pas plus tard à un rapport d'échange des produits, forme indirecte de sa réalisation. En fait, une diversité spontanée intervient avec la distribution spontanée du travail entre les communautés, dans le cadre de laquelle et le travail et les produits d'une communauté deviennent les besoins d'une autre, ce qui conduit à l'échange et à la transformation du produit en marchandise.39 Il est bien évident que le rapport de propriété privée libéré de la contrainte directe est la cause déterminante de l'échange et du phénomène de la forme marchande, qui joue le rôle de médiateur dans la réalisation de la distribution sociale du travail et des autres rapports de reproduction sociale de la vie. Le développement des forces de production et le phénomène du surplus des produits, telles sont les bases de la rupture des rapports de popriété sociale à l'intérieur des communautés, et les phénomènes de propriété privée et d'échange des produits-marchandises, la voie par laquelle »se maintient l'unité des différents travaux«.41 Ce processus est soutenu par les rapports de propriété privée et d'échange des produits entre les communautés. Chaque développement qualitatif ultérieur des forces de production a coîncidé avec un développement de la distribution sociale du travail,42 s'accompagnant à son tour d'un développement ultérieur des rapports de propriété privée et de la société de classe. Cependant, le niveau relativement bas du pouvoir de développement des forces de production, et avec elles de la distribution sociale du travail, a eu pour conséquence de développer, parallèlement à la propriété privée, la subordination de la personne, caractère prédominant de la société esclavagiste et féodale. Dans cette situation, le travail artisanal à domicile et le travail manufacturier, autrement dit l'industrie au vieux sens mot, reste une activité accessoire, un appendice de l'agriculture, ce qui, dans le cadre des rapports de propriété privée du système de subordination de la personne, donne lieu à une organisation naturelle de l'économie.43 Il s'ensuit que les raisons de la fin de l'économie naturelle et de l'apparition de l'économie marchande sont à chercher dans le changement des rapports de l'économie elle-même, autrement dit, dans le changement de l'état de distribution sociale du travail et de rapports de propriété, changement qui intervient sur la base du développement progressif des forces matérielles de production. Ce processus est fort complexe et ses stades divers obéissent au principe de conditionnement réciproque. C'est ainsi, par exemple, que dans le cadre de la distribution sociale du travail, pour que les activités particulières soient réellement développées au maximum et deviennent par là le domaine privé des individus ou des groupes d'individus, il faudrait nécessairement développer un rap-

⁸⁹ Ibid. p. 50

⁴⁰ Ibid. p. 281, 282

⁴ Ibid. p. 282 4 K. Marx — F. Engels: L'idéologie allemande, livre I, Kultura 1964, 16

of its realization. In fact, spontaneous diversity occurs with the spontaneous distribution of labor between communities, whereby both the labor and products of one community become the needs of another, leading to the exchange and the transformation of the product into a commodity.30 It is quite obvious that the relationship of private property freed from direct constraint is the determining cause of exchange and of the phenomenon of the market form, which plays the mediating role in the realization of the social distribution of labor and other relations of social reproduction of life.

The development of the forces of production and the phenomenon of the surplus of products, such are the bases of the breakdown in the relations of social "Exchange of products-commodities, the way by which the unity of the different works is maintained".41 This process is supported by the relations of private property and the exchange of products between communities. Each subsequent qualitative development of the forces of production coincided with a development of the social distribution of labour,48 which in turn was accompanied by a subsequent development of private property relations and class society. However, the relatively low level of the power to develop the forces of production, and with them of the social distribution of labour, has had the consequence of developing, parallel to private property, the subordination of the person, a predominant characteristic of slave and feudal society. In this situation, artisanal work at home and manufacturing work, in other words industry in the old sense of the word, remains an accessory activity, an appendage of agriculture, which, within the framework of property of the system of personal subordination, gives rise to a natural organization of the economy.43 It follows that the reasons for the end of the natural economy and the appearance of the market economy are to be sought in the change in the relations of the economy itself, in other words, in the change in the state of the social distribution of labor and property relations, a change which takes place on the basis of the progressive development of the material forces of production.

This process is very complex and its various stages obey the principle of reciprocal conditioning. It is thus, for example, that within the framework of the social distribution of labour, for particular activities to be really developed to the maximum and thereby become the private domain of individuals or groups of individuals, it would be necessary ent to develop a raplB Ibid. p. 50

40 Ibid. p. 281, 282

43 K. Marx — F. Engels: German Ideology, Book I, C u ltura 1964, 16
43 K. Marx, Capital III, K u ltu ra 1948, Belgrade, p. 681

port de propriété privée libéré de toute dépendance et subordination de personne. Ce n'est qu'alors, au moment où les producteurs privés agissent dans l'indépendance et l'autonomie à l'intérieur de chaque branche d'activité prise en particulier, que le travail est vraiment distribué, au plein sens du mot. On voit apparaître alors qualitativement une nouvelle situation, dans laquelle les anciens rapports de dépendance personnelle font place à un autre moyen et à une autre forme de liasion, car le travail humain a toujours revêtu et devra toujours revêtir, d'une manière ou d'une autre, une certaine forme sociale. Ce moyen de communication est l'échange et la forme marchande du produit du travail, lesquels, loin de diviser la production, lient ce qui est divisé indépendamment d'eux-mêmes.44 Par conséquent, lorsque le travail social apparaît comme un complexe de travaux privés qui s'accomplissent dans une indépendance et une autonomie réciproques, ses produits qualitativement différents doivent être échangés et prendre forme de marchandises, 45 car les produits étrangers ne peuvent devenir siens qu'à condition que les siens deviennent étrangers.46 La liaison nécessaire et la réalisation de la distribution sociale du travail, laquelle, dans une autre situation, est accomplie directement grâce aux rapports de propriété sociale ou aux rapports de propriété privée du système de dépendance personnelle, doivent être maintenant médiasées par l'échange des produits et la »renommée« de leur valeur.

Par conséquent, il ne fait plus de doute que la condition et la cause des phénomènes d'échange et d'économie marchande en général sont les suivantes: niveau relativement élevé de la distribution sociale du travail spontanément développée, et rapports de propriété privée libérés de la dépendance et de la subordination de la personne.47 Ces deux points sont également utiles et nécessaires à l'apparition et à l'existence de l'économie marchande, et ils réalisent ensemble l'unité des différences dans leur existence personnelle. Nous avons établi que l'existence des rapports de propriété privée est inconcevable hors d'un certain degré de développement de la distribution sociale du travail, et que, au niveau supérieur, cette distribution n'existe que dans le cadre de la libre propriété privée. Dans leur unité, ces rapports font les moments essentiels de toutes les formes de production historiques qui réclament nécessairement des rapports monnaie-marchandise comme forme indirecte et spécifique de réalisation de la distribution du travail et comme moyen de communication général dans l'ensemble du processus de reproduction sociale. Cependant, ces deux points ont beau être également nécessaires et utiles, ils se distinguent entre eux par les conséquences qu'ils entraînent. Marx estime que la distribution sociale du travail est »la condition de l'exi-

⁴⁴ K. Marx, Capital I, p. 282, 284

⁴⁵ Ibid. p. 37 46 Ibid. p. 65

⁴⁷ De même la possession privée »libre« (forme inconséquente et inachevée de propriété privée), qui occupe une place déterminée dans le mouvement des rapports de propriété privée. (Marx, Capital III, p. 684, 685)

particular, that the work is really distributed, in the full sense of the word. . We then see the qualitative appearance of a new situation, in which the old relationships of personal dependence give way to another means and to another form of connection, for human labor has always had and will always have to have, one way or another, a certain social form. This means of communication is exchange and the commodity form of the product of labor, which, far from dividing production, link what is divided independently of themselves. a complex of private labors which are accomplished in reciprocal independence and autonomy, its qualitatively different products must be exchanged and take the form of commodities, 45 for foreign products can become its own only on condition that its own become foreigners.46 The necessary connection and realization of the social distribution of labor, which in another situation is accomplished directly through the relations of social property or the private property relations of the system of personal dependence, must now be mediated, through the exchange of products and the »renown« of their value.

Consequently, there is no longer any doubt that the condition and the cause of the phenomena of exchange and of the market economy in general are the following: relatively high level of the social distribution of labor spontaneously developed, and of private property freed from the dependence and subordination of the person n e47 These two points are equally useful and necessary for the appearance and in their personal existence. We have established that the existence of private property relations is inconceivable outside a certain degree of development of the social distribution of labor, and that, at the higher level, this distribution only exists within the framework of free property, private. In their unity, these relations constitute the essential moments of all historical forms of production which necessarily demand money-commodity relations as an indirect and specific form of realization of the distribution of labor and as a general means of communication. in the whole process of social reproduction. However, although these two points may be equally necessary and useful, they are distinguished from each other by the consequences to which they entail. M arx considers that the social distribution of labor is "the condition of exi44 K. M arx, Capital I, p. 282, 284

"Ibid. p. 37

"Ibid. p. 65

47 The same applies to »free« private possession (inconsequential and incomplete form of private property), which occupies a definite place

stence de la production marchande, bien qu'inversement la production marchande ne soit pas la condition de l'existence de la distribution sociale du travail«.48 Il rappelle, à l'appui de cette thèse, que dans l'ancienne commune indienne, ou chez les anciens habitants du Pérou, ou encore dans la phase première de la société communiste moderne, le travail est divisé, mais les produits du travail ne deviennent pas marchandises. En d'autres termes, il n'y a pas de production de marchandises sans division sociale du travail, mais la division sociale du travail a existé avant l'apparition de la production de marchandises et persistera après sa disparition, car la réalisation de la distribution sociale nécessaire du travail peut s'effectuer d'une autre manière. C'est une raison suffisante pour conclure que la division sociale du travail, si elle en est une condition inéluctable, n'est pas la cause directe du phénomène de forme marchande. En réalité, la division sociale du travail ne peut produire une économie marchande que dans l'unité de certains rapports de propriété. Ces rapports sont de propriété privée et de production privée, dans la mesure où ils se libèrent du système de subordination. Donc, les rapports de propriété privée libres, c'est ce motif et cette cause directes qui exigent l'échange privé libre des marchandises, qui exige donc la forme marchande, moyen inévitable et pour cette situation moyen unique de réaliser la nécessaire distribution du travail et la liaison sociale en générale. C'est pourquoi la présupposition de la disparition de l'économie marchande ne sous-entend pas la disparition de la division sociale du travail, mais la disparition des rapports de propriété privée. Ces derniers doivent faire place à la propriété sociale, base et cadre de la socialisation directe du travail et de sa distribution.

On pourrait en conclure: premièrement, que le phénomène de forme marchande et d'économie monnaie-marchandise en général est lié seulement à une certaine époque de l'histoire sociale, 49 et deuxièmement que dans le cadre de cette époque, qui peut se définir en gros comme l'époque de la société de classe, la production marchande apparaît comme la nécessité d'une certaine forme de production bien déterminée, ou plus exactement, comme le produit des rapports de production correspondants. 51 Nous avons déjà montré que Marx a qualifié ces rapports de propriété privée des moyens de production, 52 propriété privée qui permet une production privée autonome, et indépendante, en même temps que »la société compte une distribution du travail tellement développée que la disjonction est déjà accomplie entre valeur d'usage et valeur d'échange«, le degré de developpement étant commun »aux for-

⁴⁸ K. Marx, Capital I, p. 9, 10

⁴⁹ K. Marx, Capital I, p. 27

⁵⁰ Cette coincidente entre l'existence de l'économie monnaiemarchandise et la sociétá de classe n'est pas fortuite, mais découle des rapports qui en sont la base générale et commune.

 ⁵¹ K. Marx, Capital I, p. 53
 ⁵² K. Marx, Capital I, p. 520

existence of commodity production, although conversely commodity production is not the condition for the existence of the social distribution of labor., or among the ancient inhabitants of Peru, or again in the first phase of modern communist society, labor is divided, but the products of labor do not become commodities. In other words, there is no production of commodities without the social division of labor, but the social division of labor existed before the appearance of commodity production and will persist after its disappearance, for the realization of the necessary social distribution of labor can be effected in another way. This is reason enough to conclude that the social division of labor, if it is an ineluctable condition, is not the direct cause of the phenomenon of the commodity form. In reality, the social division of labor can produce a market economy only in the unity of certain property relations. These relationships are private property and private production, insofar as they free themselves from the system of subordination. Therefore, free private property relations, it is this direct motive and this direct cause which require the free private exchange of commodities, which therefore requires the commodity form, an inevitable means and for this situation the only means of realizing the necessary distribution of labor and social bonding in general. This is why the presupposition of the disappearance of the market economy does not imply the disappearance of the social division of labor, but the disappearance of relations of private property. The latter must make way for social property, the basis and framework for the direct socialization of labor and its distribution.

One could conclude: firstly, that the phenomenon of the commodity form and of the commodity-money economy in general is linked only to a certain period of social history,49 and secondly that in the framework of this epoch, which can be broadly defined as the epoch of class society, commodity production appears as the necessity of a certain well-determined form of production, or more exactly, as the product corresponding relations of production.51 We have already shown that M arx qualified these relations as private property of the means of production,62 private property which allows for autonomous and independent private production, at the same time distribution of labor so developed that the disjunction is already accomplished between use value and exchange value, the degree of development being common to the for48 K. M arx, C apital I, p.

p.

27

50 This coincidence between the existence of the commodity-money economy and class society is not fortuitous, but stems from the relations which are its general and common basis.

91 K. Marx, Capital I,

p.

53

53 K. M arx, Capital I,

p.

520

mations économico-sociales historiquement les plus différentes«.⁵³ Sur cette base, et sur elle seule, base qui, dans une certaine mesure, est présente dans les formes de production les plus différentes, le produit du travail devient marchandise par l'intermédiaire de l'échange. Il en est de même lorsque, dans les rapports entre communautés parentales et comunistes, le produit du travail devient pour la première fois marchandise, et lorsqu'il devient marchandise comme travail du propriétaire d'esclaves ou du seigneur féodal, du petit paysan ou de l'artisan, du capitaliste ou de l'état, et pour finir, de ce que l'on appelle les entreprises socialistes.

Dans les cadres des structures sociales esclavagistes et féodales, l'échange des produits et la forme marchande apparaissent sur la base d'un développement relatif de la distribution du travail, et, dans la mesure exacte où disparaissent les rapports de dépendance personnelle, c'est-à-dire de domination et de sujétion directes, apparaissent et existent les rapports entre producteurs autonomes et indépendants, c'est-à-dire des rapports de propriété privée libres. Les valable pour les rapports des gros propriétaires non travailleurs, et l'ets également pour les rapports des serfs dans les conditions de la rente monétaire. Dans les conditions de la rente monétaire, le serf n'est pas libéré de la subordination, mais la subordination est considérablement allégée, lui permettant dans la même mesure de devenir autonome et indépendant comme producteur de marchandises.

Les petits producteurs libres et indépendants, qui existent dans toutes les formations de classe de la société, sont liés par des rapports beaucoup plus simples. En fait, ce sont des producteurs de marchandises, comme d'ailleurs tous les autres, parce que d'un côté la divison sociale du travail spontanément apparue et développée rend leur production unilatérale mais multilatéraux leurs besoins, et parce que, d'un autre côté, comme propriétaires privés autonomes et indépendants, ils sont contraints d'associer leurs travaux privés par l'échange des produits, ce qui revient à dire qu'ils peuvent s'approprier les produits étrangers et satisfaire leurs besoins par la seule voie de l'aliénation des leurs.⁵⁶

La forme de production capitaliste fait complètement disparaître la liaison antérieure directe du travail artisanal à domicile et du travail manufacturier avec l'agriculture, et ceci sur toute la surface du vaste terrain qu'elle englobe et assujettit. Donc, on assiste à un développement plus conséquent et plus étendu de la distribution du travail, laquelle, de son côté, est rendue possible par les nouveaux rapports de propriété. La propriété privée capi-

55 K. Marx, Capital, I, p. 65

³⁸ K. Marx, Capital I, p. 120

³⁸ Même dans les situations où la production esclavagiste dans l'agriculture, la manufacture, la marine, etc., est une production de marché, elle n'est pas libérée de ses éléments de production naturelle, car le marché esclavagiste est toujours approvisionné en marchandises et en force de travail par les guerres, la piraterie, etc, pillage qui n'emprunte pas la voi d'un processus d'échange, mais celle de l'appropriation naturelle de la force de travail d'autrui par le besoin physique direct«. (Capital II, p. 396)

extent, is present in the most different forms of production, the product of labor becomes a commodity through the intermediary of exchange. The same is true when, in the relations between kinship and communist communities, the product of labor becomes for the first time a commodity, and when it becomes a commodity as the labor of the slave-owner or the feudal lord, the father. be the peasant or the artisan, the capitalist or the state, and finally, of what are called socialist enterprises.

Within the frameworks of slavery and feudal social structures, the exchange of products and the market form appear on the basis of a relative development of the distribution of labor, and, to the exact extent that relations of personal dependence disappear. , that is to say of direct domination and subjection, there appear and exist the relations between autonomous and independent producers, that is to say relations of free private property. non-working proprietors, and the ets also for the relations of serfs under the conditions of monetary rent. Under the conditions of monetary rent, the serf is not freed from subordination, but subordination is considerably relieved, enabling him to the same extent to become autonomous and independent as a producer of commodities.

The free and independent petty producers, who exist in all class formations of society, are bound by much simpler relations. In fact, they are producers of commodities, like all the others, because on the one hand the social division of labor which spontaneously appeared and developed makes their production unilateral but multilateral to their needs, and because, on the other hand, as autonomous and independent private proprietors, they are forced to associate their labors with the private sector through the exchange of products, which amounts to saying that they can appropriate foreign products and satisfy their needs by the only way of the alienation of their own.66

The capitalist form of production completely does away with the previous direct link between artisanal work at home and manufacturing work with agriculture, and this over the entire surface of the vast terrain that it encompasses and subjugates. Thus, we are witnessing a more consistent and more extensive development of the distribution of labour, which, for its part, is made possible by the new property relations. Private property capi-M K. M arx, C apital I, p. 120

Even in situations where slavery production in agriculture, m anufacture, marine, etc., is market production, it is not freed from its elements of natural production, because the slave market is always supplied with goods and labor power through wars, piracy, etc., looting that does not follow the path of a process of exchange, but that of 'n atu ra l ap p ro p riatio n o f th e o th ers' work force b y direct physical need'. (Capital II, p. 396) M K. M arx, Capital, I, p. 65

taliste, c'est-à-dire le rapport des capitalistes et des ouvriers aux moyens de production, au travail et aux produits, est libérée de toutes les formes de domination et de sujétion directes. Le travailleur est une personne libre, et en tant que tel, il est propriétaire privé et vendeur de sa marchandise: sa force de travail, 56 qui ne devient marchandise que dans un rapport de valeur avec une autre, autrement de quoi elle reste une ordinaire force naturelle. Partout nous rencontrerons propriétaires privés et producteurs libres et indépendants. Nous savons que ce rapport est préexistant au capitalisme, mais son développement devient désormais conséquent et maximal, grâce d'une part aux rapports entre producteurs directs, ou ouvriers, et gros propriétaires, ou non ouvriers, et d'autre part, grâce aux rapports conséquents entre les propriétaires eux-mêmes, ou producteurs capitalistes. En conséquence, aucune condition ni aucune cause de l'économie marchande ne se signale comme un phénomène commun à plusieurs formes de production. Le changement est en ceci que les rapports de production, condition et cause générale et commune de l'économie marchande, sont réalisés avec plus de conséquence et quantitativement développés jusqu'aux frontières du possible. C'est pourguoi l'économie marchande, sous sa forme capitaliste, est élargie et enrichie doublement: premièrement, parce que dans le cercle des marchandises, il s'en est glissé une nouvelle: la force de travail, et deuxièmement, parce que, sur la base du phénomène-marchandise de la force de travail et des rapports capitalistes en général, le »terrain« de la production marchande est développé jusqu'aux limites du possible, c'est-à-dire jusqu'à un point où, littéralement, tous les produits du travail humain (et même davantage) doivent entrer dans le sycle de l'échange et prendre la forme sociale de marchandises.⁵⁷ Ce qu'il y a ici de qualitativement nouveau n'est pas dans l'économie marchande en tant que telle, mais dans l'économie capitaliste.

FONCTION SOCIALE DE L'ECONOMIE MARCHANDE ET SA REALISATION

Depuis qu'il existe une économie marchande, les conditions et les causes qui la suscitent sont restées en substance les mêmes. On retrouve partout des rapports qualitativement identiques qui, sous une forme historiquement déterminée, restent présents quand changent les époques et les formes de production. Cette identité d'essence des conditions et des causes est un facteur de base qui entraîne l'identité du caractère de la marchandise comme forme sociale de produit du travail, quelles que soient les différentes formes de production en cause, ⁵⁸ car, selon Marx, les caractères des processus de production y sont indifférents. ⁵⁹ Bien entendu,

talism, that is to say the relation of capitalists and workers to the means of production, to labor and to products, is freed from all forms of direct domination and subjection. The worker is a free person, and

K. Marx, Capital I, p. 118
 K. Marx, Capital I, p. 520 et III, p. 268

K. Marx, Capital III, p. 268
 K. Marx, Capital II, p. 74, 104, 313, 314

as such, he is the private owner and seller of his commodity: his labour-power,56 which only becomes a commodity in a relation of value with another, otherwise it becomes a commodity. remains an ordinary natural force.

Everywhere we will meet private owners and free and independent producers. We know that this relationship is pre-existing in capitalism, but its development henceforth becomes consistent and maximal, thanks on the one hand to the relationship between direct producers, or workers, and large landowners, or non-workers, and on the other hand, thanks to the consequent relations between being the owners themselves, or capitalist producers. Consequently, no condition or cause of the market economy stands out as a phenomenon common to several forms of production. The change is in that the relations of production, condition and general and common cause of the commodity economy, are realized with more consequence and quantitatively developed to the frontiers of the possible. This is why the market economy, in its capitalist form, is enlarged and enriched in two ways: firstly, because a new one has slipped into the circle of commodities: labor power, and secondly because, on the basis of the commodity-phenomenon of labor power and of capitalist relations in general, the "terrain" of commodity production is developed to the limits of the possible, that is, say up to a point where, literally, all the products of human labor (and even more) must enter the cycle of exchange and take the social form of commodities.57 What is qualitatively here is What is new is not in the market economy as such, but in the capitalist economy.

SOCIAL FUNCTION OF THE MARKET ECONOMY

AND ITS REALIZATION

Ever since there has been a market economy, the conditions and causes that give rise to it have remained substantially the same.

We find everywhere qualitatively identical relations which, in a historically determined form, remain present when times and forms of production change. This essential identity of conditions and causes is a basic factor which leads to the identification of the character of the commodity as a social form of the product of labor, whatever the different forms of production involved,58 because, according to Marx , the characteristics of the production processes are indifferent there.69 Of course,

I, p. 118

»7 K. Marx, C apital

I, p. 520 e t III, p. 268

58 K. Marx, Capital

III, p. 268

59 K. Marx, Capital

II, p. 74, 104, 313, 314

cela ne signifie pas que l'économie marchande s'accomode de n'importe quel processus de production, au contraire, puisque, à la base de toute forme de production dont les produits prennent forme de marchandises, il doit se trouver certains rapports en substance identiques. C'est ainsi par exemple que le fait que la forme marchande sert parfaitement la production capitaliste et ses buts s'explique par le fait que l'appropriation capitaliste, c'est-à-dire la propriété bourgeoise, s'accomode parfaitement d'une propriété qui convient à l'économie marchande en général.⁶⁰

L'essence commune et les conditions vitales de la forme marchande en tant que phénomène, dans le rapport aux différentes formes de production desquelles elle procède, ne sont que l'expression et le moyen matériel d'une fonction sociale commune, qui est assumée en général par l'économie marchande, et toujours, en gros, de la même manière. C'est la fonction de réalisation de la distribution sociale du travail, rapport nécessaire de la production sociale et de la reproduction de la vie. Outre tous les textes explicites qui vont dans ce sens,61 toute l'analyse que fait Marx de la marchandise et de l'économie marchande en général va à l'appui de cette identification de cette fonction. La forme marchande et le système complexe des rapports monnaie-marchandises apparaissent tout d'abord pour unifier, dans le processus direct lui-même, une production divisée. En effet, depuis que les hommes existent, leur travail a une forme sociale déterminée. Les conditions sociales correspondantes, nous l'avons montré, déterminent l'affirmation du lien et de l'unité du travail social comme échange des produits des travaux privés. La forme qui produit alors la distribution nécessairement proportionnelle du travail, dans chaque branche de la production, mais aussi chez les producteurs privés qui agissent dans ces branches, donc, la forme par le truchement de laquelle se réalise, proportionnellement aux besoins de la société, la distribution qualitative et quantitative du travail entre les nombreux propriétaires privés, cette forme, c'est la valeur d'échange des produits du travail, ou plus exactement, leur valeur. La loi de la valeur est une forme spécifique qui définit »quelle quantité du temps de travail dont elle dispose dans son ensemble la société peut dépenser à la production de chaque espèce marchande prise en particulier«.63

⁶⁰ K. Marx, Capital I, p. 481-485

^{*}I 'sL'échange ne divise pas la production en différentes sphères, au contraire, il établit un rapport entre les différentes sphères et les transforme en branches de la production sociale tout entière, branches qui dépendent toutes plus ou moins les unes des autres. Cette distribution du travail devient la voie d'échange de sphères de production primitivement différentes mais réciproquement indépendantes«. Ou encore: »Mais qu'est-ce qui constitue l'unité des travaux indépendants des éducateurs, des tanneurs et des cordonniers? Le fait que ce que chacun produit existe comme marchandise«. »La distribution du travail dans la société se réalise par l'achat et la vente des produits des différentes branches«. (Capital I, p. 284, 285)

⁶² K. Marx, lettre à L. Kugelman, oeuvres choisies, 3, 1950, t. II, p. 452

⁶³ K. Marx, Capital I, 285

be certain relations in identical substances. Thus, for example, the fact that the commodity form perfectly serves capitalist production and its aims is explained by the fact that capitalist appropriation is

that is to say, bourgeois property is perfectly suited to property which suits the market economy in general.80

The common essence and the vital conditions of the commodity form as a phenomenon, in relation to the different forms of production from which it proceeds, are only the expression and the material means of a common social function, which is assumed in general by the market economy, and always, roughly speaking, in the same way. It is the function of realizing the social distribution of labour, the necessary relation of social production and the reproduction of life. Aside from all the explicit texts that go in this direction,61 all of Marx's analysis of the commodity and of the commodity economy in general supports this identification of this function. The commodity form and the complex system of money-commodity relations first appear to unify, in the direct process itself, a divided production. In fact, ever since men have existed, their work has had a determinate social form. The corresponding social conditions, as we have shown, determine the affirmation of the bond and unity of social labor as an exchange of the products of private labor. The form which then produces the necessarily proportional distribution of labor, in each branch of production, but also among the private producers who act in these branches, therefore, the form through which is realized, in proportion to the needs of society, the qualitative and quantitative distribution of labor among the many private owners, this form is the exchange value of the products of labor, or more exactly, their value. The law of value is a specific form which defines "how much labor time society as a whole can expend on the production of each commodity taken in particular".63

M K. M arx, Capital I, p. 481—485

61 "Exchange does not divide production into different spheres, on the contrary, it establishes a relationship between the different spheres and transforms them into branches of social production altogether, branches which all depend more or less on each other. This distribution of labor becomes the channel of exchange of initially different but reciprocally independent spheres of production. Or again: "But what constitutes the unity of independent labor of educators, tanners and shoemakers? The fact that what everyone produces exists as a commodity. "The distribution of work in the socfefe is carried out by the purchase and sale of the products of the

various branches«. (Capital I, p. 284, 285)

"K. Marx, Capital I, 285

Le point de départ du processus d'échange où apparaît la forme marchande est le caractère doublement social des travaux privés, qui, dans le processus direct de la production, existent indépendamment les uns des autres.64 En mettant leurs produits dans un rapport de valeur, les hommes identifient leurs travaux. les soumettant en même temps à une mesure sociale proportionnelle. Cette représentation nécessaire des différents travaux autonomes et indépendants des producteurs privés comme parties du travail social, et leur temps de travail comme partie du temps de travail social, s'effectue ici de telle sorte que le caractère social des travaux privés laisse son empreinte dans leurs produits.65 En fait, »l'égalité des travaux humains prend la forme concrète d'une matérialisation de la valeur des produits«, et »l'évaluation de la dépense de la force de travail par la durée du travail prend la forme de grandeur de valeur des produits du travail«.66 Îl s'agit simplement ici d'un Ȏchange« dans lequel la forme marchande et tout le système des rapports monnaie-marchandises, donc la loi de la valeur comme principe général de base de l'économie marchande en général, deviennent et restent rien d'autre qu'une forme spécifique et un moyen de réaliser la distribution sociale du travail. En d'autres termes, les producteurs privés, indépendamment de la forme historique de ce nomène, en échangeant des produits, échangent leurs travaux, liant et associant ceux-ci dans le travail social. Les travaux, de cette manière, ne se lient pas directement tels qu'ils sont à l'état naturel, mais parce qu'ils sont représentés dans la valeur et la grandeur de valeur de la marchandise.

Dans l'accomplissement de la fonction sociale en question, la spécificité de l'économie marchande et de la loi de la valeur consiste en ce que, premièrement, la règle nécessaire de la distribution du travail »ne s'applique que comme une loi moyenne d'injustice«,67 et deuxièmement, cette règle »s'applique par la force comme une loi naturelle et régulière, comme par xemple la loi de la pesanteur quand une maison s'écroule sur la tête de quelqu'un«.68 Cependant, seuls les propriétaires privés sont objectivement à un comportement qui ne reconnaît aucune autorité, si ce n'est celle »de la concurrence, de la contrainte que fait peser sur eux leurs intérêts réciproques, de même que, dans le monde animal, la lutte de tous contre tous maintient plus ou moins les conditions d'existence de toutes les espèces«.69 Cependant, il est évident qu'il serait erroné d'attribuer les maux mentionnés (ainsi que beaucoup d'autres) à la seule forme d'économie marchande et à la loi de la valeur. Les conditions et les causes de ces maux ne sont pas dans la qualité marchande de l'économie, mais dans l'économie-même et dans ses rapports. Dans le processus direct de production où dominent les rapports de propriété privée, »l'assemblage quanti-

⁶⁴ K. Marx, Capital, I, p. 38

⁶⁵ K. Marx, Capital III, p. 556 K. Marx, Capital I, p. 36, 37
 K. Marx, Capital I, p. 62
 K. Marx, Capital I, p. 39

⁶⁹ K. Marx, Capital I, p. 286

²⁹²

another.64 In mettan t their products in a relation of value, men identify their labors, subjecting them at the same time to a proportional social measure. This necessary representation of the various autonomous and independent labors of private producers as part of social labor, and their labor time as part of social labor time, is carried out here in such a way that the social character of private labor leaves its in their products.65 In fact, whe equality of human labor takes the concrete form of a materialization of the value of products«, and »valuation of the expenditure of labor power by the duration of labor takes the form of the magnitude of the value of the products of labor. value as the basic general principle of the market economy in general, become and remain nothing more than a specific form and a means of realizing the social distribution of labor. In other words, private producers, regardless of the historical form of this nomene, by exchanging products, exchange their labors, linking and associating these in social labor. The works, in this way, do not bind directly as they are in their natural state, but because they are represented in the value and the magnitude of the value of the commodity.

In the performance of the social function in question, the specificity of the market economy and of the law of value consists in the fact that, first, the necessary rule of the distribution of labor "applies only as an average law of injustice",67 and secondly, this rule "is applied by force as a natural and regular law, as for example the law of gravity when a house collapses on someone's head«.68

However, only private proprietors are objectively in a behavior that does not recognize any authority, except that of

"competition, the constraint imposed on them by their reciprocal interests, just as, in the animal world, the struggle of all against all more or less maintains the conditions of existence of all species".69 However, it is obvious that it would be erroneous to attribute the mentioned evils (as well as many others) to the sole form of the market economy and to the law of value. The conditions and causes of these evils are not in the market quality of the economy, but in the economy itself and in its relationships. In the direct process of production where private property relations dominate," the quanti-44 K. M arx, Capital, I, p. 38

44 K. M arx, C apital III, p. 536

44 K. M arx, Capital I, *. 36, 37

47 K. M arx, Capital I, p. 62

48 K. M arx, C apital I, p. 39

44 K. M arx, Capital I, p. 286

tatif des organismes sociaux de la production, qui présente ses mebres disjoints dans le système de distribution du travail, est tout aussi fortuit que l'assemblage qualitatif«.70 Donc, d'un côte la nécessité, pour les travaux privés autonomes et indépendants de s'affirmer comme des chaînons de la distribution sociale du travail, et de l'autre, le fait que distribution du travail est »un organisme de production spontané, dont les fils se tissent derrière le dos des producteurs«,71 c'est-à-dire un état dans lequel »le hasard et la nature règlent comme il leur plaît la distribution des producteurs de marchandises et de leurs moyens de production entre les différentes branches du travail social«.72 Par conséquent. l'élément d'inégalité dans les rapports entre producteurs privés et tous les autres maux du même genre se trouvent d'abord dans l'économie elle-même, c'est-à-dire dans le processus direct de production. La loi de la valeur, fonctionnant comme une loi intérieure et se manifestant aux yeux des agents de production pris en particulier comme une loi naturelle aveugle, ne fait que »réaliser l'équilibre social de la production au sein de ses fluctuations fortuites«.73

Il convient d'examiner de plus près le rôle social de l'échange et de la forme marchande, et par là de la loi de la valeur. Sur la base des rapports adéquats à une certaine forme de production, ces phénomènes apparaissent comme un chaînon intermédiaire dans l'ensemble du processus social de production et de reproduction de la vie. Et ce »chaînon intermédiaire« semble servir à la réalisation de tous les rapports de production, distribution et consommation. Cependant, la présupposition de la réalisation des buts particuliers à telle ou telle forme de production, de même que les intérêts des producteurs privés dans le cadre de cette production, est toujours la réalisation d'une distribution sociale du travail nécessaire. Ceci vaut pour la production marchande capitaliste, forme d'exploitation faisant époque, mais ceci vaut aussi pour les petits producteurs qui vivent de leur travail. La liasion des travaux privés en un tout social déterminé, c'est-à-dire la réalisation de la distribution sociale du travail, est une fonction inséparable de l'essence-même du processus qui a produit la forme marchande, inséparable des conditions et des causes communes et générales du phénomène d'économie marchande, et de son existence. Toutes les autres fonctions sont données et procèdent, d'un côté, de la position d'échange des produits dans l'ensemble du système de la reproduction sociale de la vie, et de l'autre, des caractères particuliers de toutes les formes de production historiquement déterminées qui ont besoin de la médiation de la valeur »renommée«.

⁷⁰ Ibid. p. 67

⁷¹ Ibid. p. 65, 66

⁷⁸ Ibid. p. 285

^{&#}x27;8 K. Marx, Capital III, p. 763

distribution of labour, and on the other hand, the fact that the distribution of labor is "an organism of spontaneous production, the threads of which are woven behind the backs of the producers",71 c that is to say, a state in which "chance and nature regulate as they please the distribution of the producers of commodities and their means of production between the different branches of social labor".72 By Consequently, the element of inequality in the relations between private producers and all the other evils of the same kind are found first of all in the economy itself, that is to say in the direct process of production. The law of value, functioning as an internal law and manifesting itself in the eyes of the agents of production, taken in particular as a blind natural law, only "realizes the social equilibrium of production within its fortuitous fluctuations". .73

It is worth examining more closely the social role of exchange and of the market form, and hence of the law of value. On the basis of adequate relations to a certain form of production, these phenomena appear as an intermediate link in the whole of the social process of production and reproduction of life. And this "intermediate link" seems to serve the realization of all the relations of production, distribution and consumption. However, the presupposition of the realization of the goals particular to this or that form of production, as well as the interests of the private producers within the framework of this production, is always the realization of a social distribution of the necessary work. This applies to capitalist commodity production, an epoch-making form of exploitation, but it also applies to small producers who live from their work. The binding of private labor into a determinate social whole, that is, the realization of the social distribution of labor, is a function inseparable from the very essence of the process which produced the commodity form. inseparable from the common and general conditions and causes of the phenomenon of the market economy, and of its existence. All the other functions are given and proceed, on the one hand, from the exchange position of products in the whole system of the social reproduction of life, and on the other, from the particular characteristics of all forms. historically determ ined production s that need value mediation

```
"reputation".
```

70 Ibid. p. 67

71 Ibid. p. 65, 66

7> Ibid. p. 285

'• K. M arx, C apital III, p. 763

LA SOCIETE SOCIALISTE CONTEMPORAINE ET L'ECONOMIE MARCHANDE

L'analyse des conditions et des causes, comme celle du phénomène lui-même d'économie marchande, donne suffisamment de preuves de l'incompatibilité de cette production avec la production et l'économie socialiste. Marx s'est expliqué sur cette question à plusieurs reprises.74 On pourrait dire, en résumant, que la production socialiste en tant que »travail directement associé«... est »une forme de production diamétralement opposée à la production marchande«.75 Un examen correct de ces assertions nous oblige à conclure qu'on ne saurait adopter une position contraire.76 Certes, beaucoup l'admettent en ajoutant toutefois que la pratique contemporaine s'est révélée différente. Cependant, selon nous, on n'a pas encore répondu à la question suivante: s'agit-il alors d'une autre pratique du socialisme, ou des rapports et des formes de l'économie dans l'ancienne société? La réponse exige un examen approfondi de toutes les complexités de la pratique sociale dans les pays socialistes, lequel, par malheur, n'existe pas encore. Nous tenterons ici d'établir quelques présuppositions, qui par la voie de la recherche nous conduiront peut-être jusqu'à la réponse.

La situation sociale de la majorité des pays dits socialistes est carastérisée par la prédominance des structures socialistes, s'accompagnant de puissants éléments hérités de l'ancienne société. Par éléments hérités de l'ancienne société, nous entendons moins les séquelles »de classe« que les anciens rapports présent dans une structure en vigueur qui se présente et se déclare socialiste. Donc, il s'agit de quelque chose d'ancien qui se manifeste sous une nouvelle forme, avec un nouveau nom. On sait qu'il existe d'énormes différences entre les hommes dans leurs rapport aux moyens de production, au travail et aux produits du travail, et par voie de conséquence, des différences dans les domaines de la vie qui reposent sur ces données. Tout cela compose un ensemble de positions sociales diverses et antithétiques, et en premier lieu, d'une part dans les couches travailleuses de la société, d'autre part dans la couche que l'on appelle d'ordinaire bureaucratie. Ces positions sociales obéissant aux principes de conditionnement et de dépendance réciproques, il est normal de conclure que les deux couches dont nous parlions offriront des rapports relevant de la nouvelle et de l'ancienne sociétés. Il nous semble cependant, compte tenu de la nature générale et de l'existence de la réalisation pratique,

 ⁷⁴ K. Marx, Critique du programme de Gotha, oeuvres choisies de Marx et Engels, Belgrade 1950, livre II, p. 23. Capital II, Kultura 1947, p. 287, 288. F. Engels, Anti-Dürhing, Belgrade 1959, p. 337
 ⁷⁵ K. Marx, Capital I, p. 55, 56 (note № 50)
 ⁷⁶ Des le territ applies et dit supporter la supporter de l'économie.

⁷⁶ Dans le texte où il est dit que, »après la suppression de l'économie capitaliste, et avec l'arrêt de la production sociale«, la détermination de la valeur restera prédominante, Marx écrit en toutes lettres qu'elle consistera à faire que »la régularisation du temps de travail et la distribution de travail social entre les différents groupes de production ,et enfin la comptabilité les concernant, deviennent plus importantes que jamais«. (Capital III, p. 739)

AND THE MARKET ECONOMY

The analysis of the conditions and the causes, like that of the phenomenon of the market economy itself, gives sufficient proof of the incompatibility of this production with production and the socialist economy. Max has expounded on this question on several occasions.74 One could say, in summary, that socialist production as "directly associated labour"...

is "a form of production diametrically opposed to commodity production."75 A proper examination of these assertions obliges us to conclude that one cannot adopt a contrary position.78

Admittedly, many admit this, adding, however, that contemporary practice has turned out to be different. However, in our opinion, the following question has not yet been answered: is it then another practice of socialism, or the relations and forms of the economy in the old society? The answer requires a thorough examination of all the complexities of social practice in socialist countries, which, unfortunately, does not yet exist. We will attempt here to establish some presuppositions, which through research will perhaps lead us to the answer.

The social situation of the m ajority of the so-called socialist countries is characterized by the predominance of socialist structures, accompanied by powerful elements inherited from the old society.

By elements inherited from the old society, we mean less the "class" sequels than the old relations present in a structure in force which presents itself and declares itself socialist. So it is something old manifesting in a new form, with a new name. We know that there are enormous differences between men in their relationship to the means of production, to work and to the products of work, and consequently, differences in the areas of life that are based on these data. All of this composes a set of diverse and antithetical social positions, and in the first place, on the one hand in the working strata of society, on the other hand in the stratum which is ordinarily called bureaucracy. These social positions obeying the principles of reciprocal conditioning and dependence, it is normal to conclude that the two layers of which we were speaking will offer relations belonging to the new and the old societies. It seems to us, however, taking into account the general nature and the existence of the practical realization, p. 23. C apital II, K u ltu ra 1947, p. 287, 288. F. Engels, Anti-Diirhing, B elgrade 1959, p. 337

75 K. Marx, Capital I, p. 55, 56 (note *6 50) 78 In the text where it is said that, "after the suppression of the capitalist economy, and with the cessation of social production", the determination of value will remain

predominant, M arx writes in full that she. will consist in ensuring that "the regularization of working time and the distribution of social work between the different production groups, and finally. the accounts concerning them, become more important than ever«. (Capital III, p. 739)

que la position sociale des couches travailleuses est caractérisée par la prépondérance du moment socialiste, qui est aussi le plus »méritant« en ce qui concerne le caractère socialiste de ces sociétés. Au contraire, dans la position de la bureaucratie, le socialiste est doné négativement, c'est-à-dire comme une mesure de l'abolition des classes, et ce fait en même temps que l'essence de cette couche nous amène à croire que là, l'élément prépondérant relève de l'ancienne société. Ces éléments d'ancien présents dans la position sociale des travailleurs, et notamment de la bureaucratie. représentent une force sociale réelle qui fait obstracle à d'une restauration complète des rapports de classe et, parallèlement, une éventuelle intervention de l'extérieur ou une prétendue »diversion idéologique« relèvent d'une imagination naîve. Soit dit en passant, si cette restauration avait lieu, elle ne susciterait l'apparition d'aucune classe nouvelle, à moins que l'on entende par nouveau la combinaison d'éléments empruntés à des classes déjà

La base de l'élément socialiste dans la position des masses travailleuses et de la bureaucratie existe seulement dans un cadre et à travers un contenu donnés par la réalisation pratique des rapports de propriété sociale. Au contraire, l'essentiel des éléments de l'ancienne société ne peut être obtenu que par des rapports de propriété privée. Les deux formes de propriété sont à la base de la vie sociale des communautés socialistes, représentant en même temps la cause finale de leur évolution positive ou négative. Soutenir que le négatif procède de prétendues »déformations« du socialisme nous paraît non seulement peu sérieux, mais fondamentalement erroné. Cela ne fait que rendre encore plus confuse une situation sociale complexe dans laquelle chaque »frustration« dans les rapports de propriété sociale ne peut que déboucher sur l'apparition des rapports de propriété privée.

Le problème qui retient toute notre attention dans cette étude exige avant tout une définition du caractère social et de la forme des éléments des rapports de propriété privée que l'on trouve dans les sociétés socialistes. A notre avis, ce sont surtout les rapports de propriété privée des formations sociales de classe précapitalistes. C'est ce que prouve d'abord le système de dépendance et de subordination de la personne qui caractérise leur réalisation dans son ensemble, notamment en ce qui concerne l'appropriation du surplus de travail, c'est-à-dire l'exploitation des producteurs. C'est pourquoi il est faux de qualifier ces états sociaux »bureaucratiques rapports correspondants d'exploitation indirecte par une économie de monnaie-marchandise développée. On pourrait plus justement parler d'éléments de féodalisme »étatique«, comme plus adéquats à la nature de la position sociale bureaucratique. Toutefois, à côté des formes précapitalistes, on note la présence, dans les éléments de rapports de propriété privée, d'une forme bourgeoise et petite-bourgeoise.

Nous espérons que personne ne contestera que dans les éléments existants de rapports de propriété privée, la bureaucratie

»deserving« with regard to the socialist character of these societies. On the contrary, in the position of the bureaucracy, the socialist is therefore negatively, that is to say as a measure of the abolition of classes, and this fact at the same time as the essence of this layer leads us to believe that there, the preponderant element comes from the old society. These elements of the old present in the social position of the workers, and in particular of the bureaucracy, represent a real social force which stands in the way of a complete restoration of class relations and, at the same time, a possible intervention of the outside or an alleged »ideological diversion« stem from a naïve imagination. Incidentally, if this restoration took place, it would not bring about the appearance of any new class, unless we mean by new the combination of elements borrowed from classes already known.

The basis of the socialist element in the position of the working masses and the bureaucracy exists only within a framework and through a content given by the practical realization of the relations of social property. On the contrary, the essential elements of the old society can only be obtained through private property relations. Both forms of property are the basis of the social life of socialist communities, representing at the same time the final cause of their positive or negative revolution. To maintain that the negative proceeds from so-called "distortions" of socialism seems to us not only unserious, but fundamentally erroneous. This only confuses even more a complex social situation in which every "frustration" in the relations of social property can only lead to the appearance of the relations of private property.

The problem which occupies all our attention in this study requires above all a definition of the social character and the form of the elements of the relations of private property which one finds in socialist societies. In our view, these are above all the private property relations of precapitalist class social formations. This is proven first of all by the system of dependence and subordination of the person which characterizes their realization as a whole, particularly with regard to the appropriation of surplus work, that is to say the exploitation of producers.

This is why it is wrong to call these social states »bureaucratic relations corresponding to indirect exploitation by a developed commodity-money economy. One could more accurately speak of elements of "statist" feudalism, as more appropriate to the nature of the bureaucratic social position.

However, alongside the precapitalist forms, we note the presence, in the elements of private property relations, of a bourgeois and petty-bourgeois form.

We hope that no one will dispute that in the existing elements of private property relations, the bureaucracy 295

se sent parfaitement à l'aise, contrairement aux masses travailleuses qui portent le poids de ce bien-être. C'est pourquoi la bureaucratie est intéressée au plus haut point par le maintien et le développement de ces rapports. Mais, étant donnée qu'ils se composent de formes historiquement différentes et mutuellement antithétiques, les intérêts de la bureaucratie comme ses aspirations sont tout à fait contradictoires. Cette partie de la bureaucratie, qui est le produit des rapports de propriété privée du système de domination et de sujétion directe, a avantage à les conserver (s'il est devenu impossible de les développer) parce que, à vrai dire, la bureaucratie s'y sent tout à fait à son aise et à l'abri. Face à la propriété sociale, on voit aspirer à se développer - ou plutôt à se restaurer sous une nouvelle forme — une forme bourgeoise et petite-bourgeoise de rapports de propriété privée »libres«, notamment la forme petite-bourgeoise qui constitute le plus bas niveau du développement de la propriété privée. En fait, aux intérêts bourgeois de la position de la bureaucratie répond l'aspiration à transferrer sur l'entreprise, c'est-à-dire sur la force de travail associée, non seulement le poids de l'exploitation, mais aussi la responsabilité du succès de la production. C'est précisément sur la base de l'existence et du développement des rapports de propriété privée dans les systèmes libérés de la dépendance personnelle qu'apparaît nécessairement et que doit apparaître l'économie monnaie-marchandise, moyen de médiation adéquat dans la réalisation de la distribution sociale du travail et des autres rapports à l'intérieur du processus sociale de la production et de la reproduction de la vie. Seul ce mouvement pourrait aboutir à un était social étatico-capitaliste, dans lequel la couche que l'on nomme »bureaucratie« serait réellement propriétaire capitaliste collectif »d'état«, et les travailleurs associés dans le cadre de l'entreprise rien d'autre que des possesseurs qui seraient exploités, comme producteurs de marchandises, par l'intermédiaire du marche.77 Ce rapport est réalisé dans les branches nationalisées de l'économie de certains pays capitalistes. Cependant, les chances d'un semblable »développement« capitaliste dans les pays socialistes sont minimes, non pas parce que des éléments de rapports précapitalistes s'y opposent, mais parce que les forces du socialisme sont là, qui réussiront à vaincre toutes les séquelles de l'ancienne société, quelle que soit leur forme historique.

Il s'ensuit qu'à la base de telle ou telle réalisation des rapports monnaie-marchandise dans les pay socialistes, on trouve une distribution sociale du travail et des rapports de propriété privée

⁷⁷ Nous remarquons que dans les conditions des rapports étatiques capitalistes, c'est-à,dire des rapports entre la bureaucratie en tant que propriétaire réel et capitaliste d'était et collectif, et les entreprises de travailleurs associés en tant que possesseurs privées, le rapport de propriété n'est pas et ne peut pas être tout à fait libéré de la subordination. Cependant, l'entreprise »non libre« est d'autant plus faible qu'elle se réduit à la pure et simple obligation du »tribut«, sous forme de plus-value que l'état s'approprie par les instruments de la propriété. Il peut alors se produire que le profit moyen et l'impôt correspondent aux conditions analogues du féodalisme »d'état«, où la rente et l'impôt coincident. (Voir K. Marx, Capital III, p. 684, 685)

feels perfectly at ease, unlike the working masses who bear the weight of this well-being. This is why the bureaucracy is most interested in maintaining and developing these relationships. But, since they are composed of historically different and mutually antithetical forms, the interests of the bureaucracy as well as its aspirations are quite contradictory. This part of the bureaucracy, which is the product of the private property relations of the system of domination and direct subjection, has the advantage of preserving them (if it has become impossible to develop them) because, to tell the truth, the bureaucracy feels completely at ease and sheltered there. Faced with social property, we see the aspiration to develop—or rather to restore itself in a new form—a bourgeois and petty-bourgeois form of "free" private property relations, notably the petty-bourgeois form which constitutes the lowest level of private property development. In fact, to the bourgeois interests of the position of the bureaucracy responds Inspiration to transfer onto the enterprise, that is to say onto the associated work force, not only the weight of exploitation, but also the responsibility of production success. It is precisely on the basis of the existence and development of private property relations in systems freed from personal dependence that the moneycommodity economy necessarily appears and must appear, as a means of mediation. adequate in realizing the social distribution of labor and other relations within the social process of the production and reproduction of life. Only this movement could lead to a state-capitalist social state, in which the so-called "bureaucracy" layer would really be the collective capitalist "state" owner, and the workers associated within the framework of the company nothing, other than possessors who would be exploited, as producers of goods, through the intermediary of the market.77 This relationship is realized in the nationalized branches of the economy of certain capitalist countries. However, the chances of a similar capitalist "development" in the socialist countries are minimal, not because elements of pre-capitalist relations oppose it, but because the forces of socialism are there, which will succeed in overcoming all the sequels of the old society, whatever their historical form.

It follows that at the base of this or that realization of the money-commodity relations in the socialist countries, one finds a social distribution of labor and private property relations. capitalist states, that is, the relationship between the bureaucracy as the real and capitalist owner of the state and collective, and the enterprises of associated workers as the pledged owners. , the relationship of ownership is not and cannot be completely freed from subordination. However, »non-free« enterprise is all the weaker in that it is reduced to the pure and simple obligation of »tribute«, in the form of surplus value than the state. ap ro p ted by the instrum ents of property. It can then happen that the average profit and the

tax correspond to the analogous conditions of "state" teodalism, where the rent and the tax coincide. (See K. Marx, C apital III, p. 684, 685) 296

libérés du système de domination et de sujétion directe. L'engagement pour une réalisation plus complète et plus conséquente de l'économie monnaie-marchandise, dans laquelle la loi de la valeur fonctionne comme régulateur des rapports économiques, recouvre en réalité un engagement dans la voie de rapports de propriété privée typiquement bourgeois ou petit-bourgeois. L'adversaire de l'économie marchande occupe en gros deux positions différentes: dans la première, il désire conserver les rapports de subordination existants comme rapports »bureaucratiques« et de propriété privée, dans la seconde, il aspire au développement des rapports de propriété sociale. Le conflit des différentes formes de propriété donne donc naissance au dilemme théorique et pratique suivant: pour ou contre l'économie monnaie-marchandise, c'est-à--dire pour ou contre la loi de la valeur. Il est certain que la production de marché, qui est fondée sur des rapports de propriété privée »bureaucratique« où dominent des rapports de dépendance personnelle, mais non par rapport à une production organisée et fondée sur les bases de la propriété sociale. Comme nous l'avons vu, cela dépend très peu du désir et de la décision des politiciens et des penseurs. Signalons encore que nous ne devons pas nous laisser troubler par le fait que les travailleurs »acceptent« l'économie monnaie-marchandise. Ils y sont forcés, car ils sont pri-sonniers des rapports de propriété privée et des intérêts et illusions de l'économie marchande, bien que tout cela n'aille dans le sens ni de leur intérêt ni de leur nature sociale.

La loi de la valeur et de la planification dans les conditions du socialisme a créé une situation tout à fait confuse, dont sont responsables à la fois les partisans et les adversaires de l'économie marchande. Pour nous, ce sont des moyens déterminés qui préparent et créent les rapports de la production sociale et de la reproduction de la vie. C'est ainsi que la planification est un moyen de créer l'association directe, applicable dans les cadres de la propriété ou de la possession privée individuelle, mais aussi dans les cadres de la communauté sociale globale, sur la base de la propriété commune ou sociale. Au contraire, la forme marchande et la loi de la valeur sont des moyens de médiation et de réalisation de l'association et de la société, qui répondent aux besoins de la propriété ou de la possession privée libre, c'est-à-dire à des situations où l'application des actions conscientes et planifiées de la société n'est pas possible, dans le cadre des rapports à l'intérieur des communautés comme dans celui des rapports intercommunautaires. Donc, en regard des rapports auxquels ils servent, ces moyens, s'excluent réciproquement: où il y a place pour les uns, il n'y a pas place pour les autres; en d'autres termes, leur application est sous la dépendance directe des rapports qui dominent dans la production. C'est pourquoi il seriat faux de faire de la planification et de la loi de la valeur des alliés mis sur un pied d'égalité, comme d'en faire des ennemis irréductibles, car la forêt cache l'arbre. Le conflit virulent entre loi de la valeur et planification cache en réalité l'exclusion réciproque de certains rapports free from the system of domination and direct subjection. The commitment to a more complete and more consistent realization of the moneycommodity economy, in which the law of value functions as a regulator of economic relations, in reality covers a commitment to the path of relations of private property typically bourgeois or petty bourgeois. The adversary of the market economy occupies broadly two different positions: in the first, he wishes to preserve the existing relations of subordination as "bureaucratic" and private property relations, in the second, he aspires to the development of relations of social property. The conflict of different forms of property therefore gives rise to the following theoretical and practical dilemma: for or against the commodity-money economy, is it

say for or against the law of value. It is certain that market production, which is based on relations of "bureaucratic" private property or relations of personal dependence dominate, but not in relation to an organized production founded on the bases of social property. As we have seen, it depends very little on the desire and decision of politicians and thinkers. Let us also point out that we must not be disturbed by the fact that the workers "accept" the commodity-money economy. They are forced to do so, because they are prisoners of private property relations and of the interests and illusions of the market economy, although all of this is neither in their interest nor in their nature, social.

The law of value and planning under the conditions of socialism has created a completely confused situation, for which both supporters and opponents of the market economy are responsible. For us, they are determined means which prepare and create the relations of social production and the reproduction of life. It is thus that planning is a means of creating direct association, applicable in the frameworks of individual property or private possession, but also in the frameworks of the global social community, on the basis of the common or social property. On the contrary, the commodity form and the law of value are means of mediation and realization of association and society, which respond to the needs of property or free private possession, that is, - to say to situations where the application of conscious and planned actions of society is not possible, within the framework of relations within communities as well as in that of inter-community relations. Therefore, with regard to the relations to which they serve, these means are mutually exclusive: either there is room for some, there is no room for others; in other words, their application is under the direct dependence of the relations which dominate in production. This is why it would be wrong to make planning and the law of value allies placed on an equal footing, like making them irreducible enemies, because the forest hides the tree. The virulent conflict between the law of value and planning actually hides the reciprocal exclusion of certain relationships 297

de propriété déterminés. La loi de la valeur et la forme marchande apparaissent en général comme un moyen nécessaire à certaines conditions sociales, lorsque la liaison directe est impossible. Aussi, si nous ne chantons pas les louanges de la loi de la valeur, il est illogique de l'accuser des »maux« apportés par certains rapports de la production elle-même, »maux« qu'elle s'efforce justement de compenser après coup. En fait, dans le désordre permament de la production sociale qui caractérise les rapports correspondants, la loi de la valeur s'efforce après coup de faire de l'ordre.

QUELQUES OBSERVATIONS CRITIQUES CONCERNANT LE »MODELE« D'ECONOMIE MARCHANDE QUE L'ON NOUS OFFRE COMME SOCIALISTE

Nous nous faisons un devoir de tenter la critique d'un modèle théorique qui, selon les auteurs qui en traitent, n'a pas encore atteint le stade d'une réalisation totale et conséquente. Comme aucun »modèle« théorique ne peut apparaître indépendamment de la pratique correspondante, notre réflexion, bien qu'elle n'ait pas la prétention de donner une note à la vie économique d'une société concrète, doit s'occuper cependant des rapports réels de caractère général, liés à une conception qui prétend au rang de théorie générale.

La théorie de la production marchande »socialiste« part de la propriété sociale comme rapport dominant, dans le cadre de quoi la production et ses réalisateurs ont un caractère social, bien que tout cela soit loin d'avoir été défini clairement. La base de départ semble jouer le rôle d'une condition générale qui, entre autres, fixe le caractère »socialiste« de l'économie marchande. En ce qui concerne les causes, on cite le plus souvent le degré de développement des forces de production, la distribution sociale du travail, puis l'existence de l'entreprise »socialiste«, sujet autonome et indépendant de l'économie et des rapports autogestifs. Donc, les rapports de propriété sont exclus comme cause possible, parce que les théoriciens de la production marchande »socialiste« avaient de »bonnes« raisons pour le faire. Mais nous avons dit ce que nous pensions du problème des conditions et des causes de l'économie marchande en général, et nous nous intéresserons maintenant à certains rapports de l'économie marchande, donnés dans une théorie dont nous avons l'intention de faire la critique.

L'un des efforts essentiels des théoriciens de la production marchande »socialiste« porte sur le désir de trouver à tout prix, dans la structure de la valeur marchande de l'entreprise dite socialiste, des rapports qualitativement nouveaux. Dès le début, on soutient que cette structure se compose d'une partie transmise et d'une partie créée, ce qui ne constitue d'ailleurs rien de nouveau, puisqu' il s'agit là d'un rapport général que l'on trouve dans toutes les structures de valeur de la marchandise. Un peu plus loin, dans le

298

of determined properties. The law of value and the commodity form generally appear as a necessary means in certain social conditions, when direct connection is impossible. Also, if we do not sing the praises of the law of value, it is illogical to accuse it of the "evils" brought about by certain relations of production itself, "evils" which it justly strives for. try to compensate afterwards. In fact, in the permanent disorder of social production which characterizes the corresponding relations, the law of value tries after the fact to create order.

SOME CRITICAL OBSERVATIONS REGARDING

THE "MODEL" OF THE MARKET ECONOMY THAT WE

OFFERS US AS A SOCIALIST

We make it our duty to try to criticize a theoretical model which, according to the authors who deal with it, has not yet reached the stage of a total and consistent realization. As no theoretical "model" can appear independently of the corresponding practice, our reflection, although it does not claim to give a mark to the economic life of a concrete society, must concern however, real relations of a general character, linked to a conception which claims the rank of general theory.

The theory of "socialist" commodity production assumes social property as the dominant relation, in which production and its implementers have a social character, although this is far from being clearly defined. The starting base seems to play the role of a general condition which, among other things, fixes the "socialist" character of the market economy. As far as the causes are concerned, the degree of development of the forces of production, the social distribution of labor, and then the existence of the "socialist" enterprise, an autonomous and independent subject of the economy, are most often cited. and self-reports. Thus, property relations are excluded as a possible cause, because the theorists of "socialist" commodity production had

»good« reasons to do so. But we have said what we think of the problem of the conditions and causes of the market economy in general, and we will now be interested in certain relations of the market economy, given in a theory which we intend to do the criticism.

One of the essential efforts of the theoreticians of "socialist" commodity production bears on the desire to find, at all costs, in the structure of commodity value of the so-called socialist enterprise, qualitatively new relations. From the beginning, it is maintained that this structure is composed of a transmitted part and a created part, which is nothing new, since

this is a general relation found in all value structures of the commodity. A little further, in the 298

même texte, on peut lire: »Si dans ce moment nous négligeons le problème de l'accumulation (dont il sera question plus loin), nous distinguons un changement dans la structure de la valeur marchande par rapport à celle qui est produite dans l'entreprise capitaliste, en ce sens que la valeur nouvelle se présente comme une catégorie unique. En fait, si l'on pose la réalisation de la marchandise produite en valeur, sa structure M = dm + r montre: premièrement que les dépenses matérielles (dm) représentent un dédommagement de la valeur figurée des moyens dépensés pour le travail et les objets du travail, et la valeur nouvelle le revenu (r) du collectif de travail. En fait, il n'y a pas de rapport social, ni de classe sociale, qui a priori, sur la base de la propriété, reçoive le revenu — ce qui conditionnerait une répartition des nouvelles valeurs en fermage et plus - value«. Il est vraiment difficile de trouver un meilleur exemple de pensée acrobatique, capable de résoudre les énormes problèmes de la vie sociale par les phrases du plus vulgaire arbitraire et par des substitutions de noms.

Soutenir qu'il est suffisant de négliger en pensées le problème de l'accumulation pour qu'apparaisse un changement qualitatif dans le phénomène de la vie réelle, c'est-à-dire dans la structure de la valeur marchande, un changement, en fait, qui ferait de la nouvelle valeur de l'entreprise socialiste »une catégorie unique«, à la différence de celle produite par l'entreprise capitaliste, soutenir cela ne nous paraît mériter de commentaire. Cependant, outre le fait que les pensées seules n'y ont rien pu changer, il a celui que, dans le cadre du rapport général de la structure de la valeur de la marchandise, la nouvelle valeur est toujours unique par rapport à la valeur transferrée, bien que que rien n'empêche qu'à l'intérieur d'elle-même elle soit divisée. Donc, il nous faudrait d'autres preuves que des phrases sur l'unité de la nouvelle valeur. On change également le nom des parties de la structure de la valeur marchande dans l'entreprise socialiste, structure qui se compose maintenant de dépenses matérielles et de revenus, A. Smith, d'ailleurs, s'inspirant des impulsions de l'intérêt de classe bourgeois, a tenté de présenter la valeur nouvelle comme une somme de revenus.79 La réponse de Marx peut parfaitement être adressée aux théoriciens de la production marchande »socialiste«: La valeur ne procède pas d'une quelconque transformation en revenu, elle doit être sur place avant de pouvoir se transformer en revenu, et prendre forme«.80 La structure de la valeur est donnée par les rapports dans le travail, qui sont déterminés par la forme de la propriété, donc, par les rapports dans son processus direct de réalisation. Dans l'échange des produits, la valeur persiste comme phénomène spécifique et se réalise comme tel, et ne prend forme de revenu que par l'intermédiaire des rapports de distribution. Il est évident que sous la nouvelle appellation de »revenus

⁷⁸ Recueil de travaux: Fondements de la théorie du revenu et de la production marchande socialiste, Dr. T. Vlaskalić: Processus de production dans l'économie socialiste, Rad (1970, 82, 2) Ibid...

 ⁷⁹ K. Marx, Capital II, p. 315
 ⁸⁰ K. Marx, Capital III, p. 753

capitalist enterprise, in the sense that the new value presents itself as a unique category. In fact, if the realization of the commodity produced is posed in value, its structure M=dm+r shows: firstly that the material expenditure (dm) represents a compensation for the figured value of the means expended for the labor and the objects of labor, and the new value the income (r) of the labor collective. In fact, there is no social relation, nor social class, which a priori, on the basis of property, receives the income - which would condition a distribution of the new values in rent and surplus - value. It is really difficult to find a better example of acrobatic thought capable of solving the enormous problems of social life by the most vulgar, arbitrary phrases and substitutions of names.

To maintain that it is sufficient to neglect the problem of accumulation in thought for a qualitative change to appear in the phenomenon of real life, that is, in the structure of market value, a change, in fact, which would make the new value of the socialist enterprise "a unique category", unlike that produced by the capitalist enterprise, we argue that it does not deserve comment. However, besides the fact that thoughts alone could not change anything, there is the fact that, within the framework of the general relation of the structure of the value of the commodity, the new value is always unique with respect to the transferred value, although nothing prevents it from being divided inside itself. Therefore, we would need other proofs than sentences on the unit of the new value.

The names of the parts of the structure of market value in the socialist enterprise are also changed, a structure which now consists of material expenditures and incomes, A. Smith, moreover, drawing inspiration from the impulses of bourgeois class interest, tried to present the new value as a sum of incomes. does not proceed from any transformation into income, it must be in place before it can be transformed into income, and take shape. which are determined by the form of the property, therefore, by the relations in its direct process of realization. In the exchange of products, value persists as a specific phenomenon and is realized as such, and takes the form of revenue only through the intermediary of distribution relations. It is obvious that under the new label of "incomes" 78 Collection of works: Foundations of the theory of income and socialist commodity production, Dr. 1970, 82, 2) Ibid. . .

78 K. M arx, Capital II, p. 315

88 K. M arx, C apital III, p. 753

de l'entreprise«, on entend escamoter toute trace des rapports dans la création et par là dans la structure réelle de la valeur nouvelle.

L'»argument« suivant en faveur du caractère unitaire de la valeur nouvelle dans l'entreprise socialiste est l'affirmation verbale qu'il n'existe pas »de rapport social, ni par conséquent de classe sociale qui a priori, sur la base de la propriété, reçoit un revenu«.81 Si ce sont les rapports de propriété qui font les rapports réels entre les hommes par le truchement des moyens de production, du travail et des produits, et non pas les déclarations politiques et juridiques, alors les théoriciens de la production marchande »socialiste« ont échoué dans leur tentative de nous convaincre avec preuve à l'appui. Ils n'ont fait que nous donner des preuves du contraire. Que peut-on conclure, par exemple, du fait que sur les 100% du produit total net, 70,5% vont au surplus du travail, et seulement 29,5% aux revenus personnels des producteurs? El est difficile de croire que les producteurs acceptent de gaîté de coeur rapport dans la distribution du travail et des produits. Nous pensons tout au contraire que, si quelqu'un consent à une telle quantité de travail aliéné, il doit en même temps être le maître et le propriétaire des moyens de production, même s'il en est autrement dans les documents politiques et juridiques. Car, »le capital n'a pas réparti le surplus du travail«, mais »partout où une partie de la société a le monopole des moyens de production, le travailleur doit, qu'il soit libre ou non, au temps de travail nécessaire à son entretien, ajouter un surplus de temps de travail afin de produire des vivres pour le propriétaire des moyens de production«.83 Si c'est la production pour le marché qui est en question, le produit tout entier apparaît sous forme de valeur, et sa structure est déterminée par les rapports dans le travail et par la propriété des moyens de production, donc, par les rapports à l'intérieur de son processus direct de création. Les rapports de distribution sont plutôt semblables aux rapports de production. C'est pourquoi il est illogique de soutenir, comme le font les théoriciens de la production marchande »socialiste, que la valeur nouvelle est unique avant et non unique après la réalisation, quand elle se divise en revenu personnel et en surplus du travail. Cette distribution de la nouvelle valeur, comme ils disent, après la réalisation ce n'est rien d'autre que la conséquence normale de l'état des rapports dans son processus de création.

Les théoriciens de la production marchande »socialiste« peuvent nous objecter que nous ne prenons pas en considération le caractère »nouveau« du surplus du travail, lequel, selon eux, loin d'être extorqué d'avance, est au contraire partiellement rendu aux producteurs par la médiation de l'accumulation, l'autre partie étant consommée sous forme de revenu par les autres membres

liste, Recueil de travaux, p. 72 83 K. Marx, Capital I, p. 176

 ⁸¹ Recueil de travaux: Fondements de la théorie du revenu...p. 82
 82 Dr. D. Dragišić: Position du producteur dans le système autogestif,
 Fondements de la théorie du revenu et de la production marchande socia-

The next »argument« in favor of the unitary character of the new value in the socialist enterprise is the verbal affirmation that there does not exist »a social relationship, nor therefore a social class which a priori, on the basis of property, receives an income".81

If it is the relations of property which make the real relations between men through means of production, labor and products, and not political and legal declarations, then the theorists of "socialist" commodity production "failed in their attempt to convince us with supporting evidence. They have only given us evidence to the contrary. What can be concluded, for example, from the fact that of the 100% of the total net product, 70.5% goes to the labor surplus, and only 29.5% to the personal income of the producers?82 It is hard to believe that producers gladly accept a relationship in the distribution of labor and products. We think, on the contrary, that if someone consents to such an amount of alien labor, he must at the same time be the master and the owner of the means of production, even if it is otherwise in policy and legal documents. For, »capital has not distributed the surplus of labour«, but »wherever a part of society has the monopoly of the means of production, the worker must, whether he be free or not, at the time of labor necessary for its upkeep, to add extra labor time in order to produce food for the owner of the means of production."83

If it is production for the market that is in question, the whole product appears in the form of value, and its structure is determined by the relations in labor and by the ownership of the means of production. production, therefore, by the relations within its direct process of creation. Distribution reports are quite similar to production reports. This is why it is illogical to maintain, as do the theorists of socialist commodity production, that new value is unique before and not unique after realization, when it is divided into personal income and labor surplus. This distribution of new value, as they say, after realization is nothing but the normal consequence of the state of relations in its process of creation.

The theoreticians of "socialist" commodity production may object that we do not take into consideration the "new" character of the surplus of labour, which, according to them, far from being extorted in advance, is on the contrary partially rendered to the producers through the mediation of accumulation, the other part being consumed as income by the other members 91 Collection of works: Foundations of the theory of income . . . p. 82

81 Dr. D. Dragišić: Position of the producer in the autogestive system, Foundations of the theory of income and socialist commodity production, Collection of works, p. 72

de la société. Cependant, puisqu'une partie du surplus de travail (lire de la plus-value) va à l'accumulation, c'est-à-dire se transforme en nouveaux frais de production (lire capital), la seconde partie étant consommée par la »bureaucratie« et les autres couches non productives sous forme de revenu, on ne peut rien changer au fait qu'il reste »un travail non rétribé, dont la quantité est déterminée par des conditions tout à fait différentes«,84 de celles dont nous parlent les théoriciens sous-nommés. Dans toutes les situations »de qui pro quo où le revenu devient source de valeur marchande et non la valeur marchande source de revenu«, où la valeur marchande »se présente comme composée de différentes sortes de revenus«, ce qui est le cas chez les theoriciens de la production marchande »socialiste«, on peut toujours se poser les mêmes questions.85 Exemple: quels critères réels définissent les rapports d'une part dans la répartition de la valeur nouvelle (selon eux »revenu de l'entreprise«) en revenus personnels des producteurs et surplus de travail, et d'autre part la répartition du surplus du travail lui--même? Si la loi de la valeur est le régulateur essentiel de ces rapports, comme l'affirment nos théoriciens, comment cela se passe--t-il? Les réponses de Marx aux questions posées sont parfaitement claires et précises, et il est difficile de croire que les théoriciens de la production marchande »socialiste« sont incapables de les comprendre. En outre, ils s'efforcent de nous offrir en échange un verbalisme affriolant et de nous faire accepter des mots nouveaux pour désigner de vieilles choses. Par exemple, ils font l'impossible pour éviter de donner au surplus du travail le nom de plus-value, bien que ce soit sa seule forme possible dans les conditions de l'économie marchande. Les revenus personnels des producteurs ne sont pas la forme et l'expression du travail nécessaire, bien qu'il n'y aurait rien de plus normal, puisque d'un autre côté et eux-mêmes le reconnaissent — le surplus du travail existe. Mais, cette logique de pensée, qui selon nous est la seule valable, ils la fuient consciemment, car elle les amènerait à admettre l'existence d'une valeur nouvelle composée de la valeur de la force de travail et de la plus-value, ce qui est déjà dangereux pour le caractère »socialiste« de leur économie marchande. Alors les théoriciens de la production marchande »socialiste«, passant sans même s'en apercevoir sur leur conception de la structure de la valeur des produits du travail, affirment que l'importance des revenus personnels des producteurs (et des autres) est définie ou doit être définie par la qualité et la quantité de leur travail. Il semble donc que les revenus personnels soient une forme de valeur de travail --- c'est-à-dire son prix. Ne s'agirait-il pas ici de l'expression imaginaire bien connue »valeur du travail«, dans laquelle la notion de valeur a non seulement disparu, mais s'est transformée en son contraire? Mais chez nos théoriciens, cela a un certain sens, puisque cela leur permet de qualifier de prix du travail une évidente appropriation du travail d'autrui.

⁸⁴ K. Marx, Capital II, p. 315

⁸⁵ K. Marx, Capital II, p. 310, 311

of the company. However, since part of the surplus labor (lire surplus value) goes to accumulation, i.e. is transformed into new production costs (lire capital), the second part being consumed by the »bureaucracy« and the other non-productive strata in the form of income, nothing can be changed about the fact that there remains »unpaid work, the quantity of which is determined by conditions quite different«84 from those of which the under-named theoreticians speak to us. In all situations

»de qui pro quo where income becomes a source of market value and not market value a source of income«, where market value »presents itself as composed of different kinds of income«, which is the case among theoreticians of »socialist« commodity production, one can always ask the same questions.85 Example: what real criteria define the ratios of a share in the distribution of the new) into personal income of producers and surplus labor, and on the other hand the distribution of surplus labor itself.

-even? If the law of value is the essential regulator of these relations, as our theorists affirm, how does this happen?

does he? Marx's answers to the questions posed are perfectly clear and precise, and it is hard to believe that the theorists of "socialist" commodity production are incapable of understanding them. Moreover, they strive to offer us in exchange an alluring verbalism and to make us accept new words to designate old things. For example, they do their utmost to avoid giving surplus labor the name of surplus value, although this is the only form possible under the conditions of the market economy. The personal income of the producers is not the form and the expression of the necessary work, although there would be nothing more normal, since on the other hand

— and they themselves recognize it — the surplus of labor exists.

But they consciously shun this logic of thought, which we believe is the only valid one, because it would lead them to admit the existence of a new value composed of the value of labor power and surplus value, which is already dangerous for the "socialist" character of their market economy. So the theoreticians of "socialist" commodity production, passing without even realizing it on their conception of the structure of the value of the products of labor, affirm that the importance of the personal incomes of the producers (and others) is defined or must be defined by the quality and quantity of their work. It therefore seems that personal income is a form of labor value.

— that is, its price. Is this not the well-known imaginary expression "value of work", in which the notion of value has not only disappeared, but has

been transformed into its opposite? But for our theoreticians, this has a certain meaning, since it allows them to qualify as the price of labor an obvious appropriation of the work of others.

MK. Marx, Capital II, p. 315

85 K. M arx, C apital II, p. 310, 311

301

Dans la théorie de l'économie marchande »socialiste«, on trouve aussi la thèse selon laquelle l'existence de l'entreprise en tant que producteur particulier et autonome est la condition et la base de l'autogestion ouvrière. Il nous semble à nous que la dite autonomie, par essence, ne peut être rien d'autre qu'une existence privée, que ce soit sous forme de propriété ou de possession, ce qui ne peut laisser de place à l'autogestion des ouvriers sur le plan social en général. Car, quel que soit le degré de solidarité existant entre les ouvriers, le cadre des rapports de propriété privée les oblige à un comportement dans lequel dominera la lutte pour l'intérêt particulier, c'est-à-dire privé, ce en quoi ils ne différeront pas beaucoup des autres propriétaires ou posseusseurs privés. Le travailleurs associés dans l'entreprise ne peuvent être possesseurs que dans les conditions du capitalisme d'état. Autrement, on connaît des exemples de formes coopératives de la propriété ouvrière dans les cadres des structures capitalistes en vigueur, qui ne sont autres que des formes de propriété privée. Les ouvriers sont alors leurs propres capitalistes, et en tant que tels, des producteurs de marchandises. Cependant, la pratique actuelle et sa réalisation n'ont pas confirmé la présupposition du développement de la forme coopérative de propriété ouvrière comme moyen de faire disparaître la forme capitaliste. D'autre part, sur le plan social général, cela ne représenterait pas un progrès notable, puisque, en fait, il s'agirait de remplacer une forme de propriété priveée par une autre. Mais, s'il arrivait par hasard que le développement assure la domination des formes coopératives de la propriété privée des travailleurs, nous sommes sûrs que cette situation déboucherait aussitôt sur une association des travailleurs et de leur propriété sur le plan social général, c'est-à-dire à création de la propriété sociale, ce qui serait la fin de leur autonomie et de leur liberté de producteurs, puisq'alors l'économie marchande deviendrait superflue et inutile. Donc, la seule voie vers une authentique gestion ouvrière est celle qui passe par la suppression de toutes les formes de propriété privée, même celle que l'on pourait formellement traiter d'»ouvrière«. Il s'ensuit que la forme coopérative de propriété ouvrière n'a pas et ne peut avoir de perspective historique. Une autogestion ouvrière conséquente, ou plus exactement une gestion, peut exister et exister seulement: premièrement, dans le cadre des rapports de propriété sociale, c'est--à-dire de la propriété des producteurs associés de la société dans sa totalité, et deuxièmement, à condition d'être en même temps réalisée dans le cadre de l'entreprise et dans celui de toute la communauté sociale, grâce à toutes les branches essentielles de la vie.

Les autres »preuves« de l'économie marchande »socialiste«, telles que celles qui concernent les motifs et la rentabilité de la production là où se présente ce qu'on appelle »l'empreinte du revenu«, ensuite, le »coût réel« de la marchandise comme prix de revient dans le système de l'économie marchande »autogestive«, la perte et le profit, etc, ne représentent rien d'autre qu'une terminologie chaotique ou, dans le meilleur des cas, la désignation de vieilles choses par des noms nouveaux.

302

In the theory of the »socialist« market economy, one also finds the thesis according to which the existence of the company as a particular and autonomous producer is the condition and the basis of worker self-

management. It seems to us that the said autonomy, in essence, can be nothing other than a private existence, whether in the form of property or possession, which cannot leave room for self-management of the workers on the social level in general. For, whatever the degree of solidarity existing between the workers, the framework of the relations of private property obliges them to a behavior in which the struggle for the particular interest will dominate, that is to say private, in which they will not differ much from other private proprietors or possessors. The workers associated in the company can only be owners under the conditions of state capitalism. Otherwise, we know of examples of cooperative forms of workers' property within the framework of the capitalist structures in force, which are nothing other than forms of private property. The workers are then their own capitalists, and as such producers of commodities. However, current practice and its realization have not confirmed the presupposition of the development of the cooperative form of workers' ownership as a means of making the capitalist form disappear. On the other hand, on the general social level, this would not represent a notable progress, since, in fact, it would be a matter of replacing one form of private property by another. But if it were to happen by chance that development ensured the dominance of cooperative forms of the private property of the workers, we are sure that this situation would lead immediately to an association of the workers and their property over the general social plan, that is to say the creation of social property, which would be the end of their autonomy and their freedom as producers, since then the market economy would become superfluous and useless. Thus, the only path to genuine workers' management is through the abolition of all forms of private property, even that which could formally be called "worker's". It follows that the cooperative form of workers' property does not and cannot have a historical perspective. A consequent workers' self-management, or more exactly a management, can exist and exist only: firstly, within the framework of the relations of social property, it is

that is to say, of the property of the associated producers of the company as a whole, and secondly, provided that it is carried out at the same time within the framework of the company and within that of the whole social community, thanks to all the essential branches of life.

The other »proofs« of the »socialist« market economy, such as those concerning the motives and the profitability of production where the so-called »imprint of income« presents itself, then the » real cost" of the commodity as cost price in the system of the "autogestive" commodity economy, loss and profit, etc., represent nothing but a chaotic terminology or, in the best of times, the calling of old things by new names.

Pour finir, on pourrait conclure que le concept de production marchande qui nous est offert comme socialiste renferme tous les traits caractéristiques de la consience petite-bourgeoise et de ses intérêts. Ce qu'on désire, en réalité, c'est une production privée et une appropriation privée s'accompagnant de l'économie mon--naie-marchandises adéquate, mais sans conséquences fâcheuses pour les propriétaires et les producteurs privés. Comme dirait Marx: on voudrait renverser le pape, mais garder le catholicisme. Les théoriciens de la production marchande »socialiste« s'efforcent de résoudre les contradictions réelles d'une vie sociale de toute évidence non socialiste à coup de phrases bien frappées, art où ils se sont rendus maîtres. Donc, ce que l'on ne peut atteindre réellement, il faut l'atteindre par la fiction de la lanque, de manière à changer la véritable nature des choses, c'est-à-dire que »les contradictions réelles, qui ne sont pas réellement résolues, doivent l'être par des phrases«.86 On peut parfaitement appliquer à ce cas cette remarque de Marx, que si le mouvement social peut réellement progresser et ses difficultés être effacées par la seule suppression des expressions qui sonnent mal et leur remplacement par d'autres, meilleures, il suffit alors de s'adresser aux institutions scientifiques linguistiques et de leur demander une nouvelle édition du dictionnaire.87

K. Marx, Théories de la plus-value, livre III, p. 98
 K. Marx, Capital I, p. 440, note 26 (ou Misère de la philosophie)

is private production and private appropriation accompanied by the global economy.

-naie-m arkandiques adequate, but without unfortunate consequences for owners and private producers. As M arx would say: we would like to overthrow the pope, but keep Catholicism.

The theoreticians of "socialist" commodity production strive to resolve the real contradictions of an obviously non-socialist social life with well-phrased phrases, an art in which they have become masters. Therefore, what one cannot really attain, one must attain through the fiction of language, so as to change the true nature of things, that is to say,

which are not really resolved, must be solved by sentences. 88 We can perfectly apply to this case this remark of M arx, that if the social movement can and its difficulties can be erased simply by deleting the expressions which sound bad and replacing them with other, better ones, it suffices then to address scientific linguistic institutions and ask them for a new edition of the dictionary. 87

84 K. M arx, Theories of Surplus Value, Book III, p. 98

87 K. M arx, C apital I, p. 440, note 26 (or Misere de la philosophie)

CULTURE ET DÉMOCRATIE

Octavian Chetan

Bucuresti

Le jeu des dichotomies et des analogies pousse parfois la théorie vers des constructions schématiques, achevées de point de vue logique, mais d'une efficacité minime (ou même nulle) sur le plan de la pratique sociale. Ainsi, le point de départ-principe ou thèse générale d'une valeur théorique et pratique d'une ample audience, mais figé à un niveau d'abstraction inoperant dans les cas concrets de l'historie, est développé en soi-même, en dehors de la totalité sociale et historique dont il vise, en fait, l'explication et l'approfondissement. Ces moments représentent un recule de la théorie et une vulgarisation des certaines vérités dans une pratique sous-théorique, dont le plus important moment réside dans le pointage du schéma avec des »thèses« au lieu de l'analyse proprement-dite de celles-ci.

Il arrive ainsi, que les problèmes théoriques du développement et de l'orientation de la nouvelle culture socialiste, furent abordés pas seulement une fois dans cette manière, dans des études plus ou moins récentes. C'est une vérité éclatante et en même temps une réalité en plein procès de génèse, le fait que le socialisme suppose nécessairement une grande richesse de la vie culturelle, multiformément développée, radicalement différente en ce qui concerne l'extension et le contenu de la culture des sociétés fondées sur des relations d'exploitations. Mais, biensûr qu'il n'est pas permit d'exiger comme suprême mission de la théorie de faire réclame à cette nouvelle culture, socialiste, comme il arrive parfois quand la plaidoire a l'air d'être générée par des motives compétitives, et que les tâches de cette nouvelle culture semblent reduites à prouver la supériorité du socialisme sur le capitalisme. La culture n'est pas un diadème brillant froidement sur le front d'une nation comme preuve de sa supériorité spirituelle. Elle est surtout une action conciemment poursuivie, engagée, une action d'influencer et d'éduquer une spiritualité tout entière, action qui s'intègre dans l'ensemble général d'une pratique révolutionnaire, mais qui, à son tour, dévo-

Octavian Chetan

Bucharest

The interplay of dichotomies and analogies sometimes pushes the theory towards schematic constructions, complete from a logical point of view, but of minimal (or even zero) effectiveness in terms of social practice. Thus, the point of departure-principle or general thesis of a theoretical and practical value of a wide audience, but fixed at a level of abstraction inoperative in the concrete cases of history, is developed in itself, apart from the social and historical totality of which it aims, in fact, the explanation and the deepening. These moments represent a retreat of the theory and a popularization of certain truths in a sub-theoretical practice, the most important moment of which resides in the pointing of the diagram with »theses« instead of the analysis properly. - said of these.

It thus happens that the theoretical problems of the development and orientation of the new socialist culture have been approached not only once in this way, in more or less recent studies. It is a striking truth and at the same time a reality in the midst of a gender process, the fact that socialism necessarily presupposes a great richness of cultural life, multi-formally developed, radically different as regards the extent and content of the culture of societies based on exploitative relations. But, of course, it is not permissible to demand as the supreme mission of the theory to claim this new, socialist culture, as sometimes happens when the argument seems to be generated by competitive motives, and that the tasks of this new culture seem reduced to proving the superiority of socialism over capitalism. Culture is not a coldly shining diadem on the brow of a nation as proof of its spiritual superiority. It is above all a con-

knowingly pursued, engaged in, influencing and educating

an entire spirituality, an action which is integrated into the general whole of a revolutionary practice, but which, in its turn,

305

ile son propre sens, uniquement si on l'envisage à travers la totalité de l'expérience sociale et historique. Au plein-centre de la culture se trouve l'homme, sa personnalité et sa subjectivité; et les buts profonds, la raison d'être et la nécessité historique de la culture socialiste sont ainsi indéniablement liés à la constitution d'un homme nouveau.

C'est dans ce noeud vital de la culture qu'on doit insérer la théorie. Les intérêts vitaux de la nouvelle organisation sociale exigent l'élaboration d'une théorie de la culture qui soit axée sur l'analyse des conditions et des moyens efficients à transformer révolutionnairement l'homme, à constituer la nouvelle spiritualité, communiste.

Évidemment, la plupart des études et des articles centrés autour de la nouvelle culture socialiste, envisagent, au moins indirectement, ces problèmes. Mais leur principal défaut réside dans la superficialité et la hâte avec lesquelles sont parcourrues les plus difficiles facettes de ce problème, facettes éludées le plus souvent par des schémas, auxquelles on aboutit par le déjà mentionné jeu des analogies et des dichotomies.

La thèse marxiste suivant laquelle l'existence détermine la conscience est largement connue. Dans l' »Idéologie allemande«, Marx et Engels précisent leur pensée, en montrant que » . . . ce sont les hommes qui produisent leurs propres représentations et leurs propres idées, ce sont les hommes réels, actives, ainsi qu'ils sont déterminés par un certain développement de leurs forces productives et de leurs relations qui correspondent à ce développement, jusque dans leurs formes les plus éloignées. La conscience (das Bewußtsein) ne peut jamais être autre chose que l'existence même reflétée dans la conscience (das bewußte Sein), l'existence des hommes n'étant que le procès réel de leur vie. C'est n'est pas la conscience qui détermine la vie, mais c'est la vie qui détermine la conscience«1. L'idée, fondamentale à une conception matérialiste de l'histoire, est reprise par Marx dans son ouvrage Contributions à la critique de l'économie politique. Préface: »ce n'est pas la conscience des hommes qui détermine leur existence, mais, tout au contraire, leur existence sociale est celle qui vient de déterminer leur conscience «2. Quel est le sens profond de ces principes généraux? Et comment se réalise-t-elle dans des différentes organisations sociales cette détermination de la conscience? Quel est en fait le procès? Quels sont agents de propulsion et de freinage et par quels moyens spécifiques agissent-ils?

En vehiculant ces thèses strictement dans le plan le plus général, détachées de toute histoire réelle nous ne pourrons dépasser jamais la sphère d'une spéculation vide; les thèses même ne deviendront pas que des pures abstractions, dépourvues de toute valeur explicative. La théorie doit aller à la rencontre de la con-

² Idem, vol. 13, p. 9.

¹ Marx, Engels, Opere, vol. 3, Ed. a II-a, Ed. politica, Bucuresti, 1962, p. 26—27.

historical necessity of socialist culture are thus undeniably linked to the constitution of a new man.

It is in this vital knot of culture that the theory must be assured. The vital interests of the new social organization require the elaboration of a theory of culture which is centered on the analysis of the conditions and the efficient means to transform man revolutionaryly, to constitute the new spirituality, communist.

Of course, most of the studies and articles centered around the new socialist culture, at least indirectly, consider these problems. But their main fault lies in the superficiality and the haste with which the most difficult facets of this problem are traversed, facets most often eluded by schemas, which are arrived at by the game of analogies and dichotomies already mentioned.

The Marxist thesis that existence determines consciousness is widely known. In the »German Ideology«, M arx and Engels clarify their thinking, showing that » . . . it is men who produce their own representations and their own ideas, they are real, active men, as they are determined by a certain development of their productive forces and of their relations which correspond to this development. even in their most remote forms. Consciousness (das. Bewußtsein) can never be anything other than existence itself reflected in consciousness (das bewufite Sein), the existence of men being only the real process of their life. It is not consciousness that determines life, but it is life that determines consciousness. The idea, fundamental to a materialist conception of history, is taken up by Marx in his work Contributions to the Critique of Political Economy. Preface: "it is not the conscience of men that determines their existence, but, on the contrary, their social existence is that which has just determined their conscience"2. What is the deeper meaning of these general principles?

ral? And how is this determination of consciousness realized in different social organizations? What is actually the trial? What are propellants and brakes and by what specific means do they work?

By conveying these theses strictly on the most general plane, detached from any real history, we will never be able to go beyond the sphere of an empty speculation; even theses will not become mere abstractions, devoid of any explanatory value. Theory must go to meet the con-1 M arx, Engels, Opere, vol. 3, Ed. a Il-a, Ed. politica, Bucuresti, 1962, p. 26—27.

^{.*} Idem, vol. 13, p. 9.

naissance réelle de l'activité pratique, à l'encontre du procès pratique du développement des hommes. C'est alors seulement que »le verbiage concernant la conscience cesse«³, note Marx.

Mais l'activité pratique est toujours marquée par l'imprêvu, par des éléments inédits et specifiques, dont la théorie doit les soumettre à la même analyse unitaire, pour en eviter de flotter à la dérive.

En analysant la société capitaliste Marx nous a devoilé le phénomène complexe de l'aliénation. C'est ainsi que l'existence sociale transparait dénaturée dans la conscience des hommes. La réfléxion, dans ce cas, n'est pas adequate. Les masses exploitées n'aboutissent pas spontanément à la conscience de leur situation sociale-économique et politique réelle; leurs yeux en opposition avec leur intérêts réels, avec leur intérêts de nature générale qui caracterisent la class toute entière; les rapports entre les hommes prennent la forme d'une relation entre les choses. C'est ainsi qu' entre les opinions, les convictions et les systèmes de valeurs d'une part et l'existence sociale de l'homme de l'autre part, il y a une grave inadéquation. Le procès de la détermination de la conscience par l'existence sociale se dévoile ainsi dans ses articulations même, comme étant vicié. Autrement, le prolétariat acquerrait automatiquement la conscience révolutionnaire, la conscience de sa situation réelle dans la société bourgeoise.

C'est Marx qui a démontré qu'il s'agit d'une contradiction apparente. En fait, ni le rapport existence-conscience, n'est pas vicié, ni le principe général infirmé. La réflexion de l'existence sociale se trouve modélée et médiée par la position de l'homme dans la société. Ce n'est pas l'existence sociale dans sa généralité exempte de déterminations qui détermine leur conscience, mais c'est le procès concret de l'histoire engrenant les hommes. L'ignorance aliénante, la fausse conscience sont la conséquence d'une aliénation existente sur le plan du réel, sont le résultat des certains rapports sociaux inhumains. »Si dans l'idéologie toute entièrs - affirme Marx -, les hommes et leurs relations nous apparaissent à l'envers, comme dans une chambre obscure, ce phénomène résulte lui aussi du procès historique de leur vie, dans la même manière que le renversement des objets sur la rétine s'ensuive du procès physique non medié de leur vie«4. L'aliénation vecue sur le plan subjectif est donc détérminé par l'aliénation présente dans la réalité objective. Marx considère que l'intensification de l'aliénation objective, va déterminer, dans les conditions de la société capitaliste, aussi une intensification du sentiment subjectif de l'aliénation; ainsi que les hommes vont resentir l'aliénation comme une force »insupportable«, la révolution leur apparaissant comme l'unique solution. Ce procès implique dans la vision de Marx deux premises pratiques: »Pour en devenir une force insupportable, c'est-à-dire une force gui provoque nécés-

³ Idem, vol. 13, p. 28.

⁴ Idem, p. 27.

»the verbiage concerning consciousness ceases«3, notes Marx.

. But practical activity is always marked by the unexpected, by new and specific elements, the theory of which must subject them to the same unitary analysis, to avoid floating adrift.

By analyzing the capitalist society M arx revealed to us the complex phenomenon of Valienation. It is thus that social existence shows through in nature in the consciousness of men. Reflection, in this case, is not adequate. The exploited masses do not come spontaneously to the consciousness of their real social-economic and political situation; their eyes in opposition to their real interests, to their interests of a general nature which characterize the entire class; relations between men take the form of a relation between things. This is how

between opinions, convictions and value systems on the one hand and the social existence of man on the other, there is a serious mismatch. The process of the determination of consciousness by social existence is thus revealed in its very articulations, as if it were vitiated. Otherwise, the proletariat would automatically acquire revolutionary consciousness, the consciousness of its real situation in bourgeois society.

It was Marx who demonstrated that this is an apparent contradiction. In fact, neither the relationship between existence and consciousness is flawed, nor is the general principle invalidated. The reflection of social existence is modeled and mediated by the position of man in society. It is not social existence in its generality devoid of determinations that determines their consciousness, but it is the concrete process of history bringing men together. Alienating ignorance, false consciousness are the consequence of an alienation existing on the level of the real, are the result of certain inhuman social relations. "If in the whole of ideology – affirms M arx –, men and their relations appear to us upside down, as in a dark room, this phenomenon also results from the historical process of their life, in the m same way that the reversal of objects on the retina follows from the unmediated physical progress of their life"4. The alienation experienced on the subjective level is therefore determined by the alienation present in the objective reality. M ax considers that the intensification of objective alienation will determine, under the conditions of capitalist society, also an intensification of the subjective feeling of alienation; thus men will experience alienation as an "unbearable" force, revolution appearing to them as the only solution. This trial implies in the vision of M arx two practical premises: "To become an unbearable force, that is to say a force which provokes nfcees-a Idem, vol. 13, p. 28.

sairement la révolution, que cette aliénation transforme la masse de l'humanité dans des gens totalement dépourvus de propriété des gens qui en même temps doivent se trouver en contradiction avec le monde de la richesse et de la culture; or, ces deux conditions, ajoute Marx, supposent une puissante croissance de la force productive, un haut degré de développement de cette force«5. Ce développement des forces productives apparaît dans le texte de Marx comme »une prémise pratique absolument necessaire car en son absence, on n'aboutirait qu'à une généralisation de la pauvreté«, situation qui introduirait de nouveau la lutte pour le minimum indispensable, ainsi que »toute l'ancienne turpitude«. On invoque souvent ce dernier aspect de l'analyse de Marx, par ces théoriciens bourgeois contemporains qui considèrent que la prosperité générale (possible selon leur opinion dans les conditions du capitalisme contemporain) constitue l'unique rémède sûr à l'aliénation. Mais, en fait, la vision de Marx subordonne la problématique de l'aliénation dans sa totalité au concept de la propriété priyée, propriété considérée »comme fondement et cause du travail autoaliéné«, comme »produit«, mais aussi comme »réalisation de cette autoaliénation «6.

Mais le dépassement de la situation d'aliénation et la liquidation de la propriété privée capitaliste par la révolution n'est pas l'oeuvre des individus aliénés, mais de la classe. Les gens peuvent ressentir chacun à sa manière les mêmes conditions objectives d'aliénation. La fausse conscience peut générer, par contre, au niveau des masses, des états de passivité, de compromis avec une réalité pénible. Marx insistera, dans ses oeuvres de maturité, sur le rôle de la classe et de la conscience de classe, au cours du processus de la libération du prolétariat. Comme le soulignera ultérieurement G. Lukacs, le point de vue de la totalité dans l'analyse critique théorique de la société comme object, impose que le sujet même de cette connaissance et de cette action soit une totalité.Or, cette conception du sujet comme totalité est représentée dans la société moderne par la classe ouvrière, la seule qui puisse soumettre l'entière réalité sociale à l'action révolutionnaire, et à la transformation totale. C'est le parti révolutionnaire des ouvriers, porteur de la conscience de classe du prolétariat, conscience incarnée de sa mission historique —, qui détermine que l'immédiateté noyée dans la facticité soit inclue dans la totalité en devenir et que la théorie soit une avec la pratique sociale.

On peut poser la question: est-ce-que ce modèle élaboré pour comprendre le rapport existence-conscience dans les conditions de l'aliénation objective de l'individu, dominé par la propriété privée capitaliste, est-il valable pour les analyses théoriques récentes que étudient le même rapport dans les conditions de la société socialiste? La question cache, en fait, une observation critique préalable, et la réponse va essayer son détaillement succinct.

Idem, p. 35.
 K. Marx, Fr. Engels, Scrieri din tinerete, Ed. Politica, Bucuresti, 1968,
 p. 559.

into people totally devoid of property, people who at the same time must find themselves in contradiction with the world of wealth and culture; Now, these two conditions, adds Marx, presuppose a powerful growth of the productive force, a high degree of development of this force.

This development of the productive forces appears in the text of M arx as "an absolutely necessary practical premise because in its absence, we would only end up with a generalization of poverty", a situation which would once again introduce the struggle for the indispensable minimum, as well as wall the old turpitude«. This last aspect of Marx's analysis is often invoked by those contemporary bourgeois theoreticians who consider that general prosperity (possible according to their opinion under the conditions of contemporary capitalism) constitutes the only remedy for 'alienation. But, in fact, the vision of M arx subordinates the probie-matics of alienation in its totality to the concept of private property, property c o n s i d e r "as the foundation and cause of autoalienated work", as a "product", but also as wrealization of this self-alienation«8.

But the overcoming of the situation of alienation and the liquidation of capitalist private property by revolution is not the work of alienated individuals, but of the class. People can each experience in their own way the same objective conditions of alienation. False consciousness can generate, on the other hand, at the level of the masses, states of passivity, of compromise with a painful reality. M arx insisted, in his mature works, on the role of class and class consciousness during the process of the liberation of the proletariat. As G. Lukacs will later underline, the point of view of the totality in

critical theoretical analysis of society as an object imposes that the very subject of this knowledge and this action be a totality. Now, this conception of the subject as a totality is represented in modern society by the working class, the only one who may subject the entire social reality to revolutionary action, and to total transformation. It is the revolutionary workers' party, bearer of the class consciousness of the proletariat, incarnate consciousness of its historical mission, which determines that the immediacy drowned in facticity is included in the totality in becoming and that theory is one with social practice.

One can ask the question: is this model elaborated to understand the relation existence-consciousness in the conditions of the objective alienation of the individual, dominated by capitalist private property, is it valid for the analyzes recent theories that study the same relationship in the conditions of socialist society? The question hides, in fact, a preliminary critical observation, and the answer will attempt its succinct detail.

5 Idem, p. 35.

8 K. Marx, Bro. Engels, Writings from Youth, Politica Ed., Bucharest, 1968, p. 559.

308

En ne disposant pas encore dans le cadre théorique du problème sur la nouvelle culture socialiste, d'une analyse critique, cela mène à mon avis, à des transpositions permanentes basées sur des analogies et des renversements symétriques. Évidemment, celles-ci ne peuvent rien résoudre, mais seulement elles créent l'illusion d'une solution théorique. De cette situation découle le fait que la majorité des études théoriques concernant la culture sont exemptes d'un centre unifiant, le seul capable de les coordoner et de les engager sur la même route, vitale pour le progrès de la société socialiste: la formation d'un nouvel homme, l'affirmation plénaire de la nouvelle conscience socialiste.

Si on part de la thèse générale du conditionnement de la conscience par l'existence sociale, — le modèle initial nous permet de construire un nouveau rapport, cette fois-ci entre les conditions objectives de l'aliénation et leurs reflets sur le plan de la conscience d'un part, et le comportement social et individuel, comme reaction subjective aliéné, de l'autre. L'analyse systématique de ce rapport dans les principaux domaines de la vie sociale (production matérielle, sphère des relations sociales et interpersonnelles, vie spirituelle, vie politique) nous dévoile deux choses: la complexitée des modalitées par lesquelles on influence et on modèle la conscience des individus engrénés dans le mécanisme social, et les grandes difficultés qui obstruent l'action des éradications de la fausse conscience et de l'éducation des masses aliénées, — éducation sans l'ésprit d'une vraie conscience de classe capable de surprendre d'une manière critique le processus réel de l'aliénation et de le supprimer par la pratique révolutionnaire. Une existence sociale dénaturée, ne peut donner naissance donc qu'à une conscience dénaturée. Ce fait exige une action ample, au niveau de la classe et de son parti révolutionnaire, exige une théorie révolutionnaire sans laquelle aucun mouvement révolutionnaire effectif et efficace ne peut être concu.

Dans la société socialiste, les conditions materielles qui génèrent l'état d'aliénation ont été liquidé pour toujours par l'évincement de la propriété privée sur les moyens de productions. Le rapport entre l'existence sociale et la conscience sociale, n'est plus faussé par l'aliénation objective, ni par son corolaire sur le plan des réactions subjectives. La nouvelle existence sociale ne détermine donc plus, comme l'ancienne, une fausse conscience. Le caractère transparent et adéquat du rapport fondamental — qu'on peut aisement transcrire dans un modèle explicatif cette fois-ci renversé — a convaincue des nombreux théoriciens de la culture à considérer le problème de l'aliénation dans les conditions du socialisme comme inactuel. Bien sûr, les lois générales du progrès socialiste, le processus révolutionnaire de l'édification du socialisme, le climat spirituel général, stimulé par les permanentes initiatives politiques du parti de la classe ouvrière, par ses soins d'établir et développer des nouvelles relations humaines d'entre--aide, dans toutes les domaines de la vie sociale - voilà des facteurs doués d'un effet permanent, qui garantissent et orientent

By not yet having in the theoretical framework of the problem on the new socialist culture, a critical analysis, this leads, in my opinion, to permanent transpositions based on analogies and symmetrical reversals. Obviously,

these cannot solve anything, but only they create the illusion of a theoretical solution. From this situation arises the fact that the majority of theoretical studies concerning culture are exempt from a unifying centre, the only one capable of coordinating them and setting them on the same road, vital for the progress of socialist society: the formation of a new man, the full affirmation of the new socialist consciousness.

If we start from the general thesis of the conditioning of consciousness by social existence, the initial model allows us to construct a new relationship, this time between the objective conditions of alienation and their reflections on the plane. of consciousness on the one hand, and social and individual behavior, as an alienated subjective reaction, on the other. The systematic analysis of this relationship in the main domains of social life (material production, sphere of social and interpersonal relations, spiritual life, political life) reveals two things to us: the complexity of the methods by which we influence and the consciousness of individuals meshed in the social mechanism is modeled, and the great difficulties which obstruct the action of the eradication of false consciousness and the education of the alienated masses, — Education without the spirit of a true class consciousness capable of to critically surprise the real process of alienation and suppress it through revolutionary practice. A denatured social existence, therefore, can only give birth to a denatured consciousness. This fact requires broad action, at the level of the class and its revolutionary party, requires a revolutionary theory without which no effective and efficient revolutionary movement can be conceived.

In socialist society, the material conditions that generate the state of alienation have been liquidated forever by the ousting of private property from the means of production. The relationship between social existence and social consciousness is no longer falsified by objective alienation, nor by its corollary on the level of subjective reactions. The new social existence therefore no longer determines, like the old one, a false consciousness. The trans sp arent and adequate character of the fundam ental relationship — which can easily be transcribed into an explanatory model this time reversed — has convinced many cultural theorists to consider the problem of alienation. under the conditions of socialism as outdated. Of course, the general laws of socialist progress, the revolutionary process of building socialism, the general spiritual climate, stimulated by the permanent political initiatives of the party of the working class, by its care to establish and develop new human relationships between

⁻ help, in all areas of social life - these are factors with a permanent effect, which guarantee and guide 309

le processus de la formation et du développement, de la nouvelle conscience socialiste, au niveau de la société dans son ensemble. Mais cela n'a pas pu empecher l'aparition d'une opinion érronée: l'idée que le processus d'éducation communiste, pourrait être mené et parachevé même sans un effort permanent directement orienté vers ce but. Cette opinion erronée a été traduite au point de vue théorique par une obstension de l'analyse devant les problèmes complexes du développement de la conscience, par un éloignement théorique de ces problèmes vitaux. Certes, leur analyse rigoureuse, implique de nombreuses difficultées d'ordre methodologique, théorique et idéologique. C'est Marx lui-même qui constatait: »quand on étudie de telles boulversements révolutionnaires, il faut toujours faire une distinction entre la transformation révolutionnaire matérielle des conditions économiques de production, qui peut-être constatée avec une précision scientifique, et ces formes politiques, juridiques, religieuses, artistiques ou philosophiques, c'est à dire, les formes idéologiques par lesquelles les hommes deviennent conscients de ce conflit et le resolvent par le moyen de la lutte«7.

Il nous semble toutefois que ce serait une attitude théorique de circonstance celle qui considérerait en bloc, toutes les attitudes, les habitudes, les mentalités et les conceptions négatives qui se manifestent encore dans la vie sociale des sociétées socialistes, soint comme résidus des anciennes relations de la société capitaliste, soit comme résultats non-désirés des influences parvenus de l'extérieur, d'un mode de vie étranger au socialisme et des idéologies ennemies. En dispersant toujours notre attention à l'exterieur des structures de la société socialiste, — la recherche théorique risque de perdre de vue le processus réel de la formation et de la conservation de ces phénomènes négatives et de ne pas contribuer dans une mesure nécessaire à l'élaboration des moyens que le perfectionnement de l'organisation et de la direction de notre société socialiste exige.

Si nous passons en revue les difficultées qui s'élèvent devant l'effort d'éduquer les masses qui édifient la nouvelle société et si nous les comparons au réactions subjectives aliénées, crées par les conditions objectives de l'aliénation dans le captitalisme, — nous trouvons devant une série d'aspects intéressants, au moins comme hypothèses d'une recherche ultérieure. Parmi ceux-ci nous pourrions mentionner:

a) Les réactions subjectives aliénées specifiques à l'aliénation existante dans le domaine de la production materielle, manquent presque totalement dans le tableau des manifestations spirituelles négatives. La liquidation de la propriété privée des moyens de production, la conscience d'être le maître et le producteur direct ont determiné des changements radicaux dans l'attitude des masses envers leur popre activité productive.

⁷ K. Marx, Fr. Engels, Opere, vol. XIII, p. 9.

But this could not prevent the emergence of an erroneous opinion: the idea that the process of communist education could be carried out and completed even without a permanent effort directed directly towards this goal. This erroneous opinion has been translated from the theoretical point of view by an obstinacy of the analysis in the face of the complex problems of the development of consciousness, by a theoretical distancing from these vital problems. Admittedly, their rigorous analysis involves numerous methodological, theoretical and ideological difficulties. It was M arx himself who noted: "When one studies such revolutionary upheavals, one must always make a distinction between the material revolutionary transformation of the economic conditions of production, which can be observed with scientific precision, and those political, legal, religious, artistic or philosophical forms, that is to say, the ideological forms by which men become aware of this conflict and resolve it by means of struggle.

It seems to us, however, that it would be a theoretical attitude of circumstance that which would consider as a whole all the negative attitudes, habits, mentalities and conceptions which still manifest themselves in the social life of socialist societies, as residues of the old ones. relations of capitalist society, or as the undesired results of influences from outside, of a way of life alien to socialism and of hostile ideologies. By always scattering our attention outside the structures of socialist society, theoretical research risks losing sight of the real process of the formation and preservation of these negative phenomena and failing to contribute to the necessary extent to the elaboration of the means which the improvement of the organization and the management of our socialist society requires.

If we review the difficulties that arise in the effort to educate the masses who are building the new society and if we compare them to the alienated subjective reactions created by the objective conditions of alienation in capitalism, —

we are faced with a series of interesting aspects, at least as hypotheses for further research. Among these we could mention:

a)

Subjective alienated reactions specific to existing alienation in the realm of material production are almost entirely missing from the chart of negative spiritual manifestations. The liquidation of the private property of the means of production, the consciousness of being the master and the direct producer have determined radical changes in the attitude of the masses towards their own productive activity.

b) On peut faire les mêmes observations en ce qui concerne les réactions subjectives aliénées specifiques à la situation objective d'aliénation dans le domaine de l'activité spirituelle. L'aliénation religieuse domine la sphère de ces manifestations négatives.

c) On trouve une situation légèrement differente dans le domaine des relations interpersonnelles et sociales. L'ancienne fausse conscience maintient dans ce domaine un nombre assez

grand de réactions subjectives aliennées.

L'analyse attentive périodique de ces phénomènes qui freinent encore l'essor de la conscience socialiste, peut affectivement contribuier à depister les situations qui donnent encore naissance. même dans les conditions actuelles d'une nouvelle vie sociale en plein progrès, à des réactions subjectives aliénées. Dans ce sens et seulement dans ce sens, les problèmes de l'aliénation restent capitales pour une société socialiste decidée à accomplir les aspirations humanistes les plus avancées du monde contemporain. Si le but du socialiste est l'emancipation de l'homme, alors la nouvelle société se distingue à chaque moment de son évolution par une analyse attentive du processus social. Et cela non seulement sous l'angle du progrès materiel de la société, du bien-être materiel et spirituel des gens, mais aussi sous l'angle du dépassement de n'importe quelle situation objective aliénée, qui persiste ou qui surgit dans un ou l'autre des domaines de la vie sociale, au cours du perfectionnement continuel de la structure sociale, de l'organisation et de la direction du corpuss social.

Dans ce contexte les problèmes de l'éducation marxiste-léniniste de tous ceux qui travaillent et l'amélioration de l'activité politique et idéologique acquièrent un poids accru. Au premier plan de ce processus se situent comme forces dynamisantes — la stimulation et la promotio d'une vie culturelle active, engagée, profondément partinique et — le développement ininterrompu de la démocratie socialiste.

La manifestation créatrice de la culture socialiste et la démocratisation conséquente de la vie quotidienne, de chaque secteur d'activité sociale, l'introduction du principe du travail colectif à touts les niveaux d'activitées, une large promotion du dialoque avec les masses, — represente la seule garantie ferme du développement spirituel et materiel de la société socialiste, de l'accomplissement de la personalité humaine, de l'émancipation totale de l'homme.

C'est d'ailleurs la conclusion annoncée par le titre même de notre communication: culture et démocratie.

- b) The same observations can be made with regard to the subjective alienated reactions specific to the objective situation of alienation in the field of spiritual activity. Religious alienation dominates the sphere of these negative manifestations.
- c) A slightly different situation is found in the area of interpersonal and social relations. The old false consciousness maintains a fairly large number of alienated subjective reactions in this area.

The careful periodic analysis of these phenomena which still slow down the growth of socialist consciousness can affectively contribute to detecting the situations which still give birth, even in the present conditions of a new social life in full progress, to alienated subjective reactions. In this sense and only in this sense, the problems of alienation remain capital for a socialist society determined to fulfill the most advanced humanist aspirations of the contemporary world. If the goal of the socialist is the emancipation of man, then the new society is distinguished at each moment of its evolution by a careful analysis of the social process. And this not only from the angle of the material progress of society, of the material and spiritual well-being of people, but also from the angle of overcoming any alienated objective situation, which persists or arises. in one or other of the domains of social life, in the course of the continual improvement of the social structure, of the organization and direction of the social corpus.

In this context the problems of the Marxist-Leninist education of all who work and the improvement of political and ideological activity acquire increased weight. At the forefront of this process are the energizing forces—the stimulation and promotion of an active, committed, deeply partisan cultural life and—the uninterrupted development of socialist democracy.

The creative manifestation of socialist culture and the consequent demooratization of daily life, of each sector of social activity, the introduction of the principle of collective work at all levels of activity, a broad promotion of dialogue with masses, — represents the only firm guarantee of the spiritual and material development of socialist society, of the fulfillment of human personality, of the total emancipation of man.

This is, moreover, the conclusion announced by the very title of our communication: culture and democracy.

LITERATUR UND REVOLUTIONÄRER MYTHOS ALS KATEGORIE DER UTOPIE

Vlado Mađarević

Zagreb

Der Begriff des Mythos ist eine umfassende dialektische Ganzheit, die im Laufe des historischen Prozeßes, besonders im umstürzlerischen, revolutionären Zeiten, ihren Sinn aufzeigt und ihre Funktion entwickelt, wobei sie sich vorwiegend durch das schriftliche, literarische Wort manifestiert.

Ich betrachte hier nur die endlichen Attributionen des Mythos, die in den revolutionären Bewegungen entstanden sind und durch Beziehungen der verschiedenen Interessenschichten der gesellschaftlichen Kreise untereinander fixiert wurden. Dabei spielen auch einige Vertreter der Machtmittel, der öffentlichen Medien oder der Behörden mit, bei der Bildung von bestimmten konkreten Mythen, die manipuliert oder im humanistischen Sinne interpretiert werden. Auf diese Art entstehen negative oder positive Attributionen konkreter Mythen, worüber ich in Verbindung mit ihrer Funktion als Kategorie und Element der Utopie sprechen werde.

In der Einleitung betone ich, daß das Aufsteigen eines neuen fortschrittlicheren gesellschaftlichen Bewußtseins aus der alten Mentalität, über den eigennützig lebenden kleinbürgerlichen Geist, einer der unentbehrlichen Faktoren und wesentlichen Triebe jeder wahren Revolution ist.

Dieses leidenschaftliche Streben, das individuelle und revolutionäre Bewußtsein zu verbinden, schließt auch den ständigen Kampf gegen ahistorische, falsche, reaktionäre Mythen, und besonders gegen rechte, nationalistische Mystifikationen und sogennante »tausendjährige Lügen« im Krležianischen Sinne, immanent ein.

Man muß aber die gesellschaftliche Bedeutung und die relativ progreßive Funktion der sogennanten historischen, humanistischen Mythen dialektisch begreifen und richtig historisch beurteilen, derjenigen Mythen, die vom »Prinzip Hoffnung« getragen sind, und wie revolutionäre Volkslegenden aus dem generalisierenden

Vlado Madjarević

Zagreb

The concept of myth is a comprehensive dialectical whole, which in the course of the historical process, especially in subversive, revolutionary times, reveals its meaning and develops its function, expressing itself primarily through the written, literary word manifested.

I am only considering here the finite attributions of the myth that arose in the revolutionary movements and were fixed by the relationships between the various interest groups in social circles. Some representatives of the means of power, the public media or the authorities also play a part in the formation of certain concrete myths, which are manipulated or interpreted in a humanistic sense. In this way, negative or positive at-ributions of concrete myths arise, which I will talk about in connection with their function as category and element of utopia.

In the introduction I emphasize that the rise of a new, more progressive social consciousness out of the old mentality, over the self-serving petty-bourgeois spirit, is one of the indispensable factors and essential drives of any true revolution.

This passionate quest to combine individual and revolutionary consciousness also closes the constant struggle against ahistorical, false, reactionary myths, and especially against right-wing, nationalist mystifications and so-called

>> thousand-year lies« in the Krležian sense, im manently.

One must, however, dialectically understand and correctly historically assess the social significance and the relatively progressive function of the so-called historical, humanistic myths, those myths that are based on the "principle of hope" and how revolutionary folk legends from the generalizing 313

und verabsolutierenden menschlichen Streben nach dem Sinne der revolutionären Überwindung gesellschaftlicher Fesseln und geistiger »Entfremdungen« emporwachsen.

Ich gebrauche also hier den Termin »Mythos« nicht in pejorativem Sinne, wie das sonst oft rational-kritisch üblich ist, sondern in dialektisch-dualistischen, teils affirmativem und lebensschöpferischen Sinne — als eines der wesentlichen Elemente des Begriffes der Utopie und ihrer geschichtlichen Funktion — hauptsächlich dem Lexikon-Begriff »Märchen und Erzählungen über heldenhafte Legenden« entsprechend — und das heißt, auch im Sinne von Lenin's Aufforderung an die Schriftsteller und die Menschen überhaupt: »Träumt«!

Solche humanistischen Mythen sind immer utopisch symbolische Projektionen aus der Vergangenheit für die Zukunft, Projektionen tiefster und bester menschlicher emotiv-rationaler Antriebe, als Personifikationen edler Eigenschaften des persönlichen und gesellschaftlichen Bewußtseins im Widerstand gegen jede unmenschliche Gewalt und jedes Unrecht; sie entfalten sich als eine idealisierte Wesenheit subjektiver revolutionärer Opfer und Potenziale für ein allgemeines, objektives Wohl. Dies bestätigen alle volkstümlichen, demokratischen, sowie intellektuellen wissenschaftlichen Mythen — von Kraljević Marko und Matija Gubec (jugoslawische Volkshelden) bis zu Marx und Lenin. Solche progreßiven historischen Mythen werden nicht nur zu einem inspirierenden Faktor in der Kunst und der Literatur, sondern auch zum wesentlichen Stimulus bei der Eroberung neuer, immer weiterer Lebenshorizonte der Menschheit.

Dafür ist heute das beste Beispiel die Che-Guevara-Legende die sich schon langsam in einen progreßiven, neuhistorischen Mythos umwandelt. Trotz des schlecht ausgewählten Gebietes und der Taktik der Aktion, aber gerade wegen seines tragischen Endes, ist diese Legende von außerordentlich anregender Ausstrahlung und von mobilisierender Bedeutung für die revolutionären Bewegungen unentwickelter und vom Imperialismus exploitierter Länder, und in einigen Fällen auch für die sogennante »Neue Linke«. Und gerade da sind wir Zeugen wie dieser Legenden-Mythos gleichzeitig zum Beweis für neue Möglichkeiten der Bereicherung zeitgemäßer, wahrhaftig engagierter Literatur, wird, besonders im Theater, wo er neue Lebensinhalte und poetische Impulse vermittelt. Auf diese Weise bestätigt sich im Laufe der Jahrhunderte immer wieder eine immanente Verbindung, wenn auch nicht eine vollkommene Synthese so doch eine humanistische Symbiose, der Kunst und der Revolution. Wenn man deshalb bei uns iz Jugoslawien heute so viel Lärm macht um die Zerstörung aller revoluvionären Mythen, auch derer aus unserem, jugoslawische Volksbefreiungskampf, dann kann dieser anarchistische »revolutionäre« Aufruf nur als eine Zerstörung von trügerischen oder »verratenen« Mythen, akzeptiert werden.

Die historische Erfahrung führt auch zur »Revision« und Verurteilung einiger Früherer historischer revolutionärer Mythen, die So I don't use the term in "myth" here in a pejorative sense, as is otherwise often the case in rational-critical terms, but in a dialectical-dualistic, partly affirmative and life-creating sense - as one of the essential elements of the concept of utopia and its historical function—mainly corresponding to the dictionary term "fairy tales and stories about heroic legends"—and that means, also in the sense of Lenin's request to writers and people in general: "Dreams"!

Such humanistic myths are always utopian symbolic projections from the past for the future, projections of deepest and best human emotional-rational drives, as personifications of noble qualities of personal and social consciousness in opposition to any inhuman violence and injustice; they unfold as an idealized entity of subjective revolutionary sacrifices and potentials for a general, objective good. This is confirmed by all folk, democratic, as well as intellectual scientific myths — from K raljević Marko and Mati ja Gubec (Yugoslav folk heroes) to M arx and Lenin. Such pro-grefiive historical myths become not only an inspirational factor in art and literature, but also an essential stimulus in the conquest of new, ever-expanding horizons of human life.

The best example of this today is the Che Guevara legend —

which is already slowly turning into a progressive, new-historical myth. Despite the ill-chosen area and the tactics of action, but precisely because of its tragic ending, this legend is of extraordinarily stimulating aura and of mobilizing importance for the revolutionary movements of undeveloped countries and those exploited by imperialism, and in some Also fall for the so-called »New Left«.

And it is precisely here that we are witnessing how this legendary myth becomes proof of new possibilities for enriching contemporary, truly committed literature, especially in the theater, where it conveys new life content and poetic impulses. In this way, over the centuries, an immanent connection, if not a perfect synthesis, at least a humanistic symbiosis, of art and revolution is reaffirmed. If we in Yugoslavia make so much noise today about the destruction of all revolutionary myths, including those from our Yugoslav people's liberation struggle, then this anarchist "revolutionary"

Appeal only as a destruction of deceitful or "betrayed" ones

myths to be accepted.

Historical experience also leads to the "revision" and condemnation of some earlier historical revolutionary myths that 314

in der falsch angewandten Praxis rasch oder allmählich ihr humanistisches Wesen verloren und zu ahistorischen und repressiven Mythen wurden. Dafür gibt es genug Beispiele — am nächsten sind uns die bekannte Entartung des autoritativen Sozialismus im Stalinismus, sowie verschiedene mystifikatorische Reaktionen die der authentischen sozialistischen kämpferischen Bewegung für den Kommunismus das Wesentliche und den Sinn rauben. So könnte man die ganze bisherige Geschichte der menschlichen Gesellschaft, oder nach Marx, die »Vorgeschichte der Menschheit«, sowie die Geschichte der Literatur, besonders ihrer inneren Konflikte und Stilkämpfe, immer wieder als Geschichte von kontradiktorischen Oszillationen und von dialektischen Antinomien innerhalb des allgemeinen, historischphilosophischen Begriffes des Mythos auffassen, bzw. als Kampf zwischen falschen, mystifizierten (oder denen die im Laufe des historischen Prozeßes falsch geworden sind) und wahrhaften, humanistischen Mythen.

Wenn wir über die Beziehungen, Verbindungen und Konflikte von Kunst und Revolution sprechen, können wir also nicht am humanistischen Mythos vorbeigehen, und deshalb widme ich ihm hier eine solche Aufmerksamkeit. Die gesellschaftliche Revalorisierung des revolutionären, humanistischen Klassenmythos ist gerade heute auch bei uns in Jugoslawien besonders notwendig, weil wir uns nur durch eine vertiefte, wissenschaftlich marxistische Erklärung dieses Mythos und auf dialektisch-funktioneller Ideengrundlage, mit klassenhaft organisierter Festigkeit, der atavistischen Welle hysterisch ausgelassener, reaktionärer, falschen nationalistischer, rechter Mythen aller Arten, entwehren können, vom Chauvinismus bis zum Unitarismus — die drohen einen neuen Faschismus zu bilden — und deren alltäglichen Mystifikationen, in der Literatur als ästhetischideologischen Erkentnissprozeß, sowie in der Politik als revolutionärem Akt.

Jede Fesselung oder Negierung der gesellschaftlich-ideologischen Funktion humanistischer Mythen, als konkretem »Prinzip Hoffnung« (in Bloch's utopischem Sinne), in der Klassen- und Übergangsgesellschaft, mit ständigen antagonistischen Konflikten der Interessengruppen und -schichten, bedeutet ein skeptisches oder nihilistisches Verzichten auf einen konkreten Kampf. Obwohl man dies mit allen möglichen rationalistischen Gründen und philosophischen Analysen rechtfertigen könnte — kann ein solcher Verzicht die revolutionäre Entwicklung der menschlichen Gesellschaft, ihr ständiges und sprunghaftes Fortschreiten zur klassenlosen, und auf diese Weise endlich »entmythologisierten« Gesellschaft nur aufhalten, paralysieren, oder sogar verhindern.

Ohne humanistische Mythen kann also weder die Literatur noch die Revolution fast nicht existieren, oder sich entwickeln. Dies ist also der Berührungspunkt, wo sie sich treffen und manchmal in konkreten, historisch aufgedrängten und gespannten revolutionären Situationen verbinden. Alle ihre humanistischen Ideen und ökonomisch-gesellschaftlichen Analysen, sowie die daraus abgeleitete marxistische Ideologie, führen im letzten Sinne, und in den ver-

authoritative socialism in Stalinism, as well as various mystificatory reactions that rob the authentic socialist militant movement for communism of the essence and meaning. Thus one could think of the entire previous history of human society, or according to Marx, the "prehistory of mankind," as well as the history of literature, especially its inner conflicts and struggles of style, again and again as a history of contradictory oscillations imd of dialectical antinomies within the general, historical-philosophical concept of myth, or as a struggle between false, mystified (or those that have become false in the course of the historical process) and true, humanistic myths.

So when we talk about the relations, connections, and conflicts of art and revolution, we cannot ignore the humanist myth, and that is why I devote such attention to it here. The social revalorization of the revolutionary, humanistic class myth is particularly necessary today in Yugoslavia, because we can only do this through a deeper, scientifically Marxist explanation of this myth and on a dialectic-functional idea basis, with class-organized firmness, the atavistic wave of hysterically boisterous, reactionary, false nationalist, right-wing myths of all kinds, from chauvinism to unitarism — threatening to form a new fascism — and their everyday mystifications, in the Literature as an aesthetic-ideological process of knowledge, as well as in politics as a revolutionary act.

Any shackling or negation of the social-ideological function of humanistic myths, as a concrete "principle of hope" (in Bloch's utopian sense), in the class and transitional society, with constant antagonistic conflicts between interest groups and strata, means a skeptical one or nihilistic renunciation of a concrete struggle. Although one could justify this with all sorts of rationalistic reasons and philosophical analyses, such a renunciation can only stop the revolutionary development of human society, its constant and erratic progress towards a classless, and thus finally "demythologized" society, paralyze, or even prevent.

Thus, without humanist myths, neither literature nor revolution can exist or develop. So this is the point of contact where they meet and sometimes connect in concrete, historically imposed and tense revolutionary situations. All their humanist ideas and economic and social analyses, as well as the Marxist ideology derived from them, lead in the last sense and in the ver- 315

schärften ökonomischen Verhältnissen bestimmter historischen »Momente«, immer zu einigen konkret-veredelten historischen Mythen, die, neben der wissenschaftlichen »Aktionsführung«, zur geistigmoralischen Inspiratoren werden, zu echten Fermenten solcher befreiend-revolutionärer Aktionen.

Der Mythos ist also eines der wesentlichen Elemente die die Dichtung und demnach auch die Kunst befruchten. Und weil der historische Mythos als dynamische Anregungskomponente, als unentbehrliche romantische Begeisterung, aber nicht als blinder Fanatismus, auch in die geistige Struktur jeder wahren Revolution eindringt, deshalb erweist er sich als dasjenige Ferment, das Kunst und Revolution miteinander verbindet, fast amalgamiert, wenn auch nicht synthetisiert. Und gerade das fortgeschrittene gesellschaftliche Bewußtsein ist diejenige geistige Kraft, die dieses Amalgam reinigt, zur Besinnung bringt, ihm einen Sinn gibt, und die entsprechenden historischen humanistischen Mythen und revolutionären Legenden ausliest. Es aktualisiert sie immer zur rechten Zeit und wandelt sie zu einem inspirativen und eindringlichen Mobilisierungs-Faktor des befreienden Klassenkampfes, in der revolutionären Veränderung der Welt und der Mentalität des Menschen, in der Bewegung der menschlichen Geschichte überhaupt.

Deshalb ist der ständige Kampf gegen alle Mystifikationen, ebenso wie die Revalorisierung des humanistischen Klassenmythos, unentbehrlich und notwendig — gegen alle Mystifikationen im Leben, in der Kunst, sowie in der Politik -- die mit der Mentalität des Menschen und seinen Mythen manipulieren; bzw., um ein Wortspiel zu machen — die den bürgerlichen Mensch »vermythen«, korrumpieren mit alten, überlebten kleinbürgerlichen Mythen, als »Wurzeln des Bösen« aller Mystifikationen. Diese Mystifikationen wachsen also auf dem trüben Schlamm unüberwundener oder unter günstigen gesellschaftlichen Umständen wieder belebter, traditionalistischer, ahistorischer, falschen Mythen - in der Kultur, in Literatur und nationalen Politik. Sie manipulieren spekulativ und gesellschaftlich üntverantwortlich, im Rahmen jugoslawischen Verhältnisse eines Mehrvölkerstaates, besonders mit der Sprache, aber auch mit den Prinzipien der sogennanten »absoluten Freiheit« des individuellen Menschen und der abstrakt absoluten Schaffensfreiheit, sowie mit der Mentalität und mit Mythen romantischer oder mystisch-nationalistischer »Ideologien« - entweder unitaristischen oder separatistischen Typs, die die Arbeiterklasse in der Nation auflösen, und deren Rolle und Lage als führende Kraft in der Gesellschaft unmöglich machen.

Deshalb sind diese Mystifikationen unmittelbar mit zerstörerischer Skepsis gegen die ständig reicher werdende revolutionäre Theorie und Praxis der Arbeiterbewegung gerichtet, gegen die Eroberung edler, manchmal auch utopisch-mythischer Projektionen, der humanisierten menschlichen Zukunft in kollektiver Gleichberechtigung und wahrhafter individueller, und nicht manipulierter Freiheit des Komunismus.

which, in addition to the scientific "action leadership", become mentaloral inspirers, genuine ferments of such liberating-revolutionary actions.

Myth is therefore one of the essential elements that fertilize poetry and, consequently, art. And because the historical myth penetrates into the intellectual structure of every true revolution as a dynamic stimulating component, as an indispensable romantic enthusiasm, but not as blind fanaticism, that is why it proves to be that Ferm ent that connects art and revolution, almost amalgamated, if not synthesized. And it is precisely the advanced social consciousness that is the spiritual force that purifies this amalgam, brings it to its senses, gives it meaning, and sorts out the corresponding historical humanistic myths and revolutionary legends. It always updates it at the right time and transforms it into an inspirational and urgent mobilizing factor in the liberating class struggle, in the revolutionary change in the world and in human mentality, in the movement of human history in general.

Therefore, the constant struggle against all mystifications, as well as the revalorization of the humanistic class myth, is indispensable and necessary - against all mystifications in life, in art, as well as in politics - which are associated with the mentality of M manipulating people and his myths; or, to make a pun — those who "suppose-you" corrupt the bourgeois man with old, outdated petty-bourgeois myths as the "roots of evil" of all mystifications. These mystifications, then, grow on the muddy mud of vanquished or revived, under prosperous societal circumstances, traditionalist, ahistorical, false myths—in culture, in literature, and in national politics. They manipulate speculatively and socially responsibly, within the framework of the Yugoslav conditions of a multi-national state, especially with the language, but also with the principles of the so-called »absolute freedom« of the individual human being and the abstract absolute creative freedom, as well as with the mentality and with myths of romantic or mystical nationalist "ideologies" - either unitarian or separatist type, which dissolve the working class in the nation, and their role and position as leading K make raft in society impossible.

That is why these mystifications are directed with destructive skepticism against the ever-growing revolutionary theory and practice of the labor movement, against the conquest of noble, sometimes also utopian-mythical projections of the humanized human future in collective equality and true individual, and not manipulated freedom of communism.

Man kann deshalb sagen daß solche Manipulationen ständig die Entwicklung des fortschrittlichen gesellschaftlichen Bewußtseins und der sozialisistischen Solidarität verleugnen oder fesseln, daß sie ihr das private, persönliche Bewußtsein des angeblich »absolut freien« abstrakten Menschen, hauptsächlich des Intellektuellen »als solchen«, gegenüberstellen, freien von jeglichen gesellschaftlichen Beziehungen und Verantwortungen. Ein solcher, nur »für sich« freier Intellektueller, und besonders mancher Schriftsteller, siht oft das Ziel seines Schaffens hauptsächlich in der künstlerischen Esotherie und im kulturellen Eskapismus. Gerichtet auf den sogennanten »gewöhlichen Menschen«, entwickeln diese mannigfaltigen Manipulationen mit dem menschlichen Bewußtsein eigentlich unbewußt, oft aber auch systematisch überlegt, die alte kleinbesitzerisch spiesbürgerliche Mentalität im neuen urbanisierten Stadtbewohner der zeitgenössischen technischen Zivilisation, und schaffen dadurch wieder einen neuen »technischen« oder »automobilistischen« negativen Mythos der Konsumgesellschaft.

Eine solche alt-neue egoistische kleinbürgerliche Mentalität der mittleren Klasse findet den Sinn des Lebens hauptsächlich in einem skruppellosen Jagen nach höherem persönlichen Einkommen, das aus windigen oder fingierten »Arbeitsleistungen« oder aus verschiedenen maklerischen Quellen, ohne jedes sozialistische Kriterium reklamiert wird. Ein solcher Sinn des Lebens, das ganze Leben, bzw. die Gesellschaft »aufzusaugen«, wird »vertieft« durch das unkritische Rennen nach allen Formen und Firmen der westlichen »Mode« und durch das gesellschaftlich unverantwortliche »Aneignen« von allen erreichbaren materiellen Gütern und von privilegierten Begünstigungen der einseitig entwickelten Halbkonsumgesellschaft, ohne geistige Dimension, bzw. mit einer verlorenen, immer mehr »entfremdeten« Seele der wahrhaften, breitesten menschlichen Kultur, das heißt der Massenkultur.

Diese Verteidigung des Sinnes der Revolution und des Zwecks des humanistischen Mythos, in ihrer dynamischen Integralität, und utopischen Totalität, vor immer hartnäckigeren »anti-mythischen« und »anti-heroischen« Negationen des revolutionären Prozeßes überhaupt, ist keine Mythomanie, sondern eine marxistische Anerkennung und dialektische Berücksichtigung aller historisch-klassenhaften und Erkenntnis-psychologischen anregenden Ideenkräfte der sozialistischen Revolution.

Und nur die allmähliche, stufenartige Befreiung des gesellschaftlich »entfremdeten« Menschen wird gleichzeitig auch die Befreiung der Menschheit von der Last aller historischen und neuerlichen Mythen, bisher unvermeindliche anregende Geisteskräfte der Klassengesellschaft, bedeuten. Erst das könnte die wirkliche »Entmythologisierung des Lebens und des Menschen sein, und damit auch die vollkommene »Aufhebung seiner Entfremdung« in der klassenlosen Gesellschaft der kollektiven Gleichheit des Einzelmenschen, im Marxschen, Engelsschen und Leninschen »Reich der Freiheit«, das auf dem stufenartigen Kampfweg der Revolutionen immer mehr erobert wird, obwohl man es nie völlig

development of progressive social consciousness and socialist solidarity, that

it is the private, personal consciousness of the supposedly "absolutely free" abstract human being, primarily the intellectual

"as such", free from any social relationships and responsibilities. Such an intellectual, who is only free "for himself", and especially some writers, often sees the main goal of his work in artistic esotericism and in cultural escapism. Aimed at the so-called »comfortable people«, these diverse manipulations with the human consciousness actually develop unconsciously, but often also systematically considered, the old petty-proprietor bourgeois mentality in the new urbanized city-dwellers of contemporary technical civilization, and thereby create a new »technical« or

»automobilist« negative myth of consumer society.

Such an old-new, egotistical, middle-class, middle-class mentality finds the meaning of life chiefly in a ruthless pursuit of higher personal income, derived from bogus or fictitious "work performance" or from various brokerage sources, without recognizing any socialist criterion is la m ed. Such a meaning of life, the whole of life or society, is »deepened«

through the uncritical race after all forms and companies of western "fashion" and through the socially irresponsible "appropriation" of all attainable material goods and privileged benefits of the one-sidedly developed semi-consumer society, without a spiritual dimension, or with a lost, more and more "alienated" soul of the true, broadest human culture, that is, of mass culture.

This defense of the meaning of the revolution and the purpose of the humanist myth, in its dynamic integrality, and utopian totality, above all more adamantly "anti-mythical"

and "anti-heroic" negations of the revolutionary process in general, is not a mythomania, but a Marxist recognition and dialectical consideration of all historical-classical and epistemological-psychological stimulating powers of ideas of the socialist revolution.

And only the gradual, gradual liberation of the socially "alienated" human being will at the same time also mean the liberation of mankind from the burden of all historical and recent myths, hitherto inevitable stimulating mental powers of class society. Only that could be the real »demythologization of life and man, and with it also the

complete »abolition of his alienation

Dung« in the classless society of the collective equality of the individual, in Marxian, Engelsian and Leninian

"Realm of freedom," which is conquered more and more on the gradual path of struggle of revolutions, although it is never fully conquered

als wahre Utopie ohne die Reste einiger gesellschaftlicher Beschränkungen erreichen kann. Deshalb werden immer ein gewißer historischer Raum und ein gesellschaftlicher Sinn für die neue konkrete Utopie verbleiben.

Vielleicht wird diese eigenartige, allmähliche »Entmythologisierung« des Menschen und seiner »Vorgeschichte«, gleichzeitig zum Verlust der Dichtung und der künstlerischen Phantasie führen, besonders auch der historischen Phantasie, bzw. ihrer alten moralischen und ästhetischen Sensibilitäten, sogar bis hin zum Ende der alten Kunstformen - wie es schon einige wissenschaftliche Futurologen prophezeien. Oder wird dies trotzdem die Erfindung von neuer Dichtung und die Entwicklung von neuer Phantasie und Kunst sein, welche der neuen zukünftigen Zivilisation der befreiten Menschheit und der neuen Sensibilität der völlig gesellschaftlich zum Bewußtsein gebrachten und moralisch helleren Menschengestalt, auf der Suche nach neuen, konkreten, antimythischen kosmischen Utopien entsprechen würden. Weil uns alle Voraussetzungen für eine solche vorläufige Betrachtung noch immer fehlen, können wir dieses noch nicht voraussehen. Aber jede alte Mythologie der Revolutionen - wie es schon heute die Mythen von der Pariser Kommune, der Oktoberrevolution, von unserem, jugoslawischen Volksbefreiungskampf, von der chinesischen Revolution, vom vietnamischen revolutionären Widerstand gegen den amerikanischen Imperialismum usw., sind - wird als Drama von leidenschaftlichen und leidenhaften Erinnerungen, als historisches Wissen und heldenhafte Anerkennung, als instruktive Erkenntnis des überwundenen schweren, und blutigen revolutionären Weges der Klassengeschichte der Menschheit — im Kampfe für die soziale Gerechtigkeit und Freiheit des Menschen, im Bewußtsein bleiben.

Deshalb ist das generalisierte antagonistiche Entgegensetzen von Mythos und Wirklichkeit, von Kunst und Revolution, die sich in der Neigung nach der nicht-möglichen »Synthese« (aber eigentlich nach der möglichen und nötigen Symbiose in konkreten Situationen) angeblich gegenseitig ausschließen und »verraten«, ein sinnloses Spiel mit Begriffen — weil es das Aufheben jeden Sinnes der Kunst und jeden Zwecks der Revolution bedeutet. Diese zwei, der Struktur nach, wesentlich verschiedenartige Wesenheiten, aus verschiedenen Domänen der menschlichen Aktion, können nicht als solche« eine zu der anderen feindlich gegenübergestellt werden — sondern man muß immer konkret und »bänglich« fragen: »was für eine« Kunst, »welcher« Künstler und »welche«, oder noch besser »wessen« Revolution in einer bestimmten Zeit und einem bestimmten Raum der Gesellschaft feindlich zusammenstoßen. Die Stellungnahme der abstrakten negativen Polarisation der Kunst, bzw. der Literatur und der Revolution, ihrer Wirklichkeit und ihres Mythos, bedeutet keine moralische »bange Fraglichkeit« des schöpferischen »Mißtrauen in Alles« (im Marxschen Sinne), sondern sie enthüllt sich als Übergang in den reinen Agnostizismus und kann in manchen Fällen zu einem größeren oder klei-

than true utopia without the remnants of some social restrictions. Therefore, a certain historical space and a social sense will always remain for the new concrete utopia.

Perhaps this peculiar, gradual "demythologization" of man and his "prehistory" will simultaneously lead to the loss of poetry and artistic imagination, especially historical imagination, or its old moral and aesthetic sensibilities, even to the end of the ancient art forms — as some scientific futurologists are already prophesying. Or will this nonetheless be the invention of new poetry and the development of new imagination and art appropriate to the new future civilization of liberated humanity and the new sensibility of the fully socially conscious and morally brighter human form, in search of new, concrete, anti-mythical cosmic utopias. Because we still lack all the prerequisites for such a preliminary consideration, we cannot yet foresee this. But every old mythology of the revolutions — like the myths of the P arisen commune, of the October revolution, of our Yugoslav people's liberation struggle, of the Chinese revolution, of the Vietnamese revolutionary resistance against the American In perialism around etc., are - as a drama of passionate and suffering memories, as historical knowledge and heroic recognition, as an instructive realization of the overcome difficult, and bloody revolutionary path of the class history of mankind - in the struggle for the social G justice and freedom of man, stay in mind.

That is why the generalized antagonistic opposition of myth and reality, of art and revolution, which in the inclination towards the impossible "synthesis" (but actually towards the possible and necessary symbiosis in concrete situations) are supposedly mutually exclusive and "betray«, a meaningless game with concepts - because it means the abolition of every sense of art and every purpose of the revolution. These two, structurally, essentially different entities, from different domains of human action, cannot be contrasted as such" one hostile to the other - but one must always be concrete and "anxious" ask: »what kind of« art, »which« artist and »which«, or even better »whose« revolution clash in a specific time and space of society. Taking a stance on the abstract negative polarization of art, or of literature and the revolution, its reality and its myth, does not imply any moral "anxious questionability" of the creative "distrust in everything" (in Marx's sense), but it reveals itself as a transition into pure agnosticism and can in some cases lead to a larger or smaller 318

neren Defätismus führen gegen konkreten edlen Anstrengungen in der revolutionären Verwirklichung der humanistischen Vision des Kommunismus.

Die dialektische Dualität der literarischen Tätigkeit schließt auch die spezifische andere Art der inneren Dichotomie des künstlerischen Schaffens an sich, ein, sehr ähnlich der dualistischen Struktur der wahren revolutionären Aktion: das ist ihr befreiender mythisch-euphorischer Sinn und ihre skeptisch forschende Absicht. Diese inneren Antinomien, in ihrem tieferen schöpferischen Engagement und dialektischen Geflecht, sind in beiden Fällen und in jedem Sinne als utopische Projektionen der emotiv-rationalen Erkenntnis — aus der Erfahrung der Vergangenheit und der Lage der Gegenwart an die Vision der Zukunft zugewandt. So wird diese Verbindung von befreiendem mythischen Enthusiasmus, in seinem utopischen Kontext und Sinne, und von forschendem Mißtrauen in der Kunst und in der Revolution, zum wesentlichen Faktor beim Schaffen neuer Beziehungen zwischen den Menschen, in welchen der Mensch immer mehr aus seinem beschränkten historischen Wesen heraus, zur geistigen Fülle des authentischen menschlichen Daseins hinwächst - zur ersehnten, allmählich eroberten Zukunft der Freiheit.

In dieser utopisch projektierten Vorwärtsbewegung, haben die entwickeltere schöpferische Phantasie und das fortschrittlichere gesellschaftliche Bewußtsein die wichtige Funktion eines Leuchtturms — der die Wege und Richtungen der »ununterbrochener Revolution« in die unaufhaltbar kommende Zukunft beleuchtet. Jene Zukunft, die als konkrete Utopie so pathetisch die alte und schon ziemlich schäbige, aber doch immer wieder aktuelle, frische und neue Parole der französischen Revolution und der Pariser Kommune, wie auch der Oktoberrevolution und unserer, jugoslawischen sozialistischen Revolution, ausdrückt: Freiheit, Gleichheit, Brüderlichkeit, für alle Menschen — eine Parole, die Charakter und Sinn einer wahren und edlen mythischen Botschaft bekommt.

(Diese Erörterung ist ein kleiner Auszug aus einer größeren analytischen Abhandlung »Literatur und Revolution«.)

The dialectical duality of literary activity also includes the specific other kind of inner dichotomy of artistic creation itself, very similar to the dualistic structure of true revolutionary action: this is its liberating mythical-euphoric sense and their skeptical investigative intent.

These inner antinomies, in their deeper creative engagement and dialectical meshwork, are in both cases and in every sense utopian projections of emotional-rational cognition - from the experience of the past and the situation of the present to the vision of the facing future. Thus, this combination of liberating mythical enthusiasm, in its utopian context and sense, and inquiring distrust in art and in revolution, becomes the essential factor in creating new relationships between people, in which man in the m he grows more out of his limited historical being towards the spiritual fullness of authentic human existence — towards the longed-for, gradually conquered future of freedom.

In this utopian projected forward movement, the more developed creative imagination and the more progressive social consciousness have the important function of a lighthouse - illuminating the ways and directions of the "uninterrupted revolution" in the unstoppable future. That future which, as a concrete utopia, so pathetically expresses the old and already rather shabby, but always current, fresh and new slogan of the French Revolution and the Paris Commune, as well as the October Revolution and our Yugoslav socialist revolution: Freedom, equality, fraternity, for all people - a slogan that takes on the character and meaning of a true and noble mythical message.

(This discussion is a small excerpt from a larger analytical treatise, Literature and Revolution.) 319

THÈSES SUR LA SIGNIFICATION ÉTHIQUE DU FAIT DE L'ART DANS LA CONSTITUTION DE LA CULTURE

Niculae Bellu

Bucarest

I. L'art est un mode de communication et, dans ce sens, un langage. Mais ce qu'il communique — à l'encontre du langage commun fondé sur des connaissances apparemment claires — n'est pas l' effet d' un savoir, mais bien le frémissement même de la recherche; c'est l'agitation confuse devant l'inconnu qui se refuse à la connaissance et qui — en même temps — se révèle à celle-ci, non par des concepts mais par des images sensibles sur le point de proclamer (déceler) des vérités nouvelles. Le génie de l'art signifie l'intuition des processus, la recherche des réponses aux questions posées par le temps, et ceci dans la perspective de la subjectivité et de la singularité. (Dans l'art, la vérité est vécue comme événement, remarque Heidegger).

Ainsi l'art signale et prépare le champ encore indéfini de la réflexion, de la critique et de la philosophie; il annonce et élabore la problématique culturelle propre à chaque epoque historique. Dans ce sens l'art devient, sur le parcours de sa constitution et de son développement, une modalité de la connaissance mais qui s'affirme — comme connaissance — seulement dans des conditions impropres, notamment dans les conditions d'un tâtonnement de la connaissance conceptuelle. C'est un mouvement incertain et d'avant-garde. Il est la langage de cette connaissance tâtonnante.

II. Dans cet esprit, Hegel constate que »en fait, c'est l'art qui, le premier, a instruit les peuples«.

Ce devenir marque un dédoublement dans la substance même de l'art. Il y a un premier moment, celui où l'art est une fin en soi et pour soi et non »un moyen pour des fins morales« (Hegel); mais, sur ce fondement, un deuxième moment apparaît, lorsque l'art reçoit l'attribut de modalité de la connaissance et que, le premier, il instruit les peuples. Ainsi, il est à la fois pour lui-mê-

Nicolae Bello

B ucarest

I. Art is a mode of communication and, in this sense, a language. But what it communicates — unlike common language based on apparently clear knowledge — is not the effect of knowledge, but the very thrill of research; it is the confused agitation before the unknown which refuses knowledge and which — at the same time — reveals itself to it, not by concepts but by sensory images on the point of proclaiming (detecting) new truths. The genius of art means the intuition of processes, the search for answers to questions posed by time, and this from the perspective of subjectivity and singularity. (In art, truth is experienced as an event, Heidegger remarks).

Thus art signals and prepares the still undefined field of reflection, criticism and philosophy; it announces and discusses the cultural problem specific to each historical period.

In this sense, art becomes, along the path of its constitution and its development, a modality of knowledge but which asserts itself — as knowledge — only under inappropriate conditions, in particular under the conditions of a trial and error of conceptual knowledge. It is an uncertain and avant-garde movement. It is the language of this tentative knowledge.

II. In this spirit, Hegel observes that "in fact, it is art which first educated peoples".

This becoming marks a duplication in the very substance of art. There is a first moment, when art is an end in itself and for itself and not "a means for moral ends" (Hegel); but, on this basis, a second moment appears, when art receives the attribute of modality of knowledge and when, the first, it instructs peoples. Thus, he is k both for himself e-321

me et pour autre chose. Il devient un fait de culture et par cet fait, il réunit ces deux moments en un tout organique, qui ne peut ples être séparé:

Il en résulte:

- 1. Que l'art reste quelque chose en lui-même, toute utilisation de l'art comme moyen pour une autre fin que lui-même constitue une altération de l'art;
- 2.ensuite l'art, par le fait qu'il oeuvre avec le »matériel« spirituel de l'époque, gu'il choisit ses sujets dans la problématique propre à une époque, que ses options sont celles déterminées par une réalité complexe et empirique, l'art disons-nous engendre une connaissance dans l'esprit d'une tendance déterminée de l'époque même, une connaissance tendancielle.
- 3. ce résultat dérivé qui ne détermine pas le concept de l'art (dans ce sens qu'il ne concerne pas l'oeuvre d'art comme telle) s'institute en même temps comme son attribut historique et donne à l'art la puissance d'un fait de culture ce qui permet de le considérer et de le manipuler comme tel.
- III. Dans le fait de culture, le moment premier de l'art est supprimé, on ne lui prête aucune importance.
- Dans le fait d'art le sens de communication et de tendance est impliqué seulement et regardé comme contingent. Hegel dit: »de toute oeuvre authentique on peut tirer une morale, il s'agit de savoir qui est capable de tirer cette morale«.
- Ici la spontanéité, qui est le propre du fait d'art, se joint à la signification laquelle est le produit d'une expérience pratique et d'une idéologie. L'art est ainsi soumis à une action de déchiffrement en-tant que fait de culture. Mais nous nous trouvons devant une double lecture et un double déchiffrement possible de toute oeuvre d'art. Il faut retenir que le déchiffrement significatif (en tant que moment de l'idéologie, agit sur le climat spirituel d'une époque et acquiert une action modélatrice de l'esprit humain au cours d'une période; en même temps, par voie directe, l'oeuvre d'art agit sur la sensibilité humaine, quelque soit son caractère idéologique; cette action directe de l'art sur la réceptivité propre à la sensibilité humaine a été remarquée par Platon et Aristotel qui l'ont qualifiée de »transformation de l'âme«.
- IV. En tant qu'expression de la subjectivité chargée d'intentions et de buts »l'art introduit dans les choses et dans les relations autrement purement contingentes une signification humaine« (Hegel). Par cette action de signification, il engendre les éléments premiers et vivants de toute nouvelle reconstruction culturelles. Il agit pour fixer ce qui, autrement, eut été inexprimable et fugitif. Cette action de l'art a été saisie par Kant lorsqu'il parle d'universaux sans concepts. De cette manière, l'esprit humain se prépare lui-même pour l'étape suivante qui représentera une nouvelle tranche de réalité. C'est dans ce sens que Heidegger voit dans l'art une nouvelle mise en valeur des choses lesquelles, autre-

me and for something else. It becomes a fact of culture and by this fact, it unites these two moments in an organic whole, which cannot be separated:

II in result:

- 1. That art remains something in itself, any use of art as a means to an end other than itself constitutes an alteration of art;
- 2. then art, by the fact that it works with the spiritual »material« of the time, that it chooses its subjects in the problematic specific to an era, that its options are those determined by a reality complex and empirical, art, we say, engenders a knowledge in the spirit of a determined tendency of the time itself, a tendential knowledge.
- 3. this derived result which does not determine the concept of art (in the sense that it does not concern the work of art as such) establishes itself at the same time as its historical attribute and gives art has the power of a fact of culture, which allows it to be considered and manipulated as such.

III. In the fact of culture, the first moment of art is suppressed, it is given no importance.

In the fact of art the sense of communication and tendency is only implied and regarded as contingent. Hegel says: "from any authentic work one can draw a moral, it is a question of knowing who is capable of drawing this moral".

Here the spontaneity, which is proper to the fact of art, is joined to the meaning which is the product of a practical experience and an ideology. Art is thus subjected to an action of deciphering as a fact of culture. But we find ourselves faced with a double reading and a possible double deciphering of any work of art. It must be remembered that significant deciphering (as a moment of ideology, acts on the spiritual climate of an era and acquires a modeling action of the human spirit during a period; at the same time, by direct means, the work of art acts on human sensibility, whatever its ideological character; this direct action of art on the receptivity proper to human sensibility was noted by Plato and Aristotel who called it a "transformation of the soul".

IV. As an expression of subjectivity charged with intentions and aims, "art introduces into things and into relations — otherwise purely contingent — a human meaning" (Hegel). Through this action of signification, it engenders the primary and living elements of any new cultural reconstruction. It acts to fix what otherwise would have been inexpressible and fleeting. This action of art was grasped by K an t when he speaks of universals without concepts. In this way, the

human mind prepares itself for the next stage which will represent a new slice of reality. It is in this sense that Heidegger sees in art a new enhancement of things which, other-322

ment seraient réduites à une signification uniquement utilitaire: la forêt n'est que du bois; la montagne, une carrière seulement; le fleuve rien qu'une force hydraulique ou une voie de transport. L'art engendre une autre signification humaine des choses et des relations.

Nietzsche observe, avec raison, que la musique opère une transfiguration de la réalité, ce qui signifie que la banalité du quotidien acquiert une valeur nouvelle.

V. Par conséquent, l'art se place à l'avant-garde de la culture spirituelle. Il est constitutif de chaque étape du développement de l'homme; en tant qu'être générique. Il se refuse ainsi à tout apriorisme, à tout schéma et ne se laisse subordonner à aucune »raison théorique« qui suppose comme étant connu précisément ce qui est en voie d'être découvert. L'art est une modalité de la »raison pratique« et non pas de la »raison théorique«. L'art est plutôt prométhéen, c'est-à-dire fondateur et prospectif.

VI. L'art se révèle ainsi comme un moment de spontanéité pure propre à chaque culture, comme une expression à la fois pratique et active de toute tendance nouvelle; cette spontanéité créatrice, cette nouvelle spiritualité de l'art ne sont pas dépourvues de prémisses matérielles. Mais il y a aussi une part d'utopie dans les investigations qui engendrent le fait d'art. Il s'agit là d'un devancement de la réalité qui ouvre la voie à un dépassement réel de la réalité même, d'un dénoncement qui actualise. L'art apparait ici comme un agent de ce mouvement en avant. Il en résulte que ce qu'on appelle efficacité pratique (et dérivée) de l'art est en raport direct avec le degré selon lequel une époque historique est ou n'est pas révolutionnaire; et aussi, en rapport direct avec le degré d'intensité et de profondeur des tendances révolutionnaires de la dite époque. Toute limitation imposée à l'art agit ainsi comme une mesure de temporisation de la révolution et révèle le pouls irrégulier de cette même révolution qui recule devant ses propres conséquences.

VII. Dans ce sens, l'art est dépourvu de toute stratégie ou tactique dans la spontanéité de ses recherches. Il se refuse à tout ce qui serait institutionnel — ou, autrement dit — rendre un fait d'art institutionnel signifie détruire l'originalité de l'art, en tant que chose en elle-même ou comme chose concernant un autre objet. Une contradiction apparaît ici, comme un effet du développement historique. Le dépassement et la reconstitution de cette contradiction — au delà de tout arbitraire — sont conçus comme une loi de l'histoire. Une culture nouvelle, un homme nouveau, ne sauraient être que des produits qui dérivent de cette confrontation. Seule, une illusion naîve est susceptible de faire croire qu'on pourrait se passer de cette confrontation, toujours aigue, souvent dramatique, mais créatrice.

Dans ce sens, ont doit reconnaître dans le fait spontané de l'art, un instrument — toujours incisif — de la révolution sociale. L'art est une arme de la révolution qui vise les adversaires de tout re-

m ent would be reduced to a purely utilitarian significance: the forest is only wood; the mountain, only one quarry; the river nothing but a hydraulic force or a transport route!

Art engenders another human meaning of things and relationships.

Nietzsche observes, with good reason, that music operates a transfiguration of reality, which means that the banality of everyday life acquires a new value.

V. Therefore, art is at the forefront of spiritual culture. It is constitutive of each stage of human development; as being generic. It thus refuses any aprioriism, any schema and does not allow itself to be subordinated to any »theoretical reason« which supposes as being known precisely what is in the process of being discovered. Art is a modality of »practical reason« and not of »theoretical reason«. Art is rather promethean, that is to say founding and prospective.

VI. Art thus reveals itself as a moment of pure spontaneity specific to each culture, as an expression both practical and active of any new trend; this creative spontaneity, this new spirituality of art are not devoid of material premises: But there is also a part of utopia in the investigations which engender the fact of art. This is a getting ahead of reality which opens the way to a real overcoming of reality itself, of a denunciation which actualizes. Art appears here as an agent of this forward movement. It follows that what is called the practical (and derived) efficacy of art is directly related to the degree to which a historical epoch is or is not revolutionary; and also, in direct relation to the degree of intensity and depth of the revolutionary tendencies of the said period. Any limitation imposed on art thus acts as a measure of temporization of the revolution and reveals the irregular pulse of this same revolution which recoils before its own consequences.

VII. In this sense, art is devoid of any strategy or tactic in the spontaneity of its research. It refuses anything that would be institutional—or, in other words—to make a fact of art institutional means to destroy the originality of art, as a thing in itself or as a thing concerning another object. A contradiction appears here, as an effect of historical development. The overcoming and the reconstitution of this contradiction—beyond any arbitrariness—are conceived as a law of history. A new culture, a new man, can only be products that derive from this confrontation. Only a naive illusion is likely to make people believe that we could do without this confrontation, which is always acute, often dramatic, but creative.

In this sense, we must recognize in the spontaneous fact of art, an instrument - always incisive - of social revolution. Art is an army of revolution that targets the adversaries of any re-323

nouvellement de la société; mais qui s'attaque aussi à ses propres lenteurs, à ses propres erreurs, inévitables sur la voie de ses recherches.

. .

L'art demeure, dans ce sens une expression engagée de l'homme dans l'histoire; c'est ici, dans son engagement, que se trouve le point d'insertion de l'art dans une responsabilité humaine ouverte et c'est ceci qui implique une éthique intégrée dans toute oeuvre d'art. Entendre l'art de cette manière, reconnaître son essence sociale, cela ne saurait être que l'effet d'une conception puissamment et patiemment établie par la révolution même.

newly from the company; but which also attacks its own slowness, its own errors, inevitable on the path of its research.

Art remains, in this sense, a committed expression of man in history; it is here, in its commitment, that the point of insertion of art is found in an open human responsibility and it is this which implies an ethics integrated into any work of art. To understand art in this way, to recognize its social essence, can only be the effect of a conception powerfully and patiently established by the revolution itself.

324

MAHATMA GANDHI'S CONCEPT OF TRUSTEESHIP SOCIALISM: A HINDU SEARCH FOR UTOPIA

Robert Kragalott

Delaware, Ohio, U.S.A.

The recent Mahatma Gandhi Centenary Year brought a renewed interest in the Gandhian concept of Trusteeship Socialism.1 Gandhi based his socialism on traditional Hindu religious and social values. His trusteeship program called for voluntary relinquishment of wealth and land to the poor, decentralization, village self-sufficiency and self-government, cottage and small-scale industries, and »a new humanism based on absolute devotion to nonaquisitiveness, non violence, and truth.«2 Although most Indian politicians and scholars acclaim Gandhi's trusteeship concept, a minority of critics, particularly communists, argue that Gandhian economic theories are of no use in the struggle to overcome the economic ills that beset Indian society.3 What is the relevance of Gandhi for contemporary India? It is my intention in this paper to reveal the gap between the ideal implications of Gandhi's Trusteeship Socialism as it relates to the actual building of socialist society in India.

At the outset, we should note that the economic issues that agitate most socialist movements throughout the world are completely irrelevant in India. No significant capitalist class exists in India. The industrial proletariat is extremely weak. The predominant form of property is the tiny plot worked by primitive, inefficient peasant labor. India, therefore, is not so much faced with the

¹ Among the books containing selections from Mahatma Gandhi's writings on Trusteeship Socialism, the most prominent are: M. K. Gandhi, Socialism of My Conception, Bombay: Bharatuja Vidya Bhavan, 1966; M. K. Gandhi, Towards Nonviolent Socialism, Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House, 1957.

M. W. Fisher, and J. V. Bondurant, Indian Approaches to a Socialist Society, Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1956, p. 38.
 E. M. S. Namboodiripad, The Mahatma and the Ism, New Delhi, 1959, pp. 111—117.

Robert Kragalott

Delaware, Ohio, U.S.A.

The recent M ahatm a G andhi Centenary Y ear brought a renewed in terest in the G andhian concept of Trusteeship Socialism.1

Gandhi based his socialism on traditional H indu religious and social values. His trusteeship program called for voluntary relinquishm ent of w ealth and land to the poor, decentralization, village self-sufficiency and self-governm ent, cottage and small-scale industries, and wa new hum anism based on absolute devotion to nonaquisitiveness, non violence, and truth.«2 Although most Indian politicians and scholars acclaim G andhi's trusteeship concept, a m inority of critics, p articularly communists, argue that t Gandhian economic theories are of no use in the struggle to overcome the economic ills that beset Indian society.3 What is the relevance of Gandhi for contemporary India? It is my intention in this paper to reveal the gap between the ideal implications of G andhi's Trusteeship Socialism as it relates to the actual building of socialist society in India.

A t the outset, we should note that the economic issues that agitate most socialist movements throughout the world are completely irrelevant in India. No significant capitalist class exists in India. The in dustrial proletariat is extremely weak. The predominant form of property is the tiny plot worked by primitive, inefficient peasant labor. India, therefore, is not somuch faced with the 1 Among the books containing selections from Mahatma Gandhi's writings on Trusteeship Socialism, the most prominent are: M. K. Gandhi, Socialism of My Conception, Bombay: Bharatuja Vidya Bhavan, 1966; M. K. Gandhi, Towards Nonviolent Socialism, Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House, 1957.

pp. 111—117.

^{*} M. W. F isher, and J. V. B ondurant, Indian Approaches to a Socialist Society, Berkeley, C alifornia: U niversity of California Press, 1956, p. 38.

[®] E. M. S. N am boodiripad, The M ahatm a and the Ism, New Delhi, 1959.

problem of redistributing wealth, but of creating wealth. What India needs is rapid economic development to bring about an improved standard of living at minimum cost in human suffering.

There are few Indian leaders who deny that some form of socialism is absolutely essential for the development of an equitable economic system that will eliminate the dire poverty in Indian society. The question that still has to be worked out is the form of socialism best suited to India's needs. The Indian Communists, who represent nearly ten per cent of the popular vote, demand that economic development be achieved rapidly through nationalization of all means of production and distribution. They cite the astonishing accomplishment of the Soviet Union which doubled its industrial wealth in the last ten years and is ranked the second greatest industrial nation in the world. In a recent speech, an Indian Communist exclaimed:

The people of India want rapid economic development. They do not fear Communism, for it is hard to impress our hungry and poverty stricken masses with arguments about the loss of personal freedom. particularly when Communism provides our neighbors with food, shelter, a piece of cloth, social security, and education for children. We Communists ask the so-called Socialist Government — »How quickly can you give us land, industrialize our country, educate our children, and raise our standard of living?«⁴

Mrs. Indira Gandhi, Prime Minister of India, has recently emerged victorious in her struggle to maintain power against the old guard conservatives in the Congress Party. She now heads a majority government which no longer depends for its survival on the support of the Communists and other minor leftist parties. The Communists have always made it clear to Mrs. Gandhi that she must nationalize foreign banks and foreign trade, distribute land to poor peasants, adopt a pro-labor policy and forge friendship with the Soviet Union. Moreover, the young Congress Party Socialists want Mrs. Gandhi to announce a time-bound program of socialist reform. In the past, Mrs. Gandhi used the excuse that the old guard conservative did not allow her to fulfill the Congress Manifesto of Economic Reforms. At this moment in Indian history, Prime Minister Gandhi is on trial. If she fails to solve the massive unemployment and land problems, the young people, the Socialists, and the Communists will desert her. As the editor of the Times of India wrote: »Everything will depend upon the speed with which Mrs. Gandhi can define her policies, draw up a time schedule for carrying them out, and convince the public that there is at long last going to be a break from the easy-going ways of the past.«5

⁵ Times of India, November 4, 1969.

⁴ Speech by Mr. Hiren Mukerjee, Communist representative in the Lok Sobha, India's National Parliament, November, 1969.

There are few Indian leaders who deny th a t some form of socialism is absolutely essential for the developm ent of an equitable economic system th at will elim inate the dire poverty in Indian society. The question th a t still has to be w orked out is the form of socialism best suited to India's needs. The Indian Communists, who represent nearly ten per cent of the popular vote, dem and th at economic developm ent be achieved rapidly through nationalization of all means of production and distribution. They cite the astonishing accomplishment of the Soviet Union w hich doubled its industrial w ealth in the last ten years and is ranked the second greatest industrial nation in the world. In a recent speech, an Indian Communist exclaimed:

The people of India w ant rapid economic development.

They do not fear Communism, for it is h ard to impress our hungry and poverty stricken masses w ith argum ents about the loss of personal freedom, p articularly w hen Communism provides our neighbors w ith food, shelter, a piece of cloth, social security, and education for children.

We Communists ask the so-called Socialist Government

— »How quickly can you give us land, industrialize our country, educate our children, and raise our standard of living?«4

Mrs. Indira Gandhi, Prim e M inister of India, has recently em erged victorious in h er struggle to m aintain power against the old guard conservatives in the Congress P arty. She now heads a m ajority governm ent which no longer depends for its survival on the support of the Communists and other m inor leftist parties. The Communists have always made it clear to Mrs. Gandhi th a t she m ust nationalize foreign banks and foreign trade, distribute land to poor peasants, adopt a pro-labor policy and forge friendship with the Soviet Union. Moreover, the young Congress P a rty Socialists want Mrs. Gandhi to announce a tim e-bound program of socialist reform. In the past, Mrs. Gandhi used the excuse that the old guard conservative did not allow h er to fulfill the Congress M anifesto of Economic Reforms. A t this m om ent in Indian history, Prim e M inister Gandhi is on trial. If she fails to solve the massive unem ploym ent and land problems, the young people, the Socialists, and the Communists will desert her. As the editor of the Times of India wrote: »Everything will depend upon the speed w ith which Mrs. Gandhi can define her policies, draw up a time schedule for carrying them out, and convince the public th a t there is at long last going to be a break from the easy-going ways of the past.«5

4 Speech by Mr. Hiren Mukerjee, Communist Representative in the Lok Sabha, India's National Parliament, November,

s Times of India, November 4, 1969.

326

It seems obvious that Mrs. Gandhi will accelerate the pace of socialist reforms in an attempt to revitalize the Indian economy. What has to be carefully measured are the safeguards to prevent accelerated socialism from degenerating into totalitarianism. Undoubtedly, Mrs. Gandhi wants to continue down the road of democratic socialism and industrial modernization as advocated by her father, Jawaharlal Nehru. At the same time, Mrs. Gandhi does not want to hurt the many revered followers of Mahatma Gandhi's concept of Trusteeship Socialism. The well-known, highly popular, and immensely respected socialist leaders - Jayaprakash Narayan and Vinoba Bhave, have strongly opposed the path of industrial and urban modernization for India. They continue to support Mahatma Gandhi's idea that both the West's and Russia's industrial civilizations are basically materialistic and destructive of human harmony and community. For them, India's salvation rests on the revival of traditional Hindu religious and social values, which include an economy based on home workshops and the cooperative village form of life. For them, Gandhi's Trusteeship Socialism, based on the self-abnegation of individualism, is far superior to the Western ideal of the free individual, pursuing his own independent goals and ambitions at the expense of others. India must not adopt the dehumanising Western model of industrialization. A redivision of the land into cooperative village communes, together with the development of cottage workshops. is the only way to rescue the Indian people from their abysmal poverty.

How can Mrs. Gandhi react to the followers of Mahatma's concept of Trusteeship Socialism? I believe she must continue the process of industrial modernization, but she will also encourage land reform and the development of cooperative village communes. As any Prime Minister of India, Mrs. Gandhi must recognize the tremendous moral force of Trusteeship Socialism. Let us now consider in greater detail the socialist thought of Mahatma Gandhi.

Although some Indian scholars, and particularly Indian Communists challenge his claim, Mahatma Gandhi asserted that he introduced socialism in India as one aspect of his nonviolent struggle against English colonial rule. Gandhi made the claim public in an article published by the newspaper *Harijan* on April 20, 1940:

I have claimed that I was a Socialist long before those I know in India avowed their creed. My socialism was natural to me. It came out of my unshakable belief in nonviolence. No man could be actively nonviolent and not rise against social injustice...⁶

Socialism is a beautiful word. In socialism all the members of society are equal, none low, none high. I venture to suggest that it is the fundamental law of nature that Nature produces enough for the wants of humanity, and if only everybody took enough for himself and nothing more, there would be no pauperism in this world. I say that you

⁶ Harijan, April 20, 1940.

W hat has to be carefully m easured are the safeguards to prevent accelerated socialism from degenerating into totalitarianism. Undoubtedly, Mrs. Gandhi w ants to continue down the road of democratic socialism and industrial m odernization as advocated by her father, Jaw aharlal Nehru. At the same time, Mrs. Gandhi does not w ant to h u rt the m any revered followers of Mahatma Gandhi's concept of Trusteeship Socialism. The well-known, highly popular, and immensely respected socialist leaders — Jayaprakash N arayan and Vinoba Bhave, have strongly opposed the path of industrial and urban modernization for India. They continue to support M ahatm a G andhi's idea th a t both the West's and Russia's industrial civilizations are basically m aterialistic and destructive of hum an harm ony and community. For them, India's salvation rests on the revival of traditional Hindu religious and social values, which include an economy based on home workshops and the cooperative village form of life. For them, Gandhi's Trusteeship Socialism, based on the selfabnegation of individualism, is far superior to the W estern ideal of the free individual, pursuing his own independent goals and ambitions at the expense of others.

India m ust not adopt the dehum anising W estern model of industrialization. A redivision of the land into cooperative village communes, together w ith the developm ent of cottage workshops, is the only w ay to rescue the Indian people from their abysmal poverty.

How can Mrs. Gandhi react to the followers of M ahatm a's concept of Trusteeship Socialism? I believe she m ust continue the process of industrial modernization, but she will also encourage land reform and the developm ent of cooperative village communes.

As any Prim e M inister of India, Mrs. Gandhi m ust recognize the trem endous m oral force of Trusteeship Socialism. Let us now consider in g reater detail the socialist thought of M ahatma Gandhi.

A lthough some Indian scholars, and particularly Indian Comm unists challenge his claim, M ahatm a Gandhi asserted that he introduced socialism in India as one aspect of his nonviolent struggle against English colonial rule. Gandhi made the claim public in an article published by the new spaper Harijan on April 20, 1940: I have claimed th a t I was a Socialist long before those I know in India avowed th eir creed. My socialism was natural to me. It came out of my unshakable belief in nonviolence. No m an could be actively nonviolent and not rise against social injustice . . . 0

Socialism is a beautiful word. In socialism all the members of society

are equal, none low, none high. I venture to suggest that it is the fundam ental law of nature that Nature produces enough for the wants of hum anity, and if only everybody took enough for himself and nothing more, there would be no pauperism in this world. I say that you

• Harian, April 20, 1940.

327

and I have no right to anything that we have until the millions of poor are clothed and fed better. You and I must adjust our wants, and even undergo voluntary starvation in order that they may be nursed, fed, and clothed.7

Socialist literature had no significant influence on Gandhi. Among the formative influences on his concepts of nonviolence and Trusteeship Socialism may be mentioned Henry David Thoreau, Essays on Civil Disobedience; Leo Tolstoy, The Kingdom of God is Within You; John Ruskin, Unto This Last; the Sermon on the Mount; and, the Bhagavad Gita.8

In 1920, when Gandhi assumed leadership over the Indian National Congress, he transformed the nationalist struggle for independence in two ways. First, he introduced the highly successful techniques of nonviolence and civil disobedience. Second, he transformed Indian nationalism from a small movement composed of Western-educated intellectuals into a mass movement supported by the uneducated millions. Althoug he was Western educated and had embraced British manners, Gandhi progressively discarded Western ideas and dress and gradually found truth for himself in the old Hindu traditions. He retained only the most meager possessions, wore nothing but a loincloth, walked on foot from village to village, meditating, fasting, preaching nonviolence, and advocating his concept of Trusteeship social justice. Millions of peasants and urban workers revered him because he said it would not be enough to attain freedom from British rule. The relation of the rich to the poor within India must also be changed. The rich man must think of himself as his brother's keeper, and must voluntarily use his wealth as a trust for the benefit of the poor. Gandhi based his Trusteeship doctrine on a celebrated werse in the ancient Hindu scripture, Ishopanishad, »All that is in the universe is pervaded by God. Renounce first, therefore, in order to enjoy. Covet not anybody's riches.«

Gandhi wrote:

In other words, everything must, in the first instance, be surrendered to God, and then out of it, one may use, not for selfish enjoyment, but for the service of God's creation, according to one's strict need, and no more. One would then not covet what belongs to another.9

Gandhi believed in the ideal of equitable distribution. Equitable distribution meant that each man should have the wherewithal to supply all his natural needs. Specifically, every one must be assured of a balanced diet, a decent house to live in, sufficient cloth to cover his body, adequate medical care, and facilities for educating his children.10

 ⁷ M. K. Gandhi, Socialism of My Conception, pp. 3, 45—46.
 ⁸ H. T. Muzumdar, »Mahatma Gandhi's Economic Theories«, Modern Review (December, 1967), p. 385.

Pyarelal, Mahatma Gandhi: The Last Phase, Ahmedabad: Navajivan,

^{1958,} p. 624.

10 Harijan, January 30, 1937; M. K. Gandhi, Socialism of My Conception, pp. 278-280.

fed, and clothed.7

Socialist literatu re had no significant influence on Gandhi.

Among the form ative influences on his concepts of nonviolence and Trusteeship Socialism m ay be m entioned H enry David Tho-reau, Essays on Civil Disobedience; Leo Tolstoy, The Kingdom of God is W ithin You; John Ruskin, Unto This Last; the Serm on on the M ount; and, the Bhagavad Gita.8

In 1920, when Gandhi assumed leadership over the Indian National Congress, he transform ed the nationalist struggle for independence in two ways. First, he introduced the highly successful techniques of nonviolence and civil disobedience. Second, he tran sform ed Indian nationalism from a small movem ent composed of W estern-educated intellectuals into a mass movem ent supported by the uneducated millions. A lthoug he was W estern educated and had em braced B ritish m anners, G andhi progressively discarded W estern ideas and dress and gradually found tru th for himself in the old H indu traditions. He retained only the most meager possessions, wore nothing b u t a loincloth, w alked on foot from village to village, m editating, fasting, preaching nonviolence, and advocating his concept of Trusteeship social justice. Millions of peasants and urban w orkers revered him because he said it would not be enough to attain freedom from B ritish rule. The relation of the rich to the poor w ithin India m ust also be changed. The rich m an m ust think of him self as his bro th er's keeper, and m ust voluntarily use his w ealth as a tru st for the benefit of the poor.

Gandhi based his Trusteeship doctrine on a celebrated werse in the ancient Hindu scripture, Ishopanishad, »All th a t is in the universe is pervaded by God. Renounce first, therefore, in order to enjoy. Covet not anybody's riches.«

Gandhi wrote:

In other words, everything must, in the first instance, be surrendered to God, and then out of it, one m ay use, not for selfish enjoym ent, b ut for the service of God's creation, according to one's strict need, and no more. One would then not covet w hat belongs to another.9

Gandhi believed in the ideal of equitable distribution. Equitable distribution m eant that t each m an should have the wherew ithal to supply all his natural needs. Specifically, every one must be assured of a balanced diet, a decent house to live in, sufficient cloth to cover

his body, adequate medical care, and facilities for educating his children. 10

7 M. K. Gandhi, Socialism of My Conception, pp. 3, 45—46.

8 H. T. Muzumdar, »M ahatma G andhi's Economic Theories«, M odern R eview (December, 1967), p. 385.

• Pyarelal, Mahatma Gandhi: The Last Phase, Ahmedabad: N avajivan, 1958, p. 624.

10 Harijan, January 30, 1937; M. K. Gandhi, Socialism of My Conception, pp. 278—280.

328

If equitable distribution is the essence of socialism, then Gandhi was a socialist. When the Indian Marxists attacked his concept of Trusteeship as unrealistic and impracticable, Gandhi insisted that Trusteeship was based on socialist principles that would bring together the rich and the poor to share in peace and brotherhood the wealth of the nation.

Yet, it is true that Gandhi was not a socialist in the sense referred to by Karl Marx. He believed that class war is not inevitable and that capital and labor need not be antagonistic to one another. Moreover, it was neither desirable nor just to dispossess people of their property. Consistent with his basic outlook of nonviolence, Gandhi sought to achieve socialist equality through the voluntary conversion of the hearts of the rich.

The ideal I want to realize is not expropriation of the property of private owners but to restrict its enjoyment so as to avoid all pauperism, discontent, and the ugly contrast that exists today between the lives and surroundings of the rich and the poor.¹¹

Gandhi argued that the capable and talent rich should not be restricted from earning and possessing wealth, for such restriction would seriously curb human freedom and would injure society. The capable and talented person should be free to create wealth, but he should surrender voluntarily the bulk of his wealth as a trust for the good of the community by limiting personal possessions and standard of living.¹²

At this point, in a flash of brilliant prophecy, Gandhi touched upon the problem of recurring inequalities that have led to the rise of a new privileged class in all the socialist countries of the contemporary world. As Friedrich Nietzsche predicted in the abstract and Milovan Djilas described in the concrete, so Gandhi warned that even after the existing inequalities of wealth have been removed, the problem of recurring in equalities resulting from the varying capacity and talent of different individuals will remain. Gandhi wrote:

It would be possible to remove inequalities by forceful expropriation. This, however, cannot make the peasant equal to the prince. It leaves untouched the problem of recurring inequalities resulting from the natural disparity in the talents and aptitudes of various people. All have not the same capacity. All have not the same degree of intelligence; therefore, some will have ability to earn more and others less. People with talents will have more, and they will utilize their talents for this purpose. If they utilize their talents kindly, they will be performing the work of the community. Such people exist as Trustees. I would allow a man of intellect to earn more; I would not cramp his talent. But the bulk of his greater earn-

¹¹ Young India, November 21, 1929.

¹² Harijan, August 25, 1940.

Trusteeship was based on socialist principles that would bring together the rich and the poor to share in peace and brotherhood the wealth of the nation.

Yet, it is true that Gandhi was not a socialist in the sense referred to by K arl Marx. He believed that class war is not inevitable and that capital and labor need not be antagonistic to one another. Moreover, it was neither desirable nor just to dispossess people of their property. Consistent with his basic outlook of nonviolence, G andhi sought to achieve socialist equality through the voluntary conversion of the hearts of the rich.

The ideal I w ant to realize is not expropriation of the prop erty of private owners b u t to restrict its enjoym ent so as to avoid all pauperism , discontent, and the ugly contra st th a t exists today betw een the lives and surroundings of the rich and the poor.11

Gandhi argued that the capable and talent rich should not be restricted from earning and possessing wealth, for such restriction would seriously curb hum an freedom and would injure society.

The capable and talented person should be free to create wealth, but he should surren der voluntarily the bulk of his wealth as a trust for the good of the comm unity by limiting personal possessions and standard of living.12

A t this point, in a flash of b rillian t prophecy, Gandhi touched upon the problem of recurring inequalities that t have led to the rise of a new privileged class in all the socialist countries of the contemporary world. As Friedrich Nietzsche predicted in the abstract and M ilovan D jilas described in the concrete, so Gandhi w arned that t even a fter the existing inequalities of wealth have been removed, the problem of recurring in equalities resulting from the varying capacity and talen t of different individuals will remain. Gandhi w rote:

It would be possible to remove inequalities by forceful expropriation. This, however, cannot make the peasant equal to the prince. It leaves untouched the problem of recurring inequalities resulting from the n atu ral disparity in the talents and aptitudes of various people. All have not the same capacity. All have not the same degree of intelligence; therefore, some will have ability to earn m ore and others less. People with talents will have more, and they will utilize their talents for this purpose. If they utilize their talents kindly, they will be perform ing the work of the community. Such people exist as Trustees.

I w ould allow a m an of intellect to earn more; I would not cram p his talent. B ut the bulk of his g reater earn11 Y o un g India, N ovem ber 21, 1929.

11 Harijan, August 25, 1940.

ings must be used for the good of the state, just as the income of all earning sons of the father goes to the common family fund.¹³

Even if the inequalities of wealth were removed by force, the problem of recurring inequalities resulting from the varying capacity and talent of different individuals will remain. Unless outstanding talent is fostered and held in trust to be used in the best interest of society, it will again give rise to a privileged class. The only answer to the problem of recurring inequalities is to convert voluntarily the man of talent to the moral principles of trusteeship.¹⁴

Gandhi believed that a transition period would be necessary to convert the rich to the moral principles of Trusteeship. In due course, when the vast majority of the people were converted, trusteeship would be embodied in national law and its operation regulated by the State. ¹⁵ He sincerely believed that people do respond to an appeal to their soul. However, if they proved impervious to the appeal to reason, the weapon of nonviolent noncooperation should be brought into play. In Gandhi's words:

Suppose a landowner exploits his tenants by appropriating for himself the bulk of the fruit of their toil. If the landlord refused to accept the principle of trusteeship, the tenants should refuse to till the land and public opinion should be directed against the possible use of black-leg (scab) labor. The owner cannot till all the land himself and he will have to give in to their demands.¹⁶

Gandhi advocated that the method of nonviolent noncooperation should be utilized against capitalist exploatation of industrial workers. He envisaged industry as a joint enterprise in which both capital and labor were co-trustees for society. Instead of thinking in terms of exclusive right and engaging in class war, the owners of industry and workers should cooperate in creating wealth for the good of society.¹⁷ If the owners refused to surrender voluntarily the bulk of their profits as a trust for the good of society, if they refused to pay labor an adequate wage, Gandhi told the workers that it was their right and moral duty as co-trustees to engage in nonviolent strike activity. He told labor that since they were as much owners of industry as the capitalists, as co-trustees they must regard the interests of society as their own. Therefore, they should protect society from the short-sighted greed of the capitalists. On the other hand, if the workers used nonviolent strike activity to improve their standard of living, the demands of the strikers should not work to the detriment of the social good. 18

¹³ Pyarelal, Mahatma Gandhi: The Last Phase, pp. 623-624.

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 626.

¹⁵ Harijan, March 31, 1946.

¹⁶ Pyarelal, Mahatma Gandhi: The Last Phase, p. 627.

Harijan, September 7, 1947.
 M. K. Gandhi, Socialism of My Conception, pp. 189—198, 204—205, 207, 217—219.

Even if the inequalities of w ealth w ere removed by force, the problem of recurring inequalities resulting from the varying capacity and talent of different individuals will rem ain. Unless outstanding talen t is fostered and held in tru st to be used in the best interest of society, it w ill again give rise to a privileged class. The only answ er to the problem of recurring inequalities is to convert voluntarily the man of talent to the moral principles of trusteeship.14

Gandhi believed th at a transition period would be necessary to convert the rich to the moral principles of Trusteeship. In due course, when the vast majority of the people were converted, trusteeship would be embodied in national law and its operation regulated by the State.15 He sincerely believed that people do respond to an appeal to their soul. However, if they proved impervious to the appeal to reason, the weapon of nonviolent noncooperation should be brought into play. In Gandhi's words: Suppose a landow ner exploits his tenants by appropriating for himself the bulk of the fruit of their toil. If the landlord refused to accept the principle of trusteeship, the tenants should refuse to till the land and public opinion should be directed against the possible use of black-leg (scab) labor. The owner cannot till all the land himself and he will have to give in to their demands.16

Gandhi advocated that the m ethod of nonviolent noncooperation should be utilized against capitalist exploatation of industrial w orkers. He envisaged industry as a joint enterprise in which both capital and labor were co-trustees for society. Instead of thinking in term s of exclusive right and engaging in class war, the owners of industry and w orkers should cooperate in creating w ealth for the good of society.17 If the owners refused to su rrender voluntarily the bulk of their profits as a trust for the good of society, if they refused to pay labor an adequate wage, Gandhi told the w orkers that it was th eir right and moral duty as co-trustees to engage in nonviolent strike activity. He told labor that t since they were as much owners of industry as the capitalists, as co-trustees they m ust regard the interests of society as their own. Therefore, they should protect society from the short-sighted greed of the capitalists. On the other hand, if the w orkers used nonviolent strike activity to improve their standard of living, the demands of the strikers should not w ork to the detrim ent of the social good.16

is p yarelal, M ahatma Gandhi: The Last Phase, pp. 623—624.

14 Ibid., p. 626.

15 Harijan, March 31, 1946.

19 Pyarelal, Mahatma Gandhi: The Last Phase, p. 627.

17 Harijan, September 7, 1947.

18 M. K. Gandhi, Socialism of M y Conception, pp. 189—198, 204—205, 207, 217—219.

By the year 1918 Gandhi was firmly committed to the method of militant nonviolent noncooperation to bring about his concept of trusteeship. At this time, he used the Hindu word Satyagraĥa to describe the nonviolent method. Satya means truth, soul, which Gandhi regarded as the equivalent of love; agraha means force. His idea of satyagraha was that an opponent could be won over more surely by love, patience, and appeal to human decency than by resort to violence. To decide in advance that certain adversaries are incapable of decency is wrongly accusing them of humanity. Satyagraha recognizes the humanity of every adversary and seeks to force him to act in ways consistent with his own latent human ideals of decency and honor. Gandhi believed that one could acomplish voluntary conversion of an adversary only if one banished fear and hatred from one's own heart, and treated the adversary courteously and patiently even if he threatened not only one's liberty and possessions but even one's very life. He taught his followers never to resist arrest and never to hit back when beaten. Carried out in this spirit, satyagraha is clearly an active, determined attempt to change an opponent's attitude and beliefs through love and appeal to human decency.19

Having evolved his concept of satyagraha, Gandhi continued throughout his life to try to develop increasingly the inner strength, selflessness, and selfdiscipline necessary to carry the burden of nonviolent struggle against injustice. He gave up material comforts and developed habits of prayer and occasional long fasts that were related to the strict methods of satyagraha. He became increasingly a radiant, vital, and compelling personality— and one of the towering figures in history.

Gandhi first put into practice his concept of satyagraha when he personally directed a strike of textile workers in Ahmedabad in 1918.20 Once convinced of the justice of the worker's demands for a wage increase and improved working conditions, Gandhi himself opened negotiations with the employers and sought to obtain a peaceful, fair settlement. The mill owners, however, refused to submit to pressure from an outsider. Moreover, Gandhi's offer to submit the dispute to arbitration was rejected. At this point, he gave the workers preliminary training in nonviolence, and asked them to take a pledge not to work till the owners voluntarily agreed to arbitrate the just demand for a wage increase. Every day for three weeks, led by Gandhi, the workers paraded the streets carrying appropriate placards in peaceful procession. Gandhi addressed mass meetings of workers and interested citizens, and issued pamphlets daily. One of the strike leaders wrote:

In about three weeks, demoralization set in among the workers on strike. Some of them began to waver. They said they had no food for themselves and their families.

M. K. Gandhi, "Science of Satyagraha«. Young India, November 5, 1919.
 The definitive study on Gandhi's role in the Ahmedabad strike is Erik
 Erikson's Gandhi's Truth: On the Origins of Militant Nonviolence, New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1989.

describe the nonviolent method. Satya means truth, soul, which Gandhi regarded as the equivalent of love; agraha means force.

His idea of satyagraha was that an opponent could be won over more surely by love, patience, and appeal to hum an decency than by resort to violence. To decide in advance that certain adversaries are incapable of decency is wrongly accusing them of humanity. Satyagraha recognizes the hum anity of every adversary and seeks to force him to act in ways consistent with his own latent hum an ideals of decency and honor. Gandhi believed that one could acomplish voluntary conversion of an adversary only if one banished fear and hatred from one's own heart, and treated the adversary courteously and patiently even if he threatened not only one's liberty and possessions but even one's very life. He taught his followers never to resist arrest and never to hit back when beaten. Carried out in this spirit, satyagraha is clearly an active, determined attempt to change an opponent's attitude and beliefs through love and appeal to hum an decency.19

Having evolved his concept of satyagraha, Gandhi continued throughout his life to try to develop increasingly the inner strength, selflessness, and selfdiscipline necessary to carry the burden of nonviolent struggle against injustice. He gave up material comforts and developed habits of pray er and occasional long fasts th a t w ere related to the strict m ethods of satyagraha. He became increasingly a radiant, vital, and compelling personality

— and one of the tow ering figures in history.

G andhi first p u t into practice his concept of satyagraha when he personally directed a strike of textile w orkers in Ahmedabad in 1918.20 Once convinced of the justice of the w orker's demands for a wage increase and im proved working conditions, Gandhi him self opened negotiations w ith the employers and sought to obtain a peaceful, fair settlem ent. The m ill owners, however, refused to subm it to pressure from an outsider. Moreover, G andhi's offer to subm it the dispute to arbitration was rejected. At this point, he gave the w orkers prelim inary training in nonviolence, and asked them to take a pledge not to work till the owners voluntarily agreed to arb itrate the ju st dem and for a wage increase.

Every day for th ree weeks, led by Gandhi, the w orkers paraded the streets carrying appropriate placards in peaceful procession.

G andhi addressed mass m eetings of w orkers and interested citizens,

and issued pam phlets daily. One of the strike leaders wrote: In about three weeks, dem oralization set in among the w orkers on strike. Some of them began to waver. They said they had no food for themselves and their families.

1# M. K. Gandhi, »Science of Satyagraha«. Young India, November 5, 1919.

*° The definitive study on G andhi's role in the A hm edabad strike is Erik H. Erikson's G andhi's Truth: On the Origins of M ilitant Nonviolence, New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1969.

On the morning of March 12, 1918, facing a meeting of strikers, Gandhi made an unexpected announcement. He declared he would himself touch no food till the worker's pledge was redeemed. This was Gandhi's first fast on a public issue in India. It electrified the workers and restored their morale. Meanwhile, on the other side, the millowners were touched and then became worried as the fast extended for three full days. They bestirred themselves to find a way out. At the end of four days, arbitration was agreed to and Gandhi broke his fast. The principle and procedure of arbitration were thus introduced in the industrial relations of this country for the first time. Gandhi declared on this occasion to the workers of Ahmedabad that it was not their triumph but triumph of justice and hence a victory for both sides.21

Not unnaturally, many industrialists and large landowners were frightened and alienated by Gandhi's attempts to force trusteeship by militant nonviolent noncooperation. During the long years of struggle for Indian independence, Gandhi came to realize that it would be unwise to alienate the propertied classes whose backing was needed to achieve independence. Thus, he gradually refined the concept of social trusteeship by rooting it firmly in Hindu religious and social traditions. In this guise, Gandhian trusteeship gained the support of the rich and the poor in India's highly segmented society.22

In order to comprehend why trusteeship has effectively functioned even to the present day, it is necessary to understand the nature of certain important traditional beliefs and behavior patterns in Indian society. We know that the caste system reinforces the class structure of Indian society. Admittedly, legislation and changing attitudes are gradually eroding the caste system; but even more resistant to change has been the traditional religious values and social behavior patterns of indian society. Inherent in Indian society is a web of reciprocal relationships, among which, for our purposes, the most important are those based on the giving and receiving of charity.23

The concept of charity is part of the legacy of ancient Indian moral precepts and is an essential aspect of an Indian's religious dharma (moral duty). The ancient Hindu scripture, Mahabharata, laid special emphasis that only the charitable distribution of wealth could enable men to fulfill their dharma. The Hindu religious classics not only urged wealthy individuals to establish and support charitable institutions, but particularly emphasized the practice of alms giving by individuals directly to other individuals The ancient Hindu books stressed the merit that would be gained

H. T. Muzumdar, op. cit., p. 389.
 E. M. S. Namboodiripad, The Mahatma and the Ism, pp. 111—117, and pp. IX-XII.

²⁵ See, e. g., P. V. Kane, History of Dharmasastra, Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1941.

andhi's first fast on a public issue in India. It electrified the w orkers and restored th eir morale. Meanwhile, on the other side, the millowners w ere touched and then became w orried as the fast extended for th ree full days. They bestirred them selves to find a w ay out. At the end of four days, arbitration was agreed to and Gandhi broke his fast. The principle and procedure of arbitration w ere thus introduced in the industrial relations of this country for the first time. G andhi declared on this occasion to the w orkers of Ahm edabad th a t it was not the eir trium ph b u t trium ph of justice and hence a victory for both sides.21

Not unnaturally, m any industrialists and large landow ners w ere frightened and alienated by G andhi's attem pts to force trusteeship by m ilitant nonviolent noncooperation. D uring the long years of struggle for Indian independence, G andhi came to realize th a t it would be unwise to alienate the propertied classes whose backing was needed to achieve independence. Thus, he gradually refined the concept of social trusteeship by rooting it firm ly in Hindu religious and social traditions. In this guise, G andhian trusteeship gained the support of the rich and the poor in India's highly segmented society.22

In order to com prehend w hy trusteeship has effectively functioned even to the present day, it is necessary to understand the nature of certain im portant traditional beliefs and behavior patterns in Indian society. We know that the caste system reinforces the class structure of Indian society. A dm ittedly, legislation and changing attitudes are gradually eroding the caste system; but even more resistant to change has been the traditional religious values and social behavior patterns of indian society. Inherent in Indian society is a web of reciprocal relationships, among which, for our purposes, the most im portant are those based on the giving and receiving of charity.23

The concept of charity is p art of the legacy of ancient Indian m oral precepts and is an essential aspect of an Indian's religious dharma (moral duty). The ancient H indu scripture, Mahabharata, laid special emphasis th a t only the charitable distribution of w ealth could enable m en to fulfill th eir dharma. The Hindu religious classics not only urged w ealthy individuals to establish and support charitable institutions, bu t p articularly emphasized the practice of alms giving by individuals directly to other individuals The ancient H indu books stressed the m erit th a t would be gained 21 H. T. M uzumdar, op. cit., p. 389.

22 E. M. S. Nam boodiripad, The M ahatm a and the Ism, pp. Ill—

117, and pp. IX—XII.

23 See, e. g., P. V. Kane, History of Dharmasastra, Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1941.

by those who gave charity to worthy Brahman priests and ascetics (sanyasi) as well as to those at the lowest levels of the social structure — the untouchables, the common workers (Sudras), the deformed, and the diseased., It was the dharma of untouchables and Sudras to serve the upper classes; in return they could claim — without any loss of self-respect — dependence on their patrons for cast-off goods and food.²⁴

The concept of *dharma* in Indian thought is directly related to the concept of *Karma*, which states that by performing well the *dharma* appropriate to one's caste, an individual thereby determines for himself a higher position in his next life. Thus, instead of encouraging change and upward social mobility, traditional Hinduism has fostered a spirit of acceptance of both one's duties and one's place in the social structure. It is as important for the wealthy to fulfill their *dharma* of giving charity as it is for the poor to fulfill their *dharma* of accepting charity. Hinduism teaches the poor to accept their low station in life and holds out the promise of a higher socio-economic position in the next life. But Hinduism does not teach the rich to be content; it condones their pursuit of wealth, as long as a part of it is given to charity.

In the early 1920's, however, the Hindu concept of society was challenged by new ideas that took root in a small group of Indian intellectuals. Among the new ideas, socialism had a penetrating effect because it called for an egalitarian as opposed to an hierarchical society. In the 1920's an Indian Communist Party was formed, and soon after a number of small socialist parties. Earlier, as we have learned, Gandhi had launched the trade union and peasant movements. At the same time that Gandhi was evolving his concept of trusteeship, many politically aware Indians realized that no matter what vision anyone held for a better life for the Indian people, there could be little hope of achieving it until India was free from colonial rule. They believed that the independence movement needed an ideology that would attract mass support from the poor, the radical socialist intellectuals, as well as the rich who endorsed the traditional social values. Gandhi himself came to realize that he would have to refine his concept of trusteeship to bridge the gap between the traditional Hindu and the new socialist view of the Indian social structure.25 First, Gandhi claimed that he was a true socialist because the concept of social trusteeship emphasized that all persons should live at one economic level, that the rich, voluntarily limiting their possessions and standard of living should give up their wealth for the good of the community. The socialists, however, were convinced that Gandhi was not a true socialist because he argued that it was not possible and not desirable to abolish class distinctions in India. Gandhi told a delegation of Indian Communists: »If you want capital to be extinct,

²⁴ Ibid., pp. 116—120.

²⁵ H. Kabir, »Gandhiji and the Indian Revolution«, The Visva-Bharati Quarterly (Santiniketan, 1949), pp. 212—219.

and the diseased., It was the dharma of untouchables and Sudras to serve the upper classes; in re tu rn they could c la im _

w ithout any loss of self-respect — dependence on their patrons for cast-off goods and food.24

The concept of dharma in Indian thought is directly related to the concept of Karma, which states that by performing well the dharma appropriate to one's caste, an individual thereby determines for him self a higher position in his next life. Thus, instead of encouraging change and upward social mobility, traditional Hinduism has fostered a spirit of acceptance of both one's duties and one's place in the social structure. It is as important for the wealthy to fulfill their dharma of giving charity as it is for the poor to fulfill their dharma of accepting charity. Hinduism teaches the poor to accept their low station in life and holds out the promise of a higher socio-economic position in the next life. But Hinduism does not teach the rich to be content; it condones their pursuit of wealth, as long as a part of it is given to charity.

In the early 1920's, however, the H indu concept of society was challenged by new ideas that took root in a small group of Indian intellectuals. Among the new ideas, socialism had a penetrating effect because it called for an egalitarian as opposed to an hierarchical society. In the 1920's an Indian Communist P arty was formed, and soon afte r a num ber of small socialist parties. Earlier, as we have learned, G andhi had launched the trade union and peasant movements. A t the same tim e th a t Gandhi was evolving his concept of trusteeship, m any politically aw are Indians realized that no m atter w hat vision anyone held for a better life for the Indian people, th ere could be little hope of achieving it until India was free from colonial rule. They believed that the independence movement needed an ideology that twould a ttract mass support from the poor, the radical socialist intellectuals, as well as the rich who endorsed the traditional social values. Gandhi himself came to realize that he w ould have to refine his concept of trusteeship to bridge the gap betw een the traditional Hindu and the new socialist view of the Indian social structure.25 First, Gandhi claimed that he was a true socialist because the concept of social trusteeship em phasized that all persons should live at one economic level, that the rich, voluntarily lim iting th eir possessions and standard of living should give up th eir w ealth for the good of the community.

The socialists, however, we re convinced that Gandhi was not a true socialist because he argued that it was not possible and not desirable

to abolish class distinctions in India. Gandhi told a delegation of Indian Communists: »If you w ant capital to be extinct, M Ibid., pp. 116-120.

" H. K abir, »G andhiji an d th e In dian Revolution«, The V isv a -B h a ra ti

Q uarterly (Santiniketan, 1949), pp. 212-219.

if you want to abolish the capitalists, you will never succeed. «26 He told a delegation of wealthy landowners:

> My object is to reach your hearts and convert you so that you hold all your private property in trust for your tenants and use it primarily for their welfare. But supposing that there is an attempt unjustly to deprive you of your property, you will find me fighting on your side.27

Thus, through the ideal of trusteeship, with rich and poor living voluntarily as one, Gandhi provided the chiliasm that so successfully attracted the poor rural masses. At the same time, Gandhi attracted to himself and the independence movement the capitalist and landed classes. He not only legitimized the status of the wealthy, he also elevated their role in the nationalist struggle and in Indian society, as long as they considered themselves trustees. Furthermore, by emphasizing that the rich should give to the poor, Gandhy restated the traditional Hindu concept of charity to which the wealthy classes adhered.

Gandhi also reinforced the security of the propertied classes by his attitude toward the poor. He spoke out against violent revolution and urged that the poor should »love« the wealthy trustees. He argued that wealth belonged to society as a whole, and that the trustees were in charge of the use of wealth for the common good of everybody in Indian society.28

Despite Gandhi's arguments, many Indian intellectuals, particularly the socialists, severely criticized the trusteeship idea. Nehru was one of the most vehement in his criticism. His opposition centered around three main points:29

First, he saw nothing new in Gandhi's concept of Trusteeship. He told Gandhi that all religions in one way or another called on the rich to be charitable to the poor. This religious attitude was rooted in the ancient world, where the only escape from misery was hope of a better world to come.

Second, Nehru in a letter to Gandhi posed the question squarely: Is it reasonable to give unchecked power and wealth to an individual and expect him to use it entirely for the public good? Even Plato's philosopher-kings could hardly have borne the burden worthily. Plato took away their wealth because he knew they could not be trusted in this way. I concede that there might be isolated individuals who are charitable and share their wealth with the poor, but surely it is absurd to build the whole teory of Trusteeship around these few benevolent people. For the most part, there are only frail human beings who think only about their personal good and advancement.

Third, Nehru noted that it was paradoxical for Gandhi to be so concerned about the poor and at the same time support the

M. K. Gandhi, Towards Nonviolent Socialism, p. 159.
 Jawaharlal Nehru, Toward Freedom, Boston: Beacon Press, 1958, p. 325.
 M. K. Gandhi, Socialism of My Conception, pp. 253-254, 274-276. 29 Jawaharlal Nehru, Toward Freedom, pp. 143, 320-323.

your hearts and convert you so that t you hold all your private property in trust for your tenants and use it primarily for their welfare. But supposing that there is an attempt unjustly to deprive you of your property, you will find me fighting on your side.27

Thus, through the ideal of trusteeship, w ith rich and poor living voluntarily as one, G andhi provided the chiliasm that to successfully attracted the poor rural masses. At the same time, Gandhi attracted to him self and the independence movement the capitalist and landed classes. He not only legitimized the status of the wealthy, he also elevated their role in the nationalist struggle and in Indian society, as long as they considered themselves trustees. Furthermore, by emphasizing that the rich should give to the poor, Gandhy restated the traditional Hindu concept of charity to which the wealthy classes adhered.

Gandhi also reinforced the security of the propertied classes by his attitude toward the poor. He spoke out against violent revolution and urged that the poor should »love« the wealthy trustees. He argued that wealth belonged to society as a whole, and that the trustees were in charge of the use of wealth for the common good of everybody in Indian society.28

Despite G andhi's argum ents, m any Indian intellectuals, p a rticularly the socialists, severely criticized the trusteeship idea.

N ehru was one of the most vehem ent in his criticism. His opposition centered around th ree m ain points:29

First, he saw nothing new in G andhi's concept of Trusteeship.

He told Gandhi th a t all religions in one w ay or another called on the rich to be charitable to the poor. This religious attitu d e was rooted in the ancient world, w here the only escape from m isery was hope of a b e tte r w orld to come.

Second, N ehru in a le tte r to Gandhi posed the question squarely: Is it reasonable to give unchecked pow er and w ealth to an individual and expect him to use it en tirely for the public good? Even P lato's philosopher-kings could hardly have borne the burden w orthily. Plato took away the ir w ealth because he knew they could not be tru sted in this way.

I concede th a t there m ight be isolated individuals who are charitable and share th eir w ealth w ith the poor, b u t surely it is absurd to build the whole teory of Trusteeship around these few

benevolent people. For the most part, there are only frail hum an beings who think only about their personal good and advancement.

Third, N ehru noted that it was paradoxical for G andhi to be so concerned about the poor and at the same time support the

*® M. K. Gandhi, Towards N onviolent Socialism, p. 159.

17 Ja w a h a rla l Nehru, Tow ard Freedom, Boston: Beacon Press, 1958, p. 325.

19 M. K. Gandhi, Socialism of M y Conception, pp. 253—254, 274—276.

s# Ja w a h a rla l Nehru, Tow ard Freedom, pp. 143, 320—323.

social relics of the old order that had all along the way created such misery for the poor. Many of the rich landowners had taken land unjustly from indebted peasants, yet, argued Nehru, these were to be the people who would act as trustees for the poor in Indian society. Despite these criticism, the effect was largely lost. For example, while in prison during the years 1942-44, out of courtesy to Nehru and other socialists, Gandhi read Karl Marx's Das Kapital. At the end of that feat of endurance, he wrote: »I think I could have written it better, assuming, of course, that I had the leisure for the study Marx has put in it. «30 When Nehru insisted that socialism must be the path for India to follow after the independence struggle, Gandhi replied that he had always advocated socialism for India. »I am socialist. Trusteeship is socialism.«

Although they were at odds with Gandhi, Nehru and the socialists realized that the primary task was the independence struggle. Thus the socialists refrained from attacking Gandhi too often because he was indispensable in holding together the entire independence movement.

Through all the long years of the independence struggle, Nehru worked closely with Gandhi and was Gandhi's explicit choice as his successor. But there were profound differences in thinking between the two men.31 Whereas Gandhi believed in nonviolence as a fundamental principle of life, Nehru believed in it only as a means sometimes useful in particular circumstances. With his scientific and secular mind, Nehru objected to Gandhi's method of mixing religion and politics. While Gandhi wrapped his message in the symbols of traditional Hinduism, Nehru spoke out in modern and Western terms. Above all, there was a marked difference between them regarding economic policy. Nehru did not share Gandhi's distrust of mechanization or his interest in spinning and cottage industries. He believed in the industrialization of India and in the building of major hydroelectric dams. Moreover, he advocated state ownership or control of key industries, steeply graduated income and inheritance taxes, and far-reaching land reforms. Gandhi's reliance on renunciation and on the voluntary use of wealth as a trust for the less fortunate seemed to Nehru too idealistic and too impractical. He wanted the Indian National Congress to adopt a program of radical social reform as an essential part of its platform. With the help of other socialists within the organization, Nehru hoped to convert the Congress as a whole to socialist beliefs. While Gandhi lived, Nehru did not succeed in this.

On the eve of independence, however, Gandhi finally decided to move closer to the ideology of Nehru and the socialists. He issued a final statement, entitled Practical Trusteeship Formula, that redefined his concept of trusteeship.32

H. T. Muzumdar, op. cit., p. 386.
 P. D. Kaushik, »Non-Gandhian Influences on Pre-independence Ideology of the Indian National Congress«, The Modern Review (October, 1962), pp. 274—279.

M. K. Gandhi, Socialism of My Conception, pp. 289—290.

the people who w ould act as trustees for the poor in Indian society. Despite these criticism, the effect was largely lost.

For example, w hile in prison during the years 1942—44, out of courtesy to N ehru and other socialists, Gandhi read K arl M arx's Das Kapital. A t the end of that feat of endurance, he wrote: »I think I could have w ritten it better, assuming, of course, that I had the leisure for the study M arx has put in it.«30 When Nehru insisted that t socialism m ust be the path for India to follow after the independence struggle, Gandhi replied that he had always advocated socialism for India. »I am socialist. Trusteeship is socialism.«

A lthough they were at odds w ith Gandhi, N ehru and the socialists realized th a t the prim ary task was the independence struggle.

Thus the socialists refrained from attacking Gandhi too often because he was indispensable in holding together the entire independence movement.

Through all the long years of the independence struggle, Nehru worked closely with G andhi and was G andhi's explicit choice as his successor. B ut there were profound differences in thinking between the two men.31 W hereas G andhi believed in nonviolence as a fundam ental principle of life, N ehru believed in it only as a means sometimes useful in p articular circumstances. W ith his scientific and secular mind, N ehru objected to G andhi's method of mixing religion and politics. W hile G andhi w rapped his message in the symbols of traditional Hinduism, N ehru spoke out in modern and W estern term s. Above all, there was a marked difference between them regarding economic policy. N ehru did not share Gandhi's d istrust of m echanization or his interest in spinning and cottage industries. He believed in the industrialization of India and in the building of major hydroelectric dams. Moreover, he advocated state ow nership or control of key industries, steeply graduated income and inheritance taxes, and far-reaching land reforms.

G andhi's reliance on renunciation and on the voluntary use of w ealth as a tru st for the less fortunate seemed to N ehru too idealistic and too im practical. He w anted the Indian National Congress to adopt a program of radical social reform as an essential p art of its platform . W ith the help of other socialists w ithin the organization, N ehru hoped to convert the Congress as a whole to socialist beliefs. While G andhi lived, N ehru did not succeed in this.

On the eve of independence, however, Gandhi finally decided to move

closer to the ideology of N ehru and the socialists. He issued a final statem ent, entitled Practical Trusteeship Formula, that redefined his concept of trusteeship.32

10 H. T. M uzumdar, op. cit., p. 386.

tl P. D. K aushik, »N on-G andhian Influences on Pre-independence Ideology of the In d ian N ational Congress«, The M odern R eview (October, 19BZ), pp. 274—279.

* M. K. Gandhi, Socialism of My Conception, pp. 289—290.

- 1. Trusteeship provides a means of transforming the present capitalist order of society into an egalitarian one. It gives no quarter to capitalism, but gives the present owning class a chance of reforming itself. It is based on the faith that human nature is never beyond redemption.
- 2. It does not recognize any right of private ownership of property except so far as it may be permitted by society for its own welfare.
- 3. It does not exclude legislative regulation of the ownership and use of wealth.
- 4. Thus, under State-regulated trusteeship, an individual will not be free to hold or use his wealth for selfish satisfaction or in disregard of the interest of society.
- 5. Just as it is proposed to fix a decent minimum living wage, even so a limit should be fixed for the maximum income that could be allowed to any person in society. The difference between such minimum and maximum incomes should be reasonable and equitable and variable from time to time so much so that the tendency would be towards obliteration of the difference.
- Under the Gandhian economic order the character of production will be determined by social necessity and not by personal whim or greed.

It is clear from Nehru's criticism that Gandhi's concept of Trusteeship Socialism was impractical and unrealistic. Gandhi's economic theories were utopian, not curative. The building of democratic socialism in contemporary India is not possible merely in his terms of self-sufficient village communities, small-scale rural industry home spinning and weaving, and distributive justice based on voluntary relinquishment of wealth and land to the poor. His message was one from the traditional Hindu religious and social post. Once independence was won, new leaders with a different outlook, a philosophy of secular socialism, were needed to guide India toward industrial and urban modernization.

If Gandhi's economic program has been discarded in favor of large-scale urban industrialization based on continuous planning and state control, if India is developing into a welfare state with planned activities extending into every sphere, what then is left of Gandhi's concept of Trusteeship Socialism? Though his economic ideas have been discarded, and his nonviolent political methods no longer considered useful or effective, there is one significant sphere of national life where Gandhi's teachings still have relevance. The government of Indira Gandhi encourages and gives legal sanction for the establishment of Gramdan village cooperatives. Mahatma Gandhi's trusteeship concept is a major theme in the ideology of the Gramdan movement. Gramdan means literally »village land given in gift.« Though the initial aim of the movement was to collect and distribute land to the landless, it has recently widened its scope in an attempt to avoid the coercive evils of capitalism and urban industrial society through the establi-

- It gives no q u arter to capitalism, b ut gives the present owning class a chance of reforming itself. It is based on the faith that hum an nature is never beyond redemption.
- 2. It does not recognize any rig h t of private ow nership of property except so far as it m ay be perm itted by society for its own welfare.
- 3. It does not exclude legislative regulation of the ownership and use of wealth.
- 4. Thus, under State-regulated trusteeship, an individual will not be free to hold or use his w ealth for selfish satisfaction or in disregard of the in terest of society.
- 5. Ju st as it is proposed to fix a decent m inim um living wage, even so a lim it should be fixed for the m axim um income that tould be allowed to any person in society. The difference between such m inim um and m axim um incomes should be reasonable and equitable and variable from time to time so m uch so that the tendency would be towards obliteration of the difference.
- 6. Under the G andhian economic order the character of production will be determined by social necessity and not by personal whim or greed.

It is clear from N ehru's criticism that G andhi's concept of T rusteeship Socialism was impractical and unrealistic. G andhi's economic theories were utopian, not curative. The building of democratic socialism in contemporary India is not possible merely in his terms of self-sufficient village communities, small-scale rural industry home spinning and weaving, and distributive justice based on voluntary relinquishment of wealth and land to the poor.

His message was one from the traditional H indu religious and social post. Once independence was won, new leaders w ith a different outlook, a philosophy of secular socialism, were needed to guide India tow ard industrial and urban modernization.

If G andhi's economic program has been discarded in favor of large-scale urban industrialization based on continuous planning and state control, if India is developing into a w elfare state w ith planned activities extending into every sphere, w hat then is left of G andhi's concept of Trusteeship Socialism? Though his economic ideas have been discarded, and his nonviolent political methods no longer considered useful or effective, there is one significant sphere of national life w here G andhi's teachings still have relevance. The

governm ent of Indira Gandhi encourages and gives legal sanction for the establishm ent of Gramdan village cooperatives. M ahatm a G andhi's trusteeship concept is a m ajor them e in the ideology of the Gramdan movement. Gramdan means literally

»village land given in gift.« Though the initial aim of the movem ent was to collect and distribute land to the landless, it has recently widened its scope in an attem pt to avoid the coercive evils of capitalism and urban industrial society through the establi

shment of egalitarian, self-governing, self-sufficient *Gramdan* village cooperatives.³³ At present, there are approximately ten thousand Gramdan villages in India.³⁴ The *Gramden* movement was launched in 1952 by Vinoba Bhave and Jayaprakash Narayan, the leading disciples of contemporary Trusteeship Socialism. While it is commendable that the *Gramdan* movement has given many poor peasants the opportunity to farm donated land, nevertheless the *Gramdan* cooperatives are isolated dots on the vast poverty-stricken subcontinent where only a small number of landowners were persuaded to part with a fragment of their land for humanitarian purposes.

Apart from the Gramdan movement and the significant role he played in the struggle for independence, Mahatma Gandhi's legacy to India and the world is that he was a great moral teacher. His ideals and moral values will always be relevant. Moral values such as nonviolence, love, brotherhood, cooperation, sharing; political ideals such as freedom, democracy, peace: social objectives such as elimination of poverty, abolition of caste distinctions, emancipation of women, unity of all national groups and communities, equality, concern about the rise of a new privileged class these were the indivisible parts of his life and teaching. Gandhi's teachings were an inspiration for the mass of poor peasants and workers in India to free themselves from the bonds of social, economic, and political oppression. The mass of the poor looked up to him as their saviour and protector. All contemporary societies need great moral teachers such as Mahatma Gandhi to arouse the social-consciousness of the wealthy and the successful in the struggle to overcome the problems of violence, poverty, and suffering in the world.

34 Times of India, October 20, 1965.

shm ent of egalitarian, self-governing, self-sufficient Gramdan village cooperatives.33 A t present, there are approxim ately ten thousand G ram dan villages in India.34 The Gramden movement was launched in

³⁸ Jayaprakash Narayan, Towards a New Society, New Delhi: Congress for Cultural Freedom, 1958, p. 38.

1952 by Vinoba Bhave and Jayaprakash Narayan, the leading disciples of contem porary Trusteeship Socialism. While it is commendable that the Gramdan movement has given many poor peasants the opportunity to farm donated land, nevertheless the Gramdan cooperatives are isolated dots on the vast poverty-

-stHcken subcontinent w here only a small num ber of landowners w ere persuaded to p a rt w ith a fragm ent of their land for hum an itarian purposes.

A part from the Gramdan m ovem ent and the significant role he played in the struggle for independence, M ahatm a Gandhi's legacy to India and the w orld is that he was a great moral teacher.

His ideals and m oral values will always be relevant. Moral values such as nonviolence, love, brotherhood, cooperation, sharing; political ideals such as freedom, democracy, peace: social objectives such as elim ination of poverty, abolition of caste distinctions, em ancipation of women, u n ity of all national groups and communities, equality, concern about the rise of a new privileged class

— these w ere the indivisible p arts of his life and teaching.

G andhi's teachings were an inspiration for the mass of poor peasants and workers in India to free them selves from the bonds of social, economic, and political oppression. The mass of the poor looked up to him as the ir saviour and protector. All contemporary societies need great moral teachers such as Mahatma Gandhi to arouse the social-consciousness of the wealthy and the successful in the struggle to overcome the problems of violence, poverty, and suffering in the world.

^{**} Ja y ap ra k a sh N arayan, Tow ards a N ew Society, New Delhi: Congress for C u ltural Freedom , 1958, p. 38.

^{**} Tim es of India, October 20, 1965.

DIE VIETNAMESICHE REVOLUTION UND DIE MARXISTISCHE PHILOSOPHIE

Shingo Shibata

Tokyo

Wenn ich die Ansicht vertrete, daß um den Vietnamkrieg philosophisch gesehen ein Kampf zwischen Materialismus und Idealismus ausgetragen wird, so stelle ich damit keineswegs in Abrede, daß es idealistische Philosophen gibt, die das vietnamesische Volk unterstützen. Die materialistische Wirklichkeit des Vietnamkrieges selbst ist es, die auf die idealistischen Philosophen einwirkt, die demokratischen und materialistischen Elemente ihrer Auffassungen stärkt und sich schließlich auch in ihrem Handeln auf materialistischen Weise wiederspiegeln muß. Ich zitiere die Feststellung Russels, daß der Gang der Geschichte in Vietnam entschieden wird. Danach handelte Russell, als er sich für die Verurteilung der Kriegsverbrechen des amerikanischen Imperialismus durch einen internationalen Gerichtshof einsetzte und - seinem Gewissen als Philosoph folgend — den amerikanischen Imperialismus öffentlich anklagte¹. Der französische Existentialist Jean Paul Sartre übernahm den Vorsitz in diesem »Russell Tribunal«, zu dessen Mitgliedern auch Simone de Beauvoir gehörte². Der amerikanische Philosoph John Sommerville (Professor an der California-Western--Universität und Vorsitzender der amerikanischen Forschungsgemeinschaft für dialektischen Materialismus) berief am 10. April 1967 ein Nationales Tribunal in New York ein und führte in einem Aufsatz auch selbst Anklage gegen die Aggression in Vietman3. Auch Howard Parsons (Dekan der philosophischen Fakultät der Universität Bridgeport und stellvertretender Vorsitzender dersel-

¹ B. Russell, War Grime in Vietnam, 1967

Anklagerede und Urteil Sartres bei dieser Gerichtsverhandlung sind auch in philosophischer Hinsicht bedeutsam. Vgl. Das Russell-Tribunal, hrag. vom Komitee zur Untersuchung der amerikanischen Kriegsverbrechen in Vietnam, Tokio 1967—68, 2 Bde. (japan.)

³ J. Sommerville, The U. S. Constitution and the Vietnamese War, 1966 (typescript)

Shingo Shibata

Tokyo

If I take the view that, philosophically speaking, the Vietnam War is a battle between materialism and idealism, I am in no way denying that there are idealistic philosophers who love the Vietnamese people support. It is the materialistic reality of the Vietnam War itself that has an effect on the idealistic philosophers, which strengthens the ocratic and materialistic element of their views and ultimately has to be reflected in their actions in a materialistic way. I quote Russel's statement that the course of history will be decided in Vietnam. Russell acted accordingly when he advocated the condemnation of the war crimes of American imperialism by an international court and — following his conscience as a philosopher — publicly accused American imperialism1. The French existentialist Jean Paul S artre took over the presidency of this »Russell Tribunal«, whose members also included Simone de Beauvoir2. The American philosopher John Som merville (Professor at the California-W estem -

University and Chairman of the American Research Association for Dialectical Materialism) appointed April 10, 1967

a national tribunal in New York and in an article he himself introduced charges against the aggression in Vietman3.

Also H ow ard Parsons (Dean of the Faculty of Philosophy, University of B ridgeport and Vice-Chairman of the same-1 B. Russell, War Grim e in Vietnam , 1967

•

- * Accusation speeches in S artre's verdict at this trial are also significant from a philosophical point of view. Cf. the Russell-Tn bunal, h rag . by the Committee of Inquiry into American War Crimes in Vietnam , Tokyo 1967-68, 2 vols. (japan.) q
- J. Sommerville, The U. S. Constitution and the Vietnamese War, 196b (typescript)

ben Forschungsgemeinschaft) erhob in etlichen seiner Schriften Anklage gegen den amerikanischen Imperialismus4. In Japan war im August 1967 durch das Japanische Komitee zur Untersuchung der amerikanischen Kriegsverbrechen in Vietnam das »Tokioter Tribunal« einberufen worden, vor dem der Philosoph Yoshishige Kozai eine umfassende Anklagerede hielt. Diesem Tribunal gehörte auch Prof. Risaku Mutai an. Kozai verurteilte den Massenmord in Vietnam auch vom philosophischen Standpunkt aus und erklärte das Vietnamproblem zum Prüfstein für die Philosophie⁵. Ich selbst habe in den vergangenen sechs Jahren bei aller Unzulänglichkeit getan, was meinen Kräften stand, um den Aggressionskrieg in Vietnam öffentlich zu verurteilen. Zur Unterstützung des vietnamesischen Volkes gründete ich den Alice-Herz--Friedensfonds und beschäftigte mich mit der Bedeutung der vietnamesischen Revolution für die Philosophie und Gesellschaftswissenschaften⁶.

Daß Russell als Senior der analytischen Philosophie, daß Sartre und Simone de Beauvoir als Vertreter des Existentialismus den amerikanischen Imperialismus verurteilt haben, ist in der Tat äußerst positiv zu bewerten, knüpft sich doch daran die Erwartung, daß marxistische und idealistishe Philosophen künftig noch stärker zu einheitlichen Aktionen im antiimperialistischen Kampf übergehen werden. Wichtiger als die aktive Teilnahme einiger weniger idealistischer Philosophen an der Verurteilung der Vietnam-Aggression ist aber, daß die überwiegende Mehrheit der marxistischen Philosophen nicht begreift, welche Bedeutung die Verurteilung der Aggression in Vietnam und die vietnamesische Revolution für die Philosophie haben, daß sie daher in dieser Beziehung weit hinter solchen Vertretern des Idealismus wie Russell und Sartre zurücksteht. Haben beispielsweise die Philosophen der sozialistischen Länder im Kampf gegen die Vietnam--Aggression und aus Solidarität mit dem vietnamesischen Volk an irgendeiner Stelle das Wort als Philosophen ergriffen? Gibt es irgendwelche Publikationen, in denen sie die philosophische Bedeutung der vietnamesischen Revolution behandelt haben? Meines Wissens existiert keine einzige Veröffentlichung dieser Art, so erschreckend das auch ist. Ich selbst habe anläßlich des Symposiums »Mensch und Gesellschaft in der wissenschaftlich-techni-

Vietnamtagebuch, Tokio, 1969. Japanisch.

⁴ N. L. Parsons, May the People Judge: Some Moral Issues in the U. S. Government's Vietnam Var, 1967 (typescript). Parsons ist auch der Verfasser eines ausgezeichneten Gedichts, in dem er seiner Trauer um Ho Chi Minh Ausdruck verleiht: H. L. Parsons, Ho Chi Minh: Good-by and Werlcome, 1969 (typescript). Auch der amerikanische marxistische Philosoph DeGrood befaßte sich in einer Arbeit mit dem Kampf gegen den Vietnamkrieg und übte in diesem Zusammenhang Kritik an der Neuen Linken. David H. DeGrood, Lanin and the New Left, 1970 (Praxis)

[§] Vgl. Genocide — eine Dokumentation des Tokioter Tribunals, hrsg. vom Japanischen Komitee zur Untersuchung der amerikanischen Kriegsverbrechen in Vietnam, Tokio 1968. Siche auch Y. Kozai, Philosophie am Scheideweg, in: Bd. 1 der Iwanami-Reihe »Philosophie, Tokio 1968 (japan.)
§ Vgl. S. Shibata, Vietnam und Fragen der Ideologie, Tokio, 1968 und

the »Tokyo Tribunal« in Japan, before which the philosopher Yoshishige Kozai delivered a comprehensive indictment. Prof. Risaku Mutai also belonged to this tribunal. Kozai also condemned the mass murder in Vietnam from a philosophical point of view and declared the Vietnam problem as a touchstone for philosophy5. In the past six years, despite all the inadequacies, I have done what I could to publicly condemn the war of aggression in Vietnam. To support the Vietnamese people, I founded the Alice Heart

-Peace Fund and dealt with the meaning of the Vietnamese revolution for philosophy and social sciences8.

The fact that Russell, as the senior of analytical philosophy, that Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir, as representatives of existentialism, have condemned American imperialism, is indeed to be rated extremely positively, since the E Expectation that in the future Marxist and idealist philosophers will move even more towards unified actions in the anti-imperialist struggle. More important than the active participation of a few idealistic philosophers in condemning the Vietnam aggression is that the overwhelming majority of Marxist philosophers do not understand the importance of condemning the aggression in Vietnam and the Vietnamese revolution philosophy have that in this respect it is far behind such representatives of idealism as Russell and Sartre. For example, did the philosophers of the socialist countries fight against the Vietnam

-Aggression and out of solidarity with the Vietnamese people spoke at any point as philosophers? Are there any publications in which you have discussed the philosophical significance of the Vietnamese revolution?

To my knowledge, not a single publication of this kind exists, as frightening as that is. I myself, on the occasion of the symposium "People and Society in the Scientific-Technical-4 N. L. Parsons, May the People Judge: Some Moral Issues in the U. S.

G overnm ent's V ietnam Var, 1967 (typescript). Parsons is also the author of an excellent poem expressing his mourning for Ho Chi Minh: H. L. Parsons, Ho Chi Minh: Good-by and Werlcome, 1969 (typescript). The American Marxist philosopher DeGrood also wrote a paper about the fight against the Vietnam War and criticized the New Left in this context. David H

DeGrood, Lanin and the New Left, 1970 (practice) 8 See Genocide — a Tokyo Tribunal Document, ed. by the Japanese Committee to

Investigate American War Crimes in Vietnam, Tokyo 1968. See also Y. Kozai, Philosophy at the Crossroads, in: Vol. 1 of the Iw anam i series »Philosophy«, Tokyo 1968 (japan.) 8 See S. Shibata, V ietnam and questions of Ideologic, Tokyo, 1968 and Vietnam diary, Tokyo, 1969. Japanese.

schen Revolution«, das im April 1968 von der Tschechischen Akademie der Wissenschaften veranstaltet worden war, die Erfahrung gemacht, daß mein Antrag auf einen Vortrag zu dem Thema »Der Vietnamkrieg und die wissenschaftlich-technische Revolution« vom Veranstalter mit der Begründung abgewiesen wurde, dieses Thema hätte mit dem Symposium nichts zu tun und würde außerdem die anwesenden amerikanischen Philosophen brüskieren. Welche positiven Beiträge zur Verurteilung des amerikanischen Imperialismus, seiner Ideologie und der Vietnam-Aggression haben schließlich die jugoslawischen Philosophen geleistet, die doch mit dem Anspruch auftreten, den »Stalinismus« zu kritisieren und den Bürokratismus im Sozialismus zu bekämpfen? Soweit mir bekannt ist, keinen einzigen. Was von den Philosophen der sozialistischen Länder gesagt werden kann, dürfte auch auf die marxistischen Philosophen Westeuropas zutreffen. Auch in China, wo die philosophische Forschung durch die »große proletarische Kulturrevolution« fast gänzlich zum Erliegen kam, gibt es keine Untersuchung über die Bedeutung der vietnamesischen Revolution, ihre Allgemeingültikeit und ihre Besonderheiten aus der Sicht der marxistischen Philosophie oder, um es weiter zu fassen, aus der Sicht der marxistischen Gesellschaftswissenschaften. Man kann also durchaus nicht sagen, daß die große Mehrheit der marxistischen Philosophen gegenwärtig die »Quintessenz« ihrer Zeit schon in genügendem Maße erfaßt hätte.

Welche Probleme der marxistischen Philosophie sind aber vom vietnamesischen Volk und der Partei der Werktätigen Vietnams, also von den Trägern der vietnamesischen Revolution selbst und darüber hinaus von den vietnamesischen Philosophen aufgegriffen worden?

Will man das Charakteristische der marxistischen Philosophie in Vietnam erfassen, so muß man zunächat darauf hinweisen, daß die Existenz der Philosophen und die philosophische Forschung selbst in diesem Lande untrennbar mit einem Kampf verbunden ist, in dem es um Leben oder Tod geht, — früher gegen die Aggression des französischen und japanischen Imperialismus, heute gegen den amerikanischen Imperialismus, so daß zwischen Philosophie und Politik, zwischen den Philosophen und der politischen Organisation, der Avantgarde-Partei, eine Arbeitsteilung im schlechten Sinne gar nicht erst entstehen konnte und beide Seiten eine organische Einheit bilden. Die besondere Rolle der Intellektuellen unter den Bedingungen der Kolonialherrschaft und zum anderen auch der Umstand, daß die bürgerliche Akademie unentwickelt geblieben war, mußten dazu führen, daß die philosophischen Denker Vietnams seit Beginn dieses Jahrhunderts gleichzeitig auch gesellschaftlich aktiv und Revolutionäre wurden. Es gab keinen einzigen »marxistischen Philosophen«, der sich von den Aufgaben der Revolution isolierte. »Einen 'Marxisten' als Buchgelehrten gab es in Vietnam nicht. Das Studium anhand marxistischer Literatur war zudem vom Kolonialregime verboten

Revolution«

was rejected by the organizers on the grounds that this topic had nothing to do with the symposium and would also snub the American philosophers present.

Finally, what positive contributions to the condemnation of American imperialism, its ideology and the Vietnam aggression have the Yugoslav philosophers made, who claim to criticize "Stalinism" and combat bureaucracy in socialism? As far as I know, not a single one. What can be said of the philosophers of the socialist countries could also apply to the Marxist philosophers of Western Europe. Even in China, where philosophical research came to an almost complete standstill with the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution," there is no study of the significance of the Vietnamese revolution, its generality and its specifics, from the perspective of or about Marxist philosophy broader, from the point of view of the M arxist social sciences. It cannot, therefore, be said that the great majority of Marxist philosophers at the present time have sufficiently grasped the "quintessence" of their time.

But which problems of Marxist philosophy have been taken up by the Vietnamese people and the party of the working people of Vietnam, i.e. by the bearers of the Vietnamese revolution themselves and, moreover, by the Vietnamese philosophers?

If one wants to grasp the characteristics of Marxist philosophy in Vietnam, one must first point out that

the existence of philosophers and philosophical research itself in this country is intrinsically linked to a life-or-death struggle — formerly against the aggression of French and Japanese imperialism, today against American imperialism us, so that between philosophy and politics, between the philosophers and the political organization, the avant-garde party, a division of labor in the bad sense could not even come about and both sides form an organic unit. The special role of the intellectuals under the conditions of colonial rule and, on the other hand, the fact that the bourgeois academy had remained undeveloped, must have led to the philosophical thinkers of Vietnam since the beginning of this century at the same time also socially became active and revolutionaries.

There was not a single "Marxist philosopher" who isolated himself from the tasks of the revolution. "There was no 'M arxist as a book scholar in Vietnam. Studying on the basis of Marxist literature was worden.«7 Das trug jedoch den vietnamesischen Marxisten den Vorzug ein, daß sie die Allgemeingültigkeit des Marxismus-Leninismus ständig mit den Besonderheiten der vietnamesischen Revolution verbinden mußten und sie dadurch begriffen. Praxis und Theorie Ho Chi Minhs zeigen, daß die Allgemeingültigkeit des Marxismus-Leninismus vollkommen auf die Besonderheiten Vietnams abgestimmt ist.

An dieser Stelle soll kurz auf den theoretischen Beitrag eingegangen werden, den Ho Chi Minh zum Marxismus geleistet hat8. Hervorzuheben ist dabei vor allem, daß er die leninistischen Theorien bezüglich der Nationalitäten - und kolonialen Frage weiter vertieft und entwickelt hat. Es gibt nur sehr wenige Marxisten, die das Leben in einem kolonialen Land von Geburt an erfahren haben, die außer Vietnam viele andere koloniale und abhängige Länder aus praktischer Erfahrung kannten und darüber hinaus auch das Leben in den verschiedensten imperialistischen Ländern kennenlernten. Auch Lenin hatte diese Erfahrungen nicht. Zu den wenigen Marxisten, die solche Erfahrungen besaßen, gehörte Ho Chi Minh, und das machte es ihm möglich, die Frage der Nationalitäten und Kolonien theoretisch noch weiter zu konkretisieren Ho Chi Minh schrieb: »Der Imperialismus hat jetzt fast das Stadium der wissenschaftlichen Vollendung erreicht. Um die Proletarier der Kolonien zu unterwerfen, benutzt er die weißen Proletarier. Dann spielt er die Proletariar der einen gegen die anderen Kolonie aus. Schließlich stützt er sich auf Proletarier der Kolonien, um seine Herrschaft über die weißen Proletarier aufrecht zu erhalten.«9

Was Ho Chi Minh in dieser Darstellung verdeutlicht, ist der allgemeine Zusammenhang zwischen Imperialismus und Kolonien bzw. den Kolonien untereinander. Gleichzeitig aber wies er darauf hin, daß jede Kolonie ihre Besonderheiten hat.

»Obwohl die Bevölkerung der Kolonien überall gleichermaßen ausgebeutet und unterdrückt wird, ist ihre geistige, wirtschaftliche und politische Entwicklung doch in jeder Region anders. Annam und Kongo, Martinique und New-Cardnia haben außer der Armut nicht miteinander gemeinsam.«10

Japan war vor dem Krieg ein imperialistisches Land mit Kolonien, es ist heute abhängig vom amerikanischen Imperialismus, aber die Japaner leben in einem monopolkapitalistischen Land. Aus eigener Erfahrung kennen sie das Leben der Bevölkerung in kolonialen und abhängigen Ländern nur in geringem Maße. Die Probleme dieser Länder sind ihnen in erster Linie von den Begri-

⁷ Nguyen Knanh und Nguyen Nge, La pensée philosophique et sociologi-

que depuis 1917, in: La nouvelle critique, März 1962 8 Vgl. S. Shibata, Ho Chi Minh als Denker ,in: Rekishi — Hyoron (Historische Rundschau), Dez. 1969 (japan.)

⁹ Ho Chi Minh, Indo-China and the Pacific, 1924, Selected Works, Vol. I,

^{1960,} p. 78

10 Ho Chi Minh, Some Considerations on the Colonial Question, 1922, Sel. Works, Vol. I., 1960, p. 12

they had to constantly connect the universality of Marxism-Leninism with the specifics of the Vietnamese revolution in order to understand it. Ho Chi Minh's practice and theory show that the universality of Marxism-Leninism is perfectly attuned to the specifics of Vietnam.

At this point, the theoretical contribution made by Ho Chi Minh to Marxism should be briefly discussed8.

It should be emphasized above all that he further deepened and developed the Leninist theories with regard to the nationalities and colonial question. There are very few Marxists who experienced life in a colonial country from birth, who knew many other colonial and dependent countries besides Vietnam from practical experience and also got to know life in the most diverse perialist countries. Lenin did not have these experiences either. Ho Chi Minh was one of the few Marxists who had such experience, and this made it possible for him to theoretically concretize the question of nationalities and colonies. Ho Chi Minh wrote: »Imperialism has now almost reached the stage of scientific completion. In order to subjugate the proletarians of the colonies, he uses the white proletarians. Then he plays the proletariat of one colony against the other. After all, he relies on proletarians of the colonies to maintain his rule over the white proletarians.«9

What Ho Chi M inh clarifies in this presentation is the general connection between imperialism and colonies and between the colonies themselves. At the same time, however, he pointed out that each colony has its own peculiarities.

"Although the population of the colonies is liberally exploited and oppressed in equal measure, their spiritual, economic and political development is different in each region.

Annam and Congo, M artinique and New Cardnia have nothing in common except poverty.«10

Japan was a perialist country with colonies before the war, it is now dependent on American imperialism, but the Japanese live in a monopoly capitalist country. From their own experience they know little about the life of the population in colonial and dependent countries. The problems of these countries are primarily known to them from the terms 7 Nguyen K nanh and Nguyen Nge, La pensee philosophique et sociologique depuis 1917, in: La nouvelle critique, March 1962

(Historische Rundschau), Dez. 1969 (japan.)

9 Ho Chi Minh, Indo-C hina and the Pacific, 1924, Selected Works, Vol. I, 1960, p. 78

 $10\ \mathrm{Ho}\ \mathrm{Chi}\ \mathrm{Minh},$ Some Considerations on the Colonial Question, 1922, Sei.

Works, Vol. I., 1960, p. 12

ffen oder der Theorie her geläufig, so daß sie leicht zu einer sozusagen einfarbigen Darstellung neigen. Ho Chi Minh dagegen führte der Weg aus der französischen Kolonie auf den amerikanischen Kontinent. Er hatte die Möglichkeit, verschiedene koloniale und abhängige Länder miteinander zu vergleichen. Dadurch war er in der Lage, die Probleme dieser Länder in ihrer Allgemeinheit und zugleich in ihren Besonderheiten zur erfassen. Charakteristisch für Ho Chi Minh war, daß er bereits die dialektische Denkweise beherrschte, mit der er das Allgemeine und gleichzeitig das Besondere richtig erfassen konnte.

Zu welchem Standpunkt führte ihn diese dialektische Denkweise in politischer Hinsicht? Das geht zunächst aus der Unabhängigkeitserklärung der Demokratischen Republik Vietnam hervor, die von Ho Chi Minh konzipiert worden ist. Die Ideen der Grundrechte des Menschen, der Demokratie und des Rechts auf Revolution, denen er größtmögliche Aufmerksamkeit schenkte, verankerte er unter Einbeziehung der nationalen Frage in der Idee des »Rechts der Nation« und legte folgerichtig auch schon frühzeitig den Gedanken des »Self-reliance« und der »Selbständigkeit und Unabhängigkeit« nieder. Zum anderen konnte er sowohl dem modernen Revisionismus, der vom Marxismus-Leninismus entdeckten allgemeinen Gesetze im Verhältnis des Imperialismus zu den kolonialen und abhängigen Ländern bestreitet, als auch dem modernen Dogmatismus, der die nationalen Besonderheiten leugnet, mit einer selbständigen, kritischen Haltung gegenübertreten.

Die hier kurz skizzierte Gedankenführung Ho Chi Minhs, vor allen aber die daraus ersichtliche Dialektik des Allgemeinen und Besonderen ist für die vietnamesischen marxistischen Theoretiker und Philosophen insgesamt kennzeichnend. Unter dieser Voraussetzung läßt sich das Charakteristische der gegenwärtigen marxistischen Philosophie in Vietnam in den folgenden fünf Punkten zusammenfassen.

Erstens: Selbstverständlich ist der dialektische Materialismus die philosophische Weltanschauung der vietnamesischen Marxisten. Bemerkenswert ist jedoch, daß in methodologischer Hinsicht besonderer Wert auf die »materialistisch-historische Dialektik« (Pham Nhu Cuong) gelegt und diese Methode dem Kampf gegen den amerikanischen Imperialismus jeweils angepaßt wird. Das entnahm ich einem Gespräch mit Oberst Ha Van Lau, das mich nachhaltig beeindruckte¹¹. Pham Nhu Cuong, Direktor des Instituts für Philosophie der Demokratischen Republik Vietnam, äußerte sich über diese Methode folgendermaßen:

»Die materialistische und historische Dialektik hat uns geholfen, die abstrakte einfache, auf Quantität und materialltechnischen Fakten basierende Einschätzungsweise zu überwinden und wissenschaftliche, allseitige und konkrete Einschätzungsweise des Kräfteverhältnisses zwischen unserem Volk und dem USA-Imperialismus zu gewinnen. Alles das führt uns zu folgender Schlußfolge-

¹¹ Siche Vietnam-Tagebuch, s. s. O., S. 25-31

He had the opportunity to compare different colonial and dependent countries with each other. As a result, he was able to grasp the problems of these countries in their generality and at the same time in their particularities. It was characteristic of Ho Chi Minh that he already mastered the dialectic way of thinking, with which he could correctly grasp the general and at the same time the particular.

To what point of view did this dialectic way of thinking lead him politically? This emerges first of all from the declaration of independence of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, which was drafted by Ho Chi Minh. The ideas of basic human rights, democracy and the right to revolution, to which he paid the greatest possible attention, were anchored in the idea of the

"Right of the nation" and consequently laid down the ideas of "self-reliance" and "autonomy and independence" early on. On the other hand, he was able to counter both modern revisionism, which disputes the general laws discovered by Marxism-Leninism in relation to imperialism in relation to colonial and dependent countries, and modern dogmatism, which denies national peculiarities, with an independent, face a critical attitude.

Ho Chi Minh's train of thought briefly outlined here, but above all the dialectic of the general and the particular that can be seen from it, is characteristic of the Vietnamese Marxist theorists and philosophers as a whole. With this in mind, what is characteristic of contemporary Marxist philosophy in Vietnam can be summarized in the following five points.

First: Of course dialectical materialism is the philosophical worldview of the Vietnamese Marxists. However, it is noteworthy that, from a methodological point of view, special emphasis is placed on »materialistic-historical dialectics«

(Pham Nhu Cuong) and this method is adapted to the fight against American imperialism. I learned this from a conversation with Colonel Ha Van Lau, which made a lasting impression on me11. Pham Nhu Cuong, Director of the Institute of Philosophy of the Republic of Vietnam, commented on this method as follows:

"The materialistic and historical dialectics helped us to overcome the abstract, simple way of assessing, based on quantity and material-technical facts, and to gain a scientific, comprehensive and concrete way of assessing the balance of power between our people and US imperialism. All this leads us to the following conclusion- 11 Siche

rung: Der amerikanische Imperialismus ist reich an Dollar an Waffen: er besitzt ein großes Ökonomisches und militärisches Potential. Er ist aber nicht stark, weil er viele grundlegende Schwächen in politischer und militärischer Hinsicht, wie auf den Schlachfeldern von Vietnam, er in der Welt überhaupt, zeigt.«12

Auch Truong Chinh betonte die Wichtigkeit der dialektischen Methode.

»Ein wichtiges Problem, mit dem sich unsere Partei auseinandersetzt, ist die Ausnutzung der Widersprüche im Lager der Feinde der Revolution, — der Widersprüche, die zwischen den verschiedenen Imperialisten oder dem Imperialismus und der Klasse der feudalen Grundbesitzer sowie zwischen den Grundbesitzern untereinander bestehen. Diese Widersprüche abzuwägen, sie zu vergrössern und gleichzeitig das Lager der revolutionären Kräfte zu festigen, ist von großer Bedeutung für die Richtung der Strategie. ... Ein weiteres, für die Ausrichtung der Strategie nicht weniger wichtiges Problem besteht darin, die revolutionären Kräfte in dem Augenblick, in dem der Feind seinen Erfolg für gesichert hält, auf seine schwächste Stelle zu konzentrieren.«¹³

Die Anwendung der Dialektik ist nicht nur auf den politischen und militärischen Kampf des vietnamesischen Volkes beschränkt. Die technische Revolution, die sozialistische Industrialisierung werden als Probleme begriffen, bei denen Widersprüche zwischen dem, Menschen und der Natur zu lösen sind. Auch dann, wenn Subjekt und Objekt, Individuum und Gemeinschaft, Vernunft und Gefühl, nationale und internationale Belange, geistiger und materieller Anreiz, Produktivkräfte und Produktionsverhältnisse, Staatsmacht und Produktionsverhältnisse zur. Sprache kommen, wird bewußt versucht, diese Fragen dialektisch zu fassen¹⁴. Leider war es mir nicht möglich, Literatur in die Hand zu bekommen, aus der hervorgeht, wie systematisch die marxistische Philosophie in Vietnam gegenwärtig entwickelt wird, doch läßt das hohe Niveau der Arbeiten von Tran Duc Thao¹⁶, der als Professor an

¹² Pham Nhu Cueng, Ansprache auf dem Philosophischen Kongreß der DDR, in: Die philosophische Lehre von Karl Marx und ihre aktuelle Bedeutung, Berlin 1968, s. 84

¹³ Trueng Chinh, Forward along the Path charted by Karl Marx, 1969, pp. 83—84

¹⁴ Le Duan, On the Socialist Revolution in Vietnam, Vol. II, 1965, p. 204; Vol. III, 1967, pp. 11, 38—40, 108, 180. Es handelt sich hierbei um eine Sammlung von Reden Le Duans, die große Aufmerksamkeit verdienen, da sie zeigen, wie hervorragend die marxistische Theorie und Philosophie in Vietnam umgesetzt wird.

¹⁵ Tran Duc Thao, Phénoménologie et matérialisme dielectique, Paris 1951. Derselbs. Le 'noyau rationel' dans la dialectique hégélienne, in: La Pensée, fevr. 1965. Im erstgenannten Werk wird die Phänomenologie Husseres kritisiert und dem dialektischen Materialismus gegenübergéstellt, wobei das Niveau der damals vorherrschenden marxistischen Philosophie Stalinscher Prägung weit übertroffen wird und der Arbeit auch als Konzeption der marxistischen Philosophie Eigenständigkeit zukommt. Sie umfaßt 368 Seiten. Die letztgenannte Arbeit ist eine ausgezeichnete Untersuchung über Hegels »Phänomenologie des Geistes« und zeigt genaues Erfassen der Marxschen »Ökonomisch-philosophischen Manuskripte«.

Comment: American imperialism is rich in dollars in weapons: it has great economic and military potential. But he is not strong because he shows many fundamental weaknesses in political and militarian terms, as in the battlefields of Vietnam, he in the world in general.«12

Truong Chinh also emphasized the importance of the dialectic method.

"An important problem that our party is grappling with is the exploitation of the contradictions in the camp of the enemies of the revolution — the contradictions that exist between the various imperialists or imperialism and the feudal class landowners and between the landowners themselves. To weigh up these contradictions, to increase them and at the same time to strengthen the camp of the revolutionary forces is of great importance for the direction of the strategy. . . . Another problem, no less important for the orientation of strategy, is to concentrate the revolutionary forces on his weakest point at the moment when the enemy thinks his success is assured.«13

The application of the dialectic is not only limited to the political and military struggle of the Vietnamese people.

The technical revolution, the socialist industrialization are understood as problems in which contradictions between man and nature are to be solved. Even when subject and object, individual and community, reason and feeling, national and international concerns, mental and material incentives, productive forces and production conditions, state power and production conditions. come language, a conscious attempt is made to grasp these questions dialectically14. Unfortunately, it would not be possible for me to get my hands on any literature showing how system atic the development of M arxist philosophy in Vietnam is at present, but the high level of T ran's work allows Due Thao16, who was a professor at 12 Pham Nhu Cueng, Speech at the Philosophical Congress of the GDR, in: The philosophical teaching of K arl M arx and its current significance, Berlin 1968, p. 84

13 Trueng Chinh, F orw ard along the P a th ch arted by K arl M arx, 1969, pp. 83—84

14 Le Duan, On the Socialist Revolution in Vietnam, Vol. II, 1965, p. 204; Vol. Ill, 1967, pp. 11, 38-40, 108, 180. This is a collection of Le Duan's speeches which deserve close attention as they show how superbly Marxist Theory and philosophy is implemented in Vietnam.

15 T ran Due Thao, Phenom enologie et m aterialism e dielectique, P aris 1951. Same. Le 'noyau rationale' dans la dialectique hégelienne, in: La Pensee, fevr. 1965. In the first-mentioned work, Hussere's phenom enology is criticized and contrasted with dialectic materialism, whereby the level of the then prevailing Marxist philosophy of Stalinist character is far surpassed and the work also as a concept M arxist philosophy has its own autonomy. It includes 368

Pages. The latter work is an excellent study of Hegel's 'Phenomenology of Spirit' and shows an accurate grasp of Marx's 'Economic-Philosophical Manuscripts'.

344

der Hanoier Universität tätig ist, durchaus auf einen hohen Stand der Erforschung der Dialektik durch die vietnamesischen Philosophen schließen.

Zweitens: Ein wichtiger Gedanke, der auf dem III. Parteitag der Partei der Werktätigen Vietnams (1960) vorgetragen wurde, ist die These, daß die sozialistische Revolution aus drei Elementen besteht, nämlich aus der Revolution der Produktionsverhältnisse, der technischen Revolution und der ideologisch-kulturellen Revolution. In Bezug auf die Revolution der Produktionsverhältnisse ist bemerkenswert, daß darunter nicht nur die Veränderung der Besitzverhältnisse an den Produktionsmitteln, sondern auch eine Veränderung den Verwaltungs — und Verteilungssystems verstanden wird¹⁶. Das bedeutet, daß die Umwandlung der Besitzverhältnisse durch die Schaffung sozialistischen Eigentums allein noch nicht ausreicht. Erforderlich ist, daß des Prinzip des demokratischen Zentralismus auch in der Verwaltung richtig angewandt wird¹⁷. Das Prinzip des demokratischen Zentralismus muß also in der Produktionsweise und den Produktionsverhältnissen selbst durchgesetzt werden. Die Demokratie ist für die marxistischen Philosophen Vietnams somit kein Begriff, der nur den politischen Überbau betrifft, sondern ein Prinzip, das bis in die Produktionsverhältnisse und die Wirtschaft hinein drugesetzt werden muß¹⁸. Es bedarf wohl keiner weiteren Erklärung, daß sich dieses Prinzip des demokratischen Zentralismus im Produktionsprozeß, in den Produktionsverhältnissen qualitativ sowohl von dem für die Stalinzeit charakteristischen bürokratisch-zentralistischen System des sozialistischen Aufbaus als auch von dessen Gegenstück, dem in Jugoslawien entstandenen dezentralistischen System der »Selbstverwaltung«, durch das man sich dort in gewissem Maße zum Untertan des Wertgesetzes machen möchte, unterscheidet. Ebenso wie in Kube und Korea gibt es auch in Vietnam in der Theorie des sozialistischen Aufbaus eigenständige Elemente, die künftig detailliert untersucht werden müssen.

Drittens: In Hinblick auf die Eigenständigkeit in der Auffassung der sozialistischen Produktionsverhältnisse ist besonders interessant, daß die Partei der Werktätigen Vietnams großes Gewicht auf die technische Revolution legt und darin nach der Revolution der Produktionsverhältnisse den Kern der sozialistischen Revolution sieht. Eine wichtige These der marxistischen Weltanschauung besteht ja darin, daß die »Arbeit die Geschichte macht«19. Folglich ist es der hohe Entwicklungsstand der Produktionsweise, sind es die Großindustrie und als eines ihrer Glieder die technische Revolution, die die Geschichte und den Menschen machen. Natürlich geht die technische Revolution nicht unabhängig vom Menschen vor sich. Ihr Trägar ist gerade der Mensch, die Masse, während sie ihrerseits wiederum den neuen

¹⁶ Truong Chinh, ebends, S. 51

¹⁷ Le Duan, ebends, Vol. II, p. 81

<sup>Truong Chidh, ebends, p. 73
Le Duan, ebends, Vol. III, p. 156</sup>

Second: An important thought, which is based on the III. Congress of the Party of Working People of Vietnam (1960) is the thesis that the socialist revolution consists of three elements, namely the revolution in the conditions of production, the technical revolution and the ideological-cultural revolution. With regard to the revolution in the conditions of production, it is worth noting that it does not only mean a change in the ownership of the means of production, but also a change in the system of administration and distribution Transformation of ownership through the creation of socialist property alone is not enough. It is necessary that the principle of democratic centralism is also applied correctly in the administration 17. The principle of ocratic centralism must therefore be enforced in the mode of production and the conditions of production itself. For the Marxist philosophers of Vietnam, democracy is therefore not a concept that only affects the political superstructure, but a principle that has to be applied right down to the production conditions and the economy18. No further explanation is needed that this principle of ocratic centralism in the production process and in the conditions of production differs qualitatively both from the bureaucratic-centralist system of socialist construction characteristic of the Stalin era and from its counterpart, the one that arose in Yugoslavia decentralized system of

:> self-government«, through which one wanted to make oneself subject to the law of value to a certain extent.

As in Kube and K orea, there are also independent elements in the theory of socialist construction in Vietnam that must be examined in detail in the future.

Third: With regard to the autonomy in the conception of the socialist relations of production, it is particularly interesting that the Vietnamese Working People's Party places great emphasis on the technical revolution and, after the revolution in the relations of production, sees it as the core of the socialist revolution . An important thesis of the Marxist world view consists in the fact that "work makes history"19. Consequently, it is the high level of development of the mode of production, it is big industry and, as one of its members, the technical revolution that make history and man. Of course, the technical revolution does not take place independently of man. Their carrier is precisely the human being, the masses, while they, in turn, are the new 1# Truong Chinh, ibid., p. 51

18 Truong Chidh, ebends, p. 73

18 Le Duan, ebends, Vol. I ll, p. 156

345

Menschen und eine neue Masse formt. »Die technische Revolution ist vor allem darauf gerichtet, durch die Entwicklung der Produktivkräfte das Verhältnis zwischen Mensch und Natur und das Verhältnis der Menschen zueinander zu verändern«20. Diese technische Revolution wird sich gewiß nicht durch die »Allmacht des Arbeiters« und die »Geringschätzung des Spezialisten«, wie der moderne Dogmatismus behauptet, verwirklichen lassen. »Wissenschaft und Technik«, sagte Le Duan, »sind wertvolles Kapital der Menschheit. Unsere Partei sieht in ihnen wichtige Triebkräfte zur Beschleunigung der sozialistischen Revolution. Die Partei schätzt die wissenschaftlich-technischen Kader hoch ein.«21 Die vietnamesichen Marxisten verfallen jedoch nicht technokratischen Theorien, wie sie teilweise beim modernen Revisionismus zu beobachten sind, sondern heben zugleich auch die Rolle der Massen in der technischen Revolution richtig hervor. »Die technische Revolution ist wie jede andere Revolution eine Aufgabe der Massen. Sie muß mit einer tiefgreifenden Veränderung des Bewußtseins und der Ideologie der Massen einhergehen.«22 Aus dieser Sicht wird auch richtig auf die Aufgabe der Gewerkschaften bei der technischen Revolution verwiesen. »Um ihren Beitrag zur betrieblichen Verwaltung und zur Wirtschaftsführung zu leisten, müssen die Gewerkschaften den Arbeitern die Wichtigkeit der technischen Revolution bewußt machen, sie zu einem sicheren Verständnis der Parteilinie der technischen Revolution führen und ihnen ihre eigene Klassenposition in der technischen Revolution klar machen.«23 Es ist bereits auf Lenins Auffassung über den Zusammenhang zwischen Großindustrie und Demokratie hingewiesen worden. Beim Aufbau des Sozialismus in Vietnam wird die technische Revolution ebenfalls organisch mit der Demokratie in Produktionsprozeß verbunden. »Um eine neue Arbeitsteilung zu erreichen, müssen wir die Organisation der Produktion und der Verwaltung eng mit der technischen Revolution verbinden«, schrieb Le Duan²⁴. Das technische Niveau in Vietnam ist gegenwärtig noch niedrig, und die technische Revolution ist lediglich auf den Übergang von der Hand- zur Maschinenarbeit gerichtet. Doch die Mechanisierung wird sich zur automatisierten Mechanisierung und weiter zur Automation entwicheln müssen, und die technische Revolution muß die Perspektive der wissenschaftlich-technischen Revolution haben. Truong Ching schrieb:

»Die jetzt überall in der Wilt forschreitende wissenschaflich-technische Revolution hat ein Stadium erreicht, das für die Menschheit von sehr großer Bedeutung ist. Die Nutzung der Kernenergie, die Eroberung des Weltalls, die gewaltigen Fortschritte in der Kybernetik und in der Biologie haben Antwort auf

²⁰ Ebends, Vol. III, p. 12

²¹ Le Duan, ebends, Vol. III, p. 209

²² Ebends, Vol. II, p. 35
23 Le Duan, Role of the Vietnamese Working Class and Tasks of the Trade-Un ions at the Preesnt Stage, Hanoi 1969

²⁴ Le Duan, On the Socialist Revolution in Vietnam, Vol. II, p. 199

forces«20. This technical revolution will certainly not be brought about by the "omnipotence of the worker" and the "contempt for the specialist", as modern dogmatism claims. "Science and technology," said Le Duan, "are valuable capital of mankind. Our party sees in them important driving forces for accelerating the socialist revolution. The party values the scientific and technical cadres very highly.«21 The Vietnamese Marxists, however, do not fall for technocratic theories, as can be observed in part in modern revisionism, but at the same time emphasize the role of the masses in the technical Revolution right out. "The technical revolution, like any other revolution, is a task for the masses. She must

go hand in hand with a profound change in the consciousness and ideology of the masses.«22 From this point of view, reference is also made correctly to the task of the trade unions in the technical revolution. "In order to make their contribution to enterprise management and economic governance, the unions must make workers aware of the importance of the technical revolution, lead them to a firm understanding of the party line of the technical revolution, and show them their own class position in the of the technical revolution.«23 Reference has already been made to Lenin's view of the connection between large-scale industry and democracy. In building socialism in Vietnam, the technical revolution is also organically linked to democracy in the production process. "In order to achieve a new division of labor, we must closely link the organization of production and administration to the technical revolution," wrote Le Duan24.

The level of technology in Vietnam is currently still low, and the technological revolution is only aimed at the transition from manual to machine work. However, mechanization will have to develop into automated mechanization and further into automation, and the technical revolution must have the perspective of a scientific-technical revolution. Truong Ching wrote:

"The scientific research now progressing all over the world

-technical revolution has reached a stage that is of very great importance for mankind. The use of nuclear energy, the conquest of space, the tremendous advances in cybernetics and in biology have an answer to 20 Ibends, Vol. Ill, p. 12

21 Le Duan, ebends, Vol. Ill, p. 209

22 Ebends, Vol. II, p. 35

23 Le Duan, Role of the Vietnam ese W orking Class and Tasks of the Trade-U n ions at the P reesnt Stage, Hanoi 1969

24 Le Duan, On the Socialist Revolution in Vietnam, Vol. II, p. 199

346

viele philosophische Fragen gegeben und der Menschheit eine neue Perspektive ihrer Herrschaft über die Natur eröffnet.«25

Im Hinblick auf die wisenschaftlich-technische Revolution wird auch auf die Bedeutung der geistigen Arbeit hingewisen. »Wir erkennen den Wert der Handarbeit an, dürfen aber deshalb die Kopfarbeit nicht niedrig einstufen« 26 Obwohl Vietnam beim gegenwärtigen Stand seiner Wissenschaft und Technik von anderen industriell fortgeschrittenen sozialistischen Ländern übertroffen wird, kann man sagen, daß es ihnen dennoch an vorausschauender Einschätzung in nichts nachsteht.

Vietnam ist ein Agrarland, und in solchen Ländern besteht durch den hohen Anteil der Kleineigentümer an der Bevölkerung die Gefahr des kleinbürgelichen Radikalismus, auch wenn es sich um ein sozialistisches Land handelt. Lenin schrieb seinerzeit über Rußland: »In einem Land mit einer Bevölkerung, in der die Kleineigentümer ein ungeheures Übergewicht über die rein proletarischen Elemente haben, wird unweigerlich der Unterschied zwischen dem proletarischen und dem kleinbürgerlichen Revolutionär hervortreten, und von Zeit zu Zeit äußerst scharf hervortreten.«27 Diese Gefahr ist in China leider Wirklichkeit geworden, in Vietnam dagegen konnte sie vermieden werden. Einer der Gründe dafür ist das hohe theoretische Niveau der vietnamesischen Marxisten, insbesondere die genaue Einschätzung der Bedeutung der Großindustrie und der technischen Revolution und in diesem Zusammenhang schließlich das richtige Erfassen der führenden Rolle der Arbeiterklasse.

Viertens: Ein wichtiges Problem für die marxistische Philosophie besteht auch darin, wie das Verhältnis zwischen Individuum und Gemeinschaft, zwischen materiellem und geistigem Anreiz beim Aufbau des Sozialismus aussehen soll. Die theoretisch noch unzureichende Klärung dieses Problems ist wahrscheinlich als eine der Ursachen dafür anzusehen, daß die Bürokratie oder auch Erscheinungen der Wiedergeburt des Kapitalismus noch wie vor im Sozialismus fortbestehen. Auch in diesor Beziehung ist bemerkenswert, daß die vietnamesischen Marxisten Gemeinschaft und Individuum nicht metaphysisch einander gegenüberstellen, sondern in einem dialektischen Verhältnis sehen und davon ausgehen, daß der Sozialismus das Individuum nicht unterdrückt, sondern seine allseitige Entwicklung garantiert. Bei Le Duan heißt es dazu:

»Den Individualismus zu bekämpfen, bedeutet nicht, das Individuum zu unterdrücken. Es sollte aber nicht vergessen werden, daß das Individuum nur in der Gemeinschaft existieren und sich entwickeln kann, daß sein Dienst an der Gemeinschaft auch die beste Voraussetzung darstellt, sich selbst zu dienen. Wir dürfen daher

²⁵ Truong Chinh, ebends, p. 132

²⁶ Le Duan, ebends, Vol. III, p. 197

²⁷ Lenin, Die nächsten Aufgaben der Sowjetmacht, Werke, Bd. 27, S. 267

²⁸ Le Duan, ebends, Vol. III, p. 82

With regard to the scientific-technical revolution, reference is also made to the importance of mental work.

"We recognize the value of manual labour, but we must not therefore underestimate brainwork."26 Although Vietnam is surpassed by other industrially advanced socialist countries at the present level of its science and technology, it can be said that they are nevertheless is in no way inferior in terms of forward-looking assessment.

Vietnam is an agrarian country, and in such countries there is a danger of petty-bourgeois radicalism due to the high proportion of smallholders in the population, even if it is a socialist country. Lenin wrote of Russia at the time: "In a country with a population in which the petty proprietors outweigh the purely proletarian elements, the difference between the proletarian and petty-bourgeois revolutionaries will inevitably emerge, and come out extremely sharply from time to time. «27

Unfortunately, this danger has become a reality in China, but it could be avoided in Vietnam. One of the reasons for this is the high theoretical level of the Vietnamese Marxists, in particular the accurate assessment of the importance of big industry and the technical revolution and in this connection finally the correct grasping of the leading role of the working class.

Fourth: An important problem for Marxist philosophy is also how the relationship between the individual and the community, between material and intellectual incentives, should look in the building of socialism. The theoretically still insufficient clarification of this problem is probably to be regarded as one of the reasons why the bureaucracy or also phenomena of the rebirth of capitalism still continue to exist in socialism. In this respect, too, it is noteworthy that the Vietnamese Marxists do not metaphysically juxtapose community and individual, but see them in a dialectical relationship and assume that

The socialism does not oppress the individual, but guarantees his allround development. Le Duan says:

»Fighting individualism does not mean suppressing the individual. However, it should not be forgotten that the individual can only exist and develop in the community, that his service to the community is also the best prerequisite for serving oneself. We may therefore 25 T ruong Chinh, ibid., p. 132

28 Le Duan, ebends, Vol. I ll, p. 197

27 Lenin, The Next Tasks of the Soviet Union, Works, Vol. 27, p. 267

28 Le Duan, ebends, Vol. I ll, p. 82

347

rictiges Verhalten eines einzelnen nicht kritisieren... Ein Fach arbeiter, der sich, über seinen ungerechtfertigt niedrigon Lohn beklagt, tut das nicht aus Individualismus. Er hat das Recht dazu. Ohne Individuum gibt es keine Gesellschaft und auch keine Gemeinschaft.«²⁸

Diese präzise Unterscheidung zwischen Individuum und Individualismus und die bejahende Haltung zum Individuum stehen in auffälligen Gegensatz zum modernen Dogmatismus, der beispielsweise während der »großen proletarischen Kulturrevolution« ein Bild des »Individuums« propagierte, das sich »selbstlos aufopfert«. Diese Achtung des Individuums hebt sich aber ebenso auffällig von den dem Warengesetz zugewandten Vorstellungen vom »Individuum«, vom individualistischen bürgerlichen »Einzelwesen« ab, die im modernen Revisionismus zum Ausdruck kommen. Lenin hat für die Angestellten des sozialistischen Staates drei Prinzipien aufgestellt, nämlich 1. nicht nur Wählbarkeit, sondern auch jederzeitige Absetzbarkeit, 2. eine den Arbeitslohn nicht übersteigende Bezahlung, 3. jeder nimmt an der Kontrolle und Aufsicht teil. An der Durchsetzung dieser Prinzipien erweist sich der Grad der Demokratie im Sozialismus, und in Vietnam werden sie besonders bewußt durchgesetzt. Le Duan erklärt:

»Es gibt bei uns gegenwärtig keine großen Unterschiede bei den Normen der Gehälter Im Bergbau erhalten nicht wenige Arbeiter monatlich 150 Don: Hinzukommen 50 bis 60 Don, die die Familie des Arbeiters erhält. Das Gehalt für Minister und Mitglieder des Zentralkomitees der Partei beträgt 200 Don. In einigen Bergbaugebieten kommen auf 300 bis 500 Familien zwei bis drei Haushalte, die das gleiche Einkommen haben. Die niedrige Produktion in unserem Lande erfordert materiellen Anreiz, so daß auch die Unterschiede im Einkommen wie bisher erhalten bleiben.«²⁹

Obwohl von der Bedeutung des materiellen Anreizes die Rede ist, entstehen durch diesen Anreiz keine großen Unterschiede, bekommt ein Minister nicht sehr viel mehr Gehalt als ein Facharbeiter Lohn. Daß der Erste Sekretär einer komunistischen Partei in seinem Bericht einen Vergleich zwischen den Gehältern der Minister und Mitglieder des Zentralkomitees und den Löhnen der Arbeiter anstellt, gibt es wohl außer in Vietnam in keinem sozialistischen Land. Daß ein solcher Vergleich in aller Öffentlichkeit vorgenommen wird, zeigt, wie ernst es den vietnamesischen Marxisten mit der Ausrottung der materiellen Basis des Bürokratismus ist. Es braucht kaum gesagt zu werden, daß vor dem Hintergrund einer solchen Theorie des sozialistischen Aufbaus auch die marxistische Ethik hervorragend entwickelt ist.

Fünftens: Die vietnamesischen Marxisten sehen den Menschen nicht abstrakt, sondern in lebendiger Konkretheit. Le Duan beispielsweise setzt sich dafür ein. »die Theorie nicht nur zu er-

²⁹ Le Duan, ebends, Vol. III, p. 85

³⁰ Ebends, p. 38

Without the individual there is no society and no community.«28

This precise distinction between the individual and individualism and the affirmative attitude towards the individual stand in striking contrast to modern dogmatism, which was expressed, for example, during the »Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution«.

propagated an image of the »individual« who »sacrifices selflessly«. However, this respect for the individual stands out just as strikingly from the conceptions of the »individual«, of the individualistic bourgeois »individual being«, which are related to the law of commodities and are expressed in modern revisionism. Lenin laid down three principles for the employees of the socialist state, namely 1. not only eligibility, but also deductibility at any time, 2. payment not exceeding wages, 3. everyone takes control and on-view part. The enforcement of these principles shows the degree of democracy in socialism, and they are enforced particularly consciously in Vietnam. Le Duan explains:

»There are currently no big differences in the norms of wages in the mining industry, quite a few workers receive 150 dons a month: on top of that, the worker's family receives 50 to 60 dons. The salary for ministers and members of the Central Committee of the party is 200 dons. In some mining areas, there are two to three households for every 300 to 500 families with the same income. The low level of production in our country requires material incentives, so that the differences in income will remain as they have been.«29

Although the importance of the material incentive is discussed, this incentive does not make much of a difference, and a minister does not receive much more salary than a skilled worker. The fact that the first secretary of a communist party makes a comparison in his report between the salaries of ministers and members of the central committee and the wages of the workers is probably not the case in any socialist country except Vietnam. That such a comparison is made in public shows how serious Vietnamese Marxists are about eradicating the material basis of bureaucracy. It hardly needs to be said that against the background of such a theory of socialist construction, Marxist ethics are also superbly developed.

Fifth: The Vietnamese Marxists do not see man in the abstract, but in living concreteness. Le Duan, for example, supports this. »not only to understand the theory- 29 Le Duan, ibid., Vol. Ill, p. 85

fassen, sondern sie auch mit dem Gefühl zu verbinden« und spricht davon, daß »die Lebensanschauung des Menschen Probleme der Vernunft und des Gefühls aufwirft«, daß »Vernunft und Gefühl in enger Beziehung zueinander stehen und in jeder Weltanschauung eine Einheit bilden.«30 Die marxistische Philosophie ist stets gegen irrationalistische Menschenbilder aufgetreten und hat die Rolle der menschlichen Vernunft betont. Das war auch richtig, doch hatte der Marxismus andererseits nicht immer ausreichende Erklärungen für das Gefühl und die Leidenschaft. Diese Unzulänglichkeit mag der blinde Punkt gewesen sein, von dem der emotionale Idealismus, der früher von Schopenhauer und Nietzsche vertreten wurde und gegenwärtig typisch für die kleinbürgerlichen Radikalisten in Japan ist, seinen Ausgang nahm und bis heute tief verwurzelt ist. Auch in Japan ist bereits auf die Notwendigkeit verwiesen worden, Kritik an diesem emotionalen Idealismus zu üben, gleichzeitig aber Gefühl und Leidenschaft vom marxistischen Standpunkt aus zu erklären. Man sollte beachten, daß die vietnamesischen Marxisten ebenfalls auf die Bedeutung dieses Problems hinweisen.

Mit der Beantwortung dieser Frage hängt zusammen, wie der neue Mensch geformt und wie der Sozialismus und Kommunismus aufgebaut werden sollen. Auch hinsichtlich der Entwicklung des ideologischen Kampfes ergeben sich wichtige Probleme. Le Duan schreibt: »Unser Volk wertet den Humanismus hoch und weiß, wie man als Mensch auftreten muß.« »Die Formung des Menschen und die Erziehung seines Gemüts sind eine Angelegenheit, die wir nicht formal behandeln können.« In Zusammenhang mit der ideologischen Revolution spricht er davon, daß »die Formung des Geistes und des Gemüts der Menschen, die Schaffung eines neuen Geistes und eines neuen Gemüts« eine »langwierige Angelegenheit« sind, die die »Harmonie von Vernunft und Gemüt« erfordert³¹. Man kann wohl sagen, daß eine derartige Einschätzung der Formung des Gemüts und der Gefühle in den bisherigen marxistischen Theorien zur ideologischen und kulturellen Revolution noch nicht dagewesen ist. Das Menschenbild, das die vietnamesichen Marxisten entwickelt haben, ist in hohem Maße menschlich; es ist eine glänzende Antwort sowohl auf die Behauptungen der bürgerlichen Ideologie, im Marxismus gäbe es den »Menschen« nicht, als auch auf die Angriffe des Revisionismus.

An dieser Stelle muß darauf verzichtet werden, auf weitere theoretische Beiträge der vietnamesischen Marxisten einzugehen, von denen besonders die Bestimmung der Arbeiter- und Bauern-diktatur und der Diktatur des Proletariats sowie die Theorien des demokratischen Zentralismus, des Internationalismus, die Militärtheorie u. a. zu nennen sind. Solange aber die marxistischen Ideen und die marxistische Philosophie, die hier im Uberblick dargelegt

³¹ Le Duan, ebends, Vol. III, p. 40, 151

that "man's view of life raises problems of reason and feeling", that "reason and feeling are closely related and form a unit in every world view. «30 M arxist philosophy has always opposed irrationalistic views of man and has emphasized the role of human reason. That was true, but Marxism, on the other hand, did not always have sufficient explanations for feeling and passion. This inadequacy may have been the blind spot from which the emotional idealism formerly espoused by Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, and now typical of the petty-bourgeois radicalists in Japan, originated and permeates to this day is rooted. In Japan, too, the need to criticize this emotional idealism while explaining emotion and passion from a Marxist point of view has already been pointed out. It should be noted that the Vietnamese Marxists also point out the importance of this problem.

The answer to this question involves how the new man is to be formed and how socialism and communism are to be built. Important problems also arise with regard to the development of the ideological struggle. Le Duan writes: "Our people value humanism and know how to appear as a human being." "The formation of man and the education of his mind is a matter which we cannot formally deal with." with the ideological revolution he speaks of the fact that "the formation of the spirit and the spirit of men, the creation of a new spirit and a new spirit" is a "long-winded affair" which requires the "harmony of reason and spirit". thet31. It is fair to say that such an assessment of the formation of the mind and emotions is unprecedented in previous Marxist theories of ideological and cultural revolution. The image of man developed by the Vietnamese Marxists is highly human; it is a brilliant answer both to the claims of bourgeois ideologic that in Marxism there is "man"

not, as well as to the attacks of revisionism.

At this point it is necessary to refrain from going into further theoretical contributions of the Vietnamese Marxists, of which in particular the determination of the worker and peasant dictatorship and the dictatorship of the proletariat as well as the theories of ocratic centralism, internationalism, military theory, etc. are to be named. But as long as the Marxist ideas and the Marxist philosophy, which are presented here in overview, SI Le Duan, ibid., Vol. Ill, p. 40, 151

wurden, das vietnamesische Volk leiten, wird es seine Geschlossenheit wahren und den amerikanischen Imperialismus und das Sajgoner Regime schlagen können, das ist sicher. Der Sieg des vietnamesischen Volkes und der Sieg der vietnamesischen Revolution sind keineswegs ein »Wunder«, sie beruhen nich zuletzt auf dem hohen Stand der marxistischen Philosophie und der marxistischen Theorien in Vietnam.

350

will lead the Vietnamese people, they will be able to keep their unity and defeat American imperialism and the Sajgoner regime, that's for sure. The victory of the Vietnamese people and the victory of the Vietnamese revolution are by no means a "miracle"; they are based not least on the high level of Marxist philosophy and theories in Vietnam.

350

MOUVEMENTS SOCIAUX ET LUTTE POLITIQUE DE L'APRÈS-MAI 1968 en FRANCE

Serge Mallet

Paris

Les auditeurs constateront de multiples convergences entre la description de Spinella et la mienne: celles-ci tiennent non à une ressemblance de conception entre lui et moi mais au fait que, en France et en Italie, les phénomènes semblent non pas se présenter d'une manière analogue mais aller en gross dans le même sens. L'évolution politique et sociale est de la même nature. C'est peut-être plus clair pour la France et l'Italie que pour d'autres pays d'Europe occidentale, notamment l'Allemagne et l'Angleterre, bien que certains éléments dont on n'a pas parlé hier permèttent dé penser quen'en Angleterre nous trouvons aussi devant une situation parallèle.

La première caractéristique commune à ces deux pays est d'abord la croissance des forces productives des divers pays capitalistes de l'Europe centrale: pour la France et l'Italie il s'agit, par rapport à la période d'entre les deux guerres (1920—1939) d'un phénomène nouveau. A quelques périodes conjoncturelles près, les capitalismes de ces deux pays se caractérisaient plutôt par leurs aspects »malthusiens« et »rentiers« plutôt que par leur dynamisme industriel.

Contrairement à certaines thèses développées ici et là par des petits groupes révolutionnaires on ne peut moins que jamais parler de stagnation des forces productives; au contraire, la révolution technologiques introduite dans l'industrie et les services au cours de ces dernières années en Europe occidentale a développé d'une façon considérable les forces productives de ces pays. Et c'est le développement de ces forces productives qui me semble être en fin de compte à la base du développement actual du courant révolutionnaire en Europe occidentale. Ce développement des forces productives entraîne en effet sur le plan économique et social des conséquences relativement lourdes et complexes.

Dans une première phase (en gros de 1946 à 1960), la croissance des forces productives a été marquée par l' introduction généraSerge Mallet

Paris

Listeners will note multiple convergences between Spinella's description and mine: these are due not to a resemblance of conception between him and me but to the fact that, in France and Italy, the phenomena do not seem to be present in a similar manner but go roughly in the same direction.

The political and social evolution is of the same nature. It's not much-

- be clearer for France and Italy than for other Western European countries, in particular Germany and England, although certain elements which we did not speak about yesterday allow to think that in England we also find ourselves faced with a parallel situation.

The first characteristic common to these two countries is first of all the growth of the productive forces of the various capitalist countries of Central Europe: for France and Italy this is, in relation to the period between the two wars (1920—1939) of a new phenomenon. Apart from a few economic periods, the capitalisms of these two countries were characterized more by their "Malthusian" and "rentier" aspects rather than by their industrial dynamism.

Contrary to certain theses developed here and there by small revolutionary groups, one can less than never speak of the stagnation of the productive forces; on the contrary, the technological revolution introduced in industry and services during these last years in Western Europe has considerably developed the productive forces of these countries. And it is the development of these productive forces that seems to me to be ultimately the basis of the current development of the revolutionary current in Western Europe. This development of the productive forces does in fact have relatively serious and complex consequences on the economic and social plane.

In a first phase (roughly from 1946 to 1960), the growth of the productive forces was marked by the introduction genera-351

lisée de l'automation et de l'informatique dans certains grands secteurs de l'industrie et des services et par les progrès rapides des industries chimiques sous toutes leurs formes (pétrochemie, chimie de synthèse, textiles artificiels et plastiques, produits pharmaceutiques de »masse«), ainsi que par une croissance quantitative gigantesque de l'industrie automobile. Cependant cette nouvelle phase d'essor industriel du capitalisme concernait surtout quelques grands secteurs industriels »de pointe« et laissait subsister à ses côtés des structures de production archaīques (industrie du bâtiment, alimentaire, etc.); elle n'entamait qu'à peine le secteur agricole, celui de la distribution et celui de la fonction publique.

Puis nous sommes entrés, depuis une dizaine d'années, dans une seconde phase. En ce qui concerne la France et l'Italie du moins, on peut parler d'un double secteur capitaliste, un secteur capitaliste avancé et un secteur retardataire qui est en train de se transformer rapidement. En train de se transformer, c'est-à-dire qu'en fait nous assistons à une sorte de deuxième phase d'accumulation primitive du capital rendue nécessaire pour que les forces du capitalisme avancé puissent supporter aujourd'hui le poids de la concurrence internationale. Le secteur industriel avancé, pour parachever la modernisation de ses structures et être en mesure d'utiliser les dernières innovations technologiques dans le cadre d'une concurrence internationale accrue, a besoin de briser les dernières résistances des forces sociales précapitalistes et d'englober la totalité de la population dans le mode de production capitaliste. Les conséquences sociales et politiques de cette intégration déterminent assez largement le caractère du mouvement social actuel.

En parlant de concurrence internationale accrue, je précise qu'il commence à s'agir beaucoup plus de la lutte commerciale que se livrent dans ces pas un certain nombre de groupes de caractère multinational plutôt que d'une lutte entre les divers capitalismes nationaux. La liquidation à peu près totale des frontièrs douaniéres a enlevé aux gouvernements un de leurs principaux moyens d'intervention, tandis que la croissance des trusts »intégrés« a atteint une ampleur telle qu'ils peuvent traiter de puissance à puissance avec ceux-ci. S'il y a aujourd'hui en Europe occidentale une tentative de planification de l'economie, celle-ci passe non plus comme après 1945, par les initiatives étatiques, mais par les accords passés entre par les grandes firmes internationales.

Celles-ci exercent une pression considérable sur tout le reste du secteur capitaliste et ont eu raison des structures de planification mises en place après 1945. Tout au plus subsiste-t-il de celles-ci quelques grandes entreprises étatiques (I. R. I., E. M. I., en Italie; RENAULT et ELF-ERAP en France), mais ces grandes entreprises d'Etat ont acquis une véritable indépendance par rapport à leur propriétaire juridique — au point d'imposer leur politique de croissance à l'Etat sans se soucier des conséquences générales de celle-ci: ELF-ERAP a dicté à l'Etat français une politique pétro-lière algérienne qui s'est avérée désastreuse pour certains secteurs

use of automation and informatics in certain major sectors of industry and services and by the rapid progress of the chemical industries in all their forms (petrochemicals, synthetic chemicals, artificial textiles and plastics, pharmaceutical products -ticks of »mass«), as well as by a gigantic quantitative growth of the automobile industry. However, this new phase of the industrial boom of capitalism concerned above all a few large "leading-edge" industrial sectors and allowed archaic production structures to subsist alongside it (construction industry, food industry, etc.); it has barely entered the agricultural sector, that of distribution and that of the public service.

Then, ten years ago, we entered a second phase. As far as France and Italy are concerned at least, we can speak of a double capitalist sector, an advanced capitalist sector and a backward sector which is rapidly changing. In the process of being transformed, that is to say that in fact we are witnessing a kind of second phase of primitive accumulation of capital made necessary for the forces of advanced capitalism to be able to support today the weight of international competition. The advancing industrial sector, in order to complete the modernization of its structures and to be able to use the latest technological innovations within the framework of increased international competition, needs to break the last resistances of the pre-capitalist social forces and to encompass the entire population in the capitalist mode of production. The social and political consequences of this integration largely determine the character of the current social movement.

In speaking of increased international competition, I specify that it is beginning to be much more a question of the commercial struggle that a certain number of m ultinational groups are engaged in these steps rather than of a struggle between the various national capitalisms. The almost total liquidation of customs borders has deprived governments of one of their main means of intervention, while the growth of "integrated" trusts has reached such an extent that they can deal from power to power with these. If there is today in Western Europe an attempt to plan the economy, this no longer passes as after 1945, by state initiatives, but by agreements made between the large international firms.

These exert considerable pressure on the rest of the capitalist sector and have got the better of the planning structures put in place after 1945. Italy; RENAULT and ELF-ERAP in France), but these large state enterprises have acquired real independence from their legal owners - to the point of imposing their growth policy on the state without worrying about the consequences of this: ELF-ERAP dictated to the French State an Algerian oil policy which proved disastrous for certain sectors 352

industriels et agricoles qui avaient trouvé en Algérie un marché quasiment protégé en pleine expansion. Renault impose à l'ensemble du pays une politique urbanistique délirante qui fait dépendre toutes les localisations urbanies et industrielles de sa stratégie de développement de la consommation massive d'automobiles individuelles

Elle n'a pas en France une stratégie différente de celle de FIAT en Italie.

De ce point de vue, on pourrait dire superficiellement que nous sommes à nouveau entrés dans une phase néolibérale de l'économie capitaliste qui se traduit notamment dans l'anarchie actuelle de l'organisation du circuit monétaire européen et la libéralisation de la convertibilité des monnaies et des échanges. Ceci n'est pourtant qu'une apparence, la planification réelle ,le capitalisme d'organisation, se développant non plus au niveau des Etats nationaux mais au niveau des grands groupes internationaux eux-mêmes.

Par rapport aux forces sociales des différents pays capitalistes d'Europe occidentale, cette situation a d'abord une conséquence direct sur le niveau de combativité de la fraction de la classe ouvrière, engagée directement dans les processus capitalistes les plus avancés. Je ne reviendrai pas longuement sur ce thème connu que, pour ma part, j'ai plusieurs fois développé et qui s'est notamment vérifié non seulement en 1968 en France mais dans l'ensemble des mouvements que nous avons connus en Italie, en Fran,ce, voire en Allemagne, en Angleterre, au cours de ces dernières années. La caractéristique de ces mouvements, c'est que, consciente de ce développement considérable des forces productives dont je parlais tout à l'heure, l'offensive de la classe ouvrière porte aujourd'hui non pas sur des revendications de type quantitatif, portant essentiellement sur l'augmentation du niveau de vie, mais sur des exigences de nature infiniment plus qualitative, portant notamment sur la mise en cause de l'organisation capitaliste du travail, la réduction systématique du temps de travail et, au delà, posant nettement le problème du contrôle de la production, des rythmes de production et de l'organisation de la production par les travailleurs eux-mêmes. Spinella, hier, a parlé de ces choses à propos de l'Italie; je voudrais dire qu' il ne s'agit pas d'une tendence seulement abstraite, d'une tendence formelle. Dans la pratique, au cours de ces deux dernières années en France, un certain nombre de grandes entreprises ont vu se développer des mouvements sociaux ayant pour objectif de bloquer ou de contrôler l'organisation du travail et aboutissant à installer dans un certain nombre de cas un véritable contrôle des travailleurs sur le temps de travail. Par exemple, le cas des usines Berliet à Lyon: à la suite d'une série de mouvements de gréve et depuis plusieurs mois maintenant la direction a abondonné le contrôle de l'organisation du travail et ne fixe plus rythmes et les cadences de production. Ce sont les travailleurs organisés par ateliers qui déterminent eux-même leur propre rythme de production.

industrialists and agriculturalists who had found in Algeria an almost protected market in full expansion. Renault imposes on the whole country a delirious urban planning policy which makes all urban and industrial locations dependent on its development strategy of the massive consumption of individual automobiles.

It does not have a strategy in France different from that of FIAT in Italy.

From this point of view, one could say superficially that we have again entered a neoliberal phase of the capitalist economy which is reflected in particular in the current anarchy of the organization of the European monetary circuit and the liberalization of the convertibility of currencies and exchanges. However, this is only an appearance, real planning, organizational capitalism, no longer developing at the level of national states but at the level of the large international groups themselves.

In relation to the social forces of the various capitalist countries of Western Europe, this situation has first of all a direct consequence on the level of combativity of the fraction of the working class, directly engaged in the most advanced capitalist processes. I will not return at length to this well-known theme which, for my part, I have developed several times and which was verified in particular not only in 1968 in France but in all the movements that we have known in Italy, in France,-

this, even in Germany, in England, during these last years. The characteristic of these movements is that, conscious of this considerable development of the productive forces of which I was speaking earlier, the offensive of the working class today bears not on demands of the type quantitative, relating essentially to the increase in the standard of living, but to demands of an infinitely more qualitative nature, relating in particular to the calling into question of the capitalist organization of work, the reduction system of working time and, beyond that, clearly posing the problem of the control of production, the rhythms of production and the organization of production by the workers themselves. Spinella, yesterday, spoke of these things about Italy; I would like to say that it is not just a question of an abstract tendency, of a formal tendency. In practice, during the last two years in France, a certain number of large companies have seen the development of social movements with the aim of blocking or controlling the organization of work and leading to the establishment in a certain number of cases real control of workers over working time. For example, the case of Usines Berliet in Lyon: following a series of strikes and for several months now, the management has relinquished control of the organization of work and

no longer sets the es and production rates.

It is the workers organized by workshops who themselves determine their own rhythm of production.

353

Je cite l'exemple de Berliet parce qu'il est le plus précis, mais il se développe dans toute une série de zones, et lorsque les travailleurs n'aboutissent pas dans ces industries les plus avancées à prendre en charge directement l'organisation de la production, les mouvements de lutte vont néanmoins fondamentalement dans ce sens. La dernière grande grève d'automobiles que nous avons connue en France, partie du mouvement des ouvriers spécialisés des usines Renault, avait essentiellement pour objectif la mise en cause du système d'organisation capitaliste du travail et non pas une améllioration de ce système. Je rejoins la Spinella à propos de ce qu'il disait sur la possibilité de tels mouvements la possibilité de voir la classe ouvrière re-mettre en cause, pour la première fois depuis des dizaines d'années, le caractère inéluctable de l'organisation du travail et du rythme du travail et des cadences de production, déterminés en dernière analyse par les possibilités offertes par le développement des forces productives. C' est le développement des forces productives qui donne aujourd'hui à la classe ouvrière la possibilité de constater qu'en fait l'excédent de production, réalisé par l'augmentation des rythmes et des cadences, n'est absolument pas nécessaire au maintien et au développement de son niveau de vie.

Et l'expérience dont je parlais tout à l'heure en ce qui concerne Berliet est ce de point de vue très significative, puisque, après avoir réduit de l'ordre de 35% les cadences de production depuis maintenant six mois, les usines Berliet continuent d'être parfaitement rentables, les capitalistes continuant de réaliser des profits importants malgré une baisse de 35% des cadences de production: ce qui veut dire naturellement que le taux de récupération de la plus-value, réalisée par les nouveaux systèmes d'organisation du travail, est tel qu'en fait les travailleurs peuvent presque indéfiniment reculer les normes de la productivité sans pour autant mettre en danger l'équilibre même du système. Cette situation engendre par conséquent de nouvelles possibilités de luttes dans la fraction de la classe ouvrière liée aux industries et aux secteurs les plus avancés

Mais, en même temps, le développement de la concentration capitaliste, la nécessité pour ces grands secteurs, pour les grands trusts de contrôler au maximum la production et la distribution dans l'ensemble du corps social, aboutissent à créer une crise sociale très grave, à l'intérieur des secteurs industriels, agricoles ou commerciaux, qui survivaient jusqu'ici en dehors des grandes entreprises capitalistes. Nous assistons en quelque sorte à l'intérieur même de chaque pays à un processus d'exploitation colonial: les grands secteurs industriels prélevant sur les secteurs marginaux la part de plus-value qu'ils ne peuvent pas récupérer sur leurs propres ouvriers en fonction de la combativité de ceux-ici.

On peut dire que chaque fois que les travailleurs du secteur industriel avancé arrachent sous une forme ou sous une autre une diminution du temps de travail et des rythmes de production, la répercussion de cette situation se fait directement sentir sur un

I cite the example of B erliet because it is the most precise, but it develops in a whole series of areas, and when the work elsewhere does not end up in these most advanced industries to take charge directly the organization of production, the movements of struggle go nevertheless fundamentally in this direction. The last great automobile strike that we experienced in France, which started with the movement of specialized workers in the Renault factories, had essentially as its objective the questioning of the capitalist system of organization of work and not an improvement. of this system. I agree with Spinella on what he said about the possibility of such movements the possibility of seeing the working class re-questioning, for the first time in decades, the ineluctability of the organization of work and the rhythm of work and production rates, determined in the last analysis by the possibilities offered by the development of the productive forces. It is the development of the productive forces which today gives the working class the possibility of observing that in fact the surplus of production, achieved by the increase in rhythms and cadences, is absolutely not not necessary to maintain and develop their standard of living.

And the experience I was talking about earlier with regard to Berliet is very significant from a point of view, since, after having reduced production rates by around 35% over the past six months, the B factories erliet continue to be perfectly profitable, the capitalists continuing to make significant profits despite a 35% drop in production rates: which naturally means that the rate of recovery of the surplus value, realized by by the new systems of work organization, is such that in fact workers can almost indefinitely set back the standards of productivity without endangering the very balance of the system. This situation therefore generates new possibilities for struggle in the fraction of the working class linked to the most advanced industries and sectors.

But, at the same time, the development of capitalist concentration, the need for these large sectors, for the large trusts to control production and distribution as much as possible throughout the social body, lead to the crying out of a social crisis. very serious, within the industrial, agricultural or commercial sectors, which survived up to now apart from the big capitalist companies. We are witnessing, in a way, "the very interior of each country has a process of colonial exploitation: the large industrial sectors taking from the marginal sectors the share of surplus value that they cannot recover from their own workers. depending on the combativity of those here.

It can be said that each time that workers in the advanced industrial sector extract in one form or another a reduction in working time and production rhythms, the repercussion of this situation is directly felt on a 354

certain nombre d'usines de province dans lesquelles est utilisée une main-d'oeuvre récente d'origine rurale, ayant moins de tradition de lutte.

Le taux d'exploitation de ces catégories de travailleurs s'aggrave dans la mesure même où la résistance des ouvriers du secteur avancé diminue les possibilitées d'extorsion de la plus-value dans ces secteurs.

Pendant une année, notamment après 1969, la situation semblait s'équilibrer ainsi. Pourtant nous assistons depuis 1969 à une prise de conscience nouvelle de ces secteurs ouvriers des industries de province, de ces secteurs ouvriers d'origine paysanne. C'est que d'une part les conquêtes, réalisées ou en cours de réalisation par les secteurs les plus avancés de la classe ouvrière, engendrent chez les autres ouvriers un besoin d'homogénéisation. Cela se manifeste à la fois au niveau des salaires et au niveau des conditions de vie. D'un autre côté, ces travailleurs n'ont pas les mêmes possibilités, ils subissent les conditions d'exploitation plus dures que les ouvriers des secteurs avancés, d'où le développement d'une série de luttes dans ces secteurs des usines provinciales ou dans la paysannerie, qui prennent des formes en apparence plus dures et plus violentes que les formes qu'elles prennent dans les secteurs avancés eux-mêmes.

Nous avons vu, par exemple, de nouvelles pratiques de luttes: séquestration de cadres, de patrons, occupation des usines, etc., qui ne font que manifester la prise de conscience des travailleurs placés dans des secteurs non-stratégique de la production, mais subissant des conditions d'exploitation plus fortes que les travailleurs placés dans des secteurs stratégiques de la production.

A partir de là peut se poursuivre et s'élargir le mouvement social révolutionnaire et peut théoriquement se réaliser la jonction des luttes menées par les différentes fractions de la classe ouvrière. Seulement, cette jonction, en l'absence d'un mouvement généralisé, n'est que théorique: le hiatus entre la nature des luttes, leur »tempo«, leurs formes, dans le secteur »avancé« — et organisé solidement sur le plan syndical — et dans le secteur »arrieré«, où elles prennent l'aspect de »grèves sauvages« de caratère«, souvent spontané, est trop grand. La situation sociale des années 1969—1971 est donc à la fois marquée:

- 1º) par un maintien d'une forte combativité des travailleurs du secteur »avancé« et par l'entrée en lutte des travailleurs du secteur »arriér髹 (alors que ces travailleurs n'avaient suivi qu'à distance le mouvement de mai 68);
- 2º) Mais en même temps, par un éparpillement, une fragmentation des luttes ouvrières; la lutte de classe prend alors la forme d'une guérilla généralisée, mais non coordonnée, qui maintient le

¹ L' »arriération« de ces secteurs est en fait très artificielle. Il faudralt plutôt parler de »secteurs dépendants« qui, cristallisés dans des zones de sous-développement régional ou sectoriel, se voient confisquer par les grandes entreprises qui les contrôlent les sources d'accumulation qui leur permettraient précisément de sortir de cette »arriération«.

The rate of exploitation of these categories of workers worsens to the extent that the resistance of workers in the advanced sector reduces the possibilities of extortion of surplus value in these sectors.

For a year, especially after 1969, the situation seemed to balance itself out in this way. However, since 1969 we have been witnessing a new awareness of these working sectors of provincial industries, of these working sectors of peasant origin. This is because, on the one hand, the conquests, carried out or in the process of being carried out by the most advanced sectors of the working class, engender in the other workers a need for homogenization. This manifests itself in both wages and living conditions. On the other hand, these workers do not have the same opportunities, they suffer harsher conditions of exploitation than the workers of the advanced sectors, hence the development of a series of struggles in these sectors of the provincial factories. or in the peasantry, which take forms that are apparently harsher and more violent than the forms they take in the advanced sectors themselves.

We have seen, for example, new practices of struggle: sequestration of executives, bosses, occupation of factories, etc., which only manifest the awareness of workers placed in non-strategic sectors of production, but undergoing harsher conditions of exploitation than workers placed in strategic sectors of production.

From there, the revolutionary social movement can continue and expand and can theoretically bring about the junction of the struggles waged by the different fractions of the working class.

However, this junction, in the absence of a generalized movement, is only theoretical: the hiatus between the nature of the struggles, their

»tempo«, their forms, in the »advance« sector — and solidly organized on the union level — and in the »rear« sector, where they take on the aspect of »wildcat strikes« of character«, often spontaneous, is too big. The social situation of the years 1969-1971 is therefore both marked:

- 1°) by maintaining a strong combativeness of workers in the "advanced" sector and by the entry into struggle of workers in the
- »behind«1 (while these workers had only followed the May 68 m ovement from a distance);
- 2°) But at the same time, by a scattering, a fragmentation of workers' struggles; the class struggle then takes the form of a generalized, but uncoordinated guerrilla warfare, which maintains the 1 The

"retardation" of these sectors is in fact very artificial. It would be better to speak of "dependent sectors" which, crystallized in areas of regional or sectoral underdevelopment, see themselves confiscated by the large companies which control them the sources of accumulation which would make it possible precisely to get out of this »retardation«.

355

pays dans une situation de crise sociale permanente mais ne permet pas de déboucher sur une mise en cause globale, politique, du système de pouvoir.

Ceci en ce qui concerne la classe ouvrière. Mais le phénomène dont je parlais tout à l' heure, la nécessité, pour les grands secteurs capitalistes de procéder à la concentration maximum, de s'assurer le contrôle général de l'ensemble de l'organisation sociale aussi bien sur le plan de la production que sur le plan de la consommation, la nécessité d'intégrer dans le mode de production capitaliste la totalité des secteurs marginaux qui se trouvaient jusqu'ici en dehors, comme la paysannerie et de larges fractions de la petite bourgeoisie, engedrent au sein de ces couches un malaise politique et social profond.

On a parlé hier de prolétarisation d'une fraction de la petite et moyenne bourgeoisie; je crois que le terme est à la fois juste et imprécis, qu'il nous faut en fait parler beaucoup plus d'une différentiation accrue à l'intérieur des couches de la petite et moyenne bourgeoisie, paysannerie incluse. Certains de ces éléments, dont le grand capital a notamment besoin sur le plan politique pour assurer une certaine assise sociale au système bénéficient de »retombées de la plus-value capitaliste. C'est notamment le cas de tous ces secteurs parasitaires qu'on ne peut pas classer autrement que comme des secteurs de la petite et moyenne bourgeoisie qui s'épanouissent en ce moment dans le cadre de la spéculation immobilière, du tourisme, de l'aménagement du territoire, etc. et qui constituent dans une certaine mesure la seule et dernière base sociale large du pouvoir capitaliste existant. Ce n'est pas, par exemple, en France, un hasard ou un mauvais choix qui fait que majeure partie du personnel parlementaire du parti gouvernemental est liée directement en tant que P. D. G.2 à la spéculation immobilière, aux travaux publics à la vente d'armes, aux affaires d'import-export, à la récupération des métaux, à la publicité.

Ils ne font que refléter le poids dans la majorité gouvernementale de ces couches sociales, de cette fraction de la petite et moyenne bourgeoisie reconvertie dans le sillage du capitalisme de monopoles.

A cette petite et moyenne »bourgeoisie d'affaires«, vient s'ajouter une fraction de la paysannerie. Le développement d'une couche de »petits capitalistes agraires«, particulièrement importante dans les riches plaines du Bassin parisien, présente cette caractéristique qu'elle doit sa prospérité beaucoup plus aux redistributions budgétaires opérées par l'Etat sous forme de subventions, de dégrèvement de taux d'intérêt, de privilèges fiscaux qu'à sa capacité »concurrentielle«. Les concessions faites à la France sur le plan

² Président-Directeur Général: Fonction qui cumule depuis 1963 les postes de Président du Conseil d'administration et de Directeur général de l'entreprise, réalisant ainsi la fusion en une seule personne du pouvoir financier et du pouvoir managérial.

This with regard to the working class. But the phenomenon of which I was speaking earlier, the need for the large capitalist sectors to proceed to maximum concentration, to ensure general control of the whole of the social organization both in terms of production and on the level of consumption, the need to integrate into the capitalist mode of production all the marginal sectors which have hitherto been outside, such as the peasantry and large fractions of the petty bourgeoisie, engender within of these strata a deep political and social malaise.

We spoke vesterday of the proletarization of a fraction of the petty and middle bourgeoisie; I believe that the term is both right and imprecise, that we need in fact to speak much more of an increased differentiation within the strata of the petty and middle bourgeoisie, including the peasantry. Some of these elements, which big capital in particular needs on the political level to ensure a certain social basis for the system, benefit from the fallout from capitalist surplus value. This is particularly the case of all these parasitic sectors which cannot be classified other than as sectors of the petty and middle bourgeoisie which are currently flourishing within the framework of speculation. real estate, tourism, regional planning, etc. and which constitute to a certain extent the only and last broad social basis of existing capitalist power. It is not, for example, in France, a coincidence or a bad choice which means that m ajor part of the parliamentary staff of the government party is directly linked as P. D. G.* to real estate speculation, to the public works to the sale of arms, to import-export business, to the recovery of metals, to publicity.

They only reflect the weight in the government majority of these social strata, of this fraction of the petty and middle bourgeoisie reconverted in the wake of monopoly capitalism.

To this small and medium "business bourgeoisie" is added a fraction of the peasantry. The development of a layer of "small agrarian capitalists", particularly important in the rich plains of the Paris Basin, presents this characteristic that it owes its prosperity much more to the budgetary redistributions operated by the State in the form of subsidies, interest rate relief, tax privileges that has its capacity

»competitive«. The concessions made to France on the plan 2 Chairman and Chief Executive Officer: Position which since 1963 has combined the positions of Chairman of the Board of Directors and Chief Executive Officer of the company, thus achieving the fusion in a single person of financial power and managerial power. de la politique agricole des pays du Marché Commun bénébicient en fin de compte à 15% de la paysannerie française, alors que la grande masse de celle-ci est rejetée dans le prolétariat.

C'est dans ces couches petites-bourgeoises parasitaires — infiniment moins larges que les anciennes couches petites-bourgeoises libérales qui asseyaient l'équilibre politique des gouvernements »centristes « de la IIIe République — que résident d'ailleurs aujourd'hui les risques de fascisation du régime.

Dans le cas où la conjoncture économique amènerait le grand capital »cosmopolite« à restreindre la part de plus-value redistribuée à ces couches, celles-ci n'hésiteraient pas à revediquer du pouvoir d'Etat les moyens de »survivre« par la fascisation du régime et la »mise au pas« des ouvriers.

Mais l'existence de cette petite et moyenne bourgeoisie »reconvertie« en parasite du capitalisme de monopoles n'équilibre pas le processus de prolétarisation de la majorité de la paysannerie et des anciennes couches moyennes libérales et le fait que celles-ci tendent à rejoindre dans leurs luttes le mouvement ouvrier.

Une large fraction de ces couches paysannes, artisanales, commerçantes, etc., aujourd'hui intégrées dans le mode de production capitaliste, passe sur des positions de lutte excessivement violentes et radicales et en arrive jusques y compris à accepter le socialisme comme seul moyen d'échapper à leur oppression par le grand capital. Ici se trouvent réalisées les conditions d'une accentuation de la lutte des classes, mais d'une lutte qui passe à travers des formes et des couches sociales entièrement nouvelles, et, en fait, nous sommes dans une phase où les organisations politiques traditionnelles sont dans l'incapacité de saisir les points où passent à l'heure actuelle les mouvements révolutionnaires et sont dans l'incapacité de déterminer elles-mêmes en quoi les formes que prend le mouvement social sont ou non révolutionnaires.

Il y a en quelque sorte un hiatus entre le développement du courant révolutionnaire à travers des formes spécifiques nouvelles, à travers des couches sociales qui jusqu'ici étaient en dehors du processus révolutionnaire, parce que bien souvent elles étaient en dehors du mode de production capitaliste, et qui prennent la forme d'une protestation générale contre les conditions de vie et l'organisation générale de la vie créées par le système capitaliste de production et d'autre part les formes de lutte traditionnellement menées par les organisations politiques. D'où, naturellement, comme je le disais tout à l'heure, une très grande dispersion des luttes, une très grande fragmentation de ces mouvements et l'impossibilité de transformer, à partir de là, la crise sociale en crise proprement politique. Néanmoins, la permanence de cette crise sociale entraîne des répercussions sur le corps politique lui-même. Je ne dis pas que nous soyons en France aujourd'hui dans une phase où il y ait liason de la crise politique et de la crise sociale.

La crise politique et la crise sociale se manifestent sur deux plans différents. Nous avons une crise sociale qui continue et qui risque de reprendre en octobre d'une façon très généralisée. Nous benefit 15% of the French peasantry, while the great mass of the latter is thrown back into the proletariat.

It is in these parasitic petty-bourgeois strata — infinitely less broad than the old liberate petty-bourgeois strata that established the political balance of governments

"centrists" of the Third Republic - who also today reside in the risks of fascisation of the regime.

In the event that the economic conjuncture led big "cosmopolitan" capital to restrict the share of surplus value redistributed to these strata, they would not hesitate to claim from state power the means of survive" by the fascisation of the regime and the "training" of the workers.

But the existence of this petty and middle bourgeoisie "converted" into a parasite of monopoly capitalism does not balance the process of proletarization of the majority of the peasantry and the old liberate middle strata and the fact that these tend to join the workers' movement in their struggles.

A large fraction of these layers of peasants, craftsmen, merchants, etc., today integrated into the capitalist mode of production, pass on excessively violent and radical positions of struggle and come to the point of even accepting socialism as the only means of escaping their oppression by big capital. Here are realized the conditions for an accentuation of the class struggle, but of a struggle which passes through entirely new forms and social strata, and, in fact, we are in a phase where the organizations traditional politicians are incapable of grasping the points where revolutionary movements are currently passing and are incapable of determining for themselves in what respect the forms taken by the social movement are or are not revolutionary.

There is a kind of hiatus between the development of the revolutionary current through specific new forms, through social strata which until now were outside the revolutionary process, because very often they were outside the mode of capitalist production, and which take the form of a general protest against the living conditions and the general organization of life created by the capitalist system of production and, on the other hand, the forms of struggle traditionally carried out by by political organizations. Hence, naturally, as I was saying earlier, a very great dispersion of struggles, a very great fragmentation of these movements and the impossibility

of transforming, from there, the social crisis into a strictly political crisis. Nevertheless, the persistence of this social crisis has repercussions on the body politic itself.

I am not saying that we are in France today in a phase where there is a link between the political crisis and the social crisis.

The political crisis and the social crisis manifest themselves on two different planes. We have a social crisis which continues and which risks resuming in October in a very generalized way. We s 357

avons d'un autre côté une crise politique qui reste pour le moment une crise politique interne, à l'intérieur de la bourgeoisie. Mais cette crise politique interne est elle-même le reflet de la crise sociale, c'est-à-dire qu'il s'agit en fait de savoir comment va être répartie la plus-value.

Et nous commençons à voir apparaître les forces qui, à l'intérieur du système de pouvoir, disent: l'essentiel, c'est de désamorcer la combativité ouvrière, par conséquent mettons en place une politique réformiste qui nous permettra de garder au moins un relatif consensus de la part de secteurs les plus avancés de la classe ouvrière; c'est la politique en France, par exemple, de Chaban-Delmas et de ses conseillers. Et d'un autre côté, une autre fraction de la bourgeoisie qui pour maintenir un équilibre politique, pour se maintenir une base sociale, a ouvert largement les portes à la spéculation individuelle, a dit à toute une série de couches de la petite bourgeoisie: »Enrichissez-vous« et est prête à protéger la distribution de la plus-value à ces couches au moyen de la terreur politique et policière.

Cette crise politique interne, dont nous voyons les reflets, peut déboucher à son tour sur une crise politique generale qui, elle peut permettre de faire passer le mouvement social dont je parlais au plan du mouvement politique.

358

On the other hand, we have a political crisis which remains for the moment an internal political crisis, within the bourgeoisie. But this internal political crisis is itself the reflection of the social crisis, that is to say that it is in fact a question of knowing how the surplus value will be distributed.

And we are beginning to see the forces appear which, within the system of power, say: the main thing is to defuse workers' combativity, therefore let us put in place a reformist policy which will allow us to allow us to keep at least a relative consensus on the part of the most advanced sectors of the working class; it is the policy in France, for example, of Chaban-

-Delmas and his advisers. And on the other hand, another fraction of the bourgeoisie which in order to maintain a political balance, in order to maintain a social basis, has opened the doors wide to individual speculation, has said to a whole series of strata of the petty bourgeoisie: »Get rich« and is ready to protect the distribution of surplus value to these strata by means of political and police terror.

This internal political crisis, of which we see the reflections, can lead in its turn to a general political crisis which, it can make it possible to pass the social movement of which I spoke at the level of the political movement.

THE CRISIS OF ADVENTURE

Miroslav Jilek

Zagreb

The theme "Reality and utopia" undoubtedly implies a great number of various subthemes and approaches. In the framework of this theme the principal problems that present themselves are the relations between the historical spirit, reality, and utopia, problems of revolutions and systems, the problems of those changes which take place when the vision of utopia becomes a seeming reality and of how, when and wherefrom arises a new hope time and time again.

Considering the level of thought which recognizes both »realistic hope« and the utopian ideal itself as the unattainable or as yet non-existent hope, we must necessarily come to the theme which should be he starting point, i. e., the problem of awareness of life.

If we try briefly to define (for the sake of discussion) hope, which is ever-present and appears in historical context, then it will be the awaiting not of *topos* but of the time, when life becomes an end in itself, and that means: when it will be possible to freely dispose of it.¹

Like other aspirations which create hope, this one has been inspiring hope for a long time.

Every rebellion and revolution which claimed to bring the ultimate way of life as opposed to mere existence, has always appeared from behind the barricade as death-bearing. Death has thus always been, paradoxically enough, the reward of life. But that is the phenomenology of reality, and what about (thánatos!) which together with eros is at all times and in all places at work.

Does the slogan "Better a grave, than a slave!" or any other revolutionary slogan, imply in itself (after the realizations of revolutionary ideals) eternal life or life as the highest value in view of its holiness, that excludes any possibility of a game with life containing risk.

^{&#}x27;This pre-supposes a relatively secure existence, which is offered by the bourgeois society to its upper strata. It is discussed more precisely later in the text.

THE CRISIS OF ADVENTURE

Miroslav Jilek

Zagreb

The them e »Reality and utopia« undoubtedly implies a great num ber of various subthem es and approaches. In the framework of this them e the principal problem s th at present themselves are the relations betw een the historical spirit, reality, and utopia, problems of revolutions and systems, the problems of those changes which take place w hen the vision of utopia becomes a seeming rea lity and of how, when and w herefrom arises a new hope time and time again.

Considering the level of thought which recognizes both »realistic hope« and the utopian ideal itself as the unattainable or as yet non-existent hope, we must necessarily come to the them e which should be he startin g point, i. e., the problem of awareness of life.

If w e try briefly to define (for the sake of discussion) hope, which is ever-present and appears in historical context, then it will be the aw aiting not of "topos" but of the time, when life becomes an end in itself, and that means: when it will be possible to freely dispose of it.1

Like other aspirations which create hope, this one has been inspiring hope for a long time.

E very rebellion and revolution which claimed to bring the u ltim ate w ay of life as opposed to m ere existence, has always appeared from behind the barricade as death-bearing. D eath has thus always been, paradoxically enough, the rew ard of life. But th at is the phenom enology of reality, and w hat about (thanatos!) which together w ith eros is a t all tim es and in all places at work.

Does the slogan »B etter a grave, the an a slave!« or any other revolutionary slogan, im ply in itself (after the realizations of revolutionary ideals) etern al life or life as the highest value in view of its holiness, that excludes any possibility of a game with life containing risk.

* This pre-supposes a relatively secure existence, which is offered by the bourgeois society to its up p er strata. I t is discussed more precisely in the text. Not a single revolution has desired this, and if it did it appeared in a different context.

The revolutionary in the very act of revolution, which as is usually said, requires sacrifices, has already attained (in himself) the essence of post-revolutionary development, which thus is not merely coming but is actively at work.

Revolution is thus an act of the future not only in what it desires, but also in what it actually is. According to this it cannot be a problem of the future if its aspirations are not already at work in its present evolution.

If revolutionary aspiration does not imply »disposal of one's life«, then revolutionary upheaval and the post-revolutionary period claim only mere existence. But the right to freely dispose of one's life is no longer a question of life but a problem of death.

So in the context of this discussion about reality and utopia, through a discussion about the awareness of life and the utopia of this life, which like revolution must always be at work, it is possible to discuss the problem of death.

Therefore on a somewhat different, more concrete level of theoretical exploration there can appear the following theses and conclusions:

1. Contemporary civilization with highly industrial and urban societies lacks the dimension of life as an adventure.

Adventure is here understood as an aspect (optimal and human) of the game with death, that is: with life.²

Adventure is the game with death which is chosen. The various dangers of contemporary civilization are imposed.

It is often said and written that people love to read pulp novels and watch westerns and detective films to be able for the moment to identify with the hero. This explanation without additional analysis of the idea of hero is superficial and even meaningless. Heroism is the result of deeds and actions, as a rule individual, by which the hero deliberately jeopardizes his life. His life is at stake for the outcome of his actions. Consequently the hero is an adventurer.

We stress this because not every adventurer must become a hero, although many wish to.

This deduction has its meaning insofar as the context contains an analysis of the contemporary relation between life and death.

² This definition really applies not only to the final aspect but also to the final range of adventure. Adventure always means going out, overcoming, and testing. More concretely, adventure is a going out before the self, a placing in front of the self, also going out along or beside the self, a departure from the circle, a departure from daily life, from the norm, a departure from routine (departure from the super-ego). It is also against the self, against others, against all; for the self, for others, for the norm, for the everyday etc., and all this for the purpose of testing reality and the meaning of one's existence. In this context adventure either confirms or negates. When it negates the meaning and reality of a given existence it acquires also a conscious role. Thus we can speak about a spiritual or intellectual adventure.

different context.

The revolutionary in the very act of revolution, w hich as is usually said, requires sacrifices, has already attained (in himself) the essence of post-revolutionary development, which thus is not m erely coming but is actively a t work.

Revolution is thus an act of the fu tu re not only in w hat it desires, but also in w hat it actually is. According to this it cannot be a problem of the fu tu re if its aspirations are not already a t work in its present evolution.

If revolutionary aspiration does not im ply »disposal of one's life«, then revolutionary upheaval and the post-revolutionary period claim only m ere existence. B ut the right to freely dispose of one's life is no longer a question of life b ut a problem of death.

So in the context of this discussion about reality and utopia, through a discussion about the awareness of life and the utopia of this life, which like revolution m ust always be a t work, it is possible to discuss the problem of death.

Therefore on a som ewhat different, more concrete level of theoretical exploration there can appear the following theses and conclusions: 1.

C ontem porary civilization w ith highly industrial and urban societies lacks the dimension of life as an adventure.

A dventure is here understood as an aspect (optimal and human) of the game w ith death, th a t is: w ith life.2

A dventure is the game w ith death which is chosen. The various dangers of contem porary civilization are imposed.

It is often said and w ritten th a t people love to read pulp novels and watch w esterns and detective films to be able for the m oment to identify w ith the hero. This explanation w ithout additional analysis of the idea of hero is superficial and even meaningless. Heroism is the result of deeds and actions, as a rule individual, by which the hero deliberately jeopardizes his life. His life is a t stake for the outcome of his actions. C onsequently the hero is an adventurer.

We stress this because not every ad venturer m ust become a hero, although m any w ish to.

Tlxis deduction has its m eaning insofar as the context contains an

analysis of the contem porary relation betw een life and death.

* This definition really applies not only to the final aspect b u t also to the final range of adventure. A dventure alw ays m eans going out, overcoming, and testing. More concretely, ad v enture is a going out before the self, a placing in fro n t of the self, also going out along or beside the self, a dep artu re from the circle, a d ep artu re from daily life, from the norm, a d ep a rtu re from routine (d eparture from the super-ego). I t is also against the self, against others, against all; for the self, for others, for the norm, for the everyday etc., and all this for the purpose of testing reality and the m eaning of one's existence. In this context ad venture eith er confirm s or negates. W hen it negates the m eaning and reality of a given existence it acquires also a conscious role. Thus we can speak about a spiritu al or in tellectual adventure.

The scientific era has freed life from a whole series of dimensions of death which were fatal or inevitable. Life was threatened from every side by disease. Many illnesses are no longer fatal thanks to modern medicine. Higher standards of living and science have removed illness as a major threat to human life. The day is not far when cancer will be conquered. Cures will be found for diseases which are historically incurable and fatal. The price of human life fluctuates with the abilities of man. Here we could expect that the Narcissus complex of man would grow. When the pleasure of acquiring material goods becomes the ultimate purpose of life, then the Narcissus complex would grow.

But — is this situation »as it should be«.? It seems that it is not as it should be and we will try to prove this. We visualize the categories of life and death as divided by a thin red line. Through history this relationship was evident. Both life and death were present to the same degree. The above mentioned development of the technical — technological — scientific civilization has shifted this »thin red line« in favour of life at the expense of death.

By this the »thin red line« has lost its former meaning. It remained constant only in the category heroism — madness. To risk one's life under conditions of almost complete security is now characterized as madness.

Let us return to our main question. Is this shifting in favor of life a normal process, i. e., biologically and psychologically acceptable, or is it disharmony in the basic life (death) categories? We must pose the question in a different way. Will man in the era of adaptation [this is his biggest problem] be able to get used to the security in life or is it impossible for him? Is it possible to live far from the determining factors of life and death?

Finally the problem appears in the following form: Does the content of the category of life remain aloof from certain changes through history or is it its antipod, the category of death, which changes?

Life as a category of totality is a historical constant and as such is an essential for all forms of thought and action. However both life as a constant and a totality are metaphysical categories. In everyday life we find a special dialectic in which death represents that constant in the totality of life which determines and gives meaning to life. According to this being is at the same time non-being and the experience or just the closeness of non-being is at the same time being.

One of the most evident examples for this dialectical game can be found in the sphere of art. Today for example death becomes more and more the problem of inspiration which was not always the case.

In the times when death was more prominent it was overcome by praising life. Today we celebrate death so that life may retain its meaning. Life itself is not life bearing. This dimension is given over more and more to death. The problem of life thus becomes the

'The scientific era has freed life from a whole series of dimensions of death which were fatal or inevitable. Life was threatened from every side by disease. Many illnesses are no longer fatal thanks to modern medicine. H igher standards of living and science have removed illness as a m ajor th reat to hum an life. The day is not far when cancer will be conquered. Cures will be found for diseases which are historically incurable and fatal. The price of hum an life fluctuates with the abilities of man. Here we could expect that the Narcissus complex of m an would grow. When the pleasure of acquiring material goods becomes the ultimate purpose of life, then the Narcissus complex would grow.

But — is this situation »as it should be«.? It seems that it is not as it should be and we will try to prove this. We visualize the categories of life and death as divided by a thin red line. Through history this relationship was evident. Both life and death were present to the same degree. The above mentioned development of the technical — technological — scientific civilization has shifted this

»thin red line« in favour of life at the expense of death.

By this the »thin red line« has lost its form er meaning. It rem ained constant only in the category heroism — madness. To risk one's life under conditions of almost complete security is now characterized as madness.

Let us re tu rn to our m ain question. Is this shifting in favor of life a norm al process, i. e., biologically and psychologically acceptable, or is it disharm ony in the basic life (death) categories? We m ust pose the question in a d ifferent way. Will man in the era of adaptation [this is his biggest problem] be able to get used to the security in life or is it impossible for him? Is it possible to live fa r from the determ ining factors of life and death?

Finally the problem appears in the following form: Does the content of the category of life rem ain aloof from certain changes through history or is it its antipod, the category of death, which changes?

Life as a category of totality is a historical constant and as such is an essential for all forms of thought and action. However both life as a constant and a totality are m etaphysical categories. In everyday life we find a special dialectic in which death represents th at constant in the totality of life which determ ines and gives meaning to life. According to this being is at the same time non-

-being and the experience or ju st the closeness of non-being is at the same time being.

One of the most evident exam ples for this dialectical game can be

found in the sphere of art. Today for exam ple death becomes m ore and m ore the problem of inspiration which was not always the case.

In the tim es w hen death was more prom inent it was overcome by praising life. Today we celebrate death so th a t life may retain its meaning. Life itself is not life bearing. This dimension is given over m ore and m ore to death. The problem of life thus becomes the 361

challenge of death. The problem of life as an antipod of death has thus reached a crisis. Consequently according to the way we think, this has brought the crisis of adventure.

Life wants to be self-choosing and self-chosen through a game with itself, as the ultimate goal of the game itself by means of the game with death. We call the game with death adventure which by this becomes the basic problem of life.

The problem of the game³ is that it has its own rules and special dimensions.

The problem of the game acquires by this its true and essential dimensions.

The game itself does not become by this the apex of happiness as a vision of the future (even in Communism), but it becomes the apex of life itself which wants — itself — when — it — wants — itself and does not — want — itself — when — it — does — not — want itself.

II

We should devote some space in this context to the phenomenon which we call a consumer society in which there is the source for this line of reasoning.

The success of contemporary societies (without considering economics) is measured by U. S. dollar income per capita. The higher the income the greater the security of the members of a given society. According to the classical scheme of thought, economic security is the basis for psycho — emotional security.

Is that so?

Is this all there is to humanity and is this really the future of all mankind?

For now let us say only the following: We do not see in that the solution of basic human problems. That is a solution only for that future which for so many has already ceased to exist.

Material and spiritual wealth that characterizes contemporary consumer society has given life economic security. Fear for biological survival, for economic security is not present as it once was. In accordance with this we may say that at the root of all efforts of mankind throughout the history of multi-class society lies the search for security.

Here we wish to say that the standard Marxist interpretation, which says that the satisfaction of one desire can lead only to the birth of another, is no longer valid for the interpretation of contemporary highly developed societies and social levels.

For many the problem of biological survival has ceased to exist.

challenge of death. The problem of life as an antipod of death has thus reached a crisis. Consequently according to the w ay we think, this has brought the crisis of adventure.

³ It is possible to conclude sometimes that the game, which K. Axelos is considering, is nothing other than a compensation, that is, a flight from the highly organized external world. In this meaning the game, which is its final consequence will not presuppose the subjects game with its own self, can testify as a new aspect of alienation. For the time being the game appears like a game with others i. e., with the surrounding external world.

Life w ants to be self-choosing and self-chosen through a game w ith itself, as the ultim ate goal of the game itself by means of the game w ith death. We call the game w ith death adventure which by this becomes the basic problem of life.

The problem of the game3 is that it has its own rules and special dimensions.

The problem of the game acquires by this its tru e and essential dimensions.

The game itself does not become by this the apex of happiness as a vision of the fu tu re (even in Communism), b u t it becomes the apex of life itself which w ants — itself — w hen — it — w ants —

itself and does not — w ant — itself — when — it — does — not — w ant itself.

Π

We should devote some space in this context to the phenom enon which we call a consumer society in which there is the source for this line of reasoning.

The success of contem porary societies (without considering economics) is m easured by U. S. dollar income p er capita. The higher the income the greater the security of the m embers of a given society. According to the classical scheme of thought, economic security is the basis for psycho — emotional security.

Is that tso?

Is this all there is to hum anity and is this really the future of all mankind?

For now let us say only the following: We do not see in that the solution of basic hum an problems. That is a solution only for that future which for so many has already ceased to exist.

M aterial and spiritual w ealth that t characterizes contemporary consumer society has given life economic security. Fear for biological survival, for economic security is not present as it once was.

In accordance w ith this we m ay say th a t a t the root of all efforts of m ankind throughout the history of m ulti-class society lies the search

for security.

Here we wish to say that the standard M arxist interpretation, which says that the satisfaction of one desire can lead only to the birth of another, is no longer valid for the interpretation of contemporary highly developed societies and social levels.

For m any the problem of biological survival has ceased to exist.

3 It is possible to conclude sometimes that the game, which K. Axelos is considering, is nothing o ther than a compensation, that is, a flight from the highly organized ex tern al world. In this meaning the game, which is its final consequence will not presuppose the subjects game with its own self, can testify as a new aspect of alienation. For the time being the game appears like a game with others i. e., with the surrounding extern al world.

What now? Does this solve the human or more concretely stated psychic problems of man?

We give here a decisively negative answer. The human problems now only begin. Now begins, what in fact began a long time ago, the problem of phychological survival. According to many symptoms this problem is far more difficult to solve than all the others known up to now in history.⁴

Dangers are no longer overcome outside the individual. On the contrary the individual becomes the battle-field of imposed and self-created ideas.

One of the solutions of psychological survival is a new adventure of life. If this really is a solution, then some basic hypotheses of contemporary interpretation of man become meaningless.

Desire for security is thus not a stable and unchanging dimension of human inner life. It undergoes significant changes through historical periods. Human psychological fundamentals have their own dialectics. Now appears the opposite of security and that is the conscious risk known as adventure.

The Individual and Adventure

What happens with the individual in a consumer society? It seems that the individual in a consumer society is destroyed in its very essence. Consumption of any kind and consumption in general lulls the individual and gradually destroys him. The individual asserts himself by systemizing the disorder of the outer world. From the disorder of the outer world the individual creates an artificial order, an artificial interpretation of his environment. Consumer societies offer external order. They offer law and order which secures the individual as a consumer. The customer thus turns into a faceless mass of input and output. Any form of resistance is dangerous for production and order. The system intentionally destroys the individual through its very being for he is no longer needed.

Thus the individual disappears from contemporary literature and theatre. Modern painting offers a disorder of colors and elements. The destruction of the individual is complete.

The destroyed individual is characterized by a loss of hope. For him it is meaningless to be hopeful. At first it appears that hope is

⁴ The problems present themselves through decline of productive motivation in youth, who belong to the richest strata of society. The model of behaviour that leads to so called success in our society is evidently unacceptable for the new generation. They differ from their fathers in that desire for advancement and social prominence, which represent the essence of bourgeois society have become for them senseless and meaningless. But a different world is not yet envisioned. Perhaps it cannot be philosophically articulated

That is the reason why this ideological emptiness, or crisis of utopia in man, exhausts itself in everything we call the sickness of Western civilization. They are all characterized by flight from the realities of life by the realities of life by the use of drugs and other irrational forms of behaviour.

We give here a decisively negative answer. The human problems now only begin. Now begins, w hat in fact began a long time ago, the problem of phychological survival. According to many sjTnptoms this problem is far more difficult to solve than all the others known up to now in history.4

Dangers are no longer overcome outside the individual. On the contrary the individual becomes the battle-field of imposed and self-created ideas.

One of the solutions of psychological survival is a new adventure of life. If this really is a solution, then some basic hypotheses of contemporary in terpretation of m an become meaningless.

Desire for security is thus not a stable and unchanging dimension of hum an in n er life. It undergoes significant changes through historical periods. H um an psychological fundam entals have their own dialectics. Now appears the opposite of security and that is the conscious risk known as adventure.

The Individual and A dventure

W hat happens w ith the individual in a consumer society? It seems that the individual in a consum er society is destroyed in its very essence. Consumption of any kind and consumption in general lulls the individual and gradually destroys him. The individual asserts him self by system izing the disorder of the outer world.

From the disorder of the outer world the individual creates an artificial order, an artificial in terp retation of his environment. Consumer societies offer external order. They offer law and order which secures the individual as a consumer. The customer thus turns into a faceless mass of in put and output. Any form of resistance is dangerous for production and order. The system intentionally destroys the individual through its very being for he is no longer needed.

Thus the individual disappears from contem porary literature and theatre. M odern painting offers a disorder of colors and elements. The destruction of the individual is complete.

The destroyed individual is characterized by a loss of hope. For him it is m eaningless to be hopeful. A t first it appears that hope is

* The problem s presen t them selves through decline of productive motivation in youth, who belong to the richest stra ta of society. The model of behaviour th a t leads to so called success in o u r society is

evidently unacceptable for the new generation. They differ from th eir fathers in the at desire for advancement and social prominence, which represent the essence of bourgeois society have become for them senseless and meaningless. But a different world is not yet envisioned. Perhaps it cannot be philosophically articulated.

. .

. .

Th at is the reason why this ideological emptiness, or crisis of utopia in man, exhausts itself in everything we call the sickness of WesteTM £ 1',1K"

zation. They a re all characterized by flight from the realities of life y

the realities of life by the use of drugs an d other irratio n al forms of behaviour.

the prerequisite for adventure. Who does not possess hope cannot be an adventurer. For those who do not have it every new unresolved step is an undertaking that equals suicide.

But the essence of the problem lies elsewhere, in the opposite. It is the loss of hope as one of the basic elements of man. Caused from the outside by the system of consumer society it can create the need for any risk, i. e., adventure.

The loss of hope ruins the totality of the individual. Here adventure enters as the new constituent of psychological totality.

Regardless of which aspect of the consumer society we consider, we can state that the industrial civilization has inaugurated an ideology which disregards some of the essential aspects of humanity, so that we can accordingly conclude that it inaugurates a thesis about a change of the nature of humanity. Like every other ideology which has pretentions to be a universal and all-embracing philosophy of life and determination of the concrete utopia as a creation by the class as a warped consciousness«, it destroys its own foundations by not providing the essential and true definition of man. In short, the mentioned ideology deforms consciousness in that it sees the economic, not to say the biological, as the all-encompassing. In the biological security it sees the real utopia and the ultimate rational and irational goal of mankind.

What ideology then does the hippy movement or other student movements bring?⁵ They advocate the philosophy of abandoning the world of economic security i. e., security of existence. It is obvious that ideologies in the classical sense are discarded because of their insufficiency and unsuitability.⁶

Thus we find ourselves in the situation that aside from the already well known struggle with outside dangers (defending oneself from enemies to protect one's own existence) in the aspirations of a new generation, we encounter a new problem. This problem is always a conflict, but here the opponent is more and more imaginary or already unknown.

The new problem which we want to discuss is how to protect one from one's self. The prerequisite for such a solution lies in the

⁵ Many student movements have been characterized adventurist in a very negative light by those who are afraid for their own world. If we consider who they are, everything becomes clear. They are those who have created the world, such as it is, according to their own desires. But human desires are not universal.

⁶ If we can question the future of ideology, in a classical sense of the word, we can also question the possibility of a classical revolution. The question arises whether the hippy movement or adventure (group adventure) is or is not revolution. We think that adventure is a post-revolutional and post-ideological result. Accordingly adventure is neither revolution nor the aftereffect of ideology. It does not contain the basis presupposition for one or the other. It cannot be a group adventure by forming a group which thinks and acts together, intentionally and rationally, and behaves accordingly. It is not a group adventure because it is not organized and is not a revolution because it has no rational goal. On the other hand it is not a counterrevolution, considering the world it negates.

But the essence of the problem lies elsewhere, in the opposite.

It is the loss of hope as one of the basic elem ents of man. Caused from the outside by the system of consumer society it can create the need for any risk, i. e., adventure.

The loss of hope ruins the totality of the individual. Here adventure enters as the new constituent of psychological totality.

Regardless of which aspect of the consumer society we consider, we can state that the industrial civilization has inaugurated an ideology which disregards some of the essential aspects of hum anity, so that we can accordingly conclude that it inaugurates at hesis about a change of the nature of hum anity. Like every other ideology. which has pretentions to be a universal and all-embracing philosophy of life and determination of the concrete utopia as a creation by the class as a warped consciousness, it destroys its own foundations by not providing the essential and true definition of man. In short, the mentioned ideology deforms consciousness in that it sees the economic, not to say the biological, as the all-

-encompassing. In the biological security it sees the real utopia and the ultim ate rational and irational goal of mankind.

W hat ideology then does the hippy m ovem ent or other student movements bring?5 They advocate the philosophy of abandoning the w orld of economic security i. e., security of existence. It is obvious th a t ideologies in the classical sense are discarded because of the ir insufficiency and unsuitability.6

Thus we find ourselves in the situation that a side from the already well known struggle with outside dangers (defending oneself from enemies to protect one's own existence) in the aspirations of a new generation, we encounter a new problem. This problem is always a conflict, but here the opponent is more and more imaginary or already unknown.

The new problem which we want to discuss is how to protect one from one's self. The prerequisite for such a solution lies in the 5 Many student movem ents have been characterized adventurist in a very negative light by those who are afraid for their own world. If we consider who they are, everything becomes clear. They are those who have created the world, such as it is, according to their own desires. But hum an desires are not universal.

6 If we can question the fu tu re of ideology, in a classical sense of the

word, we can also question the possibility of a classical revolution. The question arises w h ether the hippy m ovem ent or adventure (group ad v enture) is o r is not revolution. We think th at adventure is a post-revolutional and post-ideological result. Accordingly adventure is neith er revolution nor the aftereffect of ideology. I t does not contain the basis presupposition for one o r the other. It cannot be a group adventure by form ing a group which thinks and acts together, intentionally and rationally, and behaves accordingly. It is not a group adventure because it is not organized and is not a revolution because it has no rational goal. On the other hand it is not a counterrevolution, considering the world it negates.

rejection of the system of thought of the contemporary Western civilization, which means the destruction of that civilization.

Is there an escape?

Yes, perhaps there is one. It exists in such an »organization« of life which allows the utilizations of every single aspect of human nature, but as yet we can perceive no such tendencies in an economically oriented world.

⁷ The prerequisite for the simultaneous utilization of all aspects of humanity is the continual regeneration of man. Modern production does not make this possible. The same way of production and consumption inaugurates the philosophy of the continual regeneration and "positive developments of man. We consider this "philosophy" untrue and impossible. Adventure destroys this philosophy by its very essence. Adventure is the expression of the desire for the new regeneration of man.

Is there an escape?

Yes, perhaps there is one. It exists in such an »organization« of life which allows the utilizations of every single aspect of human n ature7, but as yet we can perceive no such tendencies in an economically oriented world.

7 The p rereq u isite for the simultaneous utilization of all aspects of hum anity is the continual regeneration of man. Modern production does not make this possible. The same way of production and consumption inaugurates the philosophy of the continual regeneration and "positive development" of man. We consider this "philosophy" untrue and impossible.

A dventure destroys this philosophy by its v ery essence. A dventure is the expression of the desire for the new regeneration of man.

LE JEU DE L'ENSEMBLE DES ENSEMBLES*

Kostas Axelos

Paris

Commencons brutalement. Par deux citations. L'une est de Marx. Il écrit, dans Le Capital, que le système capitaliste empêche le travailleur de jouir de son travail »en tant que jeu de ses propres forces corporelles et spirituelles«. L'autre est de Heidegger. Il écrit, dans La constitution onto-théo-logique de la métaphysique: »l'essence de l'Etre est le Jeu lui-même«. Ces deux citations ne sont pas tout à fait isolées, occasionnelles et arbitraires. Dans Le Capital toujours, Marx écrit de nouveau: »en même temps que le travail mécanique agresse au dernier point le système nerveux. il opprime le jeu varié des muscles et confisque toute activité libre. corporelle et spirituelle«. Et dans Le principe de raison Heidegger demande: »devons-nous penser l'Etre (...) à partir de l'essence du Jeu«? Marx pense qu'aliénation et exploitation empêchent le travailleur de déployer son activité en tant que jeu. La suppression visée du capitalisme permettrait donc à l'activité multiple de l'homme de se manifester dans le jeu et comme jeu. Ainsi serai abolie la distinction: travail (nécessaire) et jeu (libre). Marx pensa cette pensée en un éclair, mains ne la poursuivit pas d'un bout à l'autre. Heidegger »pense« que le Jeu constitue l'essence de l'Etre, l'Etre étant à penser à partir du Jeu et non l'inverse. Heidegger pensa cette pensée dans toute sa fulgurante briéveté, mais n'insista pas, n'en tira pas toutes les conséquences et semble même l'abandonner. Marx pense ontico — (ontologiquement): il pense le travail productif et technique de l'homme grâce auquel se parachève l'autoproduction du monde. C'est ce travail pratique et mondialisant qui pourrait devenir jeu. Heidegger pense ontologico — (ontiquement): il pense le sens de l'Etre qui a été oublié par l'être humain, Etre et être humain se coappartenant. Il se pourrait que le sens de l'Etre résidât dans le Jeu.

^{*} Conférence prononcée entre 1967 et 1970 aux Universités de Bâle, Genève, Belgrade, Zagreb, Bonn, Amsterdam, Leyde, Prague. Rédigée en 1970.

Kostas Axelos

P aris

Let's start abruptly. By two quotations. One is from Marx. He writes, in Capital, that the capitalist system prevents the worker from enjoying his work "as a play of his own bodily and spiritual forces". The other is from Heidegger.

He writes, in The onto-theo-logical constitution of metaphysics: »the essence of Being is the Game itself«. These two quotations are not entirely isolated, occasional and arbitrary. In Capital always, M arx writes again: "at the same time as mechanical work attacks the nervous system to the last degree, it oppresses the varied play of the muscles and confiscates all free activity, bodily and spiritual". And in The Principle of Reason Heidegger asks: »must we think of Being (...) from the essence of the Game«? M arx thinks that alienation and exploitation prevent the worker from deploying his activity as a game. Thus the distinction between work (necessary) and play (free) will be abolished. M arx thought this thought in a flash, but did not pursue it from one end to the other. H eidegger "thinks" that the Game constitutes the essence of Being, the Being being to think from the Game and not the reverse.

Heidegger thought about this thought in all its dazzling brevity, but did not insist, did not draw all the consequences and even seems to abandon it. M arx thinks ontico — (ontologically): he thinks of the productive and technical work of man thanks to which the self-production of the world is completed. It is this practical and globalizing work that could become a game. to be human cobelonging. It could be that the meaning of Being resides in the Game.

^{*} Conference prononeće e n tre 1967 e t 1970 au x U n iv e rs ity de Bale, Ge-nfeve, Belgrade, Zagreb, Bonn, Am sterdam , Leyde, Prague. R6digee en 1970.

Marx et Heidegger — entre eux se situe le penseur moderne du jeu, celui qui prête l'oreille à la voix d'Héraclite: Nietzsche — essaient de dépasser la philosophie, égale métaphysique. On pourrait appeler leur pensée métaphilosophique, en ce sens qu'elle ne fait plus obéir le Monde ou l'Etre à un principe transcendant et idéel, source du Vrai, du Bien, du Beau.

Mais comment et où rencontrons-nous la philosophie et la pensée qui l'outrepasse, à savoir le Jeu?

Commençons par chercher la place et la situation du jeu.

Dans le grand ensemble des forces élémentaires qui ajointent jeu de l'homme et jeu du monde, nous rencontrons le jeu. Avec le langage et la pensée, le travail et la lutte, l'amour et la mort, celui-ci se manifeste, dans cet ensemble, en tant que humain, ensemble des jeux dans le monde. Les forces élémentaires pénètrent les grandes puissances dont l'ensemble informe le jeu des forces élémentaires et l'accorde au jeu du monde médiatisé. Ces grandes puissances sont: magie, mythes et religion; poésie et art; politique; philosophie, sciences et technique. Le jeu de l'ensemble des forces élémentaires avec l'ensemble des grandes puissances se constitue à partir du jeu du logos et de la praxis.

Le jeu qui ajointe jeu de l'homme et jeu du monde a été pensé, depuis Platon, toujours métaphysiquement. En termes de non-jeu. C'est-à-dire d'idées (qui gouvernent jeu et non-jeu). Depuis Hegel cette philosophie idéaliste vit son parachèvement et sa fin. Qu'advient-il alors de la pensée philosophique?

La philosophie a été la base des sciences. Son ensemble s'explicite maintenant en un ensemble de sciences. Cet ensemble comporte deux ensembles (cette division ne faisant pas suffisament problème):

- a) les sciences de la nature,
- b) les sciences humaines.

Parmi ces dernières domine l'ensemble: logique, logistique, linguistique; anthropologie psychologique; sociologie.

Que devient la philosophie?

- 1. Elle se recueille dans l'histoire de la philosophie.
- Elle se fait justement remplacer par les sciences.
- 3. Elle passe, elle qui commence avec la préphilosophie, à une pensée métaphilosophique: une pensée multidimensionnelle et questionnante, globale et fragmentaire, ouverte, mondiale et planétaire.

Dans ce processus sont à noter — si l'on aime les comptabilisations — une perte et un gain. La perte: les sciences ne pensent pas mais produisent, opèrent et transforment technoscientifiquement. Le gain: le dépassement possible des idées fixes.

Toute la pensée philosophique pensa l'Etre du Monde — l'être en devenir de la totalité fragmentaire et fragmentée du monde multidimensionnel et ouvert — sous trois formes, en le ramenant toujours à un étant intramondain:

— try to go beyond philosophy, equal metaphysics. One could call their thought metaphilosophical, in the sense that it no longer makes the World or Being obey a transcendent and ideal principle, source of the True, of the Good, of the Beautiful.

But how and where do we encounter philosophy and the thought that goes beyond it, namely the Game?

Let's start by looking for the place and the situation of the game.

In the great ensemble of elementary forces which unite the game of man and the game of the world, we encounter play. With language and thought, work and struggle, love and death, the latter is manifest, in this set, as a human being, set of games in the world. The elementary forces penetrate the great powers, the whole of which informs the play of the elementary forces and accords it to the play of the mediated world. These great powers are: magic, myths and religion; poetry and art; policy; philosophy, science and technology. The interplay of all the elementary forces with all the great powers is constituted from the interplay of logos and praxis.

The game which joins the game of man and the game of the world has been thought, since Plato, always metaphysically. In terms of nongame.

That is to say of ideas (which govern game and non-game). Since Hegel this idealist philosophy has seen its completion and its end. What then becomes of philosophical thought?

Philosophy was the basis of the sciences. Its whole is now made explicit in a whole of sciences. This set comprises two sets (this division not being a sufficient problem):

- a) the natural sciences,
- b) the human sciences.

Among the latter dominates the whole: logic, logistics, linguistics; psychological anthropology; sociology.

What becomes of philosophy?

- 1. It collects itself in the history of philosophy.
- 2. It is precisely being replaced by the sciences.

3. It passes, it which begins with prephilosophy, to a metaphilosophical thought: a multidimensional and questioning thought, global and fragmentary, open, global and planetary.

In this process are to be noted - if one likes accounting - a loss and a gain. The loss: the sciences do not think but produce, operate and transform technoscientifically. The gain: the possible overcoming of fixed ideas.

All philosophical thought thought of the Being of the World — the becoming being of the fragmentary and fragmented totality of the multidimensional and open world — in three forms, always reducing it to an intraworldly being:

1. Comme logos-physis (chez les Grecs).

2. Comme logos-Dieu (chez les Judéo-Chrétiens).

3. Comme logos-homme (chez les Européens modernes).

Ces trois pensées constituent les trois seules grandes pensées de l'humanité (pensante). Elles existent dans la synchronie et dans la diachronie, cette dernière étant nettement plus marquée et marquant plus historie de la pensée.

La Physis meurt quand Dieu se révèle. Dieu commence à mourir en devenant homme - fils de Dieu et fils de l'Homme qui meurt sur la Croix — et mourra »définitivement« lorsqu'il sera tué par l'homme, le Sujet, qui se pose au centre de tout ce qui est. L'homme lui-même court cependant vers son dépassement. Avec la fin de la philosophie se parachève aussi l'humanisme. Dans l' fin de la philosophie se parachève aussi l'humanisme. Dans l' imperfection de l'inachèvement. L'homme, sujet objectif pensant et actif, a commencé à entrer déjà dans l'époque de sa fin, une fin à qui il est dévolu de durer fort longtemps. Les sciences humaines ne constituent pas l'homme. Tout au contraire. Comme l'écrit un des protagonistes des sciences de l'homme aujourd, hui. Lévi-Strauss —, sans comprendre intégralement et dans toute sa portée ce qu'il dit: »Le but dernier des sciences de l'homme n'est pas de constituer l'homme, mais de le dissoudre«. Le dissoudre en quoi?

Comment le »jeu du monde« fut-il déjà énoncé? Il le fut, plus ou moins clairement, plus ou moins complétement, par Héraclite et par Platon, par les *Proverbes* (de Salomon), par Schiller et par Novalis, par Marx, Nietzsche et Heidegger, déjà cités, par Fink.¹

Peu à peu se précise peut-être la signification du mot jeu: en tant que jeu du monde. Jeu ne signifie plus ici jeu humain ou jeu intramondain, mais jeu du monde »lui-même«, monde en tant que jeu, déploiement du jeu dans lequel se rencontrent — pour faire un? — (jeu de l')homme et (jeu du)monde. L'homme est le joueur par excellence. Mais il est aussi le constamment déjoué. Le monde n'obéit plus — tout en obéissant encore — à des règles posées ou supposées. Il les englobe ces règles, elles et leurs combinatoires. Car tous les ensembles réglés ainsi que l'ensemble des ensembles nous offrent surtout des interprétations et des donations de sens intramondaines. Le jeu du monde qui se joue du jeu de l'homme et du jeu de l' histoire mondiale est plus fort que nous — nous qui le jouons.

Forces élémentaires et grandes puissances sont prises dans les ensembles spécifiques du jeu; elles-mêmes et leurs ensembles. La linguistique envisage le langage comme un système combinatoire, comme un jeu de signes et de règles. La logique comme logistique traite la pensée comme un jeu cybernétique, autoréglé. Le travail, selon l'»économie« et la »politique« de Marx doit devenir jeu, et

- 1. As logos-physis (among the Greeks).
- 2. As God-logos (among the Judeo-Christians).

¹ Cf. Brève introduction au jeu du monde et Schéma du jeu de l'homme et du jeu du monde, dans Arguments d'une recherche et, naturellement, c'est-à-dire non ludiquement, Le jeu du monde.

3. As man-logos (among modern Europeans).

These three thoughts constitute the only three great thoughts of hum anitš (thinking). They exist in synchrony and in diachrony, the latter being clearly more marked and marking more history of thought.

Physis dies when God reveals himself. God begins to die by becoming man — son of God and son of Man who dies on the Cross — and will die "definitively" when he is killed by man, the Subject, who poses himself at the center of everything that is. Man himself however runs towards his overcoming.

With the end of philosophy also comes the end of humanism.

In the end of philosophy, humanism is also completed. In the imperfection of incompleteness. Man, a thinking and active objective subject, has already begun to enter the era of his end, an end which is destined to last a very long time. The human sciences do not constitute man. On the contrary. As one of the protagonists of the human sciences writes today.

— Levi-Strauss —, without fully and fully understanding what he said: "The ultimate aim of the sciences of man is not to constitute man, but to dissolve him". Dissolve it in what?

How was the »game of the world« already stated? He was, more or less clearly, more or less completely, by Heraclitus and by Plato, by the Proverbs (of Solomon), by Schiller and by Novalis, by Marx, Nietzsche and Heidegger, already quoted, by Fink. 1

Little by little, perhaps the meaning of the word game becomes clearer: as a game of the world. Game here no longer means human game or intraworld game, but game of the world »itself«, world as game, deployment of the game in which meet — to make one? — (game of) man and (game of) the world. The man is the player par excellence. But it is also constantly outplayed. The world no longer obeys—while still obeying—rules that are laid down or supposed. It encompasses these rules, them and their combinations.

Because all the regulated ensembles as well as the ensemble of ensembles above all offer us intraworldly interpretations and donations of meaning. The game of the world which is played by the game of man and the game of world history is stronger than us – we who play it.

Elemental forces and great powers are taken from the specific sets of

the game; themselves and their sets. Linguistics sees language as a combinatorial system, as a set of signs and rules. Logic as logistics treats thought as a self-regulated, cyber-game. Work, according to M arx's "economy" and "politics" must become play, and 1 Cf. A rg um en ts of research and, of course, that is to say not playfully, The game of the world.

divers jeux sont mis en mouvement, dans la lutte visant la conquête du pouvoir. Les jeux variés de l' amour cherchent forme--et-contenu de l'amour à l'ère planétaire: de la sexualité presque immédiate, à travers l'érotique, jusqu' à la figure problématique de la famille. Finalement, nous jouons avec la mort. Des jeux mortels qui nous subjuguent. Entre temps nous jouons à plusieurs jeux particuliers. Le jeu lui-même n'est ni sérieux ni ludique, ni nécessaire ni libre. — La mythologie, la mythologie contemporaine, codifie tous les mythes et joue avec eux à l'aide d'appareils électroniques, d' ordinateurs. La religion persiste à jouer le jeu mythologique, même un peu démythologisé, qui, dans l'ensemble du sacré, relie le jeu de l'homme au jeu divin. La poésie et l' art deviennent de plus en plus explicitement jeu2. Le jeu empirique, et non pas seulement empirique, de la politique mondiale continue à se jouer, avec et en dépit de ses protagonistes. Il est de plus en plus déterminé par les jeux de la technique et des science qui l'informent. (La mathématique et l'économie politique, par exemple, considèrent les calculs de probabilité et les stratégies correspondantes comme les éléments principaux de la théorie des jeux.) La pensée elle-même qui questionne feu la philosophie et les sciences technicisées qui la remplacent essaie de penser le jeu, à savoir le jeu du monde, le jeu qui relie homme et monde, à savoir l'ensemble des ensembles3.

Le jeu du monde est une parole anticipatrice ayant effectué cependant le pas qui rétrocède; il forme l'espace-temps du jeu de toutes les pensées et de toutes les expériences, y compris de celles qui l'occultent et le refusent. Il n'est pas un mot d'ordre ou un slogan pour une nouvelle vision du monde, à l'époque des slogans et des visions du monde. La pensée planétaire du jeu du monde — ayant déjà commencé à se déployer mais demeurant future — constitue notre tâche majeure. Pendant que plusieurs plans et schèmes du jeu nous motivent, nous-mêmes essayant de les expérimenter et de les penser. Pendant que tous les partenaires et tous les adversaires du jeu deviennent problématiques, nous-mêmes refusant de faire de ce qui est en question — qui nous interroge et que nous interrogeons — quelque chose d'objectif ou d'absolu

² Divers romans et pièces de théâtre portent au langage le jeu. Il ne s'agit pas de les énumérer tous et toutes. Pensons à Dostoievski qui dans Le joueur parle de la problématique de l'homme en général. Hermann Hesse dans Le jeu des perles de verre nous raconte l'histoire d'une petite république d'élite qui ne produit pas de la culture à proprement parler mais combine, dans un jeu relationnel unifiant, toutes les formes de culture passée. Von Vogt dans un roman de science-fiction, Le monde des non-A (des non aristotéliciens) nous montre une machine des jeux qui décide en matière de gouvernement sur la planète Terre. Après Pirandello et son jeu des rôles, Beckett met en scène le jeu (play) de la comédie humaine, de cette Fin de partie qui sans cesse déroule La dernière bande, au-delà du sensé et de l'absurde, de la tragédie et de la comédie: dans la répétition (nihiliste) du jeu.

³ Cf. Introduction à la pensée planétaire, dans Vers la pensée planétaire.

-and-content of love in the planetary era: from almost immediate sexuality, through the erotic, to the problematic figure of the family. Finally, we play with death. Deadly games that subjugate us. In the meantime we play several special games. The game itself is neither serious nor playful, neither necessary nor free. — M ythology, contemporary mythology, codifies all the m yths and plays with them using electronic devices, computers. Religion persists in playing the mythological game, even a little demythologized, which, in the whole of the sacred, links the game of man to the divine game. Poetry and art are becoming more and more explicitly game. The empirical game, and not just the empirical one, of world politics continues to be played, with and in spite of its protagonists. It is more and more determined by the games of technology and the sciences that inform it. (Mathematics and political economy, for example, consider probability calculations and the corresponding strategies as the main elements of game theory.) Thought itself which questions philosophy and the sciences technicized which replace it tries to think the game, namely the game of the world, the game which connects man and world, namely the set of sets3.

The game of the world is an anticipatory word having nevertheless taken the retroceding step; it forms the space-time of the interplay of all thoughts and all experiences, including those that hide it and refuse it. It is not a watchword or a slogan for a new worldview, in the age of slogans and worldviews. The planetary thought of the game of the world —

having already begun to be employed but remaining in the future —

is our major task. While several plans and schemes of the game motivate us, ourselves trying to experience them and think them. While all the partners and all the adversaries in the game become probiym atic, ourselves refusing to make of what is in question - who questions us and whom we question - something objective or absolute.

* Various novels and plays bring play to language. It is not a question of listing them all. Let us think of Dostoevsky who in The Gambler speaks of the problem of man in general. H erm ann Hesse in The Game of Glass Beads tells us the story of a small elite republic which does not produce culture strictly speaking but combines, in a unifying relational game, all forms of past culture.

Van Vogt in a science fiction novel, Le m onde des n o n -A (des non Aristoteliens) shows us a game machine that decides in matters of government on the planet Earth. After Pirandello and his role playing,

Beckett m et es in the game (play) of human comedy, of this Endgame which unceasingly unrolls The last tape, beyond the sense and the absurd, of the tragedy and comedy: in the rehearsal (nihi-list) of the game.

3 Cf. Introduction to planetary thought, in Towards planetary thought.

Car que pouvons-nous penser et faire par les temps qui courent?

- 1. On peut revivifier l'ancien absolu, logos-Dieu, mort, en faisant de la théologie démythologisée, en s'adonnant même à la théologie de la mort de Dieu ou en sacrifiant aux théories et aux pratiques d'une religiosité profane.
- 2. On peut se lancer dans la recherche scientifique, hautement technicisée, en s'attaquant technoscientifiquement aux deux autres anciens absolus: la nature et l'homme historique. Ainsi s'instaurent et progressent l'ensemble des sciences de la nature et l'ensemble des sciences humaines, l'ensemble des deux ensembles ne réussissant pas à constituer la Science.
- 3. On peut s'adonner à la politique, pragmatique ou messianique, viser la consolidation de l'adminis^tration gestionnaire et du pouvoir ou son renversement.
- 4. On peut continuer la quête de l'Etre par une pensée qui pense son oubli et son retrait, retrait se retirant lui-même et nous laissant en plan. En suivant la voie de Parmenide et de Platon, de Kant et de Heidegger.
- 5. On peut commencer à penser le jeu du monde en assumant toute la dureté de l'existence —, à travers sa grammaire et sa syntaxe, en écoutant son appel, en le pensant à l'aide d'une pensée enjouée et souple, cohérente, bien que sans base, acceptant l'ajointement des contraires. En suivant la voie d'Héraclite, de Hegel-Marx et de Nietzsche.
- 6. On peut prolonger, en innovant parfois, les exercices et petits jeux de l'écriture qui sous des prétextes théoriques, poétiques, littéraires, scripturaux, perpétuent les divers scripturations plus ou moins insignifiantes de la désignifiance.

Ces six possibilités s'ouvrent à nous, pendant que la philosophie = métaphysique, bien que parachevée et déjà dépassée, continuera à se survivre: de plusierus manières.

Pour ceux qui sont tentés par la possibilité de penser le jeu du monde, une question surgit, une question qui demande: comment passons-nous du jeu de l'homme et des jeux dans le monde au jeu du monde et de celui-ci à ceux-là? La réponse qui se laisse formuler dit: grâce à l'homme, être du passage, être de passage. C'est »chez« les hommes qu'a lieu le jeu des questions et des réponses entre homme et monde. Car ces deux ensembles tendent à faire un ensemble d'ensembles.

L'ensemble de la matière-énergie, l'ensemble de la matière vivante, l'ensemble de l'énergie neuropsychique et sociohistorique ne vont pas sans antagonismes, oppositions et contradictions, à l'intérieur de chaque ensemble et entre les ensembles. Chaque système, chaque structure du jeu possède une force d'attraction et une force de répulsion. Au processus vers l'homogénéité (l' association) correspond, en le contrecarrant et en le complétant — fût-ce en le faisant éclater —, le processus vers l'hétérogénéité (la dissociation). Ces deux processus combinés et alternants s'opposent et à l'intérieur de chaque système et dans le système des

demythologized theology, even by devoting oneself to the -

ology of the death of God or by sacrificing to the theories and practices of a secular religiosity.

- 2. We can embark on highly technical scientific research, by attacking technoscientifically the two other ancient absolutes: nature and historical man. Thus are established and progress the set of natural sciences and the set of human sciences, the set of the two sets does not succeed in constituting Science.
- 3. One can indulge in politics, pragmatic or messianic, aiming at the consolidation of managerial administration and power or its overthrow.
- 4. We can continue the quest for Being through a thought that thinks of its forgetting and its withdrawal, withdrawal withdrawing itself and leaving us in the lurch. By following the path of Parm enide and Plato, of K ant and Heidegger.
- 5. We can begin to think about the game of the world—assuming all the harshness of existence—through its grammar and its syntax, by listening to its call, by thinking it through with the help of playful and flexible thought, coherent, although without basis, accepting the joining of opposites. Following the path of Heraclitus, of Hegel-
- -Marx et de Nietzsche.
- 6. We can extend, sometimes by innovating, the exercises and little games of writing which, under theoretical, poetic, literary, scriptural pretexts, perpetuate the various more or less insignificant scriptures of designifiance.

These six possibilities are open to us, while philosophy

= metaphysics, although completed and already surpassed, will continue to survive: in several ways.

For those who are tempted by the possibility of thinking about the game of the world, a question arises, a question which asks: how do we pass from the game of man and games in the world to the game of the world and this to those? The answer that can be formulated-the r says: thanks to man, to be on the way, to be on the way. It is

»among« men that the interplay of questions and answers takes place between man and the world. Because these two sets tend to make a set of sets.

The whole of matter-energy, the whole of living matter, the whole of neuropsychic and socio-historical energy does not go without antagonisms, oppositions and contradictions, within each whole. ble and between the sets. Each system, each structure of the game has a force of attraction and a force of repulsion. To the process towards homogeneity (association) corresponds, counteracting it and completing it —-

even by making it burst—the process towards heterogeneity (dissociation). These two combined and alternating processes oppose each other both within each system and in the system of 371

systèmes. Pourquoi? Parce que jamais il n'y a d'actualisation rigoureuse et compléte. A cause précisément des contradictions et des antagonismes immanents. Il se joue des choses dans le monde. Très certainement. Et potentiellement et sur le régistre des actualisations. C'»est« Cela le jeu.

De quoi s'agit-il donc pour nous lecteurs et facteurs du jeu et des jeux? Notre tâche consiste à savoir lire dans tout jeu du monde tout autre jeu et, principalement, le jeu du monde. (Et non pas seulement lire, mais jouer: en renversant au besoin les règles.) En expérimentant la pluralité des perspectives au sujet de chaque problème (qui dépasse l'opposition sujet-objet). Il s'agit de correspondre — avec sérénité et tristesse — au jeu du monde — l'indicible, l'innommable, l'injouable —, sans le presser hâtivement dans de petits systèmes qui prétendent l'épuiser avec leurs méthodes réductrices, unilatérales et impérialistes. Se tenir prêts pour le jeu qui nous recquiert, jeu du langage et de la pensée, du travail et de la lutte, de l' amour et de la mort. (La vie n'est ni digne ni indigne d'êtrevécue, puisqu'il s'agit non pas de la »vivre« — avec ou sans raison de vivre - mais de la jouer.) En essayant, si le coeur nous en dit, d'en atteindre les cimes. Sans doute n'y a-t-il plus de joueurs d'élite on une élite de joueurs. Il y a cependant ceux dont nous avons besoin et qui amplifient et intensifient productivement les règles, ou, plutôt, le style du jeu. Pour nous, joueurs qui restons toujours en route. Car le jeu sans cesse se dérobe. C'est lui pourtant qui nous inspire. Sans doute devons-nous apprendre à admettre — avec dépouillement et audace — que tout est déjoué. Tous les jeux étant déjà joués. Il ne vous reste par conséquent qu'à déjouer également le jeu de l'ensemble des ensembles dont parlait cette conférence, non entendue, dont parle ce texte, indécrypté.

Certainly. E t potentially and on the register of E q u alisations. This »is« That the game.

What is it then for us readers and factors of play and games? Our task is to know how to read in any game in the world any other game and, principally, the game in the world. (And not just reading, but playing: reversing the rules if necessary.) By experiencing the plurality of perspectives on each problem (which goes beyond the subject-object opposition). It is a question of corresponding — with serenity and sadness — to the game of the world — the indescribable, the unnameable, the unplayable — without hastily pressing it into little systems which claim to exhaust it with their reductive, unilateral and imperialist methods. To be ready for the game that requires us, the game of language and thought, of work and struggle, of love and death. (Life is neither worthy nor unworthy of being lived, since it is not a question of »living it« — with or without a reason for living but of playing it.) By trying, if the heart tells us, to reach the peaks. No doubt there are no more elite players, only an elite of players. There are, however, those which we need and which productively amplify and intensify the rules, or rather, the style of the game. For us, players who always stay on the road. Because the game is constantly slipping away. It is he who inspires us. No doubt we must learn to admit — with soberness and audacity — that all is lost. All games have already been played. All you have to do, therefore, is to play the game of all the ensembles of which this conference spoke, unheard, of which this text speaks, undecrypted.

372

THEORETISCHE BEGRÜNDUNG DER IDEE DER SELBSTVERWALTUNG

Predrag Vranicki Zagreb

Historisch gesehen hat die Menschheit kaum ihre ersten Schritte bei der Verwirklichung einer neuen Art von Gemeinschaft gemacht. Jener Gemeinschaft nämlich, die mancher sozialen Bewegung und vielen großen Humanisten als Ziel vorschwebte, die, getragen von der utopischen Vision einer neuen Welt, zu größten Taten, Selbstentsagung und Aufopferung bereit waren. Die Menschheit bewegte sich auch bisher auf progressiver Bahn. Auch die größte Skepsis hinsichtlich der Methoden, die man zu diesem Zweck anwandte, kann nicht die Ergebnisse der Menschen auf allen Gebieten ihrer Kultur, der Wissenschaft, des Bewußtseins, ja auch der Moral verneinen. Sie kann aber auch nicht verheimlichen, daß dieser Aufstieg mit unzähligen Opfern und Leiden, mit der Entrechtung von ganzen Völkerschichten und Klassen teuer bezahlt wurde. Auch die humaneren zwischenmenschlichen Beziehungen gründen sich auf inhumane Methoden, und so ist die Vision des Humanum zur historischen Konstante der bisherigen Welt geworden.

Heute wissen wir, daß dieser Zwiespalt innerhalb der Menschheit, der auch immer die existentialen Interessen der einzelnen Klassen ausdrückte, mögen die ihrerseits mit den objektiven historischen Möglichkeiten übereingestimmt haben oder nicht, erst in der heutigen Zeit jenes Niveau erreicht hat, das seine Überwindung ermöglicht. Die Grundvision dieses Humanum war für Marx die Überwindung des Klassenzwiespalts durch die »Selbstverwaltung der Erzeuger«, jener Art von gesellschaftlicher Organisation, die eine Keimzelle für die Aufhebung der vom Menschen entfremdeten Macht werden sollte. Und als die europäische Arbeiterbewegung vor einem halben Jahrhundert, am Ende des ersten Welt-Dance macabre, einen neuen Abschnitt der Geschichte zu eröffnen begann, waren auf ihrem Revolutionsbanner die Grundforderung und der Grundgedanken zu lesen — alle Macht den Räten!

OF SELF-MANAGEMENT

Dear Vranicki

Zagreb

Historically, humanity has scarcely taken its first steps in realizing a new kind of community. Namely, the community that some social movements and many great humanists had in mind as their goal, who, carried by the utopian vision of a new world, were ready for great deeds, self-renunciation and sacrifice. Mankind has also been moving along a progressive path up until now. Even the greatest skepticism about the methods used for this purpose cannot negate the results of people in all areas of their culture, science, consciousness, even morality. But neither can it hide the fact that this ascent was paid for dearly with countless sacrifices and suffering, with the disenfranchisement of entire sections of the people and classes. The more humane interpersonal relationships are also based on inhumane methods, and so the vision of the humane has become the historical constant of the world up to now.

Today we know that this dichotomy within humanity, which also always expressed the existential interests of the individual classes, whether or not they have agreed with the objective historical possibilities, only today that N level that makes it possible to overcome it. For Marx, the basic vision of this humanum was the overcoming of the class divide through the "self-government of the producers," the kind of social organization that was to become a nucleus for the abolition of power alienated from man. And when the European workers' movement, half a century ago, at the end of the first world dance macabre, began to open a new chapter in history, its banner of revolution read the basic demand and the basic idea - all of them Make the guesses!

373

Ob in der Form von Lenins »Sowjets«, der deutschen oder österreichischen »Räte« oder der »consigli« nach Gramsci — erlebte die Menschheit die Morgenröte eines neuen historischen Tages. Ein einziges Wort, ein einziger Gedanke — Rat — vereinigte in sich alle Leiden, alle Hoffnungen und alle revolutionären Streben von unzähligen namenlosen Generationen, aber auch den ganzen Zorn der Geknechteten und Ausgebeuteten. So wie die Idee der Eigentumsfreiheit, der Gleichheit vor dem Gesetz und der Gleichberechtigung zu den Symbolen der bürgerlichen Welt, so wurde die Idee der »Räte« zum Symbol der Überwindung der bürgerlichen Zivilisation, d. h. zum Symbol einer Welt ohne Privateigentum der Produktionsmittel, ohne Klassen und Ausbeutung, ohne den Staat und ohne politische Hierarchien, und schließlich ohne Nationalhaß und gegenseitige Ausrottung.

Wie jedoch eine jede geschichtliche Idee, war auch diese keine bloße Widerspiegelung eines schon geschaffenen historischen Zustands sondern seine Vorwegnahme. Zu diesem Zweck war es notwendig, daß auch die Wirklichkeit selbst dieser Idee zustrebt, die historische Wirklichkeit, die noch immer gespalten, ungeordnet, widersprüchig und oft nicht vorauszusehen war. Und das heißt, daß sie sich sogar zur Wehr setzen konnte, was sie auch tat. Und das nicht nur in ihrem bürgerlichen Gewand sondern auch im sozialistischen!

Während die Welt der Bourgeoisie mit dieser Idee eine vorläufige gewaltige Abrechnung vornahm, und das mit Hilfe der Sozialdemokratie, wurden die Sowjets immer mehr zur Formalität in einem verstaatlichten Sozialismus, dem Stalin den Hauptstempel aufgedrückt und den theoretischen Ausdruck gegeben hatte. Obwohl erklärter Feind der Sozialdemokratie, handelte er eigentlich ähnlich wie diese — in dem einzigen sozialistischen Staat zu dieser Zeit:statt auf die Arbeiterräte legte er den Schwerpunkt auf den mächtigen bürokratischen Staatsapparat; dasselbe tat die Sozialdemokratie im Hinblick auf den bürgerlichen Staat.

So stand die Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung und des Sozialismus durch mehr als drei Jahrzehnte im Zeichen des »Vergessens« dieser grundlegenden Idee des Sozialismus von Marx. Die Idee der Arbeiterräte und der Arbeiterselbstverwaltung schien von der geschichtlichen Bühne verschwunden zu sein, auch der Revendication der Arbeiterklasse. Als Vorbild des Sozialismus wurde der gesamten Arbeiterbewegung der fetischisierte sozialistische Staat aufgezwungen, die Partei und der Führer! Die Massen der Werktätigen blieben weiterhin nichts als Masse, denn der Akteur der Geschichte und der sozialistischen Entwicklung war jemand anders – Instanzen, die in ihrem Namen herrschten. Diese Instanzen, die parteistaatliche Bürokratie, verfügten über die gesamte Mehrarbeit der Massen, bestimmten die Normen ihres Verhaltens ,ihre Bewegungsfreiheit, erteilten und überwachten einzelne Arbeitsplätze, beschränkten das Recht zu protestieren und erklärten jeden Protest zu einem antisozialistischen und volksfeindlichen Akt usw., ohne jemandem hierüber Rechenschaft abzulegen.

Whether in the form of Lenin's "Soviets," the German or Austrian "Rate," or Gramsci's "consigli," humanity was witnessing the dawn of a new historical day.

A single word, a single thought - advice - united in itself all the suffering, all the hopes and all the revolutionary aspirations of innumerable nameless generations, but also all the wrath of the downtrodden and exploited. Just as the idea of freedom of property, equality before the law and equal rights became symbols of the bourgeois world, so the idea of the "rate" became a symbol of the overcoming of bourgeois civilization, i. H. as a symbol of a world without private ownership of the means of production, without classes and exploitation, without the state and without political hierarchies and finally without national hatred and mutual extermination.

However, like every historical idea, this one was not a mere reflection of an already created historical situation but its anticipation. For this purpose it was necessary that reality itself also strive towards this idea, historical reality, which was still divided, disordered, contradictory and often unpredictable. And that means that she could even defend herself, which she did.

And not only in their bourgeois garb, but also in socialist ones!

W hile the world of the bourgeoisie made a massive preliminary reckoning with this idea, and with the help of social democracy, the soviets became more and more a formality in a nationalized socialism on which Stalin put the main stamp and had given the theoretical expression. Although a declared enemy of social democracy, he actually acted like them — in the only socialist state at the time: instead of the workers' rate, he put the emphasis on the powerful bureaucratic state apparatus; Social Democracy did the same with regard to the bourgeois state.

Thus, for more than three decades, the history of the workers' movement and socialism has been marked by the "forgetting" of this fundamental idea of Marx's socialism. The idea of the workers' council and workers' self-government seemed to have disappeared from the historical arena, as did the revendication of the working class. As a model of socialism, the fetishized socialist state, the party and the leader were imposed on the entire labor movement! The masses of working people continued to be nothing but masses, because the actor of history and socialist development was someone else

— Authorities that ruled in their name. These instances, the partystate bureaucracy, controlled all the overtime work of the masses, determined the norms of their behavior and their freedom of movement, granted and monitored individual jobs, restricted the right to protest and declared every protest to be an anti-socialist and anti374

Es ist gar nicht verwunderlich, daß diese etatistisch-bürokratische Hierarchie in ihrer Ohnmacht entrüstet und tief beleidigt war, als es inmitten der sozialistischen Bewegung eine kleine Partei mit ihren Völkern wagte, sich ihrem Diktat nicht zu beugen (1948). Und mehr noch, als sie diesem sozialistischen Etatismus unmittelbar darauf die Dignität des fortschrittlichen Sozialismus absprach. Entgegen allen Versicherungen und Verkündungen von Seiten der stalinistischen Führungsspitze, wonach der Sozialismus in den späten dreißiger Jahren bereits erreicht war. Und erst recht, als diese kleine Partei — im Gegensatz zur Idee von der Allmacht des sozialistischen Staates und der Partei — die Stärkung des selbstverwalteten Sozialismus, die Selbstverwaltung der Werktätigen und die Überwindung des Staatlichen und Politischen verkündete.

Ein neuer historischer Streit wurde somit entfacht. In diesem Streit ging es um ein fortgeschritteneres Modell des Sozialismus. das den Visionen und Vorstellungen von Marx mehr entsprechen würde. Die äußeren Ausmaße dieses Streites sind mehr oder weniger bekannt, dafür aber viel weniger seine wesentlichen Ausmaße. Eine ganze Ideologie wurde in Frage gestellt: die Ideologie von einem Weg zum Sozialismus; die Ideologie von Staat und Partei als dem unerläßlichen Promoter der sozialistischen Entwicklung, zugleich aber dem höchsten Richter zur Klärung aller innerhalb einer Gesellschaft auftauchenden Fragen - von den politischen und kulturellen bis zu den künstlerischen; die Ideologie vom Lebens-, Arbeits- und Kunststil, sowie vom Stil der Philosophie; die Ideologie von den unantastbaren Sphären (in diesem Fall den politischen), die jenseits aller dialektischen Kritik sich befanden, denn für sie galt nicht mehr die Dialektik der Negativität; die Ideologie von der marxistischen Dialektik, die nach außen hin eine vernichtende Kritik der Bourgeoisie sein sollte und nach innen eine gehorsame Apologie jeder politischen Proklamation; die Ideologie vom inflexiblen Zentralismus im parteipolitischen und wirtschaftlichen Leben usw.

Und die Grundidee, die wie ein historischer Maulwurf in diesem gepflügten Acker des Stalinismus wühlte, war und ist diee Idee der Räte, der Selbstverwaltung. Die Kategorie der Negativität, die aus Stalins System der sieben Linien verbannt war, bestand hartnäckig auf ihrem historischen Recht. Und weder konnte es ihr jemand bisher abstreiten, noch wird es in Zukunft können, denn sie war und wird der Wesenszug der Dynamik des gesellschaftlichen Prozesses bleiben, ein wesentlicher Hebel zur Überwindung des historisch Beschränkten und Anachronistischen. Und so ist nicht nur die Arbeiterklasse der modernen Gesellschaft die historische Negation der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft und der Bourgeoisie als Klasse, sondern ist die Selbstverwaltung der Arbeiterklasse und der einzelnen Werktätigen ebenfalls die Negation der bürokratischetatistischen Struktur der Anfangsphase des Sozialismus.

In der vorhin angeführten Kritik der stalinistischen Ideologie handelte es sich in der Tat um eine Kritik des ideologischen Bewußtseins in genuinem Marxschem Sinne. Die eigenen Ideen und It is not at all surprising that this statist-bureaucratic hierarchy was indignant in its impotence and deeply offended when, in the midst of the socialist movement, a small party and its people dared not to bow to its dictates (1948).

And even more so when they immediately denied this socialist statism the dignity of progressive socialism.

Contrary to all the assurances and proclamations by the Stalinist leadership that socialism had already been achieved by the late 1930s. And even more so when this small party — in contrast to the idea of the omnipotence of the socialist state and the party — announced the strengthening of self-governing socialism, the self-government of the working people and the overcoming of the state and political.

A new historical controversy was thus sparked. This dispute was about a more advanced model of socialism that would correspond more closely to the visions and ideas of Marx. The outer dimensions of this dispute are more or less known, but its essential dimensions much less. A whole ideologic was called into question: the ideology of a road to socialism; the ideology of state and party as the indispensable promoter of socialist development, but at the same time as the supreme judge for clarifying all questions arising within a society from the political and cultural to the artistic; the ideology of the style of life, work and art, as well as the style of philosophy; the ideology of the inviolable spheres (in this case the political ones), which were beyond all dialectic criticism, because for them the dialectics of negativity no longer applied; the ideology of the Marxist dialectic, which outwardly should be a scathing critique of the bourgeoisie and inwardly an obedient apology for every political proclamation; the ideology of inflexible centralism in party political and economic life, etc.

And the basic idea, which rooted like a historical mole in this tilled field of Stalinism, was and is the idea of the council, of self-government. The category of negativity, banned from Stalin's system of seven lines, stubbornly insisted on its historical right. And neither has anyone been able to deny it up to now, nor will it be possible in the future, because it was and will remain the essential feature of the dynamics of the social process, an essential lever for overcoming the historically limited and anachronistic . And so not only is the working class of modern society the historical negation of bourgeois society and the bourgeoisie as a class, but the self-government of the working class and the individual working people is also the negation of bureaucratic-

-statist structure of the initial phase of socialism.

The critique of Stalinist ideology cited above was in fact a critique of ideological consciousness in a genuinely Marxian sense. Your own ideas and 375

die eigene Praxis wurden mit dem Sozialismus schlechthin gleichgestellt. Die eigene politische Pragmatik, die auch monströse Ausmaße annehmen konnte, wurde zum Prinzip erhoben. Aus dem dialektischen und marx istischen Erfassen der geschichtlichen Prozesse verschand völlig die Kategorie des Besonderen, Spezifischen. Und das alles aus dem Unvermögen heraus, die Welt in ihrer Komplexheit zu begreifen und seinen eigenen Fall nur als einen besonderen Fall, auf einer spezifischen geschichtlichen Grundlage und in besonderen historischen Relationen und nicht als Paradigma für alle mehr oder weniger verschiedenen Situationen zu sehen.

Der so entbrannte historische Streit um die vorrangigen Bedingungen zur Entwicklung des Sozialismus warf die Fragen auf wie: wo die Hauptakzente setzen im Laufe dieser Entwicklung, worin die Keime einer fortgeschritteneren kommunistischen Welt sehen — ob in den politischen Formen der sozialistischen Gesellschaft (Staat und Partei) oder in der Organisiertheit der Arbeiterklasse und der sozialistischen Gesellschaft schlechthin auf der Grundlage der Selbstverwaltung; ob den Wert auf die Abschaffung der politischen Formen und auf die Stärkung derjenigen der Selbstverwaltung legen, die eo ipso eine Negation des Politischen bedeuten, oder aber die Aufmerksamkeit der Stärkung der politischen Sphäre zuwenden.

Die sowjetischen Theoretiker und Politiker haben versucht die Kritik und die Bemühungen der jugoslawischen Marxisten als Antisowjetismus und Nationalkommunismus zu diskreditieren, der als solcher angeblich ein Werkzeug des Imperialismus sein soll.¹ Aus ihrer langjährigen etatistischen Praxis heraus konnten sie sich gar nicht vorstellen, daß diese kritische Bemühung eben eine Bejahung des wahren Sowjetismus nach Lenin war, der Sowjets, die sich nicht in der Funktion einer Wahlmaschine erschöpfen sondern vielmehr unmi ttelbare Macht und unmittelbare Verwaltung bedeuten. Geblendet von ihrer bürokratischen Wirklichkeit sind sie nicht einmal auf den Gedanken gekommen, daß es sich nicht um eine eigensinnige Haltung einer Einzelpartei und eines Einzelstaates handelt sondern um einen wesentlichen, entscheidenden historischen Dialog über das Schicksal der sozialistischen Entwicklung.

Die Idee der Arbeiterräte, der Arbeiterselbstverwaltung und der gesellschaftlichen Selbstverwaltung wurde ebenso scharf als Anarchosyndikalismus, Rückfall in den Kapitalismus, Rechtsopportunismus usw. angegriffen, als hätte sich um etwas gehandelt,

¹ Seit den fünfziger Jahren bis zum heutigen Tag werden Kritiken und Beschuldingungen von Seiten der sowjetischen Ideologen in verschiedenen Varianten wiederholt. Sie alle haben die Arbeiterräte für »konkret nationale Formen der Beteiligung der Arbeiter an der Produktionsverwaltung« erklärt und somit verkündet, daß die jugoslawischen Marxisten den »National-kommunismus« vertreten. In gewissen Perioden der verschärften kritischen Auseinandersetzungen haben sie sogar erklärt, daß die jugoslawischen Kommunisten mit solchen Auffassungen im Dienste des internationalen Imperialismus stehen. (Siehe ihre Angriffe aus den späteren fünfziger Jahren in allen wichtigeren Zeitschriften.)

particular, the specific disappeared completely from the dialectic and Marxist understanding of historical processes. And all of this out of the inability to comprehend the world in its complexity and one's own case only as a special case, on a specific historical basis and in special historical relations and not as a paradigm for all more or to see less different situations.

The historical dispute about the primary conditions for the development of socialism that flared up in this way raised questions such as: where are the main accents set in the course of this development, where do the germs of a more advanced communist world see — whether in the political forms of the socialist society (state and party) or in the organization of the working class and socialist society per se on the basis of self-government; whether to emphasize the abolition of political forms and to strengthen those of self-government that eo ipso signify a negation of the political, or turn our attention to strengthening the political sphere.

Soviet theorists and politicians have tried to discredit the criticism and efforts of the Yugoslav Marxists as anti-Sovietism and national com m unism, which as such is supposed to be a tool of imperialism.1

From their many years of statist practice, they could not have imagined that this critical effort was an affirmation of true Sovietism after Lenin, of the Soviets, which do not exhaust themselves in the function of a voting machine but rather directly M eight and direct administration. Blinded by their bureaucratic reality, they did not even consider that this is not a stubborn attitude of a single party and state, but an essential, decisive historical dialogue about the fate of socialist development.

The idea of workers' councils, workers' self-government, and social self-government was attacked as sharply as anarcho-syndicalism, a relapse into capitalism, right-wing opportunism, etc., as if it had been anything 1 Since the 1950s n to this day, criticism and accusations from the Soviet ideologues are repeated in various forms. They have all declared the workers' council to be "concretely national forms of workers' participation in the management of production," thereby proclaiming that the Yugoslav Marxists represent "national communism." In certain periods of heightened critical disputes, they even declared that the Yugoslav communists were in the service of in tem atio n al imperialism with such views. (See their attacks in all major journals in the later 1950s.)

das es in der marxistischen Theorie und Praxis bisher überhaupt nicht gegeben hätte, als wäre damit eigentlich kein unterbrochener historischer Dialog fortgesetzt worden und eine historische Praxis wiederaufgenommen ,die den wesentlichsten Aspekt der neuen Geschichtsverhältnisse betraf. Darum kann auch eine Erörterung dieses Problems nicht mit dem Jahr 1950 einsetzen, als in der jugoslawischen Politik diese entscheidende historische Wende eintrat — sie datiert, obwohl mit bereits erwähnten Unterbrechungen, seit dem Entstehen von Marxens Konzeption des Menschen, der Geschichte und des Sozialismus und dauert bis heute an.²

Es ergibt sich somit folgende konkrete Frage: welche der beiden historischen Konzeptionen des Sozialismus geht aus den philosophischen und theoretischen Analysen und Positionen von Marx, Engels und Lenin hervor — diejenige der Selbstverwaltung oder diejenige des Etatismus? Welche dieser Konzeptionen ist ein Ausdruck der konsequent marxistischen Erörterung des Problems des Sozialismus und welche ein Ausdruck des politischen Opportunismus und Pragmatismus?

Die Lösung kann in keinem Einzelzitat sondern im einheitlichen marxistischen Erfassen der Geschichtsproblematik gefunden werden; besonders der Problematik der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft und ihrer Überwindung.

Die Geschichte ist für Marx kein außerhalb des Menschen sich vollziehender Ablauf sondern sein eigenes Werk. Die Verwirklichung der Geschichte und die Verwirklichung des Menschen ist ein simultaner und einheitlicher Prozeß. Von der Stufe der historischen Praxis des Menschen hängt auch die Entwicklungsstufe seines Bewußtseins ab. Die Entwicklungsstufen der menschlichen Gemeinschaft und deshalb auch des menschlichen Bewußtseins hängen von dessen sinnlichem Sein ab, worauf schon Marx in seiner Jugend genial hingeweisen hat. Die Wandlung des Menschen ist keine kontemplative oder aufklärerische Tat sondern das Ergebnis der sinnlichen und revolutionären historischen Praxis des Menschen.

Für Marx existiert nicht die Spaltung der historischen Welt in voneinander getrennte Sphären des Subjekts und des Objekts, denn der Mensch als gesellschaftliches Wesen ist — jeweils in bestimmten Produktionsverhältnissen begriffen — sowohl Subjekt als auch Objekt der Geschichte. Die Geschichte ist nur, was der Mensch durch seinen Einsatz leistet, indem er Waren herstellt, die Natur, die Kunst und alle Formen der Kultur verändert. Der organisierte Mensch wird so durch die Produkte seiner Arbeit objektiviert, durch sein Werk, das Historie in toto ist. Aber dieses Werk wiederum ist auch der weränderte Mensch.dessen Werk

² In dieser Hinsicht unterscheiden sich auch die zwei Programme (jenes des Bundes der Kommunisten von jenem der KP UdSSR) wesentlich voneinander. Während im Programm des Bundes der Kommunisten Jugoslawiens der Hauptakzent der Entwicklung des Sozialismus auf den Arbeiterräten und der gesellschaftlichen Selbstverwaltung liegt, ist er im Programm der KP UdSSR noch immer auf dem Staat, der sogar in der Periode des Kommunismus bestehen bleibt!

essential aspect of the new historical conditions. Therefore, a discussion of this problem cannot begin with the year 1950, when this decisive historical turning point occurred in Yugoslav politics — it dates, although with the interruptions already mentioned, since the emergence of M arxen's conception of man , history and socialism and continues to this day. 2

The concrete question thus arises: which of the two historical conceptions of socialism emerges from the philosophical and theoretical analyzes and positions of Marx, Engels and Lenin — that of self-government or that of statism? Which of these conceptions is an expression of the consistently Marxist discussion of the problem of socialism and which an expression of political opportunism and pragmatism?

The solution cannot be found in a single quotation but in a unified Marxist understanding of the historical problem; especially the problems of bourgeois society and how to overcome them.

For Marx, history is not a process that takes place outside of man, but his own work. The realization of history and the realization of man is a simultaneous and unified process. The stage of development of man's consciousness also depends on the stage of man's historical practice. The stages of development of the human community and therefore also of human consciousness depend on its sensuous being, as Marx ingeniously pointed out in his youth. The transformation of man is not a contemplative or enlightening act but the result of man's sensual and revolutionary historical practice.

For Marx, there is no splitting of the historical world into separate spheres of subject and object, because man as a social being — in certain circumstances of production — is both the subject and the object of history. History is only what man achieves through his efforts in producing goods, changing nature, art and all forms of culture. Organized man is thus objectified by the products of his work, by his work, which is history in toto. But this work, in turn, is also the changed man. Whose work 2 In this respect, the two programs (that of the League of Communists and that of the CP USSR) differ significantly from each other. W hile in the program of the Union of Communists of Yugoslavia the main emphasis of the development of socialism lies on the worker rates and social self-government, in the program of the CP USSR it is still on the state , which persists even in the period of com m unism!

nicht nur äußerlich in den Gegenständen der Geschichte sondern gleichfalls in ihm objektiviert wird. Genauer betrachtet vergegenständlicht sich das Subjekt der Geschichte — der soziale Mensch — in seiner historischen Praxis vielfach und verschiedenartig: im Hinblick auf seine Produktionsmittel, auf Objekte seiner Wünsche sowie seiner Bedürfnisse, durch Kunstwerke und manche Erzeugnisse anderer Art. Aber jede solche Vergegenständlichung ist zugleich ein rückbezüglicher Akt der neuen Transformation des Subjekts selbst, der Veränderung seiner Struktur, seines Bewußtseins, seiner Bedürfnisse, seines Wollens, seiner Ideale und seines Strebens.

Seine als der Entwicklungsstand der Produktionskräfte und der menschlichen Beziehungen im Laufe des Arbeitsprozesses definierte materielle Produktion ist immer eine objektive, materielle Voraussetzung für Möglichkeiten weiterer historischer Kreationen des Menschen. Aber die »andere Seite« dieser Möglichkeiten ist auch die bestimmte historische Struktur des Menschen, die im Grunde seinem eigenen Werk entspricht und immer historisch konkret gegeben ist. Die subjektiven Möglichkeiten des Menschen entsprechen im Grunde den in seinem eigenen Werk enthaltenen objektiven Möglichkeiten. So wie er auf Grund einer bestimmten Entwicklungsstufe von materiellen und sonstigen Voraussetzungen keine gesellschaftlichen Formen schaffen kann, die dieser Stufe überhaupt nicht angemessen wären, kann er das auch deshalb nicht tun, weil seine persönliche und gesellschaftliche Gleichung als Struktur seines historischen Menschseins sich von seinem eigenen Werk nicht wesenlich unterscheiden kann.

Die Kategorie der historischen Praxis ist also die fundamentale Kategorie der philosophischen Interpretation des Menschen und der Geschichte nach Marx. Jedoch war es Marx klar, daß ein jeder historischer Prozeß — obwohl immer eine Totalität — trotzdem in sich uneinig und gespalten war. In der bisherigen Geschichte und infologe der noh immer niedrigen Entwicklungsstufen des Menschen bedeutete die Vergegenständlichung des Menschen, daß es bei einer bestimmten Organisation der sozialen Beziehungen und der Produktion — im System des Privateigentums und der Klassen — zu Situationen kam, wo die Gegenstände dem Menschen gegenübergestellt wurden. Ein Gegenstand besaß seine unabhängige Existenz und ging in den Besitz eines anderen über, der sich ihm als unabhängige Macht gegenüberstellte, oft als entfremdete Gruppe, als Klasse, Herrschaft oder Mysterium.

Und so kam es durch das System des Privateigentums und des Klassenzwiespalts zu entscheidenden und tragischen Spaltungen nicht nur innerhalb der Gesellschaft sondern auch in dem historischen Subjekt selbst — dem Menschen. Statt die vielfachen Möglichkeiten des Menschen zu realisieren, ist ein Großteil der Menschheit zum einfachen Werkzeug der Produktion und der Politik herabgesetzt; die Interessen einzelner Schichten und Klassen wurden ihm als allgemeine Interessen aufgezwungen, denen er sich existentiell in seiner Abhängigkeit verpflichtet fühlte; ein

not only externally in the objects of history but also objectified in them. On closer inspection, the subject of history objectifies itself — the social human being

— in its historical practice in many different ways: with regard to its means of production, to objects of its desires and needs, through works of art and some products of a different kind. But every such objectification is at the same time a reflective act of the new transformation of the subject himself, of changing his structure, his consciousness, his needs, his will, his ideals and his aspirations.

Its material production, defined as the level of development of the productive forces and human relationships in the course of the labor process, is always an objective, material prerequisite for the possibilities of further historical creations by man. But the "other side" of these possibilities is also the specific historical structure of man, which basically corresponds to his own work and is always historically concrete. Man's subjective possibilities basically correspond to the objective possibilities contained in his own work. Just as he cannot create any social forms on the basis of a certain level of development of material and other prerequisites that would not be appropriate to this level at all, he cannot do this because his personal and social equation as S structure of his historical humanity cannot essentially differ from his own work.

The category of historical practice is thus the fundamental category of the philosophical interpretation of man and history according to Marx. However, it was clear to Marx that every historical process - although always a totality - was nevertheless internally divided and divided. In the previous history and infolog of the still lower stages of human development, the objectification of man meant that in a certain organization of social relations and production - in the system of private property and classes - situations arose where objects were confronted with people. One object possessed its independent existence and passed into the possession of another, which presented itself to it as an independent power, often as an alien group, class, dominion, or mystery.

And so, through the system of private property and class cleavage, decisive and tragic divisions arose not only within society but also in the historical subject himself—man. Instead of realizing the multiple possibilities of man, a large part of humanity is reduced to simple tools of production and politics; the interests of individual strata and classes were imposed on him as general interests to which he felt existentially committed in his dependence; a 378

System von Macht und Herrschaft wurde aufgebaut, das sich allen anderen Kräften gegenüber als eine äußerliche und durch nichts beschränkte Macht zu erkennen gab; diese ökonomische und politische Entfremdung, deren Ursache innerhalb der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft in der Dienstleistungsverpflichtung und der bürokratisierten Staatsherrschaft lag, begleiteten verschiedene ideologische Entfremdungen der zerstückelten Existenz und eines ebensolchen Bewußtseins der entrechteten Massen.

Die Partialisierung des Menschen war nicht nur eine Folge seiner existentialen Gebundenheit an eine physische Tätigkeit, was wiederum bedingt war durch die niedrige Stufe der ökonomischen und sozialen Entwicklung im allgemeinen. Das war auch eine Folge seiner sozialen Verbannung und Abschirmung gegen eine Teilnahme an der Verwaltung der sozialen Gemeinschaft. Das Privileg der Verwaltung hatten die bevorzugten Gruppen und Klassen. Für den arbeitenden Menschen blieb die Sphäre der Verwaltung ein Bereich des Unerreichbaren und Geheimnishaften. Und anstatt die Geschichte als eigenes Werk zu erleben und zu begreifen, schien sie ihm völlig intransparent, fremd, äußerlich — was eine weitere Fetischisierung seines Bewußtseins nur ermöglichte.

In diesem kurz dargelegten philosophischen Erfassen des menschlichen Daseins und des Phänomens des Geschichtlichen ist die Quelle zu suchen für Marxens Konzeption von der Notwendigkeit einer Überwindung dieser Formen der Entfremdung des Menschen und der Konzeption der allseitigen Entfaltung des menschlichen Wesens, der menschlichen Persönlichkeit. Sowohl in seinen frühen Werken als auch in den späteren »Entwürfen« und im »Kapital« gab Marx eine gründliche Analyse der ökonomischen Struktur der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft, der Herrschaft des Kapitals als Ursache der ökonomischen und politischen Entfremdung, sowie auch des Entstehens fetischisierten Bewußtseins als Folge dieser Verhältnisse. Er zeigte ebenfalls sehr genau, wie dieses Verhältnis auf die Beschränkung der Vielseitigkeit des menschlichen Wesens wirkt, indem es den Menschen seinem Wesentlichen entfremdet, d. h. der Produktion als Grundlage seiner historischen Existenz, und so seine Arbeit zur Qual, zur Verkümmerung seiner Möglichkeiten macht usw. Daß es infolge einer partiellen, beschränkten geschichtlichen Aktivität zwangsläufig auch zur Beschränkung, Partialisierung der menschlichen Persönlichkeit kam, ist nun einmal eine Konsequenz dieses beschränkten und entfremdeten Verhältnisses.

Gleichzeitig mit der Proklamierung der allgemeinhumanistischen Ansicht, wonach die Kritik an der Religion in der Erkenntnis gipfelt, daß der Mensch dem Menschen das höchste Wesen ist und daß Verhältnisse 'die den Menschen als ein erniedrigtes, geknechtetes, verlassenes und verachtetes Wesen zeigen, abgeschaftt werden müssen, setzt sich Marx auch für eine Überwindung der modernen Klassengesellschaft durch den Kampf des Proletariats für neue Gesellschaftsverhältnisse ein. Aber gerade aus den vor-

A system of power and domination was set up, which presented itself to all other forces as an external and unrestricted power; this economic and political alienation, rooted in the service obligation and bureaucratized state rule within bourgeois society, accompanied various ideological alienations of the fragmented existence and consciousness of the disenfranchised masses.

The partialization of man was not only a consequence of his existential attachment to physical activity, which in turn was due to the low level of economic and social development in general. This was also a consequence of his social banishment and shielding from participation in the administration of the social community. The preferred groups and classes had the privilege of administration. For working people, the sphere of administration remained an area of the unattainable and mysterious.

And instead of experiencing and understanding the story as his own work, it seemed completely opaque, alien, external to him

— which only made possible a further fetishization of his consciousness.

The source for Marx's conception of the necessity of overcoming these forms of alienation of man and the conception of the all-round development of the human nature, human personality. In both his early works and later Drafts and Capital, Marx gave a thorough analysis of the economic structure of bourgeois society, the dominance of capital as the cause of economic and political alienation, and also the emergence of fetishized consciousness as a result of these conditions. He also showed very clearly how this relationship acts on the limitation of the versatility of the human being, alienating man from his essence, i. H. of production as the basis of his historical existence, and thus makes his work a torment, an atrophy of his possibilities, etc. That, as a result of a partial, limited historical activity, there was inevitably also a limitation, a partialization of human personality, is a consequence of this restricted and alienated relationship.

Simultaneously with the proclamation of the general humanistic view, according to which the criticism of religion culminates in the recognition that man is man's highest being and that conditions which man as a degraded, enslaved, abandoned and despised character must be abolished, Marx also supports the overcoming of modern class society through the struggle of the proletariat for new social conditions. But straight from the pre-379

hin aufgezählten Gründen ist ersichtlich, daß Marx weder eine Proklamierung der neuen klassenbewußten noch der politischen Gesellschaft vorschwebt sondern ihre Überwindung, damit auf diesem Wege die Dignität des Menschlichen hergestellt würde, damit sich der Mensch durch sein totales geschichtliches Engagement in der Tat als der einzige Demiurg seiner historischen Welt und seines Lebens fühlte.

Diese philosophischen Dimensionen hatte und hat der Stalinismus nicht. Ihm sollte die mechanizistisch begriffene Konzeption des historischen Determinismus pragmatisch dazu dienen, jeden politischen Schritt als den einzig richtigen und historisch determinierten zu rechtfertigen. Stalins philosophische Theorie vom Subjekt und Objekt reduzierte das Subjekt in letzter Konsequenz darauf, einen objektiven historischen Prozess widerzuspiegeln, dem es sich bestenfalls nur anpassen kann. Eine Initiative blieb nur der Avangarde vorbehalten und letzten Endes der politischen Spitze selbst womit in der Theorie und Praxis, trotz der Berufungen auf die Masse, eine der radikalsten elitären Konzeptionen innerhalb des Sozialismus geschaffen und zugleich in der Praxis konsequent durchgeführt wurde. Wie widersprüchlich eine solche Konzeption und Praxis zum genuinen marxistischen und sozialistischen Wollen ist, braucht nicht besonders hervorgehoben zu werden.

Stalin fehlte eine totale Einsicht in die Konzeption des Menschen als Wesen der Praxis, denn er begriff die Kategorie der Praxis nur als eine Erkenntnistheorie, die post festum als Kriterium der Wahrheit kommt. Deswegen fehlte ihm auch völlig die Einsicht in das schwierige Problem der Entfremdung als Ausdruck einer bestimmten partialisierten Praxis des Menschen und seiner Zwiespältigkeit, was auch im Sozialismus drastische und gefährliche Ausmaße annehmen kann. Die Veränderung der menschlichen historischen Struktur, d. h. die Formierung einer neuen, komplexeren und ausgesprägteren historischen Persönlichkeit ging darum für Stalin nicht aus dem Grad des vollständigen und allseitigen historischen Engagements des arbeitenden Menschen hervor sondern aus dem politischen Gehorsam und der Befolgung der Gedanken und Weisungen des höchsten Richters. Während der vulgär verstandene historische Determinismus jeden Schritt seiner Politik rechtfertigen sollte, mußte die unmarxistische Theorie des Abbildes ein neues sozialistisches Aufklärertum rechtfertigen. Darum ein solcher Eifer der politischen und ideologischen Propaganda, eine solche Rigorosität der politischen Indoktrination, ein solcher Radikalismus im Bestreben, alle ideologischen und theoretischen Sphären auf eine Apologie des aufklärerischen Leitgedankens zu reduzieren. Darum auch ein kaum erwähnenswertes Bestreben, den arbeitenden Menschen in den historischen Prozeß der Verfügung über seine Arbeit und in die Verwaltung seiner Gemeinschaft miteinzubeziehen.

Infolge der Einsicht in die Gesellschaftsstrukturen, in den Charakter der politischen Sphäre ,in die Freiheit des Individuums und

From the reasons listed above, it is evident that Marx has in mind neither a proclamation of the new class-conscious nor the political society, but their overcoming, so that the dignity of the human being would be established in this way, so that man through his total historical commitment in fact felt as the only demiurge of his historical world and life.

Stalinism did not and does not have these philosophical dimensions. The mechanistic conception of historical determinism should serve him pragmatically to justify every political step as the only correct and historically determinate one. Stalin's philosophical theory of subject and object ultimately reduced the subject to reflecting an objective historical process to which, at best, it can only conform. An initiative was reserved only for the avant-garde and ultimately for the political leadership itself, which in theory and practice, despite appeals to the masses, created one of the most radical elitist conceptions within socialism and at the same time consistently carried out in practice. How contradictory such a conception and practice is to genuine Marxist and socialist will does not need to be particularly emphasized.

Stalin lacked a total insight into the conception of man as the essence of praxis, because he understood the category of praxis only as an epistemology that comes post festum as a criterion of truth. For this reason, he also completely lacked insight into the difficult problem of alienation as an expression of a certain partialized human practice and its dichotomy, which can also assume drastic and dangerous proportions in socialism. The change in the human historical structure, i. H. For Stalin, the formation of a new, more complex and more pronounced historical personality did not result from the degree of complete and all-round historical commitment of the working man, but from political obedience and compliance with the thoughts and instructions of the highest judge. While the vulgarly understood historical determinism had to justify every step of its politics, the un-M arxist theory of the image had to justify a new socialist enlightenment. Hence such zeal in political and ideological propaganda, such rigor in political indoctrination.

such radicalism in the endeavor to reduce all ideological and theoretical spheres to an apology for the guiding principle of Enlightenment. Hence the effort, hardly worth mentioning, to involve working people in the historical process of disposing of their work and in the administration of their community.

As a result of the insight into the social structures, into the character of the political sphere, into the freedom of the individual s and 380

in die anfänglichen Prozesse im Sozialismus mußten sich die Konsequenzen in einem Konzept bei Marx, Engels oder Lenin notwendig wesentlich unterscheiden von denjenigen Stalins. Worin besteht dieser wesentliche Unterschied, worin liegt die Wichtigkeit dieser Frage für den Sozialismus?

Wir haben schon darauf hingewiesen, daß Marxens Vision von Geschichte und Mensch konsequent begründet ist in der Lehre von der Notwendigkeit einer Überwindung der Gesellschaft des Lohnverhältnisses und somit auch ihres politischen Ausdrucks — des Staates. Die freie Entfaltung der Einzelmenschen - und sie sind die Basis der Geschichte - kan nur zustandekommen, indem die Aufspaltung der Gesellschaft auf Herrscher und Beherrschte abgeschafft und überwunden wird, indem die klassenmäßige Arbeitsteilung aufgehoben und ein allseitiges Engagement des Menschen in seinem historischen Prozeß verwirklicht wird. Dieses historische Engagement, die allseitige historische Praxis war und ist für Marx und den Marxismus die Grundlage und das Medium der allseitigen Entfaltung des menschlichen Wesens, der Befreiung von all den fetischisierten Vorstellungen, die seine individuelle und gesellschaftliche Aktion nur hemmten. Darum war es auch für alle großen Marxisten eine der grundlegendsten Voraussetzungen des Sozialismus, gleich am Anfang allen jenen Institutionen den Krieg zu erklären, die den arbeitenden Menschen ersetzten, die in seinem Namen regierten, die ihn im Laufe der Geschichte alienierten, denen er ständig untergeben und hörig war. Und die wichtigste und erste Institution mit so mächtigen Prärogativen war und ist — der Staat.³

Der Staat ist eine besondere historische Form der Gesellschaftsorganisation. In erster Hinsicht ist es eine Form der Gewalt, der Unterdrückung, der Bürokratie, abgesehen davon, daß der Staat früher wie heute eine Reihe allgemeingesellschatlicher Funktionen ausübt, ohne welche die Gesellschaft nicht fortbestehen kann. Aber diese Funktionen kann die Gesellschaft ausüben ohne eine Organisation, wie es der Staat ist. Wiewohl er für die Arbeiterklasse in den ersten Anfängen der Revolution unbedingt notwendig, ist, ist er das später — nach Auffassungen von Marx, Engels, Lenin, sowie auch der Mehrheit bedeutender Kommunisten — nur in Form seiner eigenen Aufhebung. Denn es ist ihnen allen klar, daß der Staat eine solche Konzentration von Macht und Gewalt darstellt, daß er selbst im Sozialismus leicht zur Gewalt über

In the early processes of socialism, the consequences of a concept in Marx, Engels or Lenin necessarily differed significantly from those of Stalin. What is this essential difference, what is the importance of this

³ Diese Gedanken ziehen sich wie ein roter Faden durch die Werke von Marx und Engels, die seit den vierziger Jahren bis zu ihrem Tode entstanden sind. Noch in der Polemik mit Ruge betont Marx, daß «diese Zerrissenheit, diese Niedertracht, dies Sklaventum der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft ist das Naturfundament, worauf der moderne Staat ruht, wie die bürgerliche Gesellschaft des Sklaventums das Naturfundament war, worauf der antike Staat ruhte. Die Existenz des Staats und die Existenz der Sklaverei sind unzertrennlich.« (K. Marx, Kritische Randglossen zu dem Artikel »Der König vom Preußen und die Sozialreform. Von einem Preußen, Werke 1., S. 401—402) Diese Ideen tauchen wieder in der »Deutschen Ideologie« und im »Manifest« auf, wo Marx und Engels die Abschaffung des politischen Charakters der öffentlichen Macht voraussehen.

question for socialism?

We have already pointed out that Marx's vision of history and man is consistently grounded in the doctrine of the need for society to overcome the wage relationship and thus also its political expression - the state. The free development of individuals - and they are the basis of history - can only come about by abolishing and overcoming the division of society into rulers and ruled, by abolishing the class-based division of labor and by employing an all-round engagement of man in his historical process becomes real. For Marx and Marxism, this historical commitment, all-round historical practice, was and is the basis and the medium for the all-round development of the human being, for liberation from all the fetishized ideas that only inhibited his individual and social action That's why it was big for everyone

Ben Marx believed that one of the most basic premise of socialism was to declare war at the outset on all those institutions that replaced working people, that governed in their name, that alienated them throughout history, to which they were constantly subordinate and in bondage. And the most important and first institution with such powerful prerogatives was and is

— the state.3

The state is a special historical form of social organization. In the first place it is a form of violence, oppression, bureaucracy, apart from the fact that the state, then as now, performs a number of general societal functions without which society cannot exist.

But society can perform these functions without an organization such as the state. Although it is absolutely necessary for the working class in the first beginnings of the revolution, later it is - according to the views of Marx, Engels, Lenin, as well as the majority of important communists -

only in the form of its own annulment. For it is clear to all of them that the state represents such a concentration of power and violence that it can easily lead to violence even under socialism , which have been written since the 1940s until her death. Even in the polemic with Ruge, Marx emphasizes that "this inner conflict, this meanness, this slavery of bourgeois society is the natural foundation on which the modern state, like the bourgeois, rests Society of slavery was the foundation of nature on which the ancient state rested. The existence of the state and the existence of slavery are inseparable.« (K. M arx, Critical marginal notes to the article »Der Konig vom PreuBen und die

Sozialreform. Von ein PreuBen, W erke l., pp. 401-402) These ideas appear again in the »German Ideology« and in the »Manifesto«, where M arx and Engels foresee the abolition of the political character of public power.

381

die eigene Arbeiterklasse werden kann. Darum war Lenin in der bekannten Diskussion über die Gewerkschaften auch so sehr gegen ihre Verstaatlichung und für ihre möglichst große Selbständigkeit; denn sie selbst, als eine Organisation der Arbeiterklasse, sollten diese eben Klasse vor eventuellen Mißbräuchen von Seiten ihres eigenen Staates schützen. Erst später, in Stalins totalitaristischer Konzeption des Sozialismus, wurden die Gewerkschaften — wie auch alle anderen Organisationen — zu bloßen Transmissionen eines allmächtigen bürokratisch-etatistischen Zentrums.

Daß dies die fundamentale theoretische Position der Gründer des Sozialismus war, zeigen zur Genüge viele Stellen in ihren theoretischen Schriften. Bekannt ist Marxens Stellung zur Pariser Kommune, aber es ist hier wichtig, auch eine Stelle aus dem ersten Entwurf zu dieser Skizze anzuführen, wo seine Feind schaft gegenüber dem Staat als Institution besonders scharf zum Ausdruck kommt.

»Die Kommune war, schrieb er, eine Revolution gegen den Staat selbst, gegen diese übernatürliche Fehlgeburt der Gesellschaft; sie war eine Wiederbelebung durch das Volk und des eignen gesellschaftlichen Lebens des Volkes. Sie war nicht eine Revolution, um die Staatsmacht von einer Fraktion der herrschenden Klassen an die andre zu übertragen, sondern eine Revolution, um diese abscheuliche Maschine der Klassenherrschaft selbst zu zerbrechen. «4

Es genügt, auf nur eine bekannte Stelle bei Engels hinzuweisen:

»Der erste Akt, worin der Staat wirklich als Repräsentant der ganzen Gesellschaft auftritt — die Besitzergreifung der Produktionsmittel in Namen der Gesellschaft — ist zugleich sein letzter selbständiger Akt als Staat. Das Eingreifen einer Staatsgewalt in gesellschaftliche Verhältnisse wird auf einem Gebiete nach dem andern überflüssig und schläft dann von selbst ein. An die Stelle der Regierung über Personen tritt die Verwaltung von Sachen und die Leitung von Produktionsprozessen. Der Staat wird nicht »abgeschafft«, er stirbt ab.«⁵

Derselbe Geist weht durch Lenins Werk über den Staat und die Revolution, wenn er schreibt: »Das Proletariat braucht den Staat — das wiederholen alle Opportunisten, Sozialchauvinisten und Kautski-Anhänger 'indem sie betonen, daß das die Lehre von Marx ist, »vergessen« jedoch dabei hinzuzufügen, daß das Proletariat nach Marx als erstes nur einen absterbenden Staat braucht, d. h. einen solchen, der so beschaffen ist, daß er gleich absterben könnte und müßte. Und zum zweiten brauchen die Werktätigen den »Staat«, »das heißt die als Proletariat organisierte herrschende Klasse«.6

⁴ K. Marx, Erster Entwurf zum »Bürgerkrieg in Frankreich«, Werke, Bd. 17, Seite 139—140.

⁵ Fr. Engels, Die Entwicklung des Sozialismus von der Utopie zur Wissenschaft, Berlin 1945, Seite 57.

⁶ V. I. Lenjin, Država i revolucija, Aussew. w. Bd. II., Buch I, Zagreb, 1950, Seite 152.

independence; for they themselves, as an organization of the working class, should protect this very class from possible abuses on the part of their own state. Only later, in Stalin's totalitarian conception of socialism, did the trade unions — like all other organizations — become mere transmissions of an all-powerful bureaucratic-statist center.

That this was the fundamental theoretical position of the founders of socialism is shown by many passages in their theoretical writings. M arxen's position on the Paris Commune is well known, but it is important here to cite a passage from the first draft of this sketch where his hostility towards the state as an institution is particularly sharply expressed.

'The Commune was, he wrote, a revolution against the state itself, against this most natural aberration of society; it was a revival by the people and the people's own social life. It was not a revolution to transfer state power from one faction of the ruling classes to another, but a revolution to break down this odious machine of class rule itself.«4

It suffices to refer to just one well-known passage in Engels:

"The first act in which the state really appears as the representative of society as a whole — taking possession of the means of production in the name of society — is at the same time its last independent act as a state. The intervention of a state authority in social relations becomes superfluous in one area after another and then falls asleep of its own accord. The administration of things and the direction of production processes take the place of government via persons. The state will not

"Abolished," he dies."5

The same spirit wafts through Lenin's work on the state and revolution when he writes: "The proletariat needs the state

— all opportunists, social-chauvinists and Kautskiites repeat this, emphasizing that this is the teaching of Marx, but "forgetting" to add that, according to Marx, the first thing the proletariat needs only is a dying state, i . H. one that is so constituted that it could and would have to die off immediately. And secondly, the working people need the "state," "that is, the ruling class organized as a proletariat."

4 K. M arx, F irst Draft of the "Civil War in France", Works, Vol.

17, pp. 139-140.

5 Fr. Engels, The development of socialism from utopia to science, Berlin 1945, page 57.

8 V. I. Lenin, State and Revolution, Aussew. w. Bd. II., Buch I, Zagreb, 1950, Seite 152.

382

Obwohl dies seit langen bekannte Positionen der Hauptprotagonisten und führenden Persönlichkeiten des Marxismus sind, war es trotzdem nowendig sie anzuführen, weil die Mehrheit der Marxisten in den übrigen sozialistischen Ländern noch heute die genannten Thesen nicht vertreten sondern Stalins Überzeugung von der Notwendigkeit der maximalen Stärkung des Staates, wodurch es zu seinem Absterben kommen sollte (!). Und sie erklären die These vom Absterben des Staates im Sozialismus ohne auch die leisesten Bedenken ihres marxistischen Bewußtseins — zum Revisionismus. Dann aber müßte man konsequent sein und sagen, daß Marx, Engels und Lenin Revisionisten gewesen sind, die man nur in Stalins Korrektur lesen darf!

Aus einer Menge solcher Schriften greifen wir nur zwei heraus. die zu den offizielleren gehören. Im Lehrbuch über die Grundlagen der marxistischen Philosophie schreiben seine Verfasser: »Die Marxisten haben es immer für nowendig gehalten, daß der sozialistische Staat den Bürokratismus als Überbleibsel vorsozialistischer Herrschaftsformen ausrottet. Das Hauptmittel zur Lösung dieser Aufgabe ist die Hinzuziehung der breiten Volksmassen zur Verwaltung des Staates. Sich unter dem Deckmantel des Kampfes gegen den Bürokratismus für möglichst ein schnelles Absterben des Staates einzusetzen, die Notwendigkeit der Absage an den Staat unter den Bedingungen des Sozialismus zu verkünden, während noch die kapitalistische Welt existiert — und das noch in der Übergangssituation vom Kapitalismus zum Sozialismus das bedeutet, die Werktätigen vor ihrem Klassenfeind zu entwaffnen. Der Prozess der Auflösung des Staates kann durch keine künstlichen Maßnahmen beschleunigt werden. Der Staat wird durch nichts ersetzt, er stirbt allmählich ab und zwar in Abhängigkeit davon, wie die Notwendigkeit der politischen Herrschaft aufhört. Das wird dann möglich, wenn der sozialistische Staat seine historischen Aufgaben erfüllt haben wird, und zur Lösung dieser Aufgaben ist es notwendig, die Volksmacht zu stärken. Darum darf die Sorge um die Stärkung des sozialistischen Staates nicht den Perspektiven seiner Auflösung gegenübergestellt werden; das sind die beiden Seiten der Medaille«.7

Auf dieselbe Art erörtert diese Frage auch das neueste Programm der KP UdSSR, mit einer Neuigkeit, daß bei ihnen nämlich der Staat zu einer gemeinnationalen Organisation geworden ist, die sich »bis zum endgültigen Sieg des Kommunismus erhalten wird.«⁸ Und ferner: »Allseitige Entfaltung undVervollkommnung der sozialistischen Demokratie, aktive Teilnahme aller Bürger an der Verwaltung des Staates, an der Leitung des wirtschaftlichen und kulturellen Aufbaus, Verbesserung der Funktionierung des Staatsapparats und Verstärkung der Volkskontrolle über seine Aktivität — das ist die Hauptrichtung der Entwicklung der sozialistischen Staatlichkeit in der Epoche des Ausbaus des Kommunis-

Osnovy marksistkoj filosofii, Moskva 1958, Seite 547.

Programma KPSS, Moskva, 1962, Seite 127.

countries still do not support the theses mentioned, but support Stalin's conviction of the necessity of the m aximum strengthening of the state, which should lead to its demise (!). And they declare the thesis of the withering away of the state under socialism without even the slightest hesitation of their Marxist consciousness - as revisionism. But then one had to be consistent and say that Marx, Engels and Lenin were revisionists, which one may only read in Stalin's correction!

From a multitude of such writings we shall only pick two, which belong to the more official ones. In the textbook on the foundations of Marxist philosophy, its authors write: "Marxists have always considered it necessary for the socialist state to eradicate bureaucracy as a remnant of pre-socialist forms of government. The main means of solving this task is to involve the broad masses of the people in the administration of the state. Under the guise of fighting bureaucracy, to work for the state to die out as quickly as possible, to announce the need to renounce the state under the conditions of socialism, while the capitalist world still exists — and that still in the transitional situation from capitalism to socialism —

that means disarming the working people before their class enemy. The process of dissolving the state cannot be accelerated by any artificial measures. The state will

replaced by nothing, it gradually dies out as the need for political rule ceases. This will be possible when the socialist state has fulfilled its historical tasks, and in order to solve these tasks it is necessary to strengthen people's power. That is why the concern for strengthening the socialist state must not be contrasted with the prospects of its dissolution; these are the two sides of the coin«.7

In the same way, the latest program of the CP-USSR also discusses this question, with the news that their state has become a common national organization which "will survive until the final victory of communism ."8 And further: "All-round development and perfection of socialist democracy, active participation of all citizens in the administration of the state, in the direction of economic and cultural development, improvement of the functioning of the state apparatus and strengthening of people's control over its A k tiv ita t — this is the main direction of the development of socialist statehood in the epoch of Communism building-7 Osnovy m arksistkoj filosofii, M oskva 1958, page 547.

mus. Im weiteren Entwicklungsprozeß der sozialistischen Demokratie werden Organe der Staatsmacht allmählich in solche der gesellschaftlichen Selbstverwaltung überführt.«9

Es ist ganz offensichtlich daß hier Grundprinzipe der marxistischen Auffassung über die Befreiung der Arbeiterklasse pragmatisch in Einklang gebracht werden mit einer politischen Empirie, die bisher genug Anzeichen dafür bot, radikal überwunden zu werden. Eine solche historische Selbstkritik ist jedoch schwierig und unangenehm.

Als erstes und im Zusammenhang mit dem eben Zitierten ist hervorzuheben, daß die Marxisten nie der Ansicht waren, daß weder »der sozialistische Staat den Bürokratismus ausrotten solle« noch daß er ihn ausrotten wird. Denn der Staat ist die höchste Instanz des Bürokratismus, der Brennpunkt bürokratischer Tendenzen eines Landes und folglich unfähig, eine solche Selbstnegierung auszuüben. Das können einzig die arbeitenden Menschen durch Schaffung neuer Formen der Verwaltung ihrer sozialen Gemeinschaft, die eine Verneinung des Staatlichen und Bürokratischen sein werden.

Darum ist auch nicht das Hauptproblem des Sozialismus die Lösung der vorhin erwähnten Aufgabe — »die Heranziehung der breiten Volksmassen, den Staat zu verwalten« — (obwohl auch das in gewissem Maße und in der ersten Phase zur Aufgabe gehört), weil nämlich ein jeder Staat und somit auch der sozialistische »zu eng« ist, als daß eine breite Beteiligung möglich wäre, und weil es bei allen diesen Dingen noch immer beim Staat bleibt. »Die breiten Volksmassen« können hingegen nur durch jene Formen massenweise an der Verwaltung teilhaben, welche nicht mehr staatlich und von diesen Massen nicht gelöst sind, vielmehr sich sogar auch räumlich in »ihrer Nähe« befinden, wovon noch die Rede sein wird.¹⁰

Ferner bedeutet die Auflösung des Staates eo ipso keineswegs, die »Werktätigen vor ihrem Klassenfeind zu entwaffnen«, denn der Staat ist nach der marxistischen Theorie nicht identisch mit der sozialen Gemeinschaft. Wenn die ganze Macht — die politische, ökonomische und sogar die geistige Macht — im Staat konzentriert ist, und der Staat ist immer ein bestimmter Apparat,

Programma KPSS, Moskva, 1962, Seite 127-128.

¹⁰ In der ersten Phase des Sozialismus, während die Arbeiterklasse noch die Aufgabe hat, mit der Bourgeosie und eventuell mit der Konterrevolution definitiv abzurechnen, muß der Staat möglichst stark sein. In einer solchen Situation mußte auch Lenin öfter davon sprechen und sich für die Festigung der neuen sowjetischen Staatsmacht einsetzen. Aber selbst in dieser schwierigsten Periode für den sowjetischen Staat hat Lenin immer wieder betont, daß das die sowijetische Macht sein muß, d. h. daß sie aus den Arbeiterräten und anderen Räten hervorgehen soll, beziehungsweise aus jenen Formen der gesellschaftlichen und staatlichen Organisation, die zugleich auch die Grundlage für das Absterben des Staates abgeben. Bleibt man bei der Auffassung von der Stärkung des Staates, ohne die Arbeiterräte und die gessellschaftliche Selbstverwaltung zu berücksichtigen (was ein viel weiterer Begriff ist als Staatsmacht und Staatsverwaltung), dann bleiben wir bei der etatistisch-bürokratischen These von der Stärkung einzig des staatlichen. bürokratischen Apparats der Gewalt.

of state power are gradually being transformed into organs of social self-government.«9

It is quite obvious that here basic principles of the Marxist view of the emancipation of the working class are pragmatically reconciled with a political empiricism that has so far offered enough signs of being radically overcome. However, such historical self-criticism is difficult and uncomfortable.

First of all, and in connection with what has just been quoted, it should be emphasized that the Marxists have never believed that neither "the socialist state should eradicate bureaucratism"

nor that he will exterminate him. For the state is the highest instance of bureaucracy, the focal point of a country's bureaucratic tendencies and consequently incapable of exercising such self-negation. Only working people can do this by creating new forms of administration of their social community that will be a reconciliation of the state and the bureaucratic.

That is why the main problem of socialism is not the solution to the above-mentioned task — "to attract the broad masses of the people to administer the state" — (although to a certain extent and in the first phase that is also part of the task), because every state, and thus also the socialist one, is "too narrow" for broad participation to be possible, and because in all of these things it still remains with the state. "The broad masses of the people," on the other hand, can only participate en masse in the administration through those forms that are no longer state-owned and are not detached from these masses, but rather are even physically "close to them," of which the speech w ill be.10

Furthermore, the dissolution of the state eo ipso in no way means "disarming the working people before their class enemy" because, according to Marxist theory, the state is not identical with the social community. When all power — political, economic, and even spiritual power — is concentrated in the state, and the state is always a specific apparatus,

• Program a KPSS, Moskva, 1962, pp. 127-128.

10 In the first phase of socialism, while the working class still has the task of definitely settling accounts with the bourgeoisie and possibly with the counter-revolution, the state must be as strong as possible. In such a situation, Lenin too had to speak of it more often and campaign for the consolidation of the new Soviet state power. But even in this most difficult period for the Soviet state, Lenin repeatedly emphasized that it must be the Soviet power, i. H. that it should emerge from the workers' councils and

other councils, or from those forms of social and state organization which at the same time also provide the basis for the withering away of the state. If one sticks to the notion of state strengthening without considering the labor rate and social self-government (which is a much broader concept than state power and state administration), then we stand by it the statist-bureaucratic thesis of only strengthening the state. bureaucratic apparatus of violence.

384

dann ist diese gesamte »Macht« aus den Händen des Volkes selbst dekonzentriert. Die Marxisten können es nicht annehmen, daß die Stimmenabgabe des Volkes an seine Vertreter — und sei sie noch so frei — jene Beteiligung der Volksmassen an der Verwaltung des Staates sowie ihrer eigenen Gemeinschaft bedeutet an welche die Gründer des Marxismus gedacht haben. Der Parlamentarismus mit allen seinen Wahlkombinationen und — techniken, wiewohl selbst eine historisch progressive Erscheinung, ist und bleibt eine der Haupcharakteristiken der bürgelichen Gesellschaft.

Wenn also die ökonomische und »politische« Macht allmählich aus den Händen des Staates (auch eines solchen, der die Arbeiterklasse vertreten sollte) in die Hände der Arbeiterklasse und der arbeitenden Menschen schlechthin übergeht, bedeutet das alles die Abschaffung des Staates, bedeutet also nicht die Entwaffnung der Werktätigen vor ihrem Klassenfeind, bedeutet also keine Schwächung der sozialen Gemeinschaft sondern das genaue Gegenteil: ihre Stärkung. Kein Staat kann die Aktivität von Millionen Menschen ersetzen, kein Staat kann - selbst beim besten Funktionieren seiner Verwaltung - den Enthusiasmus des Menschen ersetzen, der weiß und fühlt, daß Schicksal seiner eigenen Gemeinschaft, und damit auch das Schicksal seiner eigenen Geschichte, in seinen eigenen Händen liegt, der weiß, daß er über Produkte seiner Arbeit verfügt - und daß das alles nicht etwa eine ihm entfremdete Macht tut, und wäre sie auch von ihm selbst geschaffen. Es steht ja nicht zur Diskussion, daß in der jetzigen Situation eine starke nationale Verteidigung, angesichts des Bestehens eines internationalen Imperialismus und einer Möglichkeit der Aggression, noch immer bestehen muß. Aber es ist um so mehr notwendig zu prüfen, wie diese Wehrorganisation beschaffen sein sollte, die nach und nach immer weniger Staatsorganisation sein wird und immer mehr eine Organisation des sozialistischen Menschen, der über sein eigenes Leben und die Gesellschaft verfügt.

Darum eben handelte sich auch um irgendeine Beschleunigung der Auflösung des Staates »durch irgendwelche künstlichen Maßnahmen« sondern durch die von allen großen Marxisten vorausgeschauten Maßnahmen, die eine eigentliche und wesentliche Befreiung des Menschen im Sozialismus bedeuten, wovon noch die Rede sein wird.

Ebensowenig haben die Gründer des Sozialismus jemals behauptet, daß der Staat aufgelöst wird in dem Maße, wie die »Notwendigkeit der politischen Herrschaft aufhört« sondern daß sich der Staat sofort aufzulösen beginnt, denn es wäre sehr fragwürdig, wer zu bestimmen hat, wann die Notwendigkeit der politischen Herrschaft aufhört. Die sowjetischen Marxisten sind dagegen der Meinung — was in Übereinstimmung ist mit ihrer Divination des sozialistischen Staates, daß es eben die Aufgabe der politischen Führung ist, dies zu bestimmen. Denn ebenso wie der Staat — ihrer Auffassung nach — den Bürokratismus auszurotten hat, so bestimmt er ebenfalls die Stunde, in der die Notwendigkeit der politischen Herrschaft aufhört. Diese Stunde steht sogar fest: das

the masses in the administration of the state and of their own community which the founders of Marxism envisaged. Parliamentarianism with all its electoral combinations and techniques, although itself a historically progressive phenomenon, is and remains one of the main characteristics of bourgeois society.

So if economic and "political" power gradually passes from the hands of the state (even one that should represent the working class) into the hands of the working class and working people per se, all this means the abolition of the state, that is, means not the disarmament of the working people in front of their class enemy does not mean a weakening of the social community but the exact opposite: its strengthening. No state can replace the activity of millions of people, no state - even with the best functioning of its administration - can replace the enthusiasm of the man who knows and feels that the destiny of his own community, and thus destiny too his own history, lies in his own hands, who knows that he has the products of his work at his disposal - and that none of this is being done by a power alien to him, even if it were created by himself. It is not up for debate that in the current situation, given the existence of international imperialism and the possibility of aggression, a strong national defense must still exist. But it is all the more necessary to examine how this military organization should be designed, which will gradually become less and less a state organization and more and more an organization of socialist people who care about their own lives and the company.

That is why the dissolution of the state was to be accelerated "through some kind of artificial measure" but through the measures anticipated by all great Marxists, which signify an actual and essential liberation of man under socialism, which will be discussed later.

Nor did the founders of socialism ever claim that the state would be dissolved as the "need for political rule ceased" but that the state would begin to dissolve immediately, for it would be very questionable who to has determined when the need for political rule ceases. The Soviet Marxists, on the other hand, are of the opinion - which is in accordance with their divination of the socialist state - that it is precisely the task of the political leadership to determine this. Because just like the state —

In their view — has to root out bureaucracy, it also determines the hour when the need for political rule ceases. This hour is even certain: the 385

ist jener Augenblick, in dem »der sozialistische Staat seine historischen Aufgaben erfüllt haben wird«, folglich muß er während der ganzen Epoche immer stärker werden. So kommen wir auf die geheiligte These Stalins aus den dreißiger Jahren zurück, mit welcher er Engels »korrigierte«; in Wirklichkeit revidierte er nur eine der Grundkonzeptionen sowohl Marx' als auch Lenins, die eine Stärkung des sozialistischen Staates auch nie vorausgesehen Laben (außer in den ersten und entscheidenden Stunden der Revolution).

Gerade aus diesen Gründen ist die abschließende Feststellung der angeführten Stelle, die eine solche Haltung veranschaulicht, ein gewöhnlicher Sophismus: die Sorge um die »Stärkung des sozialistischen Staates« darf nicht »den Perspektiven seiner Auflösung« vorgezogen werden, »das sind die beiden Seiten der Medaille«. Die Dialektik eines solchen Prozesses, wonach ein Organismus oder eine Organisation dadurch absterben, daß sie immer stärker werden, ist uns noch unbekannt! Da handelt es sich vielmehr um zwei Seiten zweier verschiedener Medaillen.

Wenn man eine bestimmte Praxis um jeden Preis zum Prinzip erhaben will; nebenbei gesagt: eine Praxis, die einige Jahrzehnte hindurch genügend Insuffizienzen und Deformationen gezeigt hat, um zumindest eine etwas schärfere kritische Analyse zu verdienen, - dann muß eben dieses Prinzip in scharfen Gegensatz zu der ganzen marxistischen Konzeption treten. Und so setzen sie entgegen Marx, Engels und Lenin — nicht nur die Stärkung des Staates für die ganze Phase des Sozialismus voraus, schließen nicht nur die Möglichkeit seines Sterbens sondern setzen auch — wieder aus pragmatischen und ideologischen Gründen — die sozialistische Staatlichkeit sowohl für die Periode des Kommunismus voraus. Als auf dem XXII Kongress der KP UdSSR proklamiert wurde, daß der Kommunismus bis zum Jahre 1980 ausgebaut werden soll, wurden - angesichts des Umstandes, daß der Staat empirisch exisitiert — diese zwei Momente: der ideologische propagandistische Akt und die empirische Realität zu einem einheitlichen Prinzip verbunden — und das konnte allerdings nur die Perspektuierung des Staates auch im Kommunismus sein.

Folglich behält eine Gesellschaft, die sowohl die Arbeitsteilung als auch den Klassencharakter überwunden haben sollte, noch immer die klassenmäßige Organisation, den Zwang und die Gewaltherrschaft bei. Das ist dann doch theoretischer Nonsens. Wenn wir schon Zeugen verschiedenartigsten Mystifikationen von Seiten der Apologeten der Bourgeoisie gewesen sind, ist es nicht im mindesten notwendig und überhaupt nicht angebracht, aus einer so kritischen Konzeption, wie der des Marxismus "eine neue Mystifikation zu machen.

Folglich behält eine Gesellschaft, die sowohl die Arbeitsteilung als auch den Klassencharakter überwunden haben sollte, noch immer die klassenmäßige. Organisation, den Zwang und die Gewaltherrschaft bei. Das ist dann doch theoretischer Nonsens. Wenn wir schon Zeugen verschiedenartigster Mystifikationen von Seiten

he "corrected" Engels; in reality he only revised one of the basic conceptions of both Marx and Lenin, which also never foresaw a strengthening of the socialist state (except in the first and decisive hours of the revolution).

Precisely for these reasons, the concluding statement of the passage quoted, which illustrates such an attitude, is an ordinary sophism: concern for the "strengthening of the socialist state" must not be given priority over "the prospects of its dissolution," "those are the two sides of the medal". The dialectic of such a process, according to which an organism or an organization dies off by becoming stronger and stronger, is still unknown to us! It's more like two sides of two different medals.

If you want to elevate a certain practice to a principle at any price; by the way: a practice that has shown enough insufficiencies and deformities for a few decades to at least deserve a somewhat sharper critical analysis,

- then this very principle must come into sharp contrast to the entire Marxist conception. And so they put —

Contrary to Marx, Engels and Lenin — not only presupposes the strengthening of the state for the whole phase of socialism, not only excludes the possibility of its death but also — again for pragmatic and ideological reasons — posits socialist statehood for both the period ahead of communism.

When at the XXII Congress of the CP-USSR it was proclaimed that communism should be built by 1980, given the fact that the state empirically exists, these two moments were identified: the ideological propagandistic act and the empirical reality connected to a unified principle - and that could only be the perspective of the state, even in communism.

Consequently, a society which should have overcome both the division of labor and the class character still retains class organization, coercion and violent rule. That's theoretical nonsense. If we have already witnessed mystifications of all kinds on the part of the apologists of the bourgeoisie, it is not in the least necessary and in no way appropriate to make a new mystification out of such a critical conception as that of Marxism.

Consequently, a society which should have overcome both the division of labor and the class character still retains the class character. organization, coercion and tyranny. That's theoretical nonsense. If we are already witnesses of the most varied mystifications from page 386

der Apologeten der Bourgeoisie gewesen sind, ist es nicht im mindesten notwendig und überhaupt nicht angebracht,aus einer so kritischen Konzeption, wie der des Marxismus, eine neue Mystifikation zu machen.

Die Klassiker des Marxismus haben deutlich proklamiert, daß schon das Proletariat diese »widerwärtige Maschine der Klassenherrschaft« vernichten sollte, daß eine Übernahme der Produktionsmittel von Seiten des Staates und im Namen der Gesellschaft »zugleich sein letzter selbstständiger Akt als Staat« ist und daß das »Proletariat nur einen absterbenden Staat braucht«. Lenin spricht also — in völliger Übereinstimmung mit Marx und Engels — nicht vom Absterben des Staates erst nachdem der sozialistische Staat seine historischen Aufgaben erfüllt haben wird, d. h. »nach Vollendung des Sozialismus« und das heißt, wenn die Arbeiterklasse als Klasse nicht mehr existieren wird; sondern gerade während der Epoche des Sozialismus, während die Arbeiterklasse noch existiert; denn »das Proletariat (hervorgeh. P. V.) braucht nur einen absterbenden Staat.«

Wenn also jemand kritisiert werden soll, weil er die Grundkonzeptionen der Klassiker des Marxismus aufgibt, dann können das, wie aus alledem zu ersehen ist, nicht die jugoslawischen Marxisten sein. Die Sache wäre viel ungefährlicher, wenn das nur ein theoretischer Disput sein und bleiben könnte. Er spiegelt aber gewisse historische und soziale Konstellationen und Prozesse wider. Und ein Festhalten an den schon angeführten Positionen bedeutet im Grunde — aber nicht phänomenologisch — auch eine Rechtfertigung alles dessen, was eine mächtige und alienierte politische Sphäre durch ihr ökonomisches und politisches Monopol perpetuiert hat: die entfremdete Existenz des sozialistischen Individuums. Das bedeutet zugleich, alle diese tragischen Beispiele von Deformationen des Sozialismus durch die unmarxistische Phrase vom Personenkult abzutun, dessen eigentliche soziale Wurzeln und Voraussetzungen unbekannt bleiben. Und in einem Wort bedeutet das aus welchen Gründen auch immer - die konsequente und kritische marxistische Analyse aufzugeben.

Es kann kein Zweifel darüber bestehen, daß im Wesen einer genuinen marxistischen Interpretation der sozialistischen Entwicklung die Konzeption von der Notwendigkeit des Absterbens des Staates schon in der ersten Phase des Kommunismus, d. h. im Sozialismus stehen würde. Es stellt sich die Frage nach der zweiten Komponente dieses Prozesses. Es ist bekannt, das Marx bis zur Pariser Kommune keine Lösung dieses Problems wußte. Erst die historischen Errungenschaften der Pariser Kommunarden gaben Marx die Ansätze zur Erfassung des Prozesses der Überwindung gesellschaftlicher Staatsorganisationen. »Die Pariser Kommune sollte selbstveständlich allen großen gewerblichen Mittelpunkten Frankreichs zum Muster dienen. Sobald die kommunale Ordnung der Dinge einmal in Paris und den Mittelpunkten zweiten Ranges

of the apologists of the bourgeoisie, it is not in the least necessary, and in no way appropriate, to make a new mystification out of a conception as critical as that of Marxism. The classics of Marxism have clearly proclaimed that

the proletariat should already destroy this "disgusting machine of class rule", that a takeover of the means of production by the state and in the name of society is "at the same time its last independent act as a state" and that that

"The proletariat only needs a dying state." Thus Lenin — in complete agreement with Marx and Engels — does not speak of the withering away of the state only after the socialist state has fulfilled its historical tasks, i. H. "after the completion of socialism" and that means when the working class will no longer exist as a class; but precisely during the epoch of socialism, while the working class still exists; because "the proletariat (formerly P.V.) only needs a dying state."

So if anyone is to be criticized for abandoning the basic concepts of the classics of Marxism, then, as can be seen from all this, it cannot be the Yugoslav Marxists. The matter would be much safer if it could only be and remain a theoretical dispute. However, it reflects certain historical and social constellations and processes.

And sticking to the positions already mentioned means basically - but not phenomenologically - also a justification of everything that a powerful and alienated political sphere has perpetuated through its economic and political monopoly: the alienated existence of the socialist individual . At the same time, this means dismissing all these tragic examples of deformations of socialism with the un-Marxist phrase of the personality cult, the actual social roots and prerequisites of which remain unknown. And in one word that means —

for whatever reason — to give up the consistent and critical Marxist analysis.

There can be no doubt that in the essence of a genuine Marxist interpretation of socialist development, the conception of the necessity of the withering away of the state was already present in the first phase of communism, i. H. would stand in socialism. The question arises as to the second component of this process. It is well known that Marx knew no solution to this problem until the P ariser Commune. It was only the historical e m genes of the P ariser Communards that gave Marx the starting points for comprehending the process of overcoming social state organizations. "The Paris Commune should of course serve as a model for all the great commercial centers of France. Once the communal order of things once in P aris and the midpoints of the second rank 387

eingeführt war, hätte die alte zentralisierte Regierung auch in den Provinzen der Selbstregierung der Produzenten weichen müssen.«¹¹

Marx' Preokupation im Hinblick auf die Lösung des historischen Problems — der politischen und ökonomischen Befreiung der Arbeiterklasse — findet in diesen Erkenntnissen auch ihre organisatorische Lösung. Abgesehen von der Notwendigkeit des Staates in der ersten Zeit des Revolutionsprozesses liegt der Akzent nicht auf dieser politischen Sphäre sondern auf der »Selbstverwaltung der Produzenten«, den Arbeiterräten, die somit zur Basis einer neuen sozialen Struktur und Gemeinschaft werden.

Wir wissen, daß Lenin diese sowie auch viele andere Ansichten von Marx und Engels in seinem bekanten Werk über den Staat und die Revolution gründlich analysiert und mit ihnen in allen entscheidenden Lösungen dieses grundlegenden historischen Problems übereingestimmt hat. Auch für Lenin ersetzt die Kommune die vernichtete alte Staatsmaschine und führt an ihrer Stelle eine neue Demokratie ein, deren Grundlage die »Selbstverwaltung der Produzenten« ist, kein Staat mehr im traditionellen Sinne des Wortes.

Daß Lenin in den Sowjets, und das heißt in der Selbstverwaltung in erster Hinsicht der Arbeiterklasse, vor wie auch nach der Revolution die Grundlage sowohl des neuen proletarischen Staates als auch die Ansätze seines Absterbens erblickte — geht aus einer Reihe von Lenins Schriften aus Zeit nach der Revolution hervor. Das war noch immer die Periode der gewaltsamen Revolution, als es galt, auch über den neuen Staat der Arbeiterklasse nachzudenken und diesen Staat zu festigen, als in der Tat eine eiserne Disziplin des Proletariats und der Partei notwendig war, damit sich die neue Regierung der Konterrevolution widersetzen konnte. Darum taucht in Lenins Schriften aus dieser Zeit - wie bereits betont wurde - notwendig auch das Problem der Festigung des Staates auf, aber auch dort nicht als eines vom Volk isolierten und über ihm stehenden Organismus und auch nicht ohne jene sozialen Voraussetzungen, die eine Grundlage für sein Absterben darstellen werden.

Das Proletariat brauchte auch damals, nach Lenin, den Staat, aber einen solchen, der »so beschaffen ist, daß er gleich absterben könnte und müßte«. Und diese seine Beschaffenheit, die es ermöglichen soll, daß der Staat gleich anfangen kann, abzusterben, bedeutet nicht die Übertragung der ganzen ökonomischen und politischen Herrschaft auf die Staatsbürokratie sondern die Einbeziehung möglichst breiter Massen des Volkes in die Verwaltung (nicht nur des Staates), und zwar durch die Arbeiter-, Soldaten- und Bauernsowjets und ihre Deputierten. »Der sozialistische Staat«, schrieb Lenin zu Anfang des Jahres 1918, »kann nur als ein Netz von Produktions- und Verbraucherkommunen entstehen, die über ihre Produktion und ihren Verbrauch gewissenhaft Buch führen, über die Arbeitszeit ökonomisch verfügen, die Arbeitsproduktivi-

¹¹ K. Marx, Der Bürgerkrieg in Frankreich, Werke 17, Seite 339.

Marx's preoccupation with regard to the solution of the historical problem - the political and economic liberation of the working class - also finds its organizational solution in these insights. Apart from the necessity of the state in the first period of the revolutionary process, the accent is not on this political sphere but on the "self-government of the producers", the worker councils, which thus become the basis of a new social structure and community.

We know that Lenin thoroughly analyzed these and many other views of Marx and Engels in his well-known work on the State and Revolution and agreed with them on all the crucial solutions to this fundamental historical problem. For Lenin, too, the Commune replaces the destroyed old state machine and introduces in its place a new democracy based on the "self-government of the producers," no longer a state in the traditional sense of the word.

That Lenin saw in the soviets, and that means in the self-government primarily of the working class, both before and after the revolution, the basis both of the new proletarian state and the beginnings of its demise - comes from a number of Lenin's writings from time emerged after the revolution. It was still the period of violent revolution, when it was also necessary to think about and consolidate the new state of the working class, when in fact iron discipline of the proletariat and the party was necessary, so that the new government could oppose the counter-revolution. Therefore, in Lenin's writings from this period - as has already been emphasized - the problem of consolidating the state necessarily also appears, but even there not as an organism isolated from the people and standing above them, and also not without those social prerequisites, which will form a basis for its demise.

Even then, according to Lenin, the proletariat needed the state, but one that "is so constituted that it could and would have to die out right away." And this nature of it, which should make it possible for the state to begin to wither away right away, does not mean the transfer of the entire economic and political rule to the state bureaucracy, but rather the inclusion of the broadest possible mass of the people in the administration (not only of the state), namely by the workers', soldiers' and peasants' Soviets and their deputies. 'The socialist state,' wrote Lenin at the beginning of 1918, 'can only come into being as a network of production and consumer communes which keep conscientious accounts of their production and consumption, economically dispose of working hours, which labor productive

[&]quot;K. M arx, The civil war in France, W erke 17, page 339.

tät ständig steigern und auf diese Weise es erreichen, die Arbeitszeit auf sieben, sechs und noch weniger Stunden pro Tag zu verkürzen.«¹² Und etwas weiter: »Jede Fabrik, jedes Dorf stellt eine Produktions« und Verbraucherkommune dar, deren Recht und Pflicht es ist, auf ihre Art die allgemeinen sowjetischen Gesetze anzuwenden (»auf ihre Art« ist hier nicht im Sinne von ihrer Mißachtung sondern der Verschiedenheit der Formen ihrer Anwendbarkeit gemeint), auf ihre Art das Problem der Produktionskontrolle und der Verteilung der Waren. Unter dem Kapitalismus war dies »Privatsache« eines jeden einzelnen Kapitalisten, Großgrundbesitzers, Kulaken. Unter der sowjetischen Regierung ist das keine Privatsache sondern die wichtigste Staatsangelegenheit.«¹³

Selbst in den entscheidendsten Stunden des Bestehens der jungen sowjetischen Republik ging Lenin also prinzipiell und zugleich konkret an die schwierigsten konkreten Probleme betreffend die Organisierung der neuen Regierung. Die Selbstverwaltung der Produzenten, die Arbeiterräte als eine Organisation der Kommunen sollten nicht nur für die Organisation der Produktion sondern auch für die »Evidenz der Produktion und des Erzeugnisseverbrauchs«. Die neue Organisation der Sowjets, von deren Mitgliedern er ausdrücklich behauptete, sie dürften sich nicht in »Parlamentarier« oder »Bürokraten«14 verwandeln, war für Lenin eine neue Art von Demokratismus, des proletarischen, der eine »höhere Stufe von Demokratismus darstellt, sowie den Bruch mit seiner bürgerlichen Entartung, den Übergang zum sozialistischen Demokratismus und den Bedingungen, unter denen der Staat wird abzusterben anfangen.«15 Die Organisation der Sowjets war in der Anfangsperiode auch das Fundament des neuen Staates, zugleich aber auch die Grundlage und die Bedingung seines Absterbens. Jedoch, solcher Sowjets, bzw. Räte, auf die es allmählich immer mehr Rechte und Ingerenzen - in erster Linie ökonomische zu übertragen galt, zugleich aber auch viele andere gesellschaftliche Verpflichtungen.

Die Größe der historischen Persönlichkeit Lenins liegt gerade in seiner genialen Fähigkeit, die Schwierigkeiten jeder Revolutionsetappe konkret zu lösen, ohne dabei die allgemeinen Grundtendenzen zu übersehen, die während einer längeren historischen Zeitspanne die Widersprüchlichkeiten zwischen den neuen Formen des Kommunismus und den noch immer vorhandenen und notwendigen politischen Formen der gesellschaftlichen Organisation lösen sollten.

¹² V. I. Lenjin, Naredni zadaci sovjetske vlasti, Izabrana djela II, 1. Buch, Seite 329.

^{14 »}An der weiteren Verbesserung der Organisation der Sowjets und ihrer Macht muß intensiv gearbeitet werden. Es ist die kleinbürgerliche Tendenz, die Mitglieder der Sowjets in »Parlamentarier« oder wiederum in Bürokraten zu verwandeln. Dagegen ist anzukämpfen, indem alle Sowjetmitglieder an der praktischen Teilnahme in der Verwaltung herangezogen werden sollen, usw.« (Lenin, Die Nächsten Aufgaben der Sowjetmacht, Seite 343.
15 V. I. Lenin, Ebda, Seite 343

whose right and duty is to apply in their own way the general Soviet laws ("in their own way" here is not meant in the sense of disregarding them, but in the sense of the variety of forms of their applicability), in their own way the problem the production control and the distribution of the goods. Under capitalism, this was a "private matter" for each individual capitalist, big landowner, kulak. Under the Soviet government, this is not a private matter but the most important state matter.«13

Thus, even in the most crucial hours of the existence of the young Soviet republic, Lenin approached the most difficult concrete problems concerning the organization of the new government in a principled and at the same time concrete manner. The self-government of the producers, the workers' council as an organization of the communes should not only be used for the organization of production but also for the "evidence of production and product consumption". The new organization of the soviets, whose members he expressly insisted should not be turned into "parliamentarians" or "bureaucrats"14, was for Lenin a new kind of democracy, the proletarian, the one "higher stage of democratism, as well as the break with its bourgeois degeneration, the transition to socialist democratism and the conditions under which the state will begin to wither away.«15 The organization of the Soviets was that too in the initial period Foundation of the new state, but at the same time also the basis and the condition of its death.

However, such soviets, or rates, to which there are gradually more and more rights and inferences — primarily economic ones —

to be transferred, but at the same time many other social obligations.

The greatness of Lenin's historical personality lies precisely in his brilliant ability to concretely solve the difficulties of each revolutionary stage, without overlooking the general basic tendencies that over a long historical period have created the contradictions between the new forms of the K ommunism and the still existing and necessary political forms of social organization.

12 V. I. Lenin, The Next Tasks of the Soviet Government, Selected Works II, 1. Buch, Seite 329.

12 None, Seite 333.

14 »Intense work must be done on further improving the organization of the Soviets and their power. It is the petty-bourgeois tendency to turn the members of the soviets into "parliamentarians," or back into bureaucrats. This is to be combated by involving all Soviet mem bers in practical

participation in the administration, etc.« (Lenin, The next tasks of the Soviet power, page 343.

12 V. I. Lenin, Ebda, Page 343

Die Sowjets als Grundlage der neuen Staatsgewalt und zugleich — in der Form der Arbeiterräte — als Grundlage ihres Absterbens, keineswegs aber die Sowjets als eine parlamentarische und bürokratische Institution. Mehr noch: solche Sowjets, die in Fabriken und Dörfern nicht nur über die Produktion sondern auch über die Distribution der Waren Kontrolle ausüben.

Infolge des Bürgerkrieges, des nahezu restlosen Verschwindens der alten Arbeiterklasse während des Krieges, der Zerstörungen und der Zurückgebliebenheit des Landes sowie der ihm ungenügend zur Verfügung stehenden Zeit, war es Lenin nicht möglich gewesen, diese Konzeption weiter zu verfestigen und auszuarbeiten. Seine Nachfolger haben das ganze Problem einseitig begriffen und es im Sinne der Stärkung eben jener Sphäre behandelt, die Lenin als vorübergehend und zugleich als gefährlich auch für den Sozialismus ansah — der staatlichen und bürokratischen. Die etatistische Konzeption des Sozialismus hat in einem Augenblick den völligen Sieg über diejenige der Selbstverwaltung davongetragen.

Zu Lenins Zeit wurde die Idee der Arbeiterräte, besonders unter dem Einfluß neuer Erfahrungen der russischen Revolution, als Bote der neuen Zeit, der geschichtlich neuen gesellschaftlichen Verhältnisse aufgefaßt. A. Gramsci, G. Lukács, K. Korsch und viele andere haben in dieser Konzeption jenes historische Novum gesehen, daß die bourgeoisen Gesellschaftsverhältnisse ablösen sollte.

Es erscheint angebracht, noch wenigstens die Gedanken des großen italienischen Marxisten und Gründers der KPI, A. Gramsci, anzuführen, der ebenfalls wie Lenin und unter seinem Einfluß, die Grundlage der Diktatur des Proletariats weder in den Gewerkschaften noch in der Partei sondern in den Arbeiterräten erblickt hat, in denen die Arbeiterklasse ihre Rolle als die eines Produzenten und nicht eines Lohnarbeiters begreift. »Die proletarische Diktatur kann entstehen in einer Art von Organisation, die für die Tätigkeit der Produzenten selbst und nicht der Lohnarbeiter, dieser Sklaven des Kapitals, spezifisch wäre. Der Fabrikant ist die erste Zelle dieser Organisation. Indem in einem solchen Rat alle Arbeitszweige vertreten sind, und zwar in Abhängigkeit von den geleisteten Beiträgen eines jeden Fachgebietes, bzw. Arbeitszweiges - zur Fertigstellung von Gegenständen, die eine Fabrik für die Gemeinschaft produziert, wird die Institution zu einer klassenmäßigen, gesellschaftlichen.«16

Gramsci hat sehr genau gespürt, daß darin der Schlüssel zu diesem Problem liegt, daß das die einzige soziale Grundlage für eine Möglichkeit der Überwindung des Lohnverhältnisses ist, und das heißt zugleich auch der ökonomischen und politischen Entfremdung, die genauso existieren kann im Verhältnis der Arbeiterklasse zum Kapitalisten und dem bourgeoisen Staat wie auch der Arbeiterklasse zum Staat im Sozialismus, falls sich dieser Staat verselbstständigt, indem er von der Arbeiterklasse diese Funktionen

¹⁶ A. Gramsci, Ord ine nuovo, 11/IX, 1919, Izabrana dela, Beograd, 1959, Seite 164—165.

no means the soviets as a parliamentary and bureaucratic institution. Even more: those soviets that exercise control in factories and villages not only over the production but also over the distribution of the goods.

As a result of the civil war, the almost complete disappearance of the old working class during the war, the destruction and backwardness of the country and the insufficient time available to him, it would not have been possible for Lenin to further consolidate and develop this conception -th. His successors understood the whole problem one-sidedly and treated it in terms of strengthening that very sphere which Lenin saw as temporary and at the same time dangerous also for socialism — the state and bureaucratic. The statist conception of socialism won in a moment complete victory over that of self-government.

In Lenin's time, especially under the influence of the new experiences of the Russian revolution, the idea of the workers' council was understood as the herald of the new age, of historically new social conditions. A. Gramsci, G. Lukacs, K. Korsch and many others saw in this conception that historical novelty that bourgeois social relations were to replace.

It seems appropriate to cite at least the thoughts of the great Italian Marxist and founder of the CPI, A. Gramsci, who, like Lenin and under his influence, laid down the basis of the dictatorship of the proletariat neither in the Unions still in the party but in the workers' rates, in which the working class sees its role as that of a producer and not a wage worker. "The proletarian dictatorship can arise in a type of organization that would be specific to the activity of the producers themselves and not of the wage laborers, those slaves of capital. The manufacturer is the first cell of this organization. By having all branches represented in such a council, in proportion to the contributions made by each branch, or branch, to the completion of items that a factory produces for the community, the institution becomes one class, social.«16

Gramsci felt very well that the key to this problem lies in this, that this is the only social basis for a possibility of overcoming the wage relationship, and that means at the same time the economic and political alienation that can also exist in the relationship of the working class to the capitalist and the bourgeois state as well as the working class to the state in socialism, if this state becomes independent by taking these functions from the working class , 1919, Izabrana dela, Beograd, 1959, pp. 164—165.

übernimmt und sie an sich reißt, ohne die die Arbeiterklasse ihrer ökonomischen und sozialen Macht beraubt wird (Übernahme der ganzen Mehrarbeit und ihre Einteilung, Verfügung über Investitionen und erweiterte Fertigung, Verweigerung des demokratischen und proletarischen Rechts völlig freier Abberufung von Delegierten usw.). Darum »erprobt und entdeckt der Betriebsrat und ein System von Betriebsräten« - nach Gramsci - »in erster Instanz neue Positionen, die die Arbeiterklasse im Bereich der Produktion hat, verleiht der Arbeiterklasse das Bewußtsein von ihrer eigenen gegenwärtigen Rolle, von ihrer realen Funktion und Verantwortung, von ihrer Zukunft. Die Arbeiterklasse zieht Schlußfolgerungen aus der Summe positiver Erfahrungen, welche die Menschen persönlich als Einzelne gesammelt haben; die Arbeiterklasse eignet sich die Psychologie und den Charakter der herrschenden Klasse an und organisiert sich als solche, das heißt, sie gründet politische Sowjets, führt ihre Diktatur ein.«17 Aus allen diesen Gründen glaubt Gramsci, daß die »Entstehung der Arbeiterräte in der Fabrik ein großartiges historisches Ereignis bedeutet, den Anbruch der neuen Ära in der Geschichte der Menschheit.18

Das sind in kürzesten Zügen die theoretischen Grundlagen der Selbstverwaltungskonzeption. Sie geht, wie wir gesehen haben, aus der spezifisch Marxschen Interpretation der Geschichte, des Menschen, der Entfremdung des Menschen in der modernen Gesellschaft sowie aus der Überwindung dieser Entfremdung und der gesamten bürgerlichen Gesellschaft durch die sozialistische Entwicklung hervor. Die Konzeption der Arbeiterselbstverwaltung und der gesellschaftlichen Selbstverwaltung ist eine logische und notwendige Konsequenz der Auffaßung des Menschen als historischen Wesens der Praxis, als eines polyvalenten Wesens, das in den bisherigen Klassenverhältnissen und in der entfremdeten Arbeit verschiedene Partialisierungen und Deformationen erfahren hat, was aber auf dem heutigen Stand der geschichtlichen Entwicklung durch den Sozialismus stufenweise zu überwinden ist. Das ist eine Konzeption des Zurückfindens des Menschen aus den ihm entfremdeten Sphären der Ökonomie (Privateigentum, Lohnverhältnis) und der Ideologie (die verschiedensten Mystifikationen) und der Möglichkeit einer Überwindung dieser ihm entfremdeten Sphären, indem er sein eigenes historisches Schicksal in seine Hände nimmt. Aus allen diesen Gründen bezeichnet diese Konzeption die tiefste Konzipierung der Humanität auf der gegenwärtigen Stufe der historischen Entwicklung.

Mit Ausnahme von einzelnen Marxisten, die diese Konzeption nie aufgegeben haben, war diese Idee, dieser verhängnisvolle Entwurf der menschlichen Befreiung im Rahmen der Arbeiterbewegung durch die ganzen drei Jahrzehnte völlig verdrängt, ja proskribiert. Darum ist das Jahr 1950, als in Jugoslawien die Idee der

<sup>A. Gramsci, Ordine nuovo 14/II, 1920, Ebda, Seite 172.
A. Gramsci, Ordine nuovo 5/VI, 1920, Ebda, Seite 178.</sup>

of the democratic and proletarian right of completely free dismissal of delegates, etc.). Therefore 'the works council and a system of works councils' - according to Gramsci - 'in the first instance tests and discovers new positions that the working class has in the field of production, makes the working class aware of its own present role, of its real function and responsibility, of their future. The working class draws conclusions from the sum total of positive experiences that people have had personally as individuals; the working class appropriates the psychology and character of the ruling class and organizes itself as such, that is, it establishes political soviets, establishes its dictatorship."17 For all these reasons, Gramsci believes that the "emergence of the workers' council in the factory means a great historical event, the dawn of the new era in the history of mankind.18

In a nutshell, these are the theoretical foundations of the concept of selfgovernment. As we have seen, it stems from the specifically Marxian interpretation of history, of man, of the alienation of man in modern society, and of the overcoming of this alienation and of bourgeois society as a whole through socialist development out. The conception of worker selfgovernment and social self-government is a logical and necessary consequence of the conception of man as a historical being of practice, as a polyvalent being who has undergone various partializations and deformations in previous class conditions and in alien work has experienced, which, however, at the current level of historical development, can be gradually overcome by socialism. This is a conception of man's finding his way back from the spheres of economics (private property, wages) and ideology (the most diverse mystifications) alien to him and the possibility of overcoming these alien spheres by finding his own historical destiny in take his hands. For all these reasons, this conception marks the deepest conception of humanity at the present stage of historical development.

With the exception of individual Marxists, who have never given up this conception, this idea, this fateful draft of human liberation within the framework of the labor movement, has been completely repressed, even proscribed, for the whole three decades. That is why the year 1950 was when in Yugoslavia the idea of 17 A. Gramsci, Ordine nuovo 14/11, 1920, Ibid., page 172.

18 A. Gramsci, New Order 5/VI, 1920, Ebda, Seite 178.

Arbeiterselbstverwaltung als Grundlage und Hauptrichtung der Entwicklung des jugoslawischen Sozialismus proklamiert und gesetzlich verabschiedet wurde, ein neuer Meilenstein der Geschichte. Von neuem wurden somit auf breiter Basis und nicht mehr nur individuell ein historischer Dialog und eine historische Praxis wiederhergestellt. Schon die ersten Jahre dieser neuen historischen Praxis, die nach so vielen Jahrzehnten als ein tatsächliches historisches Novum gewirkt hatte, stellten die gesamte stalinistische, mit anderen Worten etatistische Konzeption des Sozialismus in Frage. Erst aus dieser Sicht wurden endlich auch alle jene Erscheinungen sichtbar, die den internationalen Sozialismus so diskreditiert haben.

Obwohl das nicht mehr zum Thema dieser Abhandlung gehört. müssen noch einige wichtige Punkte hervorgehoben werden. Erst durch die Konzeption der Arbeiterräte, der Arbeiterselbstverwaltung und der gesellschaftlichen Selbstverwaltung war es möglich, die undialektische Unterscheidung der ersten Phase des Kommunismus von der zweiten, bzw. des Sozialismus vom Kommunismus zu begreifen und abzulehnen. Es wurde klar, daß die Konzeption des Sozialismus als eines Systems, in dem höchste Arbitrage und höchste Staatsmacht, Verwaltung Verfügung über die Mehrarbeit usw. einer politischen Instanz übertragen wurde, bei der Staatseigentum und alles, was daraus hervorgeht im Vordergrund steht nur Apologie einer etatistischen Praxis ist - und somit eine historische Mystifikation. Keiner der Gründer des Marxismus hat etwa an eine historische Periode des Sozialismus gedacht, in welcher der Staat und die Staatsbürokratie im Vordergrund stehen würden, in welcher die gesellschaftlichen Hierarchien zu einer solchen Macht und Intransparenz gelangen werden. Jeder von ihnen hat schon unter dieser ersten Phase des Kommunismus den Kommunismus verstanden (ganz gleich, ob man ihn Sozialismus bezeichnete), in welchem gerade diese voneinander getrennten und hierarchisierten Sphären gleich abzusterben beginnen. Sie alle haben also den Sozialismus als eine widersprüchliche Übergangszeit konzipiert, in der Staats- und Selbstverwaltungsformen historisch verflochten sind, wobei die letzteren schließlich den Sieg davontragen müssen, damit die Entstehung neuer bürokratisch-technokratischer Leviathane verhindert werden könnte.

Es ist ganz klar, daß in Abhängigkeit vom Tempo der Überwindung etatistischer und politischer Formen, der Verwandlung der Arbeiterselbstverwaltung und der gesellschaftlichen Selbstverwaltung in die dominanten Formen der Gesellschaftsverhältnisse, in Abhängigkeit also von der Schnelligkeit der Umstrukturierung der ganzen sozialistischen Gesellschaft auf der Grundlage der Selbstverwaltung beträchtliche Unterschiede zwischen den einzelnen sozialistischen Staaten bestehen werden. Dem Entwicklungsland mit einer dünnen Schicht aus Arbeiterklasse und Intelligenz, das den Weg zum Sozialismus erst einschlägt, wird man sicherlich keinen Vorwurf machen können im Zusammenhang mit der hart-

Workers' self-government was proclaimed and passed into law as the basis and main direction of the development of Yugoslav socialism, a new milestone in history. A historical dialogue and historical practice were thus restored anew on a broad basis and no longer just individually. Already the first years of this new historical practice, which after so many decades had acted as a real historical novelty, challenged the whole Stalinist, in other words statist, conception of socialism. Only from this point of view did all those phenomena finally become visible that have so discredited international socialism.

Although this is no longer the subject of this paper, a number of important points still need to be emphasized. It was only through the conception of the workers' council, workers' self-government and social self-government that it was possible to understand and reject the undialectical distinction between the first phase of communism and the second, or between socialism and communism. It became clear that the conception of socialism as a system in which supreme arbitrage and supreme state power, administration, control of overtime, etc. would be delegated to a political authority in which state ownership and all that derives from it in the foreground is —

is only an apology for a statist practice - and thus a historical mystification. None of the founders of Marxism thought of a historical period of socialism in which the state and the state bureaucracy would be in the foreground, in which the social hierarchies would achieve such power and opacity. Every one of them has already understood communism under this first phase of communism (regardless of whether one called it socialism), in which precisely these separated and hierarchized spheres are about to die off. They have all conceived of socialism as a contradictory transitional period in which forms of government and self-government are historically intertwined, with the latter ultimately having to triumph in order to prevent the emergence of new bureaucratic-technocratic leviathans could.

It is quite clear that depending on the speed of overcoming statist and political forms, the transformation of workers' self-government and social self-government into the dominant forms of social relations, i.e. depending on the speed of the restructuring of the whole socialist society based on self-government, there will be considerable differences between the individual socialist states. The developing country with a thin layer of working class and intelligentsia, which is just starting out on the road to socialism, can certainly not be blamed in connection with the hard art-392

näckigen Existenz und Domination der staatlichen und politischen Organisationsformen. Aber man wird ihm mit Recht vorwerfen können, wenn dieser Staat glaubt, daß das die höchste Ausprägung des Sozialismus und ein Paradigma für alle anderen sozialistischen Formen ist.

Es ist ebenfalls sehr klar, daß die ganze Epoche des Sozialismus eine widersprüchliche Bewegung und Entwicklung bedeutet — sogar Antagonismen und Kämpfe zwischen den politischen Formen und den Selbstverwaltungsformen der Organisation der neuen Gesellschaft sind nicht auszuschließen — mit unvermeidlichen Krisen, ewentuellen Stagnationen usw., was man schon aus den Erfahrungen unserer jugoslawischen Entwicklung ersehen kann. Es ist wiederum natürlich, daß in Staaten mit langjähriger und reicher demokratischer Tradition der politische Pluralismus auch eine wichtige Rolle innerhalb dieser Entwicklung spielen wird.

Heute ist es außerdem theoretisch schon klar — und die historische Praxis bestätigt das nur — daß die durchgeführte Nationalisierung der Produktionsmittel eine revolutionäre Maßnahme und die wesentliche Voraussetzung der weiteren sozialistischen Entwicklung war. Aber es ist ebenfalls klar, daß die Gesellschaft dank dem Festhalten an nur dieser Voraussetzung die etatistischen Gesellschaftsverhältnisse mit allen unangenehmen Folgeerscheinungen dieser Verhältnisse förderte.

Die höheren Stufen der sozialistischen Entwicklung und somit die weiteren revolutionären Perspektiven sind nur unter der Voraussetzung möglich, daß das Staatseigentum in das gesellschaftliche Eigentum übergeht durch die Entwicklung der Selbstverwaltungsprozesse. Ob sich diese Prozesse schneller oder langsamer vollziehen — im Hinblick auf die Entwicklung der demokratischen Verhältnisse, ob mit dem Ein — oder dem Mehrparteiensystems sind — historisch betrachtet — die Achse der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft. Die Selbstverwaltung und die unmittelbare Demokratie, mit anderen Worten das Absterben und die Überwindung des Politischen, Parlamentarischen und Bürokratischen bedeutet die historische Achse des Sozialismus, jene Keime, Grundbestandteile und Verhältnisse, die ein historisches Novum deutlich erkennen lassen.

Die Schaffung der neuen historischen Persönlichkeit ist kein aufklärerischer Akt, zumal heute und in einer Welt, in der eine solche Literatur, Presse und Ideologie herrscht. Ohne die Rolle der so bedeutsamen Kultursphäre für die Bewußtseinswerdung der neuen Persönlichkeit und die Bildung ihres notwendigen kulturellen Niveaus zu verkennen, muß hervorgehoben werden, daß die notwendige Voraussetzung dieses Novum die Verwirklichung der historichen Rechte der Arbeiterklasse bzw. der arbeitenden Menschen ist, damit sie auf der derzeitigen Entwicklungsstufe der Gesellschaft alle jene historischen Institutionen überwindem könn-

forms.

It is also very clear that the whole epoch of socialism means a contradictory movement and development — even antagonisms and struggles between the political forms and the forms of self-government of the organization of the new society cannot be excluded — with inevitable crises, ew potential stagnations, etc., which can already be seen from the experience of our Yugoslav development.

Again, it is natural that in states with a long and rich ocratic tradition, political pluralism will also play an important role within this development.

Today it is already theoretically clear - and historical practice only confirms this - that the nationalization of the means of production that was carried out was a revolutionary measure and the essential prerequisite for further socialist development. But it is also clear that by adhering to only this premise, society demanded statist social relations with all the unpleasant consequences of these relations.

The higher stages of socialist development and thus the further revolutionary prospects are possible only under the condition that state property passes into social property through the development of self-government processes. Whether these processes take place faster or slower-with regard to the development of democratic conditions, whether with the one - or the multi-party system are - viewed historically - the axis of bourgeois society. Self-government and direct democracy, in other words the withering away and overcoming of the political, parliamentary and bureaucratic, signifies the historical axis of socialism, those germs, basic components and relationships that clearly reveal a historical novelty.

The creation of the new historical personality is not an act of enlightenment, especially today and in a world in which such literature, press and ideology prevail. Without ignoring the role of the cultural sphere, which is so important for the awareness of the new personality and the formation of its necessary cultural level, it must be emphasized that the necessary prerequisite for this novelty is the realization of the historical rights of the working class or working people , so that it can overcome all those historical institutions at the present stage of development of society-393

ten, die an Stelle des Einzelnen und meistens gegen seine Interessen gedacht und gehandelt haben, damit die arbeitenden Menschen allmählich eine Gesellschaft schaffen könnten, in der die Herrschaft als politische Funktion, d. h. als Herrschaft über Menschen aufhören wird zu existieren und an deren Stelle die allgemeingesellschaftliche Funktion, d. h. die Verwaltung der Dinge treten wird.

394

People who thought and acted on behalf of the individual and mostly against their interests, so that working people could gradually create a society in which domination was a political function, i. H. as

domination over people will cease to exist and in its place the general one-social function, i. H. the administration of things will occur.

THE BASIS AND PROSPECTS OF THE RADICAL RIGHT

Ivan Kuvačić

Zagreb

The wealthy strata of society are usually the main defenders of the established order. They often form the nuclei of various right-wing political organizations with a view to frustrating any attempts at reforms they consider determinal to their own »vested interests.« The conservatism of the well- to-do is thus a logical consequence of their privileged status, just as the revolutionary tendencies of the poor and the oppressed are a natural outcome of their subordinate position. Economic inequality is indeed what makes these two polar strata — the expoloiters and the exploited — act as pair of homogeneous but antagonistic groups, i. e., as social classes, whose struggle for power constitutes the framework of historical progress.

When, however, in the course of the struggle, strategy and tactics become decisive factors, and an ever-growing need is felt, on both sides, of securing the aid of some suitable ally, either party to the conflict may be expected to turn their attention towards the so-called middle classes, trying to catch them in the net of their own plans and combinations. Which of the two is going to gain the upper hand will depend a good deal on who will prove to have made the nearest guess at the potential power of the prospective ally. Yet if estimation is followed by manipulation, the probabilities of winning the battle will increase in proportion to the efficiency of the means employed. This is what puts the ruling class in an advantageous position. In addition to various means of physical coercion and numerous educational and other brain-conditioning institutions, the modern State can avail itself of the enormous influence of the mass communication media and so considerably strengthen its position with respect to the opposition. This circumstance is of great consequence in analyzing the relation of social forces in modern society; it is particularly important for a correct understanding of radical-right movements, bent on restoring totalitarian forms of government.

Ivan Kuvacic

Zagreb

The w ealthy stra ta of society are usually the main defenders of the established order. They often form the nuclei of various right-w ing political organizations w ith a view to frustrating any attem pts a t reform s they consider determ inal to their own »vested interests.« The conservatism of the w ell- to-do is thus a logical consequence of the ir privileged status, just as the revolutionary tendencies of the poor and the oppressed are a natural outcome of their subordinate position. Economic inequality is indeed what makes these two polar strata— the expoloiters and the exploited

— act as p air of homogeneous b u t antagonistic groups, i. e., as social classes, whose struggle for pow er constitutes the framework of historical progress.

When, however, in the course of the struggle, strategy and tactics become decisive factors, and an ever-growing need is felt, on both sides, of securing the aid of some suitable ally, either party to the conflict m ay be expected to tu rn th eir attention towards the socalled m iddle classes, trying to catch them in the net of th eir own plans and combinations. Which of the two is going to gain the upper hand will depend a good deal on who will prove to have made the n earest guess at the potential power of the prospective ally. Yet if estim ation is followed by manipulation, the probabilities of w inning the b attle will increase in proportion to the efficiency of the means employed. This is w hat puts the ruling class in an advantageous position. In addition to various means of physical coercion and num erous educational and other brain-conditioning institutions, the m odern S tate can avail itself of the enormous influence of the mass communication media and so considerably strengthen its position w ith respect to the opposition. This circum stance is of great consequence in analyzing the relation of social forces in m odern society; it is particularly important for a correct understanding of radical-right movements, bent on restoring totalitarian forms of government.

Numerous events that have occurred in the last few years may seem to lead to the conclusion that a marked turn to the left is now taking place in the technically most advanced countries. The streets, squares, and universities of large metropolitan centres are often the scene of demonstrations, organized not only as a protest against an imperialist war, but almost as often in support of some radical change to be effected at home. Nevertheless, such a conclusion is unwarranted. The reason is that the leftist orientation of the students' avant-garde, and of one part of the working class, is counteracted by a long step in the opposite direction taken by the members of the wealthy middle classes. This fact has been pointed out by a number of discriminating observers of the American political scene. So David Riesman, in a recently published article,1 maintains that in the United States the forces of the Right are not only more numerous, more powerful, and better organized than are those of the Left, but that, in case of a serious confrontation, they may safely reckon with an incomparably stronger support on the part of the American middle classes.

This is easily understandable if one realizes the fact that the population of industrial countries, taken as a whole, represents a privileged and well-provided-for minority with respect to the overwhelming majority of the poverty-stricken inhabitants of underdeveloped areas in the rest of the world. In our times, such a juxtaposition is not only permissible — it is unavoidable.. As a matter of fact, the world of today is an organic whole, no part of which can make any progress independently of the others. As regards the rate of development, however, there are two opposed views actually in circulation: first, the theory of gradual development, excluding every possibility of leading nations being overtaken by those that are lagging behind, and second, the »great leap« theory, which contends that the evolutionary process can, and ought to be, speeded up by sudden and sweeping changes in the social structure. Needless to say, the former theory has been tailored to suit the interests of industrialized societies; the latter is meant to appeal to the inhabitants of underdeveloped countries.

If it should ever happen that left-wing parties in economically advanced countries were to join forces with the revolutionary movements in underdeveloped areas, then the probabilities of radical right-wing regimes would become very great indeed. However, rebus sic stantibus, an alliance of this kind may be regarded as a very unlikely event — there are many chances in favour of its being a projection of wishful thinking rather than a true historical perspective. And yet, this is not to say that radical right-wing regimes are utterly impossible. A good many other factors and circumstances must be taken into account before such a possibility may safely be discarded. This is not only a matter of some theoretical interest but a problem of real practical importance.

Numerous events that have occurred in the last few years may seem to lead to the conclusion that a marked turn to the left is now taking place in the technically most advanced countries. The streets, squares,

¹ »America Moves to the Right«, New York Times Magazine (October 27, 1968).

and universities of large m etropolitan centres are often the scene of dem onstrations, organized not only as a protest against an im perialist war, b u t almost as often in support of some radical change to be effected at home. Nevertheless, such a conclusion is unw arranted. The reason is that the leftist orientation of the students' avant-garde, and of one p art of the working class, is counteracted by a long step in the opposite direction taken by the m embers of the w ealthy m iddle classes. This fact has been pointed out by a num ber of discrim inating observers of the American political scene. So David Riesman, in a recently published article,1 m aintains that in the United States the forces of the Right are not only more numerous, more powerful, and better organized than are those of the Left, b ut that, in case of a serious confrontation, they may safely reckon w ith an incom parably stronger support on the p art of the American m iddle classes.

This is easily understandable if one realizes the fact that the population of industrial countries, taken as a whole, represents a privileged and w ell-provided-for m inority w ith respect to the overwhelm ing m ajority of the poverty-stricken inhabitants of underdeveloped areas in the rest of the world. In our times, such a juxtaposition is not only perm issible — it is unavoidable.. As a m atter of fact, the world of today is an organic whole, no p art of which can make any progress independently of the others. As regards the rate of development, however, there are two opposed views actually in circulation: first, the theory of gradual development, excluding every possibility of leading nations being overtaken by those th a t are lagging behind, and second, the »great leap« theory, which contends th at the evolutionary process can, and ought to be, speeded up by sudden and sweeping changes in the social structure. Needless to say, the form er theory has been tailored to suit the interests of industrialized societies; the latter is m eant to appeal to the inhabitants of underdeveloped countries.

If it should ever happen th a t left-w ing parties in economically advanced countries were to join forces w ith the revolutionary movements in underdeveloped areas, then the probabilities of radical right-w ing regimes would become very great indeed. However, rebus sic stantibus, an alliance of this kind may be regarded as a very unlikely event — there are m any chances in favour of its being a projection of wishful thinking rath er than a tru e historical perspective. And yet, this is not to say th at radical right-w ing regimes are u tterly impossible. A good m any other factors and circum stances m ust be taken into account before such a possibility may safely be discarded. This is not only a m atter of some theoretical

interest but a problem of real practical importance.

1 »America Moves to the Right«, New Y o rk Times M agazine (October 27, 1968).

In the second half of the twentieth century it is no longer admissible to suppose that the destiny of the whole world is governed exclusively by processes that are going on in the technically and socially most advanced countries. That opininon was proved to be false first by events in Russia and subsequently by those in China; nowadays, the revolutionary potential displayed by underdeveloped countries gives ample evidence of its untenability. This, however, does not prevent the highly industrialized countries from exerting a decisive influence over vast areas in all parts of the world. For that reason it is of no significant consequence if a fascist regime does succeed in seizing power in a minor country. The essential question is whether this is likely to happen in the United States or some other powerful industrial country. In my analysis, I shall limit myself to the examination of the American situation in this respect, but before doing so I shall describe some aspects of the Nazi regime in Germany and give a brief account of conditions that made Hitler's rise to power possible. This, I hope, might help to make the mechanism of fascist manipulation more comprehensible.

It has been sufficiently proved, by modern scientific methods, how wrong it is to look on the Nazis as a band of conspirators who were successful in seizing control of Germany owing, in the first place, to the political ability of their leaders. As a matter of fact, Nazism was born and grew under the protection of the German big-business community, and was accepted by the governing structures as soon as it became evident that a further increase of the monopolistic capital was incompatible with political democracy.

Throughout the period between the two World Wars, the German capital was, on the whole, keeping abreast with its American competitor as regards structural organization, degree of concentration, and force of expansion. In some branches of national economy the Reich was even somewhat ahead of the United States. But depening largely on foreign trade for the import of raw material and the export of manufactured goods, German big businessmen were continually pressing for a repartition of the world among the top nations of that time. To ensure their expansion, they were prepared to use force, at great cost of life and money. In such a case an ideology comes in handy which is apt to justify the enormous sufferings to be endured by the people at large, thus paving the way for the incorporation of the masses into the imperialistic system. This was precisely the role played by the Nazi theory of racial imperialism, conceived as an appropriate instrument for manipulating the social strata. It is a theory that was not satisfied with preaching the superiority of the German race, but availed itself freely of the pseudo-Marxist phraseology. It maintained that Germany was a proletarian country, surroun-

² Neumann, Franz, Behemoth: the Structure and Practice of National Socialism 1933—1944, New York, 1966.

In the second half of the tw entieth century it is no longer admissible to suppose th a t the destiny of the whole world is governed exclusively by processes th a t are going on in the technically and socially most advanced countries. That opininon was proved to be false first by events in Russia and subsequently by those in China; nowadays, the revolutionary potential displayed by underdeveloped countries gives ample evidence of its untena-bility. This, however, does not prevent the highly industrialized countries from exerting a decisive influence over vast areas in all p arts of the world. For that t reason it is of no significant consequence if a fascist regime does succeed in seizing power in a minor country. The essential question is whether this is likely to happen in the U nited States or some other powerful industrial country.

In m y analysis, I shall lim it m yself to the exam ination of the Am erican situation in this respect, but before doing so I shall describe some aspects of the Nazi regim e in Germ any and give a brief account of conditions that t made H itler's rise to power possible. This, I hope, m ight help to make the mechanism of fascist manipulation more comprehensible.

It has been sufficiently proved, by m odern scientific methods, how wrong it is to look on the Nazis as a band of conspirators who were successful in seizing control of G erm any owing, in the first place, to the political ability of the eir leaders. 2 As a matter of fact, Nazism was born and grew under the protection of the Germ an big-business community, and was accepted by the governing structures as soon as it became evident that a further increase of the monopolistic capital was incompatible with political democracy.

Throughout the period betw een the two W orld Wars, the Germ an capital was, on the whole, keeping abreast w ith its American competitor as regards structural organization, degree of concentration, and force of expansion. In some branches of national economy the Reich was even som ewhat ahead of the United States.

B ut depening largely on foreign trade for the im port of raw m aterial and the export of m anufactured goods, Germ an big businessmen w ere continually pressing for a repartition of the world among the top nations of th a t time. To ensure their expansion, they were prepared to use force, at great cost of life and money.

In such a case an ideology comes in handy which is apt to justify the enormous sufferings to be endured by the people at large, thus paving the way for the incorporation of the masses into the imperialistic system. This was precisely the role played by the Nazi theory of racial imperialism, conceived as an appropriate in strum ent for manipulating the social strata. It is a theory that was not satisfied with preaching the superiority of the German race, but availed itself freely of the pseudo-Marxist phraseology.

It m aintained that G erm any was a proletarian country, surroun-

* N eum ann, Franz, Behem oth: the S tructure and Practice of National Socialism 1933—1944, New York, 1966.

ded by a world of hostile plutocratic-capitalistic democracies. It emphasized the fact that the wealth of a nation did not consist of gold in its possession, but was product of human labour — a thesis that was sure to hit the mark in a country denied every possibility to refill its dwindling gold reserves, but possessed of an extremely efficacious productive and technical apparatus that had reached its highest potential under the Nazi regime.

The operative nucleus of this theory, especially as regards internal politics, is formed by anti-Semitism. Once its essential meaning is grasped and its roots laid bare, one is led to believe that National Socialism was, first and foremost, a political manipulation aiming at transforming thought into mere technique of propaganda and domination.3 It is in this field that Nazi leaders showed an amazing ability and power of invention. Resentment and protests of the lower and middle social strata were deftly channeled so as to strengthen the foundations of the very system that had engendered them. Laying blame for a life led in misery and want on a defenceless enemy that was put in the position of an alien element in the body politic, the Nazis managed to achieve a high degree of internation of German society. This is a unique example in contemporary history, showing the enormous power the modern mass influencing media are capable of giving to the political sphere.

Now, in discussing our subject, it is necessary to call special attention to the fact that anti-Semitism was used by the old and new middle classes as a platform for an alliance with industrialists and the landed aristocracy, and that this event was an indispensable condition for the establishment and consolidation of the fascist regime. To be sure, the attainment of that condition was pretty much facilitated by the position of the Jews in German society and especially by the role they were playing in German economy. Jewish influence was unquestionably strong in the free professions and in large towns. Outside the free professions, Jews controlled a considerable part of trade and transport as well as 18.7 per cent of all the banks. The influence of Jewish capital in German industry was remarkable. However, most positions occupied by Jews were primarily of an intermediate character — they served as a link between the big capital and the mass of small entrepreneurs and consumers. Farmers went to Jewish bankers, to Jewish grain or cattle dealers, or to Jewish mortgage agents. Small shopkeepers, who hated the Jewish wholesale merchants from the bottom of their hearts, could not avoid going to them for the renewal of their stocks and were, as a rule, unable to carry on business without asking some Jewish bank for financial aid. The recognition that the Jewish middlemen acted on behalf of the German financial and industrial capitalism was not in concordance with the aspirations of the German middle classes. Such a recognition would have driven them into the socialistic camp, a step they could not take without abandoning their traditions. Inasmuch as

³ Neumann, op. cit., p. 467.

th a t was sure to h it the m ark in a country denied every possibility to refill its dw indling gold reserves, b u t possessed of an extrem ely efficacious productive and technical apparatus th a t had reached its highest potential under the Nazi regime.

The operative nucleus of this theory, especially as regards in ternal politics, is form ed by anti-Sem itism. Once its essential meaning is grasped and its roots laid bare, one is led to believe that National Socialism was, first and foremost, a political manipulation aiming at transforming thought into mere technique of propaganda and domination. It is in this field that Nazi leaders showed an amazing ability and power of invention. Resentment and protests of the lower and middle social strata were deftly channeled so as to strengthen the foundations of the very system that had engendered them. Laying blame for a life led in misery and want on a defenceless enemy that was put in the position of an alien element in the body politic, the Nazis managed to achieve a high degree of internation of German society. This is a unique example in contemporary history, showing the enormous power the modern mass influencing media are capable of giving to the political sphere.

Now, in discussing our subject, it is necessary to call special attention to the fact th a t anti-Sem itism was used by the old and new middle classes as a platform for an alliance with industrialists and the landed aristocracy, and that this event was an indispensable condition for the establishm ent and consolidation of the fascist regime. To be sure, the attainm ent of that condition was pretty much facilitated by the position of the Jew s in Germ an society and especially by the role th ey w ere playing in G erm an economy. Jew ish influence was unquestionably strong in the free professions and in large towns. Outside the free professions, Jew s controlled a considerable p a rt of trad e and tran sp o rt as well as 18.7 per cent of all the banks. The influence of Jew ish capital in G erm an industry was rem arkable. However, most positions occupied by Jew s w ere prim arily of an interm ediate character — they served as a link betw een the big capital and the mass of small entrepreneurs and consumers. Farm ers w ent to Jew ish bankers, to Jew ish grain or cattle dealers, or to Jew ish m ortgage agents.

Small shopkeepers, who h ated the Jew ish wholesale m erchants from the bottom of th eir hearts, could not avoid going to them for th e renew al of th eir stocks and were, as a rule, unable to carry on business w ithout asking some Jew ish bank for financial aid.

The recognition th at the Jew ish m iddlem en acted on behalf of the

G erm an financial and industrial capitalism was not in concordance w ith the aspirations of the G erm an middle classes. Such a recognition would have driven them into the socialistic camp, a step they could not take w ithout abandoning their traditions. Inasm uch as 8 Neum ann, op. cit., p. 467.

they refused to be proletarized, those classes were only too glad to accept the National Socialist doctrine, branding the Jews as a domestic extension of the external, international, capitalistic plutocracy, and regarded as a serious threat to the German national interests. In addition, anti-Jewish hatred expressed the anxiety of those groups whose traditional patterns of culture were threatened by the intellectual vanguard that was to a considerable extent composed of Jews. Those groups were joined by many representatives of the free professions, and not a few university teachers, who considered themselves threatened by a strong Jewish competition.

A common characteristic exhibited by the majority of zealous anti-Semites consisted in the exacerbating effect that the concentration of monopolistic capital produced on their feeling of insecurity. Another collective trait in the character of the same group—one that Nazi manipulative strategy knew how to make the most of it—was a harmonious compound of racial feeling and anti-Communist orientation. (By the way, the selfsame trait had once served as the social basis for a compact between big capital and the Social Democracy, concluded long before National Socialism appeared on the political scene. This happened in the first years of our century on the pretext of a Bolshevik threat to world peace; the agreement has remained in force ever since and for the same alleged purpose.)

It is a matter of strict fact that the German Communist Party, after an initial stage marked by a series of successes due, in the main, to military defeat and the victory of the October Revolution, soon found itself in a state of total isolation and was afterwards almost completely linquidated. This was largely the results of wrong tactics employed by German communists, who got them ready-made direct from Russia. Worked out for use under quite different conditions, and originating in a country that had been a traditional rival throughout history, these tactics were chiefly responsible for the blotting out, in the consciousness of the German people, of the idea of proletarian solidatity as soon as it came in conflict with a cleverly produced, and adroitly maintained, feeling of racial and national identity.

This feeling is an inherent feature of social relations based on capitalistic forms of property, so that a proletarian, regarded as a potential negation of those relations, appears to be a person without nationality. Fascism, on the other hand, tried to preserve and strengthen those relations by stirring up nationalism as a particular form of consciousness — one that adopts the maxim »might is right« as a guiding principle in society.

The essence of nationalism lies in ethnocentrism, which may be resorted to by large and strong social groups trying to exert pressure on some smaller and weaker groups, and vice versa, by small and weak social groups striving to free themselves from pressure of some larger and stronger groups. It can be reduced to an affir-

⁴ Neumann, op. cit., p. 121.

plutocracy, and regarded as a serious th reat to the German national interests. In addition, anti-Jew ish hatred expressed the anxiety of those groups whose traditional patterns of culture were threatened by the intellectual vanguard th at was to a considerable extent composed of Jews. Those groups w ere joined by many rep resentatives of the free professions, and not a few university teachers, who considered themselves threatened by a strong Jewish competition.4

A common characteristic exhibited by the m ajority of zealous anti-Sem ites consisted in the exacerbating effect th at the concentration of monopolistic capital produced on their feeling of insecurity. A nother collective trait in the character of the same group

— one that Nazi manipulative strategy knew how to make the most of it — was a harm onious compound of racial feeling and anti-Communist orientation. (By the way, the selfsame trait had once served as the social basis for a compact between big capital and the Social Democracy, concluded long before National Socialism appeared on the political scene. This happened in the first years of our century on the pretext of a Bolshevik threat to world peace; the agreement has remained in force ever since and for the same alleged purpose.)

It is a m atter of strict fact th a t the Germ an Communist Party, after an initial stage m arked by a series of successes due, in the main, to m ilitary defeat and the victory of the October Revolution, soon found itself in a state of total isolation and was afterw ards almost completely linquidated. This was largely the results of wrong tactics employed by G erm an communists, who got them ready-m ade direct from Russia. Worked out for use under quite d ifferent conditions, and originating in a country th at had been a traditional rival throughout history, these tactics were chiefly responsible for the blotting out, in the consciousness of the Germ an people, of the idea of proletarian solidarity as soon as it came in conflict w ith a cleverly produced, and adroitly maintained, feeling of racial and national identity.

This feeling is an inherent feature of social relations based on capitalistic form s of property, so th a t a proletarian, regarded as a potential negation of those relations, appears to be a person w ithout nationality. Fascism, on the other hand, tried to preserve and strengthen those relations by stirring up nationalism as a p articular form of consciousness — one th a t adopts the maxim »might is right« as a guiding principle in society.

The essence of nationalism lies in ethnocentrism, which may be resorted to by large and strong social groups trying to exert pressure

on some sm aller and w eaker groups, and vice versa, by small and w eak social groups striving to free themselves from pressure of some larg er and stronger groups. It can be reduced to an affir4 N eum ann, op. cit., p. 121.

mation of its own ingroup properties and the concurrent negation of the properties peculiar to the opposed group or groups. It is the cohesive force of social groups based on egoism. Individual, family, civil or religious community, region, State — those are the various levels in which the biological and human law of self-preservation is still operative. Yet if ethnocentrism manifested by an oppressed group may sometimes be condoned as a desperate act of self--defence, it must be condemned as a crime against humanity whenever it is used as a means of oppression. At any rate, ethnocentrism (or, for that matter, nationalism) is a social evil when pursued for its own sake, because in that case it aims at securing some advantage for oneself by deliberately causing harm to others. It means putting one in a position to find a personal interest in playing his fellow man foul. An extremity of this attitude can be seen in the Nazi ideology, advocating physical extremination of all opponents as an absolute necessity in the struggle for political survival.

At this point, the central question is: how was it possible for a whole people to give their unqualified approval and support to a political system that promised them progress and prosperity on condition that they were prepared to take upon themselves the outrageous guilt of committing premeditated genocide? However, as there is evidence that a great number of Germans was not aware of what was really going, on, the question might perhaps just as well be put in these terms: what are the conditions that make it possible for the inhabitants of a highly industrialized country to reach so high a degree of identification with an aggressive totilitarian regime? The answer to this question is much more important as an indication of what might happen in the years to come than as an explanation of what has occurred in the past.

To account for the conformity of the masses there are, first of all, various measures taken by a totalitarian regime for the purpose of moulding and adjusting the popular will to its own. The most often used methods include - systematic atomization of society through complete control of all agents acting as intermediaries between the State and the masses; setting up of a huge network of authoritarian and semi-authoritarian organizations controlling the life of each citizen from birth to death; replacement of free relations between individuals by controlled connexions, apt to remove the last remnants of human spontaneity; subjection of every aspect of social life (work, leisure, sport, culture, family) to an organizational principle tending to promote technical efficiency by suppressing freedom and independence. All of these methods were used by the Nazi regime without encountering resistance because they happened to fall in with the tradition and character of the German people.

According to a wide-spread opinion, the identification of the German people with their fascist regime was made possible by the pervasion of their way of life with the spirit of Protestant ethics. This point of view has been worked out in detail by Erich

m ation of its own ingroup properties and the concurrent negation of the properties peculiar to the opposed group or groups. It is the cohesive force of social groups based on egoism. Individual, family, civil or religious community, region, S tate — those are the various levels in which the biological and hum an law of self-preservation is still operative. Yet if ethnocentrism m anifested by an oppressed group may sometimes be condoned as a desperate act of self-

-defence, it m ust be condemned as a crime against hum anity w henever it is used as a m eans of oppression. At any rate, ethnocentrism (or, for that matter, nationalism) is a social evil when pursued for its own sake, because in that case it aims at securing some advantage for oneself by deliberately causing harm to others.

It means putting one in a position to find a personal interest in playing his fellow man foul. An extrem ity of this attitude can be seen in the Nazi ideology, advocating physical extrem ination of all opponents as an absolute necessity in the struggle for political survival.

A t this point, the central question is: how was it possible for a whole people to give their unqualified approval and support to a political system that promised them progress and prosperity on condition that they were prepared to take upon themselves the outrageous guilt of committing premeditated genocide? However, as there is evidence that a great number of Germans was not aware of what was really going, on, the question might perhaps just as well be put in these terms: what are the conditions that make it possible for the inhabitants of a highly industrialized country to reach so high a degree of identification with an aggressive totilitarian regime? The answer to this question is much more important as an indication of what might happen in the years to come than as an explanation of what has occurred in the past.

To account for the conformity of the masses there are, first of all, various m easures taken by a to talitarian regim e for the p u rpose of moulding and adjusting the popular will to its own. The most often used methods include — system atic atomization of society through complete control of all agents acting as intermediaries between the State and the masses; setting up of a huge network of authoritarian and semi-authoritarian organizations controlling the life of each citizen from birth to death; replacement of free relations between individuals by controlled connexions, apt to remove the last remnants of hum an spontaneity; subjection of every aspect of social life (work, leisure, sport, culture, family) to an organizational principle tending to promote technical efficiency by suppressing freedom and independence. All of these methods were used by the Nazi regime w ithout encountering re sistance because they happened to fall in with

the tradition and character of the Germ an people.

According to a w ide-spread opinion, the identification of the German people w ith the ir fascist regime was made possible by the pervasion of the ir way of life w ith the spirit of Protestant ethics. This point of view has been worked out in detail by Erich 400

Fromm in his Escape from Freedom. Negation of personality, he argues, which was the necessary ideological condition of Germany's nazification, may be said to have been a postulate of the main moral principle of Protestantism — man's absolute subordination to his God. (»God,« in this context, may be taken to stand for »capitalism.«) To Luther and Calvin, man is the means of divine glory. Consequently, his activities are directed towards a goal that lies beyond himself. In Fromm's opinion, a tenet like this was quite capable of breaking man's spiritual backbone.⁵ As capitalism was gradually gaining strength, people grew more and more convinced of their own helplessness. Under such conditions they deliberately renounced their freedom and chose to follow the lead of those who proved to possess the ability and the power to satisfy their material needs in the course of a continous technical progress.

Extensive researches have been carried out to discover the psychological motives that may prevail upon an individual to accept fascism. The psychoanalytical explanation is that a person is liable to have recourse to group terriorism as a compensation for frustrations suffered in his own private life. If so, the authoritarian structure of the German family was largely responsible for it. It is on this line of thought that the concept of »authoritarian syndrome« has been developed. Under the conditions of external social pressure, and the accompanying thwarting of inner impluses, a person cannot effect his social adjustment, except by finding satisfaction in submission and servility. This means two things first, relying blindly on authority in all matters, and second, being ready to attack all those who, owing to their social position, may be regarded as convenient objects for scapegoating. On the social level, this is a common characteristic of the lower middle classes, among whose ranks is to be found, in great numbers ,the type of the impressionable weakling who goes in for violence and aggression in order to find a compensation for his feeling of insecurity. In conditions of general crisis and frustration, prevalent in Germany after the First World War, the authoritarian syndrome spread easily among other social strata as well.

Anoher factor that had contributed a great deal to the success of National Socialism in Germany should by no means be lost sight of, viz., that Nazi politics was based on the principle of full employment. By putting this principle into practice at a time of general unemployment and social insecurity, the regime managed to establish a close tie between the masses and their ruling class. The singificance of this achievement cannot be overestimated. Furthermore, full employment was accompanied by an elaborate social-security programme. The system had been developed by the Weimar democracy, but was not fully realized before Hitler assumed the reins of government. Full employment and social se-

Fromm, Erich, Escape from Freedom, New York, 1961.
 Adorno, Theodore W., and Others, The Authoritarian Personality, New York, 1964.

principle of Protestantism — mart's absolute subordination to his God. (»God,« in this context, may be taken to stand for »capitalism.«) To L uther and Calvin, m an is the means of divine glory. Consequently, his activities are directed towards a goal th a t lies beyond himself. In From m's opinion, a tenet like this w as quite capable of breaking m an's spiritual backbone.5 As capitalism was gradually gaining strength, people grew more and more convinced of their own helplessness. U nder such conditions they deliberately renounced their freedom and chose to follow the lead of those who proved to possess the ability and the power to satisfy their material needs in the course of a continous technical progress.

Extensive researches have been carried out to discover the psychological motives that may prevail upon an individual to accept fascism. The psychoanalytical explanation is that a person is liable to have recourse to group terriorism as a compensation for frustrations suffered in his own private life. If so, the authoritarian structure of the Germ an family was largely responsible for it. It is on this line of thought that the concept of »authoritarian syndrome« has been developed. Under the conditions of external social pressure, and the accompanying thwarting of inner impluses, a person cannot effect his social adjustment, except by finding satisfaction in submission and servility. This means two things—

first, relying blindly on authority in all m atters, and second, being ready to attack all those who, owing to the ir social position, may be regarded as convenient objects for scapegoating. On the social level, this is a common characteristic of the lower middle classes, among whose ranks is to be found, in great num bers, the type of the im pressionable we eakling who goes in for violence and aggression in order to find a compensation for his feeling of insecurity.

In conditions of general crisis and frustration, prevalent in G erm any afte r th e F irst W orld War, the authoritarian syndrome spread easily among other social strata as well.

A noher factor that had contributed a great deal to the success of National Socialism in Germ any should by no means be lost sight of, viz., that Nazi politics was based on the principle of fullem ployment. By putting this principle into practice at a time of general unem ployment and social insecurity, the regime managed to establish a close tie between the masses and their ruling class.

The singificance of this achievem ent cannot be overestimated.

Furtherm ore, full em ploym ent was accompanied by an elaborate social-security program m e. The system had been developed by the W eim ar democracy, b u t w as not fully realized before H itler assum ed the reins of governm ent. Full employm ent and social se

- * Fromm, Erich, Escape fro m Freedom, New York, 1961.
- Adorno, Theodore W., and Others, The Authoritarian Personality, New York, 1964.

curity were the chief factors of internal stabilization and served, at the same time, as convincing arguments — the only ones that were built on the truth — for a cleverly worked-out propaganda.

As propaganda is one of the aspects of violence (it is, in fact, violence committed against the soul) it is bound to go hand in hand with terror. In the case of Nazi Germany, the violence practised by the propagandists was seconded by the terror practised by the S. A. and S. S. formations, with the connivance of the judiciary and other organs of government. Yet, with regard to the technique of manipulation, it is well worth mentioning that one of the most important tasks of Nazi propaganda consisted in keeping the German people in a permanent state of tension. Its insistence upon activism in place of thinking meant that men should never have the freedom and time to think for themselves. But since action without thought is impossible, except in short periods of genuine mass spontaneity, the activism so achieved was nothing else but a form of bureaucratic manipulation tryng to make the action of an authoritarian apparatus appear as the spontaneous activity of the masses. This technique was first developed in the National Socialist mass meeting. As Hitler said in Mein Kampf, the mass meeting is necessary if only for the reason that in it the average individual, who feels lonely and is easily seized with the fear of being alone experiences for the first time the reassuring feeling of belonging to a greater community. If such a man, the Führer tells us steps out of his small workshop or out of the big enterprise in which he feels very small, into the mass meeting and is now surrounded by thousands and thousands of people with the same conviction, he himself succumbs to the magic influence of what the Nazi leader calls mass suggestion.⁸

At the basis of all these mechanisms of domination and techniques of manipulation we always find the aggressive structure of monopolistic capitalsm. In a situation of keen international competition, when the very foundations of the established order are in danger of collapsing under the threat of a social revolution, the monopolistic capital makes full use of various means of coercion, placed at its disposal by modern methods of government. In addition, by provoking and encouraging the initiative of groups and individuals that have become déclassé, it tends to debase most of the cultural and other spiritual values. For these reasons, the alternative offered by the radical Right, however attractive it may seem at first sight, will prove disappointing in the long run. Nevertheless, this alternative is always present, although it often turns out to be the last line of defence, rather than the starting-point for an attack, of the conservative forces.

3

Ever since the end of the Second World War, the forces of international Conservatism have been given the opportunity of using

curity were the chief factors of internal stabilization and served, at the same time, as convincing argum ents — the only ones that were built on the truth — for a cleverly worked-out propaganda.

⁷ Neumann, op. cit., p. 438.

⁸ Hitler, Adolf, Mein Kampf, Reynal & Hitchcock, New York, 1939, p. 715.

As propaganda is one of the aspects of violence (it is, in fact, violence committed against the soul) it is bound to go hand in hand w ith terror. In the case of Nazi Germany, the violence practised by the propagandists was seconded by the terror practised by the S. A. and S. S. formations, w ith the connivance of the judiciary and other organs of government. Yet, w ith regard to the technique of manipulation, it is well w orth m entioning th at one of the most im portant tasks of Nazi propaganda consisted in keeping the Germ an people in a perm anent state of tension. Its insistence upon activism in place of thinking m eant th a t men should never have the freedom and time to think for themselves.

B ut since action w ithout thought is impossible, except in short periods of genuine mass spontaneity, the activism so achieved was nothing else but a form of bureaucratic m anipulation tryng to make the action of an authoritarian apparatus appear as the spontaneous activity of the masses. This technique was first developed in the National Socialist mass meeting. As H itler said in Mein Kam pf, the mass m eeting is necessary if only for the reason th at in it the average individual, who feels lonely and is easily seized w ith the fear of being alone experiences for the first tim e the reassuring feeling of belonging to a g reater community. If such a man. the Fiihrer tells us steps out of his small workshop or out of the big enterprise ,in which he feels very small, into the mass m eeting and is now surrounded by thousands and thousands of people w ith the same conviction, he him self succumbs to the magic influence of w hat the Nazi leader calls mass suggestion.3

At the basis of all these mechanisms of domination and techniques of m anipulation we always find the aggressive structure of monopolistic capitalsm. In a situation of keen international competition, when the very foundations of the established order are in danger of collapsing under the th re a t of a social revolution, the monopolistic capital makes full use of various means of coercion, placed at its disposal by m odem methods of government. In addition, by provoking and encouraging the initiative of groups and individuals th at have become declasse, it tends to debase most of the cultural and other spiritual values. For these reasons, the alternative offered by the radical Eight, however attractive it may seem at first sight, will prove disappointing in the long run. Nevertheless, this alternative is always present, although it often turns out to be the last line of defence, ra th e r than the starting-

-point for an attack, of the conservative forces.

Ever since the end of the Second World War, the forces of in ternational Conservatism have been given the opportunity of using 7 Neumann, op. cit., p. 438.

8 Hitler, Adolf, Mein K am pf, Reynal & Hitchcock, New York, 1939, p. 715.

the strongest of all capitalistic powers of our time - the United States of America — as their main base of operation. Moreover, the government in Washington has never made a secret of it that it is ready to take any risks, not excluding that of a military intervention, in order to protect America's economic, political, and ideological interests in any part of the world where the maintenance of the status quo is in jeopardy. During the period of the cold war, the American radical Right was trying to convince the public opinion that it would be a gross mistake to give further support to the policy of anti-Fascist coalition, started by President Roosevelt and his Democratic Party. That policy, in the opinion of the right extremists, was responsible for the triumph of the Soviet Union and the subsequent spreading of Communism in the world. However, their campaign was not much of a success. The radical--right propaganda just missed the point that American capitalists were securing for themselves great advantages from the defeat of the German and Japanese fascist regimes. The American businessmen, the same that are now engaged in supporting, by both overt and surreptitious actions, numerous fascist and semifascist regimes in various parts of the globe, still find that, in the domain of domestic policy and ideology, liberalistic conceptions are the most suitable for the promotion of their interests.

If compared with the German situation under the Nazi regime, described in the preceding section, the present state of affairs in the United States shows many significant differences. The American capital, unlike its German counterpart, possesses enormous resources in its own country and has at its disposal a huge domestic market. Instead of asking for a repartition of the world, it uses its economic superiority to occupy new territories by ousting its less energetic partners from them. It is drawing much benefit from the conflict between the Soviet Union and China, which has made it impossible for the major part of socialist countries to adopt a common policy. At home, it is not threatened by the danger of an impending revolution of the Left, which might call for the establishment of a totalitarian regime. Finally, in the United States there are no Junkers, who played such an important part in the radicalization of the German rightist movement. On analyzing all the factors that have so far been found to be responsible for the establishment of reactionary regimes, we must come to the conclus ion that the United States is not at all likely to take such a political course in the near future. However, if, owing to some radical changes in the structure of the American economic system, such an alternative should become acceptable to the big financiers and businessmen, it is quite reasonable to suppose that the prosperous, and no less numerous, American middle classes, in accordance with the logic of their interests and aspirations, would give their full support to it. This particular section of American society may justly be considered as the main reserve of the American capital. The Communist menace would presumably be alleged for the establishment of an authoritarian regime, but skapegoating on an ethical or racial basis is not to be excluded beforehand.

the strongest of all capitalistic powers of our tim e — the United States of America — as their main base of operation. Moreover, the governm ent in Washington has never made a secret of it that it is

ready to take any risks, not excluding th a t of a m ilitary intervention, in order to protect America's economic, political, and ideological interests in any p art of the world w here the m aintenance of the status quo is in jeopardy. D uring the period of the cold w ar, the American radical Right was trying to convince the public opinion th at it would be a gross m istake to give fu rth er support to the policy of anti-Fascist coalition, started by President Roosevelt and his Democratic P arty. That policy, in the opinion of the right extrem ists, was responsible for the trium ph of the Soviet Union and the subsequent spreading of Communism in the world.

However, th eir cam paign was not m uch of a success. The radical-

-rig h t propaganda ju st missed the point th a t American capitalists w ere securing for themselves great advantages from the defeat of the G erm an and Japanese fascist regimes. The American businessmen, the same th a t are now engaged in supporting, by both overt and surreptitious actions, num erous fascist and semifascist regimes in various p arts of the globe, still find that, in the domain of domestic policy and ideology, liberalistic conceptions are the most suitable for the prom otion of the ir interests.

If compared with the G erm an situation under the Nazi regime, described in the preceding section, the present state of affairs in the United States shows m any significant differences. The American capital, unlike its G erm an counterpart, possesses enormous resources in its own country and has at its disposal a huge domestic m arket. Instead of asking for a repartition of the world, it uses its economic superiority to occupy new territories by ousting its less energetic p artners from them. It is draw ing much benefit from the conflict betw een the Soviet Union and China, which has made it impossible for the m ajor p a rt of socialist countries to adopt a common policy. A t home, it is not threatened by the danger of an im pending revolution of the Left, which m ight call for the establishm ent of a to talitarian regime. Finally, in the United States there are no Junkers, who played such an important p art in the radicalization of the G erm an rightist movement. On analyzing all the factors that the have so far been found to be responsible for the establishm ent of reactionary regimes, we m ust come to the conclus ion th a t the U nited States is not at all likely to take such a political course in the n ear future. However, if, owing to some radical changes in the stru ctu re of the American economic system, such an alternative should become acceptable to the big financiers and businessmen, it is quite reasonable to suppose that the prosperous, and no less numerous, American middle classes, in accordance with the logic of their interests and aspirations, would

give th eir full support to it. This p articular section of American society m ay ju stly be considered as the m ain reserve of the American capital. The Communist menace w ould presum ably be alleged for the establishm ent of an au thoritarian regime, b u t skapegoating on an ethical or racial basis is not to be excluded beforehand.

In one respect the American situation differs widely from the conditions found in Germany: in the United States there are numerous nonwhite minorities, who, in open violation of their constitutional rights, are not permitted to rise from the lowest positions in the social scale and are subjected to racial discrimination. Under the sway of the radical Right those groups would be discriminated against in an even greater measure, and yet, on account of their marginal position in the national economic system, they can hardly be expected to be made use of, as were the Jews in Germany, for the purpose of political and psychological mass manipulation. Once more, the Jews are likely to be found much more suitable for this role because of the intermediary character of the positions they occupy. Anyhow, there have been up to now no manifest signs of a militant anti-Semitism in America, though the prejudice against the Jews does exist, in a more or less latent form, in various strata of society and could easily be activated if the occasion should call for it. Anti-Semitism is particurarly noticeable among the representatives of the upper class, who, in defense of their status given to them by the »Protestant Establishment«, will do all in their power to debar Jews from investing in key industries and exclude them from distinguished social clubs and fashionable residential quarters.9 Anti-Semitism is an equally prominent feature of the lowest social class. This is especially evident among Negroes and other inhabitants of the slums, who depend on the Jewish small entrepreneurs for their daily supply of goods and services. It is a well-known fact that during Negro troubles the shops situated in ghettos, which are for the most part owned by Jews, are the first to be attacked. The delicate situation of American Jews exerts a considerable influence on the foreign policy of the state of Israel. 10 If Israel dared to go anti-American, it would probably provoke an immediate activation of anti-Semitism in the United States and - other circumstances being equally favourable — the American Jews would suddently find themselves in the position of an alien body.

However, such sequence of events is for the time being highly improbable. In American society, a continuous process of assimilation and integration of heterogeneous ethnic groups is going on contemporaneously with the complementary process of discriminatory stratification. (The latter is of course a pretty useful means for making the estabilished order more stable.) If American labour have failed so far to give evidence of their class consciousness and do not seem to have been overanxious to achieve the necessary unity of action, this has been certainly, though not exclusively due to a discriminatory splitting up of the working class along

In one respect the American situation differs widely from the conditions found in Germany: in the United States there are nu merous nonw hite minorities, who, in open violation of their

⁹ Baltzell, E. Digby, The Protestant Establishment, New York, 1966.

This policy is made to agree strictly with the interests of the American military-industrial complex, which entails its identification with the radical-right orientation. At the same time, numerous Jewish intellectuals are playing an important part in the American leftist movement.

constitutional rights, are not perm itted to rise from the lowest positions in the social scale and are subjected to racial discrimination.

U nder the sway of the radical Right those groups would be discriminated against in an even greater measure, and yet, on account of th eir m arginal position in the national economic system, they can hardly be expected to be made use of, as were the Jew s in Germany, for the purpose of political and psychological mass manipulation. Once more, the Jew s are likely to be found m uch more suitable for this role because of the interm ediary character of the positions they occupy. Anyhow, there have been up to now no m anifest signs of a m ilitant anti-Sem itism in America, though the prejudice against the Jew s does exist, in a more or less laten t form, in various strata of society and could easily be activated if the occasion should call for it. Anti-Sem itism is p articurarly noticeable among the representatives of the upper class, who, in defense of their status given to them by the »Protestant Establishment«, will do all in their power to debar Jew s from investing in key industries and exclude them from distinguished social clubs and fashionable residential quarters.9 Anti-Sem itism is an equally prom inent feature of the lowest social class. This is especially evident among Negroes and other inhabitants of the slums, who depend on the Jew ish small entrepreneurs for th eir daily supply of goods and services. It is a well-known fact that during Negro troubles the shops situated in ghettos, which are for the most p art owned by Jews, are the first to be attacked. The delicate situation of American Jew s exerts a considerable influence on the foreign policy of the state of Israel.10 If Israel dared to go anti-Am erican, it would probably provoke an im m ediate activation of anti-Semitism in the United States and — other circumstances being equally favourable the Am erican Jew s would suddently find themselves in the position of an alien body.

However, such sequence of events is for the tim e being highly improbable. In American society, a continuous process of assimilation and integration of heterogeneous ethnic groups is going on contemporaneously w ith the com plem entary process of discriminatory stratification. (The latter is of course a pretty useful means for making the establish ed order more stable.) If American labour have failed so far to give evidence of their class consciousness and do not seem to have been overanxious to achieve the necessary unity of action, this has been certainly, though not exclusively due to a discriminatory splitting up of the working class along

^{&#}x27;Baltzell, E. Digby, The Protestant Establishment, New York, 1966.

10 This policy is m ade to agree strictly w ith the interests of the Am erican m ilitary -in d u strial complex, w hich entails its identification w ith the radical-

-rig h t orientation. A t the same time, num erous Jew ish intellectuals are playing an im portant p a rt in the A m erican leftist movement.

ethnic lines.¹¹ The most sharply marked division is that between white and coloured citizens. Racial segregation is indeed a fundamental principle of the right-wing political programme. Sure enough, a thing like that never happens by pure accident.

At the present moment, the radical Right is getting much benefit from the negative reaction of public opinion to the increasingly vigorous Negro and students protest movements. It expects to win still more followers by accusing the students who would like to make common cause with the Negroes of conspiring against the Nation. As a consequence, here is a noticeable shift to the right within numerous labour groups and the lower middle class. The strata that are most involved are those that come into close contact with the nonwhite inhabitants of ghettos. They are against making concessions to Negroes because they are convinced that Negro prosperity and mobility constitute an immediate threat to their own interests. They form a large part of the partisans of Henry Wallace, the racist politician who polled over nine million votes at the 1964 presidentical elections. Obviously, under such conditions, the Right may rely on it that the poor strata of American society will give it strong support on a racial basis. This is an important prerequiste of fascist manipulation. For it is precisely from those social classes that the army of scoundrels is recruited whose task it is to do the dirty work for the fascist »big shots.« While unemployment makes such porsons assume a negative attitude towards work, economic insecurity makes them prepared to follow their leaders. They are joined by men coming from »hazardous occupations« — veterans that have served in special units during the Korean and Vietnam Wars, marines, air force aces, automobile racing drivers - all of whom are apt to become commanders of shock troops engaged in provoking disorder during student or Negro demonstrations. Such individuals are psychologically preconditioned for authoritarianism. They glory in their strength, despise weakness, and like to make a great display of their aggressive chauvinism before people of »inferior« races or nationalities. A good many of them have become members of various authoritarian organizations, such as Ku Klux Klan, the John Birch Society, and even of the American Nazi Party. They are also well represented in numerous veterans' and women's associations, which could hardly be said to be of a more liberal character. The younger generation has the opportunity of enlisting under the banner of some patriotic youth organization or other, which of course they usually do, but for all that may often be seen dashing along the streets on their motorcycles, doing their best to make them-selves a nuisance to the community. As a matter of fact, these ardent votaries of a nihilist philosophy of violence, known as »Hell's Angels«, have become a downright pest of American towns.

A second source of support for radical-right activities — a stronger and much more reliable one at that — are the nouveaux

ethnic lines.11 The most sharply m arked division is that between w hite and coloured citizens. Racial segregation is indeed a fundam ental principle of the right-w ing political programme.

¹¹ Lipset, Seymour M., and Richard Bendix, Social Mobility in Industrial Society, Berkley, 1964.

enough, a thing like th a t never happens by pure accident.

A t the present moment, the radical Right is getting much benefit from the negative reaction of public opinion to the increasingly vigorous Negro and students protest movements. It expects to win still more followers by accusing the students who would like to make common cause with the Negroes of conspiring against the Nation. As a consequence, here is a noticeable shift to the right w ithin num erous labour groups and the lower middle class. The stra ta th a t are most involved are those that t come into close contact with the nonwhite inhabitants of ghettos. They are against making concessions to Negroes because they are convinced that Negro prosperity and mobility constitute an im m ediate th reat to their own interests. They form a large p art of the partisans of Henry Wallace, the racist politician who polled over nine million votes at the 1964 p re s id e n tia l elections. Obviously, under such conditions, the Right m ay rely on it that the poor strata of American society will give it strong support on a racial basis. This is an important prerequiste of fascist manipulation. For it is precisely from those social classes that the arm v of scoundrels is recruited whose task it is to do the dirty w ork for the fascist »big shots.«

While unem ploym ent makes such porsons assume a negative a ttitude tow ards work, economic insecurity makes them prepared to follow the eir leaders. They are joined by men coming from whazardous occupations—weterans that have served in special units during the K orean and Vietnam Wars, marines, air force aces, automobile racing drivers—all of whom are apt to become commanders of shock troops engaged in provoking disorder during student or Negro demonstrations. Such individuals are psychologically preconditioned for authoritarianism. They glory in their strength, despise weakness, and like to make a great display of their aggressive chauvinism before people of winferior—races or nationalities.

A good m any of them have become mem bers of various authoritarian organizations, such as Ku K lux Klan, the John Birch Society, and even of the A m erican Nazi Party. They are also well represented in num erous veterans' and wom en's associations, which could hard ly be said to be of a m ore liberal character. The younger generation has the opportunity of enlisting under the banner of some patriotic youth organization or other, which of course they usually do, b u t for all th a t m ay often be seen dashing along the streets on th eir motorcycles,

doing the ir best to make them selves a nuisance to the community. As a matter of fact, these ardent votaries of a nihilist philosophy of violence, known as

»Hell's Angels«, have become a dow nright pest of American towns.

A second source of support for radical-right activities — a stronger and m uch more reliable one a t th a t — are the nouveaux 11 Lipset, Seym our M., and R ichard Bendix, Social M obility in Industrial Society, Berkley, 1964.

riches, including automobile dealers and real estate manipulators as the most important group among them. The American sociologist, Daniel Bell, suggests that this class of speculators lack psychological assurance that they, like their forbears, have earned their own wealth, rather than accumulated it through government aid. According to the same author, they fear that "taxes" will rob them of that wealth and are therefore convinced that the liberal government of the New Deal type should be substituted by a right-oriented one, i. e., by a government that would prove more dedicated to safeguarding the sacrosanct rights and privileges of private property. 12 To this category belong three types of persons. The first are found among the middle strata of some ethnic groups, such as the Germans and Irish, who are anxious to be accepted by the community as "true Americans". The second are found among some strata of the rural population who have lost their economic powers but are still capable of bringing their influence to bear upon politics. Finally, there is a minor group of intellectuals who confide in anti-Communism for the advancement of their careers.13

One additional factor may be quoted as directly contributing to the reinforcement of the right-wing camp — the political reorientation of that part of manual workers (and, occasionally, of skilled and white-collar workers too) who, after having lost their jobs owing to the development of automation, have their standards of living lowered in times of prosperity and well-being.

Generally speaking, the strength of the Right derives from the feeling of anxiety experienced by many people, irrespective of their class affiliations, when they are confronted with all too sudden technological changes. This applies not only to the racist South with its obsolete social structure, but also to a host of small entrepreneurs scattered all over the country, who, on becoming conscious of their inability to cope with the big corporations sound the note of alarm in an attempt to raise the nation against those who seem to threaten some of the most cherished American traditional values.

Under such conditions, the rise of right radicalism assumes the proportions of a social and political counter-revolution.

It is an historical fact that the United States moves to the right every time the nation is faced with a major defeat in field of international affairs. So McCarthysm came after the Korean War, when it was no longer possible for anyone to refuse to acknowledge the grim truth that the Chinese revolution was a fait accompli. The consequences of the present war in Vietnam, in so far as they have materialized up to now, are very much the same. As it became manifest, for all the official propaganda was saying to the contrary, that that was just another military expedition bound to end in failure, the symptomatic turn to the right was

¹³ Hofstadter, Richard, »The Pseudo-Conservative Revolt,« in *The Radical Right*, ed. by D. Bell, New York, 1964.

¹² Bell, Daniell, "Interpretations of American Politics," in The Radical Right, ed. by D. Bell, New York, 1964.

assurance th at they, like their forbears, have earned their own wealth, rather than accumulated it through government aid. According to the same author, they fear that **ataxes** will rob them of that wealth and are therefore convinced that the liberal government of the New Deal type should be substituted by a right-oriented one, i. e., by a government that would prove more dedicated to safeguarding the sacrosanct rights and privileges of private property. 12 To this category belong three types of persons.

The first are found among the m iddle strata of some ethnic groups, such as the Germans and Irish, who are anxious to be accepted by the community as »true Americans«. The second are found among some strata of the ru ral population who have lost the economic powers but are still capable of bringing the ir influence to bear upon politics. Finally, there is a m inor group of intellectuals who confide in anti-Communism for the advancement of their careers.13

One additional factor m ay be quoted as directly contributing to the reinforcem ent of the right-w ing camp — the political reorientation of th a t p art of m anual w orkers (and, occasionally, of skilled and w hite-collar w orkers too) who, after having lost the eir jobs owing to the developm ent of automation, have the ir standards of living lowered in times of prosperity and well-being.

G enerally speaking, the strength of the Right derives from the feeling of anxiety experienced by m any people, irrespective of their class affiliations, when they are confronted w ith all too sudden technological changes. This applies not only to the racist South w ith its obsolete social structure, b u t also to a host of small entrepreneurs scattered all over the country, who, on becoming conscious of their inability to cope w ith the big corporations sound the note of alarm in an attempt to raise the nation against those who seem to the reaten some of the most cherished American traditional values.

U nder such conditions, the rise of right radicalism assumes the proportions of a social and political counter-revolution.

It is an historical fact that the United States moves to the right every time the nation is faced with a major defeat in field of international affairs. So McCarthysm came after the Korean War, when it was no longer possible for anyone to refuse to acknowledge the grimtruth that the Chinese revolution was a fait accompli. The consequences of the present war in Vietnam, in so far as they have materialized up to now, are very much the same.

As it became manifest, for all the official propaganda was saying to the contrary, that that was just another military expedition bound to end in failure, the symptomatic turn to the right was 12 Bell, Daniell, »Interpretations of American Politics, «in The Radical Right, ed. by D. Bell, New York, 1964.

18 H ofstadter, Richard, »The Pseudo-C onservative Revolt,« in The Radical Right, ed. by D. Bell, New York, 1964.

there at once, and with it the unavoidable repercussions on the results of the next elections. Inevitably, whenever an expansionist illusion is shattered, something must be done to silence the voices of those who have constantly been pleading for more political freedom and more tolerance. The conservative forces, and particularly the anti-Communist crusaders, may then become increasingly intransigent and aggressive.

Well, but what about nationalism in America? Is a nationalist ideology immanent in the American Right as it is, or has been, in comparable movements elsewhere? The question seems to me to be legitimate in view of the fact that American capital, in its present expansionist stage, makes frequent use of a supernational platform. Big businessmen keep poiting out the modern technology calls for the abolishment of existing national barriers. A sound argument indeed! The pity is that there is an ulterior motive to it — lucre. Supernationalism is just grist to the American mills.

In other respects, it would be difficult to find another country where some of the main characteristics of nationalism are more pronounced. So, e. g., the national flag has been made an object of a veritable cult not only in schools and youth organizations, but also among the adult population. The honours paid to the Stars and Stripes have assumed the form of a ritual. Anything that is contrary to a rudimentary sense of belonging to the community may be declared to be "un-American" and put under a ban by the public opinion. (By the way, public opinion is a far more operative sanction against noncomformists and dissenters than the law.) An important factor of intolerance in American life is the intrinsic strain of Protestant puritanical morality, based on the assumption of a fundamental difference between right and wrong. It induces a large section of the population to oppose the rights of atheists, Socialists, and Communists to free speech.¹⁴ Another cause of intolerance may be found in the privileged position of the »Protestant Establishment.« In the United States, in fact, only Protestants of Anglo-Saxon extraction are considered »true Americans.« All other ethnic and religious groups are expected to conform to the standards of this élite: they must learn their language, adopt their customs and beliefs, imitate their way of life. This means that minority immigrant groups are forced to renounce their national identity and assimilate the American system of values. Intolerance of this kind is functional, since it makes for stability and cultural unity. In order to build a nation it is perhaps inevitable that people shall be intolerant of the practices of newcomers, and shall force them to assimilate.

Investigation of »un-American activities«, and legal proceedings taken against persons suspected of such activities, are the most convenient forms of repression practised in America by rightist organizations. The moving force of this practice is an all-pervading egotism, to which the heterogeneity of American society has given

there at once, and w ith it the unavoidable repercussions on the results of the next elections. Inevitably, w henever an expansionist illusion is shattered, something m ust be done to silence the voices of

¹⁴ Lipset, Seymour M., "The Sources of the Radical Right," in The Radical Right, ed. by D. Bell, New York, 1964.

those who have constantly been pleading for more political freedom and more tolerance. The conservative forces, and particularly the anti-Com m unist crusaders, may then become increasingly intransigent and aggressive.

Well, but w hat about nationalism in America? Is a nationalist ideology im m anent in the American Right as it is, or has been, in comparable movements elsewhere? The question seems to me to be legitim ate in view of the fact th a t American capital, in its present expansionist stage, makes frequent use of a supernational platform. Big businessmen keep poiting out the modern technology calls for the abolishm ent of existing national barriers. A sound argum ent indeed! The pity is that there is an ulterior motive to it—lucre. Supernationalism is just grist to the American mills.

In other respects, it would be difficult to find another country where some of the main characteristics of nationalism are more pronounced. So, e. g., the national flag has been made an object of a veritable cult not only in schools and youth organizations, but also among the adult population. The honours paid to the Stars and Stripes have assumed the form of a ritual. A nything that is contrary to a rudim entary sense of belonging to the community may be declared to be wun-American« and put under a ban by the public opinion. (By the way, public opinion is a far more operative sanction against noncomformists and dissenters than the law.) An important factor of intolerance in American life is the intrinsic strain of P rotestant puritanical morality, based on the assumption of a fundamental difference between right and wrong.

It induces a large section of the population to oppose the rights of atheists, Socialists, and Communists to free speech.14 Another cause of intolerance m ay be found in the privileged position of the

»Protestant Establishm ent.« In the United States, in fact, only Protestants of Anglo-Saxon extraction are considered »true Americans.« All other ethnic and religious groups are expected to conform to the standards of this elite: they m ust learn th eir language, adopt the ir customs and beliefs, im itate their w ay of life. This means that m inority im m igrant groups are forced to renounce their national identity and assimilate the American system of values. Intolerance of this kind is functional, since it makes for stability and cultural unity. In order to build a nation it is perhaps inevitable that people shall be intolerant of the practices of newcomers, and shall force them to assimilate.

Investigation of »un-Am erican activities«, and legal proceedings taken against persons suspected of such activities, are the most convenient forms of repression practised in America by rightist organizations. The moving force of this practice is an all-pervading egotism, to which the heterogeneity of American society has given 14 Lipset, Seym our M., »The Sources of the Radical Right,« in The Radical Right, ed. by D. Bell, New York, 1964.

a distinctive racial character. Repression, as a means of protecting the existing class divisions, is indeed an indispensable element in the radical-right ideology. Such reactionary methods, however, are bound to meet with a strong resistance of the Left, whose actions and tactics are diametrically opposed to those of the Conservatives.

Numerous recent events might be adduced as evidence that in the United States of America fascist methods are being more and more used in dealing with political issues, both foreign and domestic. There is an increasing tendency in that country to resort to violence and aggression, which may take such different forms as military support to foreign right-wing regimes, or the use of force in a systematic attempt to eliminate from the political arena all the leading personalities of the liberal opposition. In the latter case it is of paramount importance to note that the acts of violence committed by the radical Right are not infrequently instigated or connived at by some influential organs of government. This implies that, unless such underhand dealings are brought to the notice of the majority of the population, the results obtained by the leftwing opposition will hardly be anything but slight. On the other hand, it stands to reason that, until this condition has been fulfilled, there is no special need for the ruling class to try to get rid of democratic institutions. If both premises are valid, well, then the prospects of an extremist right-wing alternative in the United States of America may be reckoned to be rather poor, at least for the time being.

408

a distinctive racial character. Repression, as a m eans of protecting the existing class divisions, is indeed an indispensable elem ent in the radical-right ideology. Such reactionary methods, however, are bound

to m eet w ith a strong resistance of the Left, whose actions and tactics are diam etrically opposed to those of the Conservatives.

Numerous recent events m ight be adduced as evidence that in the United States of America fascist methods are being more and more used in dealing with political issues, both foreign and domestic.

There is an increasing tendency in th a t country to resort to violence and aggression, w hich m ay take such different forms as m ilitary support to foreign right-w ing regimes, or the use of force in a system atic attempt to elim inate from the political arena all the leading personalities of the liberal opposition. In the latter case it is of param ount im portance to note that the acts of violence committed by the radical Right are not infrequently instigated or connived at by some influential organs of government. This implies that, unless such underhand dealings are brought to the notice of the m ajority of the population, the results obtained by the leftw ing opposition will h ardly be anything b u t slight. On the other hand, it stands to reason that, u ntil this condition has been fulfilled, there is no special need for the ruling class to try to get rid of democratic institutions. If both prem ises are valid, well, then the prospects of an extrem ist right-w ing alternative in the U nited States of Am erica m ay be reckoned to be ra th e r poor, at least for the tim e being.

INDEX DES AUTEURS PRAXIS 1972

EDITION INTERNATIONALE

ALLEN V. L.

Contemporary Capitalism and Social Change, No. 3-4, p. 237

AXELOS Kostas

Le jeu de l'ensemble des ensembles. No. 3-4 p. 367

BAHR Hans-Dieter

Die Zukunft des Fortschritts. No. 3—4, S. 215.

BELLU Niculae

Les thèses sur la signification éthique du fait de l'art dans la constitution de la culture. No. 3-4, p. 321.

BERLINGER Rudolph

Humanität und Utopie. No. 1—2, S. 63

BURGER Hotimir

Réalité de l'idéologie. No. 1—2, p. 119.

CHETAN Octavian

Culture et démocratie. No. 3-4, p. 305.

DENIĆ Živojin

Sociologie de l'apparition, de l'existence et de la fonction de l'économie marchande. No. 3—4, p. 279

ĐURIĆ Mihailo

Die Doppelsinnigkeit der Utopie. No. 1—2, S. 27.

FLEISCHER Helmuth

Normativistisches und materialistisches Verständnis der sozialistischen Transformation. No. 3—4, S. 269.

GRLIČ Danko

Die ewige Wiederkehr des Gleichen als die Wiederkehr des künstlerischen in der Kunst. No. 1—2, S. 129.

GUÉRIN Daniel

Spontanéité, organisation et anarchisme. No. 1—2, p. 185.

INDJIĆ Trivo

Anarcho-Communism — the Movement and its Morals. No. 3—4, p. 175.

JÄHNIG Dieter

Kunst und Wirklichkeit. No. 1—2, S. 79.

JILEK Miroslav

The Crisis of Adventure. No. 3—4, p. 359.

JUNGK Robert

Zukunftswerkerkstaetten. No. 3—4, S. 209.

KANGRGA Milan

Wirklichkeit und Utopie. No. 1—2, S. 9.

KRAGALOTT Robert

Mahatma Gandhi's Concept of Trusteeship Socialism: A Hindu Search for Utopia. No. 3—4, p. 325.

KUVAČIĆ Ivan

The Basis and Prospects of the Radical Right. No. 3—4, p. 395. Spontanéité et organisation. No. 3—4, p. 203.

MAĐAREVIĆ Vlado

Literatur und revolutionärer Mythos als Kategorie der Utopie. No. 3—4, S. 313.

PRAXIS 1972

EDITION INTERNATIONALE

ALLEN V. L.

TURTLE Danko

C ontem porary Capitalism and Social

The eternal return of the same

Change, No. 3—4, p. 237

as the return of the artistic

in art. No. 1-2, p. 129.

AXELOS Kostas

GUERIN Daniel

The game of all sets.

No. 3-4 p. 367

Spontaneity, organization and anarchism. No. 1—2, p. 185.

BAHR H ans-D ieter

INDJIC Trivo

The future of progress. No.

3-4, S. 215.

Anarcho-Com m unism — the Movem ent and its Morals. No. 3—4, p. 175.

BEAUTIFUL Nicolae

JAH NIG Dieter

Les theses su r la signification 6thi-

Art and reality. No. 1-2, p.

tion of culture. No. 3-4, p. 321. JIL E K M iroslav BERLINGER R udolph The Crisis of A dventure. No. 3—4, H u m an itat un d Utopie. No. 1—2, S. p. 359. 63 JUN GK Robert BURGER H otim ir Future cities. no. 3-4, Reality of ideology. No. 1—2, p. S. 209. 119. KANGRGA Milan CHETAN O ctavian reality and utopia. No. 1-2, C u lture et dem ocratic. No. 3—4, p. S. 9. 305. KRAGALOTT Robert **DENIC Zivojin** M ahatm a G andhi's Concept of T ru steeship Socialism: A Hindu Search Sociologie de l'apparition, de l'exi-for Utopia. No. 3— 4, p. 325.

than because of the art in the constitution 79.

stence and function of the écono-

m ie m archande. No. 3-4, p. 279

KUVAClC Iv an

The Basis and P rospects of the R a

ĐURIC M ihailo

dical Right. No. 3—4, p. 395.

The ambiguity of utopia. No.

Spontanćitć et organisation. No. 3-4,

1—2, S. 27.

p. 203.

FLEISCHER H elm uth

MAĐAREVIC Vlado

Norm ativists and materialists-

L ite ra tu r und revolutionfirer Mythos

cal understanding of the socialist

as a Category of Utopia. no. 3-4, S.

T ransform ation. No. 3—4, S. 269.

313.

MAKSIMOVIĆ Ivan

Teleological and Genetic Bases of the Economic Problems of Contemporary Socialism. No. 3—4, p. 251.

MALLET Serge

Mouvements sociaux et lutte politique de l'après-mai 1968 en France. No. 3-4, p. 351.

MUMINOVIĆ Rasim

Das Utopicum als Indikation der Krise des Humanismus. No. 102, S. 47

NAVILLE Pierre

Economie et utopie. No. 1-2, p. 71.

PACI Enzo

Spontaneità, ragione e modalità della praxis. No. 3—4, p. 195.

PEŠIĆ-GOLUBOVIĆ Zagorka

La culture en tant que pont entre l'utopie et la réalité. No. 1—2, p. 103.

PICCONE Paul

Utopia and the Concrete Overcoming of Alienation. No. 1-2, p. 93.

QUARELLO Ricardo

Pour la construction d'une alternative politique — aussi bien que sociale — à l'industrialisme. No. 3—4, p. 229.

SHIBATA Shingo

Die Vietnamestische Revolution und die Marxistische Philosophie. No. 3-4, S. 339.

SUPEK Rudi

Utopie et réalité. No. 1-2, p. 3.

TADIĆ Ljubomir

Herbert Marcuse: Zwischen Wissenchaft und Utopie. No. 1—2, S. 141.

VRANICKI Predrag

Theoretische Begründung der Idee der Selbstverwaltung. No. 3-4, S. 373.

PICCONE Paul

Teleological and Genetic Bases of

Utopia and the Concrete Overcothe Economic Problem s of Contem m ing of Alienation. No. 1—2, p. 93.

p o rary Socialism. No. 3—4, p. 251.

QUARELLO Ricardo

MALLET Serge

For the construction of an a lte rn a

Social movements and political - as well as social struggle after May 1968 in France.

ale — ii l'industrialism and. When. 3—4, p.

No. 3—4, p. 351.

229.

SHIBATA Shingo

MUMINOVIĆ Rasim

The Vietnamese Revolution and

The utopia as an indication of

the Marxist philosophy. No.

Krise des Hum anism us. No. 102, S.

3 - 4, S. 339.

47.

SUPEK Rudi

Pierre

Utopia and reality. No. 1—2, p. 3.

Economy and utopia. No. 1—2, p. 71. TADIC Ljubom ir PA CI Enzo H erbert M arcuse: Between knowledge Spontaneous, reason e in the morning and utopia. No. 1-2, p. 141. of praxis. No. 3-4, p. 195. VRANICKI P redrag PEŠIĆ-GOLUBOVIĆ Zagorka Theoretical justification of the idea Culture as a bridge between of self-government. No. 3-4, p. utopia and reality. No. 1—2, p. 103. 373.

